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ABSTRACT 
The end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block 
following the unexpected political developments in international politics since the late 
1980s have had a profound impact on Turkey's international, regional and domestic 
environment. This thesis examines how the end of the bi-polar system of the Cold War 
impacted upon Turkey's foreign and security policies in the period of 1989-1999. In 
doing this, this study aims to explore the developments that took place in Turkey's geo- 
strategic area in the post-Cold War era; analyse and assess the impact of these 
developments on Turkey's overall interests and examine the policies that Turkey pursued 
in response to its changing security enviromnent. 
Turkey found that following the removal of the Soviet threat to Western Europe in the 
new era, its strategic importance due to its unique geographic location during the Cold 
War years substantially declined in the context of European security system, resulting in 
Turkey's realisation of its apparent marginalisation and cultural/political isolation from 
the newly-shaping European economic and political architecture. This set Turkey to seek 
a new foreign policy approach with the help of unexpected new opportunities which 
appeared as a result of the changing regional conditions of the new era, to define its new 
role, identify and interest. 
The argument of this thesis is that although the new developments offered Ankara the 
opportunity to play a true regional power and pivotal state role in the Balkans, the Black 
Sea, the Middle East and particularly in the ex-Soviet territories of the Caucasia and 
Central Asia with its large Turkic/Muslim nationalities, contrary to initial expectations, 
the existence of diverse and closely-interlinked internal and external challenges coupled 
with its limited capabilities originating from the country's socio-economic and political 
inability prevented Turkey from fully exploiting the new foreign policy options and 
limited the possibility and the success of its multi-regional foreign policy outcome. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose ofthe study 
The main aim of this dissertation is to show that Turkey's post-Cold War foreign and 
security policies were less successftil than originally expected by Turkish policy makers 
and the wider public in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. As such, the 
study will explore the developments that took place in Turkey's geo-strategic area in the 
post-Cold War era; analyse and asses the impact of these developments on Turkey's 
overall interests and examine the policies that Turkey pursued in response to its changing 
security environment. 
Theoreticalframework. Could Turkeyplay a 'great power'role? 
Contrary to its limited involvement in its region under the limitations of the bi-polar 
international system, the end of the Cold War enabled Turkey to have a direct 
involvement in more than a half-dozen geographical region. The new regional and 
international environment, which in many ways presented Turkey a unique opportunity to 
exert greater influence in the regions beyond its borders extending from the Adriatic Sea 
to the Great Wall of China, quickly led to expectations that Turkey was 'marching 
towards becoming a regional superpower'. By most standards Turkey could easily be 
identified as a middle power in the global context or, at the least, an important regional 
power. However, its aspiration to play a 'great power' role in the regions beyond its 
immediate borders was not viable from a theoretical perspective. Thus, although to some, 
Turkey had a real opportunity to become a 'great power' with the help of new foreign 
policy opportunities and emerging alternatives in the new era, the country lacked the 
requisite qualities to become such a power. As such, despite initial high hopes and 
expectations, Turkey's ambitious foreign policy to play a leadership role in its region 
became limited by its actual as opposed to presumed influence in the period understudy. 
Power is a contested concept and there is a little agreement on how it should be 
defined as it is widespread and diverse. Krieger defines it as 'the ability to get what is 
9 
wanted, or to produce desired change', while Stem puts it as 'the capacity to produce 
intended effects'. ' Power, therefore, -political, economic or military- is the prime 
requisite for being an influential actor in international relations. According to John 
Mearsheimer, 'power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it 
among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations. 92 
Essentially, the most powerful states in the system exert most of the influence on 
intemational events. 3 
The idea of ranking powers hierarchically from 'large' to 'small' has been a constant 
feature of descriptions of international relations for centuries. Power ranking can be 
determined by such measures as geographic size, size of population, size and nature of the 
economy, degree of international role and economic dependence, level of industrial and 
technological development, and the size and sophistication of military capabilities. 
Powers then may be defined according to their relative position on scales of these 
indicators, or certain combinations from them. Hence the hierarchical structure of modem 
world politics can be characterised as consisting of great powers, middle powers, small 
powers and micro-states. The idea of a hegemonic, or of 'superpowers' are often added at 
the top of the hicrarchy. 4 
Although there is no clear and uncontested definition in politico-military or economic 
terms, 'middle powers' are those states, which are generally regarded as secondary only 
to the 'great powers' in terms of their influence on world affairs. Their level of power 
Joel Krieger, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), pp. 73940; Geoffrey Stem, The Structure of International Society, Second Edition, 
(London and N. York: Pinter, 2000), p. 161. Also see, David Miller (ed. ), Blackwell Encyclopaedia of 
Political Thought, (Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 397400; David A. Baldwin (ed. ), 
'Power and International Relations' in Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carisneas, Thomas 
Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds. ), (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 176-91; Roger Scruton, A 
Dictionary oftolitical Thought, Second Edition, (London: McMillan, 1982), pp. 432-3. 
2john j. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton, 200 1), p. 12. 3Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, Seventh Edition (New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2006), p. 77. 
4Martin Griffiths, Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics, (New York and London: 
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permits them to play only decidedly limited and selected roles in subordinate systems 
other than their own. 5 They usually have large populations, are relatively developed, 
possess credible armed forces and are reasonably wealthy (measured as GNP per capita). 
They are also regional powers of some stature. 6 Given this framework, Turkey had the 
largest economy in its immediate region spanning from the Balkans to the Middle East 
with its strong army and growing dynamic large population as well as its considerable 
influence in some of the regional affairs, certainly qualifies it as a middle power. 
Although Holbraad did not include Turkey in the list of eighteen middle power states in 
his well-known study, Middle Powers in International Politics, by looking mainly at 
GNP, population and anned force levels of 1975, he nevertheless acknowledged that if 
Turkey had been classed under Asia, it would have easily qualified as a middle power 
under the limits proposed, but not in the European continent. 7 However, as will be 
discussed in the coming chapters in detail, Turkey made significant progress in political, 
economic and military fields particularly in the 1980s and its population has considerably 
increased since then. Thus, Goldstein and Pevehouse listed Turkey among the middle 
powers, and Mathison did not accept the idea that Turkey was a small state. 8 
Claiming the rank of a 'great power', on the other hand, is more demanding in terms of 
Routhledge, 2005), p. 535; Oyvind Osterud, 'Regional Great Powers' in Regional Great Powers and 
International Politics, Iver B. Neumann (ed. ), (London and Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 3-7. 
5L. J. Cantori and S. L. Spigel, The International Politics of Regions, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1970), p. 14. 
6Middle powers are also subdivided 'upper middle powers' and 'lower middle powers' or 'secondary 
powers' or 'regional great powers, or when considered in relation to the superpowers, as 'other major 
powers' in state system. Although in many analysis the term 'superpower' is used to correspond to the 
classical European great powers of the nineteenth century, for the purpose of this study, 'upper middle 
powers' or other similar descriptions were used for the category of great powers. For an in-depth 
discussion see, Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, (London and Basingstoke: 
The McMillan Press, 1984), pp. 75-91; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, The Penguin Dictionary of 
International Relations, (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 323; Osterud, op. cit, p. 3; Griffiths, op. cit., 
p. 535. 
7Holbraad, Middle Powers, op. cit, p. 89. 8Goldstein and Pevehouse, op. cit., p. 79; Trygve Mathison, The Function ofSmall States in the integration 
of Great Powers, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972); Also see, Ziya Onis, 'Turkey and post-Soviet 
States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence', MERIA, vol. 5, no. 2, (June 2001) 
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political, economic and military capability, and behaviour. 9 Although what qualifies as a 
$great power' is disputed in international relations literature, there are certain criteria that 
are generally acceptable by most analysts. To begin, such powers will usually posses 
advanced military capabilities and therefore have the ability to project power over vast 
distances in accordance with their national interests. For that reason, they can intervene in 
ongoing conflicts, be involved in military alliances, and participate in post-war 
settlements. 10 Great powers also tend to share a global outlook, or at least a large part of 
it, based on national interests far from their home territories and are usually characterised 
as possessing the political will to pursue them. Essentially, as they usually have 
appropriate levels of capability they can operate in more than one region. 11 Middle and 
minor powers, on the other hand, have primary interests only within a localised regional 
context. 12 
Each power has a sizeable population, relative at least to other states. They also have 
very strong economies. These large economies in turn rest on large populations, plentiful 
natural resources, advanced technology and educated labour forces. 13 'Mey are among the 
9The term 'great power' can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, where five major European states 
(Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia) informally gave themselves great powers status following 
the Congress of Vienna of 1815. It has been replaced with the term 'superpower' following the Second 
World War. They are clearly more than just regional powers, but do not meet all of the qualifications for 
superpower. It should also be noted that there is no clear delineation between a 'great' and 'regional' 
power. Some states may be regarded as both great and regional powers, i. e. China, Russia, Germany and 
Japan. There is a consensus among many analysts that during the Cold War years China, Germany, and 
Japan, with Britain and France had the great power rank. Russia could be added to this list in post-Cold 
War era. Evans and Newham, op. cit., pp. 209-10; Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions andpowers: 
The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 36; David 
Robertson, A Dictionary of Modern Politics, Second Edition, (London: Europa Publications, 1993) , p. 
453. 
10This means, at the very least, possession of strategic nuclear capability with a command of large 
conventional military forces, backed by a huge population. Holbraad puts this 'having technological and 
economic potential sufficient for maintaining or increasing nuclear capability at a comparable level. ' 
However, as in the case of Japan and Germany, to some extent, states could held a 'great power' status 
by virtue of their economic capacity and wealth. See, Carsten Holbraad, Superpowers and International 
Con t. zan an . 
flict, (London: McMillan Press, 1979), pp. 10-3; Holbraad, Middle Powers, op. ci ,p 78; Bu 
d 
Waevcr, op. cit., pp. 334. 
Buzan and Waever, op. cit, p. 3 5. 
12Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975, (Kentucky: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1983); M Haas, International Conj7ict, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 324 and p. 
33 1; Evans and Newham, op. cit., pp. 209-10. 13Goldstein and Pevehouse, op. cit., p. 78. 
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richest states in international system and disproportionably involve in world trade while 
being the primary source of foreign direct investment. 14 Moreover, great powers are the 
leading actors in the establishment and maintenance of most of the international 
organisations and accordingly their status is fonnally recognised and institutionalised in 
treaties and intemational organisations i. e. the UN Security Council. 15 
As will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, Turkey's attempt to become a great 
regional power in the new regional and international environment did not and could not 
materialise. Being at the nexus of a half-dozen region in which each area has its own set 
of political system and issues, Turkey has a unique strategic location, and virtually no 
other state -except for the US- plays a part in so many different geographical regions. 
Accordingly, Turkey believed it should naturally play a more important part in all regions 
and therefore also had a justification for demanding a higher standing internationally in 
general. In view of this, Turkey's foreign policy interests appeared to be so ambitions that 
only a 'great power' could fulfil such a role. 16 However, how far Turkey was ready to 
meet the necessary criteria for the attainment of such a status was a different issue all 
together. 
Although Turkey had a large population equal to that of some of the European states 
such as France, Britain and Germany, when Turkey's overall power capabilities relative 
to those of other great powers were considered it could not come close to those of other 
major powers. Yet although population is a tangible element of power, it does not per se 
make a nation more powerful, and it has aspects of intangibility such as unity, literacy 
14Japan, China, Russia, Great Britain and France account for about one-third of the world's total GDP- 
Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 349-52. 
"China, Russia, Great Britain and France have a great power influence on the UN as the permanent 
members of the Security Council. 
16Barry Rubin, 'Turkey: A Transformed International Role' in Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multi-regional Power, Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds. ), (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 
200 1), p. 1; Buzan and Waever, op. cit., p. 394. 
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and loyalty. 17 Furthermore, a great power is expected to have the capability to make large 
scale economic, also cultural, investments (soft power) in other parts of the world in order 
to indirectly exert influence. Having serious structural economic problems and other 
domestic issues such as the years of costly struggle against separatist PKK terror, its 
foreign policy initiatives designed to strengthen the country's role as an influential 
regional power lacked the necessary economic resources and strength. Thus, most 
promises of aid and investment in Turkey's part, as far as its foreign economic relations 
were concerned, remained mostly just statements of intentions. Essentially, despite 
president Turgut Ozal's claim 'to feel as strong as Japan' in the new era, Turkey's 
aspiration for great powerhood without the necessary economic foundation was bound to 
fail. 
Additionally, its military capacity that would enable it to project force beyond its 
locality could not come close to those of other great powers even though it had one of the 
strongest conventional forces in its region, the second largest standing force in NATO 
after the US. One other aspect of assuming a great power role is to be able to play a 
managerial role in international system in relation to the maintenance of order by means 
of diplomatic accommodations, linkage policies, codes of crisis management and so on) 8 
As will be seen in the coming chapters, when Turkish involvement in regional affairs 
became inevitable as a result of both internal and external factors in the face of its rapidly 
changing immediate region, which could have well expanded Turkey's international 
standing, Ankara failed to develop coherent policies and was far from satisfying 
expectations. 
The other aspect of being great powerhood is that apart from being forlnallY 
recognised in treaties and international organisations as great powers, they are also 
17Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and 
Justice, Third Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986), pp. 95-6. 
14 
informally recognised as great powers by international society by means of their 
reputation or standing. Turkey, on the other hand, had been generally inward-looking, had 
taken a low profile role in international relations and became reluctant to operate beyond 
its borders and therefore consciously refrained from direct involvement in its own region 
during the entire Cold War period. Foreign adventures, spheres of influence, alliance 
systems and ambiguous international interests were all considered foolish, risky, and even 
suicidal. 19 Thus, the country had no aspiration whatsoever in rising in the hierarchy of 
international power, and as Hale has pointed out 'it almost seemed to have dropped out of 
world politiCS. "20 
In answering the question of what factors make a nation powerful, many analysts refer 
to tangible (physical foundations like geography, population, natural resources, military 
strength, economics, etc. ) as well as intangibles elements such as leadership and 
personality, societal cohesiveness, foreign support and dependency, bureaucratic- 
organisation efficienCy. 21 Turkey certainly lacked some of these qualities that could have 
made a difference in driving the nation forward in the decade in question. Its domestic 
security challenges in the form of separatist PKK terror, the Kurdish issue, the advance of 
political Islam, and in many cases the lack of harmony between certain institutions of the 
country i. e. civil and military establishment meant that the element of national unity in 
pursuing a more comprehensive role in world politics was missing to a great extent at a 
time when it was so vital. In the end, although Turkey achieved some successes in its 
post-Cold War foreign and security policies, given its overall limited capacity, it was 
increasingly sidelined in the push for becoming a true regional power, denying it the 
power, role and status it sought in international politics and arena. 
180sterud, op. cit, p. 6. 
19Rubin, op. cit., P. 1. 
20Hale, 'Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War', op. cit. p. 23 1; Rubin, op-cit, p. L 21j. C. Johari, International Relations and Politics: 7heoretical perspective, (Oriental University Press, 1986), pp. 194-219; Couloumbis and Wolfe, op. cit, pp. 95-103. 
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The end ofthe Cold Mar 
The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union in 1985 was intended by the Politburo to establish a new leadership that 
would strengthen the USSR in its international relations and provide the stability and 
longevity it required. In essence the USSR attempted to introduce a new focus in its 
international relations with a view to strengthening its role in the world. However, the 
domestic reforms both political and economic, Glasnost (openness) followed by 
Perestroika (economic restructuring), introduced by Gorbachev in his attempt to halt the 
evident decline in the country's prosperity and thereby transform the USSR into a more 
efficient and viable politico-economic world power, would not bring much help to stop 
the erosion of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and worsening economic and 
political situation at home, and, in fact, served to undermine not only the unity of the 
Soviet Union but also the foundations of the Cold War itself. 
Thus, the inauguration of the new style of Soviet politics ushered in by Gorbachev 
encouraged subsequent summit meetings with the US and resulted in significant cuts in 
strategic weapons. Such developments could only be seen as specially promising for a 
new ditente. 22Within only a few years though, revolution overtook the liberalisation of 
policy being conducted by Moscow -bringing with an era of change in the form of the 
22For a detailed discussion on the reasons of the shift in the Soviet policy, and events led to the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union see, David S. Painter and Melvyn P. Leffler, 
'The End of the Cold War' in Origins of the Cold War, Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds. ), 
(London: Routhledge, 1994), pp. 317-9; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'Who Won the Cold 
WarT, Foreign Policy, no. 94, (Spring 1994); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The International 
Source of Soviet Change', International Security, vol. 16, no. 3, (Winter 1991-1992), p. 80; Daniel 
Chirot, 'What Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989T, in The Revolutions of 1989, Vlademir Tismaneany 
(ed. ), (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 31-2; Bertel Heurlin, 'The Role of The United 
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collapse of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, Soviet acceptance of German re-unification in 
1990, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops 
from Central and Eastern European countries, culminating with the collapse of the 
communist regimes. 
In all, these developments brought about an end to the bi-polar system of the Cold War 
and, thereby the East-West confrontation, that had dominated international politics for 
over four decades. Eventually, evolutionary developments led to enormous changes in the 
map of Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and 
Central Asia following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia 
later in 1992 as these nations sought to establish sovereign control over their own 
territories. 
The meaning ofthe end ofthe Cold Marfor Turkey 
Under the limitations of the Cold War bi-polar balance of power, Turkey's foreign 
relations were restricted and, in effect, Ankara was mainly occupied with a few basic 
foreign policy issues: the contaimnent of the Soviet ideological/expansionist threat; tense 
relations with Greece including the Cyprus issue; integration with the West through the 
European Community, (later the European Union); and towards the end of the Cold War a 
growing separatist terror threat allegedly supported by its southern neighbours. As a 
staunch ally of the West, Turkey placed its entire defence requirements within NATO and 
generally took a secondary role in international politics. Essentially, therefore, throughout 
the Cold War period Turkey followed a staunchly Western-oriented foreign and security 
policy regardless of the political developments within the country and, with the noticeable 
exception of Cyprus, showed little interest in regions and events beyond its borders. 
Compared to this relatively stable and predictable political enviromnent, the collapse 
of the Cold War system, gave Turkey a direct involvement in at least seven regions: 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 354. 
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namely Europe, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus- 
Caspian basin, Central Asia and the Black Sea. With the disintegration of the USSR the 
former border lands with the Soviet Union to the cast were replaced by the newly- 
independent Caucasian republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia while Turkey 
became a neighbour of Russia and the Ukraine by sea to the north. Further east, five 
independent Muslim/Turkic republics emerged in Central Asia. To the northwest, the 
overthrow of several Balkan communist regimes, and later the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia altered the Balkan state system and resulted in the emergence of new 
democratic regimes and independent states. To the south, the end of the Soviet political 
and military support as well as financial aid for some of its Middle Eastern neighbours 
has given Ankara flexibility in its regional involvement without the fear of Cold War 
friction. Taken together, this radically transformed international environment has led 
Ankara to become more engaged in its rapidly changing immediate region. 
Having shared the longest border with the Soviet Union and having been responsible 
for fully defending one-third of the NATO Alliance's frontier with the Warsaw Pact, 
Turkey was the main bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Western European security 
structure during the Cold War. Essentially, its unique strategic location made Ankara an 
important member of the alliance. Thus, the other immediate impact of the end of the 
Cold War was that, with the removal of the global threat to the West following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey's strategic relevance was questioned. As Turkish 
foreign minister Ismail Cem (1997-2002) explained, 
Turkey is not one of the major winners of the Cold War. On the contrary, it is a 
loser. Our strategic value during the Cold War was derived from our particularity 
of a rampart at the outskirts of Europe, blocking the way of the so-called 'evil 
force' 
... once that role was over; the strategic relevance of Turkey was 
lost. This 
was a trauma for Turkey. We had got used to living in Cold War conditions. Our 
institutions, our mission, our self-esteem and our identity were all defined by the 
Cold War concepts and realitieS. 23 
231smailCem, Turkey in the New Century, Second edition, (Nicosia: Rustem, 2001), p. 133. 
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As Europe increasingly shifted its focus towards its own internal matters such as the 
restructuring of Europe, it began to view Turkey as a 'burden' rather than as an important 
'asset'. Thus, in light of Europe's new agenda, Turkey, as a distant ally on the European 
periphery with its immense internal and external problems, did not constitute a priority. 
As such, as Europe started to attribute less importance to strategic issues in its relations 
with Turkey, while on issues of Turkey's European identity and Islamic past that had 
been long before ignored now came to the fore and resulted in Turkey's marginalisation 
and exclusion in the new European political and economic arrangements. This, however, 
forced Turkey to develop a new foreign policy approach or a new 'grand strategy' in its 
international relationships. As such, Turkish policy makers have increasingly turned 
towards other regions in their attempt to redefine the country's new role, identity and 
interests. 
As early as 1990, the Turkish president Turgut Ozal stated that 'for years we claimed 
that Turkey is an important ally of NATO as a southern flank country. It is now true that 
Turkey's strategic importance has declined. They will not welcome us to the European 
club (the EU) easily as they did to Greece because of the religion factor. ' Then in 1991, 
he pointed out other areas where Turkish foreign policy could expand, 'the newly-opened 
Central Asia region, where Turkey has considerable influence, the Balkans and our 
southem area, the Arab/Muslim world. 124 
Sharing the same perception with Ozal, prime minister Suleyman Demirel claimed that 
Turkey could no longer play the same role it did during the Cold War years and outlined 
new foreign policy objectives for the country in the immediate aftermath of the end of the 
Cold War as: 'an active, multifaceted, and balanced approach that seeks to exploit the 
new opportunities created by recent developments involving expanded relations with the 
24'Ozal'dan 6 Mesaj, Cumhuriyet, 17 July 1990; Cumhurbaskani Turgut Ozal'in Dunyadaki Yeni Dengeler 
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Balkan, Black Sea, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Caucasian and Central Asian 
Countries. ' However, he also emphasised that the new policy outlook did not constitute 
an alternative to its efforts to join the EC, but rather complimented Turkey's desire to 
consolidate its ties to Europe. 25 This foreign policy outlook became even more apparent 
following the exclusion of Turkey from EU's biggest ever enlargement process in 1997.26 
In response, Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz threatened to withdraw Turkey's 
membership application and declared that Turkey would freeze its political relations with 
the Union and would rather seek a 'strategic partnership' with the US and extend its 
relations with Israel. 'Turkey is not isolated in its region and still has friends in 
Washington, the Caucasus region, Central Asia and has a developing security relationship 
with Israel. ' 27 
Consequently, this effort to overcome a new isolation and insecurity would be seen in 
Turkey's growing involvement in its immediate regions extending from the Balkans to 
Central Asia as well as in strong alignments established with the US and Israel in the 
Middle East conteXt. 28 To begin with, the active policy in support for the US-led coalition 
during the Gulf War of 1991, at the cost of abandoning its long-term traditional Middle 
Eastern policy, could be viewed in a way as Ankara's efforts to prove itself as a 
continuing important asset for, and to, the West despite declining strategic importance. 
Importantly, with the re-emergence of a 'Turkic world' of more than 60 million people 
ve Turkiye Konulu Pazzar Toplantilarinda Yaptiklari Konusma, (Istanbul: ANAP, 17 November 199 1) 
25'Ozal Korkak, Akbulut Bilgisiz', Cumhuriyet, 5 August 1990; See Demirel's press conference in 
December 1991 in Peri Pamir, 'Turkey in its Regional Environment in the Post-bipolar Era: 
Opportunities and Constrains' in Building Peace in the Middle East, Elise Boulding (ed. ), (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 135-6. 
26The EU agreed to open membership negotiations with II of its 12 applicants. 27Stephen Kinzer, 'Turkey, Rejected, will Freeze Ties to European Union, New York Times, 15 December 
1997. 
28Jt was suggested that with establishing economic and political entities among the newly-independent 
Turkic republics such as a 'commonwealth of Turkic republics' or a 'common market of the Turks' 
Turkey could not only respond to its exclusion from Europe but also become an independent 'regional 
superpower' by leaving European vocation. See, Oral Sander, 'Yeni Bir Bolgesel Guc Olarak 
Turkiye'nin Dis Politika Hedefleri' in Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi, Faruk Soylemezoglu (ed. ), Second 
edition, (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1998), p. 608. 
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in Central Asia, Caucasia and, to a certain extent, in the Balkans, Turkey had a new 
opportunity to help to overcome its cultural/political isolation. The newly-emerging 
countries, regimes and communities extending from the Balkans to the ex-Soviet. 
territories were keen to establish close relations with Ankara due to the shared strong 
historical, cultural and religious ties. Moreover, in addition to the country's unique 
strategic location, Turkey appeared to have the strongest regional military power (with 
the exception of Russia) and the largest economy in the region extending from the Eastern 
Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea basin to the Middle East with its dynamic large 
population. 
Thus, the new political and economic realities favourable to Turkey led politicians and 
the wider public to hope that the twenty-first century would be a 'Turkish century' or an 
'era of the Turks'. 29 As one minister put it, 'it is the first time that a historical luck has 
favoured. the Turkish side since the Vienna retreat of 1683'1.30 'Turks living in an area 
extending from the Adriatic Sea to the borders of China have awakened and become 
active' Turkish prime minister Demirel declared, showing an interest in Turkish-speaking 
communities outside the borders of Turkey, for probably first time in the modem history 
of the country. 31 With its unique location, dynamic population, economic and military 
potential, Turkey had the potential of emerging as a true regional power and a pivotal 
state, or even a super regional power, thereby providing Ankara with a greater 
international role in world affairs as a 'world state' and a 'role model' for the newly- 
independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. it could even play a 'bridge' role 
between the West and these regions. In the words of Demirel, Turkey was now 'a 
gateway for the Western world to Caucasia, and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 
29These rhetoric were widely used by the Turkish president, the prime minister and other senior officials as 
well as the leaders of some of the Turkic republics such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. See, Hasan Celal 
Guzel, '2 1. Asir Turk Asri Olacaktir', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 1, no. 3, (March-April 1995), pp. 118-26. 
30Kamran Inan, Dis Politika, (Istanbul: Otuken Yayinlari, 1993), p. 7 1. 
31 The Middle East, no. 213, (July 1992), p. 5. 
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Balkans'. 32 Turkish president Ozal stated that 'Turkey is marching towards becoming a 
regional superpower. Thank God, the inferiority complex we have suffered before the 
Westem world for 300 years has ended. 133 
Many Turkish and other leading academics and analysts also shared these views to 
varying degrees at the time. For example, Ian Lesser argued that Ankara's geo-strategic 
'reach' was no longer limited to the role it played during the Cold War as a distant 
outpost on the European periphery, but that it was now poised to play a leading role 
across a vast region, from Eastern Europe to western China. 34 According to Sander, the 
new political developments enabled Turkey to gain a new place in the geopolitical 
thinking of Europe. 35 In turn, as William Hale argued the end of the Cold War had seen 
Turkey's re-mergence as an important actor, after a long period in which it almost seemed 
to have dropped out of world politiCS. 36 
However, this euphoria was short-lived. The first and foremost reason for this was that 
whilst the end of the Cold War era presented Turkey with some very real opportunities it 
also brought with it serious security threats, risks and challenges (probably more so than 
ever before in its modem history), thereby demanding Turkey spend more time fending 
off perceived dangers rather than to benefiting from the new opportunities. 37 The Balkans, 
32The Time, 19 October 1992, p. 3 1. 
33 Turkish Times, 15 November 199 1. 
34lan 0. Lesser, 'Preface', Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Graham E. 
Fuller (ed. ), (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. xiii. 
350ral Sander, Degisen Dunya Dengelerinde Turkiye' in Yen! Dunya Duzeni ve Turkiye, Sabahattin Sen 
(ed. ), (Baglam: Istanbul, 1992), p. 26 and p. 30. 
36William. Hale, 'Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War', Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, vol. 1, 
(1993), p. 23 1. For similar views see, E. Graham Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation' in Turkey's 
New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Graham E. Fuller (ed. ), (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1993), p. 97; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard- American Primacy and its 
Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 41; Faruk Sonmezoglu, 'Sunus' in Yeni 
Dunya Duzeni ve Turkjýe, Sabahattin Sen (ed. ), (Baglarn: Istanbul, 1992), p. 20; Alan Makovsky and 
Sabri Sayari (eds), 'Introduction' in Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign 
Policy, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 2. 
37For a general outlook of the post-Cold War international order -or better known the new world order' led by the US see, Adam Roberts, 'A New Age in International RelationsT, International Affairs, vol. 67, 
no. 3, (199 1), p. 509; James Kurth, 'Things to Come: The Shape of the New World Order', The National 
Interest, no. 24, (Summer 1991), pp. 34; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos', 
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the Middle East and the Caucasia regions have always been among the most volatile parts 
of the world. Prior to the end of the bi-polar system, the two superpowers were able to 
'manage' these regions and in doing so most of the deep-rooted regional issues such as 
ethnic tensions, border disputes, irredentism, nationalism as well as other potentially 
explosive military, political, economic and societal issues were suppressed. But with the 
end of the Soviet Union, in the words of one former Turkish defence minister, 
'geographic destiny placed Turkey in the virtual epicentre of a "Bermuda Triangle" of 
post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle 
East encircling US. '38 In retrospect, Turkey had to deal with the Gulf War, the Bosnia and 
Kosovo wars; the Azeri-Annenian war; civil unrest in Georgia; war in Chechnya; 
ongoing tension with Greece including the Cyprus issue and Serbia in the Balkans; Iran 
and Syria in the Middle East; Armenia in Transcaucasia and the growing Russian 
influence in the 'near abroad' on top of externally-linked internal threats of Kurdish 
separatism and Islamic radicalism. 
Its long history and special ties with the Balkan states and the old Soviet territories of 
the Caucasus, Black Sea and Central Asia also became an important factor in the new 
relationships. Thus, the new developments served to force Turkey to acknowledge that it 
had a moral and cultural responsibility to help its former subjects, whether Turkish or 
non-Turkish as a result of its Ottoman past and its multiethnic identity, and therefore 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3, (May-June 1996), pp. 79-91; Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', 
The National Interest, (Summer 1993), pp. 1-13; James Schlesinger, 'New Instabilities New Priorities', 
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Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 5, (September-October 1995), pp. 8-14; Wallace J Thies, 'Rethinking the 
New World Order', Orbis, vol. 38, no. 4, (Fall 1994), p. 621; Paul H. Nitze, 'America: An Honest 
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necessitated more Turkish involvement in regional affairs. This was evident during the 
Bosnia and Kosovo wars; the Azeri-Armenian war and the Chechnya and Abkhazia 
conflicts. However, the emergence of the Turkic republics, Muslim communities and new 
ethno/religious politics in the Balkans and Caucasia took Turkish policy makers who 
were totally unprepared by surprise. Hence, when these nations turned to Turkey for 
political, economic and military help, which could have well expand Turkey's influence 
in the region, Ankara's support was too limited to satisfy expectations. Ankara was 
unable to establish clear and well-established foreign policies in the region and attempted 
to continue its traditional foreign policy behaviour which avoided forging relations or 
basing policies merely on common religious and cultural bonds. This traditional 
approach, however, caused some differences among the foreign and security policy- 
making elite in Ankara as well as the wider public as lobbies who challenged the 
'traditionalists' and who pushed for more active policies emerged. Turkish foreign 
minister Cem summed up this initial response to change. 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey's first reaction was one of shock. The 
proliferation of unknowns provoked anxiety. There were strong feelings of 
alienation and insecurity at both the individual and societal level. The country was 
caught unprepared for the emerging world and its new conditions. It was almost 
impossible for a country whose legal, political, and values systems were 
reflections of its long established role to acquire a function in this new world. 39 
Turkey was also restricted by the fact that its involvement, particularly in the Balkans, 
Caucasia and Central Asia, caused a certain amount of uneasiness among its traditional 
rivals, most notably Greece, Iran and Russia as they attempted to balance the growing 
Turkish influence. This was most evident regarding Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s Russia successfully attempted to limit the Turkish influence, 
in what it considered, its own 'backyard'. 
In addition to these external challenges, the end of the Cold War brought about 
39Cem' op. Cit., pp. 34-5. 
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domestic upheaval and the rise of nationalistic and religious sentiments. In particular, the 
mounting separatist PKK terror which was exacerbated by the Gulf War of 1990-91, and 
the advance of political Islam that challenged the very foundations of the secular regime 
meant that Turkey had serious domestic security challenges it could no longer ignore. 
Fifteen years of the PKK terror was a huge drain of financial resources and created 
immense societal hostility. It also adversely affected Turkey's external relations 
(especially with Europe and Turkey's southem Middle Eastem neighbours). 
In the face of this domestic instability, the army took increasingly on a high profile 
role in domestic politics, particularly in the second half of the 1990s, which placed it in 
conflict with the elected governments whom it viewed as lacking in commitment and 
ability to deal with the threats facing the country. This was most evidenced when the 
anny attempted to restrict the non-traditional policies of the first ever Islamist 
goveniment led by the Refah (Welfare) Party (RP) and pressured the govemment to 
resign bringing further question marks over its democratic tradition. 
Thus, not surprisingly, developments in Turkish domestic politics in the decade in 
question was also instrumental in influencing its foreign policy and external relations. 
Between 1989 and 1999 there were eleven different govermnents (nine of which were 
coalitions). All had with contrasting foreign policy priorities and orientations. In the same 
period, thirteen different foreign ministers held office (I I between 1990 and 1997 to be 
precise, with one foreign minister holding the seat less than a month). As Sami Kohen, a 
leading columnist for the Turkish daily Milliyet on foreign affairs, wrote, 
The troubles that the ongoing political crisis of the country causes in foreign 
policy area are more strongly felt with each passing day. In the foreign relations 
area, we are going through the most problematic period in the history of the 
republic. The country fails to take rational and effective decisions to solve these 
problems because the political system is deadlocked. Bureaucrats try to solve the 
problems within the limits of their powers by introducing short-ten-n, provisional 
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formulas. Ankara is no longer able to take the initiative and merely reacts. 40 
Turkey's ongoing social and economic problems such as high inflation, large public 
sector borrowing, high unemployment, a huge budget deficit, highly unfair income 
distribution, mounting external debt, and corruption also severely hampered the efforts to 
pursue an effective foreign policy. Throughout the 1990s, the inflation rate averaged 72 
percent per year between 1990 and 1999 (the EU average was less than 3 percent). 41 
Accordingly, in the face of severe structural problems in the economy Turkey lacked the 
capacity to provide large-scale investments and aid to exploit new economic opportunities 
in the newly emerging markets of Central Asia, the Black Sea, the Balkans and the 
Caucasia. 
Thus, the end of the Cold War had a profound effect on Turkey's domestic, regional 
and international environment and forced Turkey to reassess its traditional foreign and 
security policies. This study will show, how sudden and unpredictable regional 
developments caught Turkey unprepared and how, in many cases, Turkey failed to 
formulate and implement the necessary policies to enable it to seize upon the new 
opportunities. As such, this study argues that despite the early high hopes and 
expectations among Turkish policy makers and the Turkish public that Turkey would 
emerge as a regional (super) power and a 'role model' in the Balkans, the Caucasia, 
40Sami Kohen, 'Guclu Hukumet Olmadikca', Milliyet, 19 June 1996. 
41The combination of internal and external factors such as the Gulf War of 1991, severe financial crises of 
1994, the collapse of the Russian economy during the latter half of the 1990s together with the economic 
turmoil in several Asian countries in 1997, and the devastating earthquake of 1999 had a profound effect 
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debt, equivalent to 54 percent of its GNP). Moreover, due to economic and political instability Turkey 
could not attract enough foreign capital investment. Between 1993-1999, it was only US$5 billion while 
some of the East European countries for example Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary attracted well 
over US$60 billion (Poland alone attracted US$30 billion) worth of investment in the same period. DPT 
Temel Ekonomik Gostergeler, (January 2001), p. 13; Turkiye Istatistik Yilligi 1997, (Ankara: T. C. 
Basbakanlik DIE, 1998), pp. 640-1; Turkiye Istatistik Yilligi 1999, (Ankara: T. C. Basbakanlik DIE, 
2000), pp. 626-7; Hazine Istatistikleri 1980-1999, (Ankara: T. C. Basbakanlik HDTM, 2000), p. 37, p. 68 
and p. 71; http: //www. treasury. gov. tr/english/ybs/geneling. htm; Henry and Ebru Ertugal-Loewendahl, 
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Central Asia and the Middle East, a combination of internal and external realities reduced 
this possibility. Instead, by 1999, Ankara could only claim (bilateral) ties with Turkic 
republics of the former Soviet Union and the strong 'strategic partnerships' with the US 
and Israel, while it had been marginalized in the European economic and political 
context, isolated in the Arab Middle East and had tense relations with almost all its 
immediate neighbours: Greece, Cyprus, Russia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Essentially 
therefore, as Mehmet Ali Birand, a senior foreign policy analyst for the Turkish daily 
Sabah, wrote in 1997; 
We have no neighbours left with whom we maintain good relations. Last week we 
received a thrashing in Tehran from the Islamic countries. Tension with Iran is 
still continuing. We are drifting towards a war with Iraq. We are almost about to 
go to war with Syria. Russia is very worried and resentful. The state of Turco- 
An-nenian relations are common knowledge. No need to mention Greece and 
Cyprus. To this list we have not added the European Union. 42 
Objectives ofthe Study 
This study aims to explore Turkey's foreign and security policies in the initial decade 
(1989-1999) of the post-Soviet era. In order to be able to examine the impact of the major 
developments in international politics on Turkey's foreign and security policies, the study 
aims to analyse those developments in detail to the extent that they are relevant to the 
subject of this dissertation so as to avoid extending the scope of the study. 
This study is not a chronological history of Turkish foreign and security policy and 
thus does not claim to look at all developments that took place in the period covered by 
this work. For this reason, certain developments, which are not directly relevant to the 
subject of this thesis, are not discussed in detail. For example, although the Cyprus issue 
has been one of the cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy for most of the last fifty years, 
the inter-communal talks between the two communities of the divided island towards 
finding a lasting solution are not discussed in significant detail. The issue as a whole and 
end result rather than the details of ongoing negotiations process, which has been going 
(November 2000). 
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on over a quarter of a century, is important for the purpose of this study. Similarly, rather 
than exploring all aspects of, for example, Turkish-Syrian bilateral relationship only 
certain issues that are relevant to the study are dealt with. 
Literature and sources ofthe study 
Foreign policy and foreign relations have received relatively scant attention in the 
general literature on modem Turkey. 43 It is a fact that the most powerful states in the 
system exert most of the influence on international events and therefore get the most 
attention from international relations scholars. 44 Being a middle power in terrns of its 
influence on world affairs, Turkey is not yet viewed as a central focus for research by 
international relations analysts. 45 Scholarly research on Turkish security policies are less 
available as only a few governmental departments monopolise the implementation and 
decision-making process. 46 Even so, many valuable studies exist on general Turkish 
foreign policy and some aspects of the security policies in both English and Turkish. 47 It 
42Mehmet Ali Birand, 'AB', Sabah, 18 December 1997. 
43Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: L. B. Hauris, 1995), p. 342; Hale, Turkish Foreign 
Policy 1774-2000, op. cit., p. 1. 
44joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 7h Edition (New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2006), p. 79. 
45Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the end of the Cold War, (London: C. 
Hurst&Co, 2003), p. 3. 
46Huseyin Bagci, Guvenlik Molitikalari ve Risk Analizi Cercevesinde Balkanlar 1991-1993, (Ankara: Dis 
Politika Enstitusu, 1904), p. 2-3. 
47Mehmet Gonlubol (ed. ), Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1995, Ninth edition, (Ankara: Siyasal 
Yayinlari, 1996); Oral Sander, Turkiyenin Dis Politikasi, (Ankara: Imge, 1998); Faruk Soylemezoglu 
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is also worth noting that there is some literature which exclusively deals with certain 
regions or regional issues such as the BalkanS48, the Turkic world49, European Union and 
the. US50, and the Middle East5 1. 
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The existing literature on Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia is also scarce. Nevertheless, 
the emergence of new independent countries following the end of the Cold War, has 
aroused a new interest in foreign policy issues in Turkish society with its large Balkan 
and Caucasian origin communities. The establishment of the Turkiye Isbirligi ve 
Kalkinma Ajansi (TIKA), (Turkish International Co-operation Agency) in 1992, which 
was attached to the foreign ministry to focus on mainly the Eurasian region, is an example 
of this. It should be remembered that Turkey's application for entry to the EU had served 
to create many centres and departments attached to the ministries and universities in 
major cities and also encouraged the creation of other non-official establishments such as 
Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi (IKV) (Economic Development Foundation). 
Official documents and publications of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
widely used throughout the study. Newspot, the press bulletin, was also a valuable source 
as were publications of some other state departments, such as DevIet Istatistik Enstitusu 
(State Statistical Institute), Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankasi (The Central Bank of the 
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Republic of Turkey), Devlet Planlama Teskilati (The State Planning Organisation) and 
Dis Ticaret Mustesarligi (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade). As of additional value use 
were the publications and two journals, Foreign Policy and Dis Politika Dergisi, of the 
Foreign Policy Institute; Silahli Kuvvetler Dergisi of the Turkish Armed Forces; SAM's 
quarterly journal Perceptions; ASAM's publications and quarterly Avrasya Dosyasi; 
StrateJi Group's quarterly journal Strateji, and finally Ankara University Faculty of 
Political Science's two journals, Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi 
and Milletlerarasi Munasebeller Turk Yilligi. 
Two valuable journals of Ortadogu ve Balkan Incelemeleri Vakfi (The Middle East 
and the Balkans Studies Foundation) Turkish Review of Middle East Studies and Turkish 
Review of Balkan Studies for the chapters on the Middle East and the Balkans, and 
TIKA's special country reports such as Turkmenistan Wke Raporu (Turkmenistan 
Country Report) and quarterly Eurasian Studies and Avrasya Etudleri for the section on 
Central Asia and Caucasia region were very useful. Ms. Emel Uresin, liaison offlicer for 
Turkey in NATO, kindly provided materials on the Alliance and Turkish-NATO 
relations. Quarterly NATO Review and Turkish NATO Dergisi helped to extract valuable 
articles as well as official documents. On the Western European Union (WEU), regular 
reports of the Assembly of the WEU, Letterfrom The Assembly and Chaillot Papers of 
the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris were extensively used in writing the 
section on the Turkish-WEU relations. For the section of Turkish-EU relations, Marmara 
University European Community Institute Documentation Centre was of a great help in 
providing official documents and other relevant materials. 
Istanbul Bayazit Library, Marmara (Istanbul), Bilkent (Ankara) and Istanbul 
University libraries as well as The British Library and Newspaper Library, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and University of London libraries were extensively 
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used during this research for Turkish and English media with their on-line editions, 
magazines, periodicals, books and other materials. 
Structure of the study 
This study comprises of nine chapters based on the regions neighbouring Turkey: 
Western EuroPe, the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasia and Central Asia. The first 
chapter gives a brief historical background of Turkish foreign and security policies. More 
specifically, it establishes a background for Turkey's policies vis-a-vis each region. 
Chapter two and three examine Turkey's diminishing role with the removal of the Soviet 
threat to Western Europe and its resultant marginalisation within the European economic 
and political structure. 
Chapter four and five analyse, the developments in the Middle East region as one of the 
main sources of threat in the post-Cold War era and its resulting impact on Turkey's 
security interests. The Gulf War of 1991; water; the Kurdish issue; the rise of political 
Islam; the arms race; and the Middle East peace process are all discussed in detail. In this 
context, the Turkish-Israeli 'strategic partnership' appeared to be a practical option to 
balance these security concerns as the threat shifted from north to south, from the Soviet 
Union to Iraq, Iran and Syria. 
Chapter six and seven examine Turkish policies vis-A-vis the developments taking 
place in the Balkans, in particular, the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Turkish-Greek 
relations are also discussed in these chapters as the changes in the region served to open 
new areas of rivalry and confrontation on top of the age-old Cyprus and Aegean-related 
issues. The two final chapters examine the developments in the old Soviet territories 
particularly Russia itself, the Caucasia-Caspian region, and Central Asia, all places that 




TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES IN THE COLD NVAR ERA 
This chapter establishes a background for analysing Turkey's policies towards such 
regions as the Middle East, the Balkans, the old Soviet empire, Western Europe and the 
United States during the Cold War era. 
During the formative years of the Turkish Republic, the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey's 
main security goal was to preserve territorial integrity and consolidate its independence. 
Thus, it sought friendly relations with neighbouring countries including the Soviet Union 
and avoided deep involvement in European affairs. Its neutral ity-based foreign policy 
continued during the Second World War. However, Soviet demands for border revisions 
and changes in the Straits agreements in the post-War period coupled with an increasing 
communist ideological threat pushed Turkey towards security arrangements with the West, 
namely with the United States, with Turkey basing its entire security system on the NATO 
alliance since the early 1950s. However, the isolation this caused in its region influenced 
Ankara to seek a more balanced and 'multi-dimensional' relationship with its neighbours 
as well as Third World countries from the 1960s. Additionally, its economy-oriented 
foreign policies introduced in the early 1980s made these relationships even more visible 
and essential. 
1.1. Evolution of Turkey's foreign and security policies between the two world 
wars 
The end of the First World War also marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which 
had allied itself with Germany against the Allied Powers. Following the Turkish War of 
Independence against the Great Powers and Greece (1920-22), Turkey signed the 
Lausanne Treaty' in 1922. This enabled it to stand as an independent state mnong the 
IFor the Treaty see, Ismail Soysal, Turkrýenin Siyasal Antlasmalari, 1921-1945), vol. 1, (Ankara: TTK, 
1983), pp. 67-241. 
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nations of the world and granted international recognition to its new borders. 2 Later in 
1923, the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk was declared on the 
ashes of the Ottoman Empire. 
Ataturk sought to establish an independent and secular nation-state that would place the 
country among the most civilised nations of the world. Thus, during his rule a variety of 
reforms in almost every aspect of life were introduced which aimed at secularising and 
modemising society. 3 Kemalism was developed as the official ideology of the RepubliC. 4 
For Ataturk, Turkey's foreign policy objectives were to seek recognition as a sovereign 
entity; to preserve the borders drawn with the Misak-i Milli, the National Pact of 1920; to 
enjoy the full benefits of peace; and finally to look to the West for direction. 5 The famous 
motto of Ataturk. 'peace at home; peace abroad' became a guiding principle in Turkey's 
external relations, and, even today, this plays an important role at the core of Turkey's 
general foreign poliCy. 6 
Another main feature of Kemalist ideology was that it strictly distanced itself from a 
revival of pan-Turkist, pan-Turan or pan-Islarnic expansionism in other Turkic/Muslim 
communities particularly in Soviet Central Asia, Caucasia and the Balkans, a move 
justified by Ataturk on the grounds that 'there is no evidence in history that the policies of 
pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism have been practised and succeeded. '7 The process of 
2For a detailed discussion on Turkish foreign policy during the War of Independence see, Toktamis Ates, 
'Ulusal Kurtulus Savasinda Turk Dis Politikasi' in Turk Dis Politikasinda Sorunlar, (Istanbul: Der, 
1989), pp. 1-24. 
3The reforms included the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate; the adoption of the Latin alphabet 
replacing the Arabic alphabet; the introduction of Western-style dress, law codes and Gregorian 
calendar; the closure of religious courts; the pursuance of women's rights. For the reforms see, Mustafa 
Baydar, Alaturk ve Devrimlerimiz, (Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi, 1973) 
4Kemalism defined itself by six principles: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, popularism, statism and 
revolutionism. 
SAtaturk'un Soylev ve Demecleri, vol. 3, (Ankara: 1954), pp. 67-8; Ayla Gol, 'A Short Summary of Turkish 
Foreign Policy: 1923-1939', A USBFD, vol. 48, no. 14, (1993), p. 57; Mehmet Gonlubol and Cem Sar, 
Ataturk ve Turkiyenin Dis Politikasi 1919-1938, (Ankara: MEB, 1973). 
61smet Giritli, Kemalist Ideoloji: Siyasi ve Ekonomik Yonleri, (Ankara: Yasar Egitim ve Kultur Vakfi, 
198 1), p. 19; Abdulahat Aksin, Ataturkun Dis Politika Ilkeleri ve Diplomasi, (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka, 
1966), pp. 1-5; Ataturkun Milli Dis Politikasi, vol. 1, (Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi, 1981), p. 27. 7Ataturk'un Soylev ve Demecled, (Ankara: Turk Devrim Tarihi Enstitusu), p. 436. 
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Westernization also meant that Ankara kept its ties with the Middle East at a minimum 
level and strictly refrained from involvement in regional affairs. Consequently, having 
distanced itself from the Ottoman legacy, apart from aligrunents established out of security 
considerations, under the subsequent Kernalist. goverrunents Turkey never showed any 
interest in its own region and refused to base its foreign policies on shared religious and 
cultural valueS. 8 
During the 1923-1930 period, the main security issue in terms of preserving territorial 
integrity and independence was the potential threat from the West resulting from unsettled 
aspects of the Treaty of Lausanne. The immediate impact of this perception was to seek 
new friendships as a balance to the West. Thus, despite the fundamental differences in 
terms of system and state philosophy, Turkey sought to have good relations with the new 
Soviet Union. 9 Though Turkey accepted technical and economic assistance from the 
Soviet Union, over the years, Turkey improved its relations with the Western world due to 
both its Westernisation policy and a growing fear of communist threat. 10 
Additionally, in order to preserve peace in the region and to consolidate its position as a 
sovereign entity, Turkey sought to set up new alliances and conclude treaties with other 
states. As such, it signed a Pact of Non-Aggression and Security with the Soviet Union in 
1925, and concluded treaties with all the Balkan states: with Yugoslavia in 1925 and 1933; 
Romania in 1933; Bulgaria in 1929; and with Greece, the Treaty of Neutralityq 
Conciliation and Arbitration in 1930. Furthermore, it also concluded several agreements 
with the great powers: the British-Turkish Treaty in 1926; the Treaty of Friendship and 
8Sedat Laciner, From Kemalism to Ozalism: The Ideological Evolution of Turkish Foreign PolicY, 
Unpublished PhD thesis, (King's College London, 2001), p. 283. 
971he Soviet Union was also seeking international recognition for its existing borders and signed the first 
treaty with the Ankara government even before the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1921 in 
which it accepted the north-eastem borders of Turkey. For the bilateral relationship during the Turkish 
War of Independence see, Haluk F. Gursel, Tarih Boyunca Turk-Rus Iliskileri, (Istanbul: Ak, 1968), PP. 
179-201. 
10A. Haluk Ulman, 'Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler 1 (1923-1968)', AUSBFD, vol. 23, no. 3, 
(September 196 8), p. 24 1. 
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Good Neighbourliness with France in 1926 and the Turkish-Italian Treaty of Friendship, 
Conciliation and Neutrality in 1928. By joining the League of Nations in 1932 Turkey 
further consolidated its independence. 
In addition, Ankara also looked for new alliances in the Middle East. Thus, the creation 
of the Saadabat Pact (sometimes referred to as the Eastern Entente or the Middle East 
Entente), between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937, though a non-aggression 
pact not a defence treaty, was to serve in establishing peace and security in the Middle 
East. The Pact, in fact, was the first manifestation of Turkey's role as a bridge-maker 
between the West and the East after the Balkan Pact and provided greater security to its 
eastem flank. II 
However, on certain issues concerning the Western powers, which had not been solved 
with the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey pursued assertive policies without making any 
compromise, i. e. the preservation of the borders drawn with the Misak-i Milli. 12 For 
example, the province of Hatay (where over forty percent of the population were Turkish) 
had been included in the National Pact frontiers but was retained under French trusteeship 
according to the Ankara Agreement of 1921. Ankara did not accept the situation as afait 
accompli and followed active policies until the province became part of Turkey in 1938.13 
Likewise, Turkey attempted to gain full sovereignty over the Straits with the Montreux 
Convention of 1936. According to the Convention, it had the right to remilitarise the zone 
and control the special commission working under the auspices of the Assembly of the 
League of Nations created by the Lausanne Treaty. 14 However, despite these successful 
foreign policy endeavours, the issue of the oil-rich Mosul province, included in the Misak- 
i Milli, remained an exception. The League of Nations decided in favour of the British 
I Ilsmail Soysal, '1937 Saadabad Pact', Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, (1988), pp. 151-3. 12Jacop Landau, 'Ataturk'un Buyuk Nutkunda Dis Politika' in Ataturk'un Buyuk Soylevinin 50. yi, 
Semineri, (Ankara: TTK, 1980), p. 45. 
131rfan and Margarete Orga, Ataturk, (London: Michael Joseph, 1962), p. 293. 
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government, which claimed the inclusion of Mousul. as part of Iraq in 1925. Turkey could 
not resist this decision, as it was not a member of the League, which was largely 
dominated by Britain, and had to struggle to cope with a Kurdish uprising, most likely 
backcd by Britain. 15 
The early 1930s saw the emergence of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy which 
eventually led to World War II. The new regimes seemed to be aspiring to redraw the 
European map, and the pressures they put on the Balkan countries to gain more control 
brought Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania together to discourage such a threat. 
These states signed an agreement creating the Balkan Entente in 1934, guaranteeing all 
frontiers and pledging collective security for the Balkans. However, as Bulgaria and 
Albania refused to join the alliance it was difficult to create a genuine regional 
orgarasation to deter Italy and Germany from pursuing their ambitions to penetrate and 
control the Balkans. 16 
1.2. Turkey and the Second World War: Neutrality pays 
The radical foreign policy changes in these countries following the rise to power of 
Hitler and Mussolini meant that the main threat to Turkey's peace and independence was 
now not coming from Britain or France but from Italy and Germany. 17 This threat was 
evidenced by Italian ambition in the Mediterranean and Germany in the Balkans, and by 
the German occupation of Austria in 1938. As the Turkish foreign minister explained 'if 
Austria falls, this means the Germans are at our neck. '18 This was compounded by the 
14Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits andNA TO, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 43-45. 
IsSee, Kemal Melek, 'Turk-Ingiliz Iliskileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri' in Turk Dis Politikasinda 
Sorunlar, (Istanbul: Der, 1989), pp. 70-3. 
16Tozun Bahceli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 14. 17john Parker and Charles Smith, Modern Turkey, (London: Routledge, 1940), pp. 194-5; Donald E. 
Webster, The Turkey of, 4taturk, (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political Science, 1939), P. 
117. 
18Quoted in Kamuran Gurun, Savasan Dunya ve Turkiye, (Istanbul: Inkilap, 1997), p. 675. 
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occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939, and subsequent economic pressure exerted on 
Romania, not to mention the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939.19 
This imminent threat pushed Ankara to pursue closer relations with Britain and France 
as it was not ready to sustain a war in view of its both economic and n-fflitary incapacity. 20 
A Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed between the three states in October 1939, whereby 
Turkey received assurances from both Britain and France who would assist her in case of 
an attack by a European power, while Turkey in turn agreed to assist Britain and France if 
a war broke out in the Mediterranean area. In addition, Turkey was not be obliged to take 
action in case of a war with the Soviet Union. 21 Although, the war later spread to the 
Mediterranean, Turkey did not join the war arguing that this could have dragged it into a 
conflict with the Soviet Union. In the end, Ankara's well-calculated diplomatic 
manoeuvres to stay out of the war were successful. 22 
Furthermore, Turkey signed a Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with 
Germany in 1941, which helped Turkish policy-makers to utilise the balance of power 
without the need to abandon neutrality. With this Treaty, the two countries undertook to 
respect each other's territorial inviolability and integrity and abstain from any kind of 
direct or indirect action against each other. 23 At the Yalta Conference of 1945, Turkey was 
invited to attend the San Francisco Conference, which led to the establishment of the 
United Nations (UN), provided that Ankara declared war on either Gennany or Japan. 
Turkey broke off its relations with Germany and then declared war on the Axis in 1945. 
19For the relations with Germany in this period see, Ibid., pp. 671-80; with Italy, pp. 504-12 and 680-2. 
20Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 3. 
21 For the Treaty see, Salih R. Burcak, 'Ingiliz-Fransiz-Turk ittifaki: 19 Ekim 1939' A VSBFD, vol. 4, nos. 
3-4, (1949), pp. 347-74. 
2217rank Tachau, Turkey, The Politics, Democracy, and Development, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 174. 
For the efforts by the Allied powers to bring Turkey into the war see, A. Sukru Esmer and Oral Sander, 
'Ikinci Dunya Savasinda Turk Dis Politikasi' in Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1995, Ninth edition, 
(Ankara: Siyasal, 1996), pp. 164-81. R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 29 and p. 69. 23Turkkaya Ataov, Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945, (Ankara: AUSBF, 1965), p. 93. 
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Turkey's entry into the UN consolidated its territorial integrity, and allowed it some 
measure of collective security. 24 
1.3. The Soviet threat and Turkey's accession into the NATO Alliance 
In the aftermath of the war the Soviets declared that they had no intention of renewing 
the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1925, which was due to expire at the end of 
1945. Furthermore, Moscow put forward territorial claims to the two provinces of Kars 
and Ardahan in northern Turkey. 25 Moscow also attempted to change the Montreux 
Convention of 193 6 and asked for a joint Turkish-Soviet control regime over the Turkish 
Straits, which would allow for a Soviet navy base. 26 Although, it was not anticipated that 
the Soviets could launch a war on Turkey, the threat was viewed as both imminent and 
clearly pronounced. Thus, the expansionist communist threat from its northern neighbour 
became a fundamental security concern for Ankara and soured the close relationship 
established during the Turkish War of Independence. 
From the Russian perspective, Turkey's location gave it an important role. Indeed, 
control of the two important Straits -main passages from the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean- was a key obstacle to Russia as far as its military, economic and security 
objectives were concerned, as past conflicts had revealed the vulnerability of Russia's 
Southern coast when the Straits were controlled by a hostile power in time of war. 27 
Despite Turkey's desire to remain neutral in the wake of the war, the Soviet threat left 
Turkey with no choice but to approach the Western world, particularly the US, to ask for 
mi tary aid and help in the defence of the country. 28 This would eventually lead to 
membership of NATO, just as in the Ottoman era Turkey relied on the existence of a 
24Mehmet Gonlubol, Turkish Participation in the UN 1945-1954, (Ankara: AUSBF, 1963), p. 149. 
25Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dis Islerinde 34 Yil: Anilar Yorumlar, (Ankara: TTK, 1980), pp. 146-7. 
26Feridun Cernal Erkin, Turk-Sovyet Ifiskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi, (Ankara: 1968), pp. 2534; Baskin 
Oran, 'Turkiye'nin Kuzeydeki Buyuk Kornsu Sorunu Nedir? Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri 1939-1970', 
A USBFD, no. 25, (1970), pp. 41-93. 
27Cyril E. Black, 'Tlie Pattern of Russian Objectives' in Russian Foreign Policy, Ivo Lederer (ed. ), (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 10- 16. 28See, Kamuran Gurun, Turk-Sovyet fliskileri, 1920-1953, (Ankara: TTK, 199 1). 
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balance of power in Europe for its own security. 29 In particular, Turkish policy makers 
hoped that inclusion in the Western alliance would provide security, both military and 
ideological, and material resources necessary for Turkey's rapid economic development. 30 
In responding to this quest, the Truman Doctrine was designed to enhance the fighting 
capabilities of the Turkish army, air force and navy to help in building strategic roads and 
to restock Turkish arsenals and war reserveS. 31 Between 1945 and 1947 Turkey received 
US$130 million (US$100 million of which came in the form of the Truman Doctrine 
military aid programme). 32 
Although Washington was initially reluctant to undertake new responsibilities in the 
Near East by accepting Turkey into NATO and the existence of some objections by some 
of the member states within the alliance, Turkey's successful participation in the Korean 
War led to an invitation to join the NATO alliance in 1952.33 Upon admission into NATO, 
Turkey received significant support from the Alliance for constructing airfields, 
telecommunication systems, and energy pipelines. 34 Not surprisingly, Turkey's entry into 
NATO, caused concern among some of its neighbours, notably the Soviet Union, as it 
29Duygu B Sezcr, Turkey's Security Policies, Adelphi Papers, (London: IISS, 198 1), p. 12; Fethi 
Tevretoglu, Dis Politika Gorusumuz, (Ankara: Ajans-Turk, 1963), p. 10. 
30Atilla Eralp, 'Turkey and the EC in the Changing Post-War International System' in Turkey and Europe, 
C. Balkir and A. Williams (eds. ), (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 26. 
31Melvyn P. Lcffler, 'Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The US, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-52', The 
Journal of American History, vol. 71, no. 4, (March 1985), p. 817; Nuri Eren, Turkey: Today and 
Tomorrow, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 235. 
32A. Suat Bilge, Milletlerarasi Politika, (Ankara: AUSBF, 1966), pp. 237-9; A. Haluk Ulman and Oral 
Sander, 'Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkcnler 11 (1923-1968)', AUSBFD, vol. 27, no. 1, (March 
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33Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dis Islerinde 34 Yil: Washington Buyukelciligi, vol. 2, (Ankara: TTK, 1986), pp. 
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Development in Turkey, 1950-1970' Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, (October 1972), p. 353; John 
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complicated Soviet defences by exposing a large, industrial area of the USSR to Western 
monitoring in times of peace, and to Western armies in times of war. 35 
In addition to membership of NATO, Turkey joined the Council of Europe and the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Ankara also 
applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 (it became 
an associate member in 1964) in order to achieve its political, and particularly economic 
objectives. Indeed, economic relations with the EEC rose steadily during the 1960s, as the 
EEC became Ankara's most important trade partner. 36 
1.4. The Baghdad Pact: Alienation from the Middle East 
Once it joined NATO, Turkey shaped its entire external relations in line with the 
policies of the Washington-led alliance. 37 This became most evident with the Baghdad 
Pact, though the failure of the Pact showed that rigidly pro-Westem policies could be 
unfavourable, and counter-productive to Turkey's interests in a region increasingly 
influenced by anti-Western Arab nationalism. For example, Turkey refused to support 
Algeria's struggle for independence from France for the sake of NATO solidarity (a 
decision that would cost Turkey dearly when the Cyprus issue was voted on at the UN). 38 
As part of its role in NATO, Turkey was ready to take on greater responsibilities in 
Middle Eastern affairs in order to block any Soviet expansion in the region. 39 Indeed, 
when the prospect for a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) of 1952, primarily a 
British initiative, failed to get satisfactory interest from the regional countries, Britain 
35AH Karaosmanoglu, 'Turkey and Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts' in NATO's Southern 
Allies: Internal and External Challenges, John Chipman (ed. ), (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 291-2. A. 
Suat Bilge, Turkiye-Sovyetler Birligi Iliskileri, 1920-1964: Guc Komsuluk (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi, 
1992), p. 335. 
36Ahmet Gokdere, 'Turkiye-Avrupa Toplulugu Iliskileri, 1959-1991' in Turkiye Ekonomisi 'Sektorel 
Gelismeleri', Celik Aruoba and Cern Alpar (eds. ), (Ankara: Turkiye Ekonorni Kurumu, 1992), p. 244. 
37Edip Celik, 100 Soruda Turkiýenin Dis Politika Tarihi, (Istanbul: Gercek, 1969), p. 159; Haluk Ulman, 
'NATO ve Turkiye', A VSBFD, vol. 22, no. 4, (December 1967), pp. 143 -67. 38Mehmet Gonlubol and Haluk Ulman, 'Ikinci Dunya Savasindan Sonra Turk Dis Politikasi (1945-1965)' 
in Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1995, Ninth edition, (Ankara: Siyasal, 1996), pp. 237-49. 
39For the Soviet moves in the region see, J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign 
Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 119-20. 
41 
turned to Turkey to lead a regional defence organisation. 40 The pact intended to stop 
Soviet expansion into the Arab world was signed by Turkey and Iraq in Baghdad in 1955 
and Pakistan, Britain and Iran joined later in the same year. 41 The US's participation in the 
pact, which was restricted to the military and the economic committee, came only in 
1957.42 
Turkey's lead role in this project was primarily intended to further secure its place in 
the Western system. 43 However, Turkey's involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs was 
not welcomed by the local actors, and to some extent, its pro-Western role lost it sympathy 
and credibility in the eyes of the Arab world. Likewise Turkey faced critics during the 
Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations. 44 
1.5. Towards a 'multi-dimensional foreign policy', 1960-1980 
In the early 1960s, Turkey's foreign relations took a new 'multi-faceted' direction. 
Developments in international politics such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the 
Cyprus crises of 1963-64 and 1974, the emergence of the East-West ditente, and growing 
public awareness on foreign affairs all forced Turkish policy-makers to pursue relatively 
more independent and balanced policies with the Eastern Bloc, Europe, Third World 
4013rian H. Reid, 'The Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact' in The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime 
Administration 1951-1955, John W. Young (ed. ), (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), p. 160. 
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42For the American interests with regard to the organisation see, FRUS, vol. 12, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1957), p. 613. 
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countries and the Arab world without reducing the level of relations with its Western 
allieS. 45 
The missile crisis 
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the first test case of the viability of the US security 
assurances, brought a new dimension to Turkish-American relations. Unknown to Ankara, 
Turkey's Jupiter missiles (deployed in 1959) became central to the discussions between 
the two super powers during the crisiS. 46 Ankara regarded the missiles as a symbol of the 
Alliance's determination to counter the Russian threat to Turkey and opposed the removal 
of the Jupiter missiles. 47 However, the agreement between the US and the Soviets required 
Washington withdraw the missiles from Turkish territories in late 1963.48 Turkey's 
disappointment with this decision was great as it appeared that the US was willing to 
sacrifice Turkish interests for other consideration, and relations were further damaged at 
the time of Johnson letter of 1964 on the Cyprus issue, which warned Ankara not to 
invade the island. 49 
The Cyprus crisis became another issue to test the value of Turkey's relationship with 
the US. Following British withdrawal from rule on the island in 1960, Cyprus increasingly 
became the cause of disagreement between the two Aegean neighbours, who were at that 
time even talking about the possibility of a Greek-Turkish customs union. 50 In the 1950s 
the 'Enosis' movement (union of Cyprus with Greece) gained momentum against British 
450mer Kurkcuoglu, 'Dis Politika Nedir? Turkiye'deki Dunu ve Bugunu', AUSBFD, vol. 35, nos. 14, 
(1980), p. 324. 
46For the deployment of the missiles see, Bruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West since World War 11' in 
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rule with the birth of 'EOKA' (National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle). 51 For 
Turkey, the ensuing violence on the island was not only a concern for the safety of the 
Turkish minority, one fifth of the island's population, but even more so, it was the 
potential threat to its own security. If Cyprus, only 50 miles from the Turkish coast, were 
to be joined to Greece, then the Greek possessions, including the Aegean islands, would 
half-encircle Turkey. 52 The agreement reached over the constitution between Britain, 
Greece, Turkey, and the representatives of both communities, which led the establishment 
of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, only helped to the postponement of the growing 
violence. 53 
When the Turkish armed forces attempted to make an amphibious landing on the island 
to help Turkish Cypriots, Washington strongly opposed the operation. The letter from 
president Johnson in June 1964 made it clear that NATO might not defend Turkey in case 
of a Soviet attack in response to action in Cyprus. 54 Eventually Turkey could not go further 
and abandoned the operation. In 197455, following a coup by supporters of 'Enosis' 
backed by the military regime in Athens against Cypriot president Makarios, Turkey 
entered the island. 56The US administration began an arms embargo, which remained in 
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effect for three years. 57 Turkey acknowledged that its national interests were not 
necessarily in conformity with those of the Alliance or the US, and as such placing its 
entire security system into the Alliance could be restrictive. 58 Although the Soviet Union 
and the EEC countries remained generally perceptive about the first military intervention, 
they became more critical following the second phase of the operation. The EEC's nine 
foreign ministers affirmed their attachment to the independence and territorial integrity of 
Cyprus, though they refrained from taking initiatives of their own and saw their role as one 
of support to the efforts of the UN. 59 
Towards a multidimensionalforeign policy 
Turkey's 'one directional foreign policy' approach soon left Ankara isolated in 
international circles. For example, in 1964, the Greek Cypriot government agreed with 
Athens to take the Cyprus issue to the UN. 60 The issue was voted on at the General 
Assembly in 1965 and only five countries supported the Turkish case while forty-seven 
Non-Aligned members voted against Turkey, and fifty-four abstained, including members 
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of the Eastern Block and NATO. 61 In particular, the Arab world's stance in favour of 
Greece was a great blow to Ankara and served to show the downside of its pro-western 
Middle East poliCy. 62 
Doubts about the value of the NATO alliance also spread from within the governmental 
and intellectual elite to the public at large and Turkey's total loyalty to the West came 
under severe criticism. This eventually forced Turkish foreign policy makers to reassess 
traditional policies and pursue more 'respectful national polices'. 63 Taken together, it 
became apparent that Turkey would face isolation in the international arena and 
marginalisation in its own region unless it shifted towards a multi-directional foreign 
policy while maintaining its ties with the West. 
These developments also coincided with the Soviet policy of reapproacment with 
Turkey. After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviets sought reconciliation with Turkey at a 
time of East-West ditente. In 1964, Turkey's foreign minister visited Moscow, the first 
such visit in 25 years. This was followed by an exchange between the prime ministers of 
the two countries. Within this framework, economic relations improved in the form of a 
US$200 million Soviet credit in 1967 as well as a number of mainly industrial projects 
undertaken with Soviet assistance in Turkey. 64By 1978, the Soviet Union was aiding 
forty-four different development projects in Turkey and by the end of the decade Turkey 
received more Soviet economic assistance than any country in the Third World except 
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Cuba. 65 In the face of a US arms embargo, Turkey also sought to improve military 
relations with the Soviet Union. 66 
Alongside the Soviet Union, Turkey also broadened its contacts with the Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO) members, the Arab countries in the Middle East, the non-aligned 
countries, and with communist countries of South-East Europe without cutting of its 
relations with the WeSt. 67 The successive left-wing Republican people's Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) governments in this period under the leadership of Bulcnt 
Eccvit, (who was known for his idcological sympathy for Socialist govcmmcnts) and the 
CHP's short-lived 1974 coalition with Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party 
(Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), which had close ideological affinities with the Islamic world, 
made it easier for good relations. 68 In general, given Turkey's disagreements with the US 
in this period, Ecevit was particularly keen to re-orientate Turkish foreign policy towards 
Europe, particularly Germany and the Scandinavian countries. 69 
In the context of Turkey's policy shift to pursue a more balanced foreign policy, Ankara 
also extended its relations with the Middle Eastern countries, which were not warm up 
until the mid 1960s due to several reasons. For modem Turkey, founded on Kernalist 
principles, the priority was to integrate with the Western world and its civilization by 
developing a secular political structure, and thus it had to eliminate the theocratic 
remnants of the Ottoman Empire. 70 Thus, despite its common cultural, religious and 
historical affinities with the Arab nations of the Middle East, Ankara chose not to show 
much interest in the region and to some extent avoided having close relations with the 
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Arab world. Also, Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise the new state of Israel 
in 1949, and in particular its poor image resulting from the several issues such as the 
Baghdad Pact experience; Turkey's stance with the Western powers with respect to the 
Suez Canal crisis in 1956; and the use of US bases in Turkey during the American 
intervention on Lebanon in 1958 all distanced Turkey and the Arab world from one 
another. 71 Finally, considering Turkey's political, economic and military needs, the region 
was not in a position to offer much in this respect. The process of integration with the 
Western Block in the Cold War environment removed Turkey's focus from regional 
politics all together. Within this context, as far as Turkey's foreign policy towards the 
Middle East was concerned, it was shaped as non-interference in intra-Arab disputes; 
compartmentalization of policy towards the West and policy towards the Middle East and 
the maintenance of bilateral relations with all states of the region. 72 
The new international environment and Ankara's desire to develop wide ranging ties to 
gain political support for the national issues, new markets for its goods, as well as the oil 
crisis of 1973-1974 all helped the process of normalization of relations with the Middle 
Eastern Arab countries. Ankara also initially hoped to cultivate Arab support on the 
Cyprus problem. In this context, a truly national policy with respect to the Arab world 
began to emerge in the early 1970s. 73 
The new Turkish policy in the Middle East was seen in action during the 1967 and 
1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Ankara did not allow the US to use military bases in Turkey to aid 
Israel, and diplomatically took a more pro-Arab position over the Arab-Israeli dispute at 
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the UN and other international forums. Turkey also granted diplomatic recognition to the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people in 1976 and consented in the establishment of the PLO office in Ankara in 1979 . 74 
Furthermore, Turkey joined the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1976, which 
provided Ankara with a forum to have close contacts with the Islamic world and to place 
issues such as Cyprus before its members. It also enabled Turkey to balance the negative 
policies of the Non-Aligned countries, where most of the Arab countries were represented. 
Importantly, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was established in 
1983 and recognized only by Turkey, received observer status. This obviously helped them 
to defend the Turkish case. 75 Turkey also gradually expanded economic ties and built up 
its exports with the oil-producing Arab countries during this period. 76 
1.6. Economy-oriented foreign policies, 1980-1989 
In September 1980, Turkish democratic development was once more interrupted by a 
military coup ditat in the face of the failure of successive governments to stop the 
growing political violence, economic crisis and political instability. 77 The elections of 
1983 saw the return of democratic rule and the election of the Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi, ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, who had served as a deputy prime 
minister in charge of the economy during the military regime. Until 1991 successive 
ANAP governments added a new dimension to traditional Turkish foreign policy with 
economic and trade relations playing an increasingly important role in the foreign policy 
process. 78 During this time, Turkish policy makers sought to achieve two main objectives: 
74Ramazan Gozen, 'Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour towards the Middle East, Foreign Policy 
(Ankara), vol. 19, nos. 1-2, (1995), p. 75. 
75Mevhibe Yuksel, 'Turkey and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OICY, Foreign Policy (Ankara), 
vol. 15, nos. 1-2, (199 1), p. 7 1; Soysal, 'Turkish', op. cit., p. 262. 
76Andrew Mango, 'Turkish Policy in the Middle East' in Turkish Foreign Policy, C. H. Dodd (ed. ), 
(Cambridge: The Eatlon, 1992), p. 66. 
771t was estimated that more than 5,000 people killed in the political violence before the intervention.. 
Nursen Mazici, Turkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Sivil Rejime Etkileri, (Istanbul: Gur, 1989), p. 172. 
78 With the new economic policies, export revenues increased from US$3 billion in 1980 to USS13 billion 
in 1990, while imports rose from US$8 to US$22.3 billion. Turkey's GNP doubled in the same period, 
from US$73 billion to US$152 billion. Turkey also extended its economic and trade relations with the 
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the transformation of the economy in a stable environment and around Turkey the 
resolution of the old disputes with neighbours such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, and the 
Soviet Union through improved economic and trade relations. 79 
Turgut Ozal, prime minister (1983-1989) and president (1989-1993), dominated 
Turkish politics at home and abroad for almost all of this decade. Indeed, he was hailed in 
many circles as a 'revolutionary statesman at the top of the state'. 80 Ozal argued that a 
strong economy with expanding trade capacity and a firm economic infrastructure could 
open up new opportunities for Turkey abroad. 81 He also argued that Turkey needed to 
work with both the Western and Muslim world and argued that 'the stronger you are in the 
East, the stronger you are in the West. '82 
The new economy-oricnted foreign policies were well practised during the eight year 
Iran-lraq War. Turkey refrained from taking sides and stayed neutral throughout the war, 
and continued its good relationships with both of the neighbouring countries while 
Eastern block countries, in particular, with the Middle Eastern Arab countries as well as other countries 
such as China, the Far East, and North America. Trade volume with the Islamic world was 42 percent of 
the whole trade, which was 4-5 percent in the 1960s. For Turkish economy and its foreign economic 
relations between 1980 and 1990 see, Nihat Tore, 'Dis Ticaret ve Doviz Kuru Politikalari' in Turkiye 
Ekonomisi 'Sektorel Gelismeleri, Celik Aruoba and Cem Alpar (eds. ), (Ankara: Turkiye Ekonomi 
Kurumu, 1992), pp. 193-202; Ekrern Donek, 'Turkiye'nin Dis Borc Sorunu ve 1980 Sonrasi Boyutlari', 
AUSBFD, vol. 50, no. 12, (1995), pp. 173-84; Paul B. Henze, 'Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First 
Century' in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Graham Fuller (ed. ), 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 15-7; Y. Kepenek and N. Yenturk, Turkiye Ekonomisi, (Istanbul: 
Remzi, 1994), p. 407; Golan, op. cit., pp. 256-7; Soysal, 'Turkish', op. cit., p. 264; Dis Ticaret 
Istatistikleri 1989, (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1991), p. 15; Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri, (Ankara: 
Basbakanlik DIE, 1998), p. 515; Turkiye Istatistik Yi1ligi 1998, (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1999), p. 499. 
79For new economic policies see, Ziya Onis, 'The State and Economic Development in Contemporary 
Turkey: Etatism to Neo-liberalism and Beyond' in Turkey between East and West, Vojtech Mostny and 
R. Craig Nation (eds. ), (Colorado: Westview, 1996), p. 163; Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 150; Z. Y. Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 43-4; Gulten Kazgan, Ekonomide Disa Ack Buyume, 
(Istanbul: Altin, 1995), pp. 391401. 
80Ramazan Gozen, 'Turgut Ozal and Turkish Foreign Policy: Style and Vision', Foreign Policy (Ankara), 
vol. 20, nos. 34, (1996), p. 9 1. 
81Basbakan Turgut Ozal'in Konusma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mulakatlarl, (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 
1986), p. 49; Hasan Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, Eight edition, (Ankara: 1990), p. 294. 
82Gulistan Gurbey, 'Ozal Donemi Turk Dis Politikasi, Dis Politka Dergisi, vol. 6, no, 2, (December 1995), 
p. 56. 
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utilising emerging trade opportunities. 83 For example, in 1985, Turkey's trade with Iraq 
totalled around US$2 billion, of which Turkish exports amounted to approximately US$I 
billion, while it was only US$113 million in 1979. In the same year, tmde volume with 
Iran reached US$2.3 billion while Turkish exports exceeded US$I billion. 84 
Furthermore, the economy and trade-centred foreign policies were applied to improve 
the tense Turkish-Greek relationships. Ozal was of the belief that these policies could be 
the key instruments in resolving differences. As Ercument Yavuzalp, under-secretary of 
the Turkish foreign ministry during the Ozal era, noted in his memoirs Ozal was of the 
belief that steady economic and trade relations would even persuade the Greek premier 
Andreas Papandreou (who was known for his uncompromising stance against Turkey) to 
start a mutual dialogue. 85 
The rise of the Kurdish issue 
During the 1980s Kurdish guerrillas actions for an independent Kurdistan, and later for 
some kind of autonomy, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology in the eastern part of Turkey 
became a national security preoccupation. 86 Until the 1980s, Kurdish nationalism had a 
religious/cultural character and apart from a few revolts was not violent. However, the 
birth of Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) in 1978, which 
83Gelisen Turkiye'de Hukumetin AN Yillik Icraati. - (1983-1989), vol. 2, (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 
1989), p. 9 1; Henri J. Barkey, 'The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the Gulf War' in The Iran-Iraq War: 
Impact and Implications, Efraim Karsh (ed. ), (London: Jaffa Centre for Strategic Studies and Macmillan, 
1987), pp. 133-53. 
84Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri 1982, (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1984), p. II and Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri 1989, 
(Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1991), p. 15. 
"Ercument Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz ve Dis Politika: Bir Diplomat Gozuyle, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1996), p. 324; 
For Turco-Greek relations in this period see, M. Ali Birand, 'Turkey and the ... Davos Process": 
Experiences and Prospects' in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, Dimitri Costas (ed. ), (London 
and Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991), p. 33; Basbakan Turgut Ozal'in Basin Afensuplarina Aciklama, 
, Xfulakat ve Konusmalari, (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1989), p. 50; Gelisen Turkiye'de, op. cit., pp. 81-4. 
86For an extensive research on PKK's history, ideology and methods see, Nihat Ali Ozcan, PM* Tarihi, 
Ideolojisi ve Yontemi, (Ankara: ASAM, 1999); Ismet Imset, Ayrilikci Siddetin 20 Yili (1973-1992), 
Second edition, (Ankara: TDN, 1992). For a full discussion on Turkish nationalism and other ethnic 
groups see, Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Tl`býf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, (London: C. Hurst, 1997), pp. 114-129. For the Turkish state discourse on the Kurdish identity 
see, Mesut Yegen, 'The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish identity' in Turkey: Identity, Democracy and Politics, Sylvia Kedourie (ed. ), (London: Frank Class, 1996), pp. 217-29. 
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established in the Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon in 1980, brought a new 
dimension to the separatist Kurdish nationaliSM. 87 It relied heavily on violence and 
targeted the security forces and civilians as well as economic targets. 88 3,568 people were 
killed between 1984-1991 including 1,278 civilians, and 846 security member forces-89 
It appeared that some of the neighbouring countries, most notably Syria, played the 
Kurdish card as a lever in their relations with Turkey. 90 Following Turkey's decision to 
exploit the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for irrigation and hydroelectricity within the South 
East Anatolia Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) in the early 1980s, the Syrian 
government provided the PKK with shelter and weaponry, and trained its fighters in order 
to pressure Ankara on the water issue. 91 Syria's policy had some success, to the extent that 
Ozal believed that to combat PKK terror effectively, the water issue between the two 
countries needed resolution. As such, in 1987 he became the first Turkish prime minister 
to visit Syria, and signed an agreement in which Turkey promised to release a minimum 
annual average of 500 cum/s from the Euphrates waters. 92 It was also hoped that through 
improved economic relations with Damascus, would reduce Syrian support given to the 
PKK issue could be curbed with the support of Syria, thus, Turkish exports to Syria 
87See, Emin Gurses, Ayrilikci Terorun AnatomisilIRA-ETA-PKK, (Istanbul: Baglam 1997), pp. 75-105; 
Henri J. Barkey, and Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed 
Opportunities', Middle East Journal, vol. 5 1, no. 1, (Winter 1997), pp. 66-7. 
"For the Kurdish issue see, 'Turkey and the Gulf War: Creation of a new centre of threat', and 'The 
Kurdish problem: Turkey's hidden war', Chapter Four and Five. 
89Kemal Kirisci, 'The Challenges of Terrorism: A Turkish Perspective, Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 20, 
nos. 3-4, (1996), p. 4; Hakan Yavuz, 'Turkey's "Imagined Enemies": Kurds and Islamist, The World 
Today, vol. 52, no. 4, (1996), p. 10 1. 
90Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's New Eastern Orientation' in Turkey's New Geopoliticsfrom the Balkans to 
Western China, Graham E. Fuller (ed. ), (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 56. 
9'Financial Times, 21 May 1992; 'The water dispute: Source for future conflicts', Chapter Two; Sukru 
Elekdag, '21/2 War Strategy, Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 1, (March-May 1996), p. 46. 
92'Turkiye Icin bir "Supolitik" Olabilir miT, in Su Sorunu, Turkiye ve Ortadogz4 Sabahattin Sen (ed. ), 
(Istanbul: Baglam, 1993), p. 449; Gun Kut, 'Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and 
Tigris', New Perspectives on Turkey, (Fall 1993), pp. 7-8. 
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reached a record level, US$143 million in 1988 and US$177 million in 1989 (it was only 
US$60 million in 1987). 93 
As shown in this chapter, throughout the Cold War years Turkey enjoyed a relatively 
peaceful environment in its region, as it was not subjected to any aggression in any form, 
thanks to the stability created by the bi-polar international system and the security 
guarantees provided by the Alliance. Having a geo-strategic importance for the West 
against the Soviet threat owing to its location, Turkey successfully exploited t. s status to 
achieve its political, economic and strategic objectives. However, the political 
developments of the late 1980s, which brought down the Soviet empire and thus the bi- 
polar system of the Cold War after over four decades, brought serious challenges to this 
established Turkish foreign and security policy understanding. As the sudden 
developments led to significant changes in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Balkans and the old Soviet territories, given Turkey's involvement in these regions as a 
result of its geography and history, the new changes had a profound impact on Turkey's 
strategic environment. To what extent Turkish policies became successful in view of the 
brand new opportunities and challenges emerged with the new era to the best interest of 
the country in the initial decade of the post-Cold War period is the subject of coming 
chapters. 
93Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri 1982, (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1984), p. II and Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri 1989, (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 199 1), p. 15. 
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PART TWO 
MARGINALISATION OF TURKEY IN THE NEW EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
Having lost its strategic importance with the end of the Cold War, there was a growing 
perception in Ankara that the West would now view Turkey as a 'burden' rather than an 
important 'asset'. As Europe turned its focus towards the reconstruction of Eastern 
Europe, other regions in the immediate vicinity of Turkey such as the Caucasia and the 
Middle East, and to certain extent the Balkans, became of only secondary strategic 
importance. Thus, Ankara and Brussels had conflicting views over priorities on what was 
perceived as a threat in the new political environment. 
Turkey feared that NATO was now subject to erosion and possibly disbandment. 
Furthennore, European Union's (EU) growing desire to build a purely European defence 
mechanism, which may have undermined or weakened the transatlantic Alliance caused 
Ankara serious anxieties. More importantly, the EU's persistent rejection of Turkey's 
membership application after almost half a century of Turkish-EU relations not to mention 
its clear preference given to Central and Eastern European countries, confinned Turkey's 
fears that it might even face marginalisation and exclusion from the 'new Europe' all 
together. The psychology of being left out of Europe in fact drove Turkey to focus on 
other regions such as the Caucasia, Central Asia, the Black Sea, the Balkans and the 
Middle East while attempting to build alliance relationships with a number of countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ISOLATION OF TURKEY IN THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
2. I. Turkey's place in the new European security architecture, the WEU and the 
ESDIfESDP: Asset or burden? 
Changing relationship with the If estern European Union (IVEL9 
In 1991, President Ozal told the NVEU Assembly 'the EC and the NVELJ will never reach 
their natural and logical limits %Nithout Turkey'. ' In actual fact, starting from the early 
1990s, the Union has started to gain a greater say uithin NATO in overcoming the inability 
of the EU to provide a security dimension to European unity. 2 Tbc EU's Nlaastricht 
Summit of 1991 ended %%ith substantial brcak-throughs not only for the EU but also for the 
WEU. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 stated that the XVEU would be developed as the 
defence component of the EU and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. As such, the 
WEU transfonned and equipped itself with certain bodies such as the defence planning cell 
and the European Corps. It also established strong relations with the Eastern and Central 
European countries through the 'associate partnership' programme. 
Furthcnnore, it took part in various operations where NATO faced difficulties in co- 
ordinating its forces in response to 'out-of-area' crises, participated in naval and air 
surveillance mission during the UN embargo on Serbia and Montenegro in 1992 as well as 
in both Gulf Wars. 3 Tle NVEU also appeared to be an organisation suited to the defence and 
security needs of European nations due to its working links with NATO; its close relations 
, Aith the EU; its freedom from out-of-area restrictions unlike NATO; the existence of the 
European Corps; and its wide ranging of membership and Assembly, which was the only 
lNewspot, 6 June 199 1. 
217or the history of WEU see, Alfred Cahen, 11, estern European Union and NATO: Building a European 
Defence Identity within Context ofAtlantic Solidarity, (London: Brassey's, 1989). The Rome Declaratiork 
Issued by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU, Rome, 26-27 October 1984; Plaý(orm on 
European Security Interests, Issued by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU, The Hague, 27 
October 1987. 
3A. Jacomet, 'The role of WEU in the Gulf Crisis' in 11'estern Europe and the Gulf, N. Gncsotto and J. 
Roper (eds. ), (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 1992), p. 160; Willem Van Eekelen, 'WEU and the Gulf Crisis', Sunival, vol. 32, no. 6, (November-December 1990), p. 528; 1YEUs Operational 
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European forum for parliamentarians to discuss security and defence-related issues without 
the presence of Russia and theUS. 4 
With Maastricht the EU member states were invited to join the WEU or to become 
observers and the other European member states of NATO were invited to become 
associate mcmbers. 5 Thus, the Turkish application for full membership %N-as met with the 
granting of associate mcmbership. 6 In Ankara's view, this was not satisfactory unless the 
decision %%-as only a temporary one and, as Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cctin 
explained, 'Turkey cannot accept a status as a second class member within the WEU. '7 
According to the WEU's Petersberg Declaration of 1992, which outlined the rights and 
responsibilities of those countries with associate membership, Turkey would be able to 
participate fully in the WEU Council meetings, working groups and other bodies (such as 
the defence planning team and the Assembly) unless it was otherwise restricted; would 
make a financial contribution to the organisation's budget; would take part on the same 
basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they committed forces; and 
would associate itself Mth the decisions taken by member states and then participate in 
their implementation except where restrictions applied. 8 
However, Turkey was crucially excluded from the decision-making process in the 
Organisation and the Yugoslav Crisis, Document 1337,5 November 1992, Assembly of WEU- 
411ans Van Mierlo, 'The WEU and NATO: Prospects for a More Balanced Relationship', NATO Review, 
vol. 43, no. 2, (March 1995), pp. 8-9. However, despite these advantages the WEU falls down on certain 
issues, which stand in the way of any serious ambition to establish a European collective defence in any 
field other than crisis management. For an in-depth discussion see, Organising Security in Europe- 
Defence Aspects, Document no: 1510,8 February 1996, Assembly of WEU, Paris, p. 2; Financial Times, 
13 May 1997; 'The Defence of Europe', The Economist, 25 February 1995, p. 25. 
5Article J. 4 of Title V and Article B of Title I (Common provisions). Treaty on European Union; 7 
February 1992. 
6'Ankara BABda Kotunun Iyisiyle Yetindi', Cumhuriýet, 18 July 1992; 'Turkey Half Joins Europe's 
Military Wing', Turkish Probe, I December 1992; 
7T6AA1 Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 20, no. 2,11 November 1992, pp. 370-5; Cumhurtýet, 14 November 1992; 
Cigdem Nas, 'Bati Avrupa Birligi Olusumu Karsisinda Turkiye'nin Durumu' in Degisen Dunya ve 
Turkjýre, Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed. ), (Istanbul: Baglam, 1996), p. 83. 
S'Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, The Kingdom of Norway and 
the Republic of Turkey'. Letter From the Assemb4,, no. 14, February 1993. 
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NVEU Council and did not have the right to block a decision that was the subject of 
consensus among the member states. 9 According to one internal report prepared by the 
WEU Assembly, Turkey has placed itself in a difficult position by giving up its freedom 
of action by associating itself %vith a European security alliance %vithout having the 
protection offered by that alliance. It found itself participating in the implementation of 
decisions taken by member states uithout being able to participate in the decision-making 
process other than in a consultative capacity. 10 Thus, Turkey found itself shouldering 
NVEU responsibilities %%ithout getting any genuine security guarantees in return. 
Indeed, Turk-cy, a NATO member for four decades, found itself treated as a second- 
class member . iithin the WEU. Tlius ANAP, the main opposition party at the time, stated 
that it would vote against ratification of the WEU. 11 For that reason, as noted by Omur 
Orhun, the head of international security affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara 
appealed that an institutional basis must be provided for its access to the security 
dimension of EUs deliberations since the WEU is the military pillar of the EU and all the 
decisions were taken in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Other%vise, Turkey would be left in an unenviable position of associating itself with 
decisions taken elsewhere or distancing itself totally from the WEU, either of which 
would not be desirable. 12 
The creation of The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)IThe European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
Ile second issue in Turkey's relationship with the WEU and probably the most 
important one, as it further isolated Ankara in the European security environment, was 
9The Enlargement of IVEQ, Document 1340, Assembly of Western European Union. IOTurkey, Document 1341,6 November 1992, Assembly of Western European Union, P- 23; Murat Yctkin, 
Ates Hattinda Aktif Politika: Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Ortadogu Vcgeninde Turkjýe, (Istanbul: Alan, 1992), pp. 3234. 
'Financial Times, 15 October 1992. 
120mur Orhun, 'Turkey, Norway and the US in the New European Security Context, Foreign Policy 
(Ankara), vol. 2 1, nos. 1-2, (1997), p. 10. 
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EU's increasing cfforts to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, especially at the 
expense of a transatlantic NATO. By the second half of the 1990s, it appeared that a 
consensus xvas emerging among the member states to move towards some sort of an 
autonomous role within the Alliance. As one French politician noted 'now that Europe has 
a single currency, it is high time that it equips itself %Nith a defence and security identity. '13 
In fact, with the Maastricht Treaty, which had assigned the WEU the role of its defence 
component, the member countries agreed to accelerate political union by implemcnting a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to replace the European Political Co- 
operation framework (EPC). 14 It was envisaged that the CFSP would cover all matters 
regarding the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence capability. 15 NATO welcomed this 
move by which the EU would take greater responsibility for their common security and 
defence, and supported it for the further development of close co-operation between 
NATO and the WEU on the basis of complementarity. 16 Later in 1994 NNith the 
introduction of a 'Combined Joint Task Force' (CJTF), as a new concept in the use of 
anns, NATO allowed the European allies to direct operations under the aegis of NVEU. 
This meant that the Alliance, for the first time, had given the WEU increased 
responsibilities as a European pillar of NATO. 17 In 1996, this was further consolidated 
follouing the agreement to have an ESDI within NATO. This was expected to replace the 
WEU in the future. 18 The ESDI was replaced with a European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) after the Cologne and Helsinki summits in June and December 1999 
13'Summit Leaders Put Euro Before Defence', The Times, 22 October 1998. 
14*17he EPC %%-as introduced in 1970 and formalised by the Single European Act of 1987 as a foreign policy 
coordination and consultation mechanism between the member states. 
IsFor policies, decision-making process and principal objectives of the CFSP see, Article J. 1, TrearY on 
European Union, 7 February 1992. 
16COmmuniqui issued by the ministerial meeting ofthe North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 2 December 1993. 




In the meantime, Turkey %%-as concerned with developments which might increasingly 
isolate Ankara from the European flank of NATO as it %vould be excluded from the central 
decision making and planning process if the WEU duplicated or even weakened NATO. 
Moreover, the possibility of the merger of the WEU and the EU in the future further 
caused concerns in Turkey that it would be isolated from all of Brussels's defence-related 
decisions. 
As one senior Turkish diplomat put it: 'rhetoric by some European leaders about 
strengthening NATO and the transatlantic link %%-as far from convincing. In reality the 
ESDI project on the table aims to transfer many of the features of NATO over to the 
EU'19. While Onur Oymen, Turkey's pcn-nanent representative at NATO, claimed 'it is 
%vrong to think that Turkey could play the role of a subcontractor in regional conflicts, 
involved only in day-to-day operations, where the main decisions will be made by other 
European allies. 120 ThUS, the essential point was that, as a senior Turkish diplomat, in 
charge of the security affairs at the foreign ministry noted: Turkey was not against the 
ESDI's progress, but desired to be represented fully in that decision making procesS. 21 
Turkey %%ras also concerned that it would have no say in the decisions if for example, the 
EU intervened militarily in the areas such as the Balkans. 22 As president Ozal 
acknowledged, Turkey supported the evolution of a stronger European dimension on the 
1 SHinisterial Afeeting ofthe North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996. 
19Yuksel Soyleme4 http: //www. foreignpolicy. org. tr/englarticies/ysoylemez - 
200301. htm 
200nur Oymen, 'The Turkish Perspective on ESDI', on Ile European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI), The Institute of Turkish Studies, Washington, May 2000. For similar views see: Erol Manisali, 
'Avrupa Kendi Ordusunu Kurarken Turkiye Dislaniyor, Cumhur4w, 28 April 1999; Muharrem Karsli, 
'TC-AB-BAB-ABD-NATO', Afill4w, 16 December 1996; Aslan Gunduz, 'AB Yolunda NATO Vetosu', 
Aks4wrk 1-7 March 1997; Turkish defence minister H. Sami Turk's speech, NATO's Evolution in the 21st 
Century and Turkey, Washington, 26 April 1999, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 21 Interview with Tomur Bayer, Turkjýve, 26 December 1999; Hasan Unal, 'Avrupa Savuruna ve Guvenlik 
Girisimi', Zamart 29 April 1999 
22ESra CaAan, 'Towards the ESDP: With or without Turkey', Turkish Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, (Spring 2003), 
pp. 45-52. 
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condition that such a development reinforced the Atlantic Alliance. 23 'Mis was further 
emphasised by the Turkish premier Ciller who stated: 'in the military field in particular, it 
has been and remains hard to conceive of any circumstances in which Europe would be 
better off without American participation. 924 
The US has also supported Turkey's full membership in the WEU declaring that the 
new military formation should include Turkey. Washington also expressed its concern 
over the EU's search for a strong defence component arguing that this could undermine 
the unity of NATO. 23 As one state department official noted 'the last thing Washington 
wanted to see was a European defence identity which begins %%ithin NATO but grows out 
of NATO and thcn away from NATO. '26 By 1998, France, which had bcen distancing 
itself for some time from NATO's military structure on the grounds that the Europeans 
were not being offered a sufficiently important role in the Alliance, became an ardent 
supporter of reactivating and merging the WEU with the EU as the Union's 'military 
arm'. But, other members such as Italy, Britain and the Netherlands argued that the WEU 
should become a European security pillar within the Atlantic Alliance rather than 
duplicate it. 27 Follovýing Britain's decision to drop its long-standing objections to a EU 
defence capability, an Anglo-French defence initiative was put forward at the end of 1998 
calling on 'credible military forces' which foresaw the EU operating in an autonomous 
manner in international crises2s, and during NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999, 
the II EU NATO members pressed the Alliance to recognise the Union's right to order 
23Presideni Turgut 0--al's Address to the JVEU Parliamentary Assembly, Paris, 5 May 199 1. 
24Tansu Ciller, 'Turkey and NATO: Stability in the Vortex of Change', NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 2, (April 
1994), pp. 3-7. Also See, Seyfi Tashan, 'Turkiye'nin Stratejik Konumu ve Sorunlar', Zaman; 3 March 
1998. 
2SAksam, 2 December 1999. 
26'Europe Warned not to Weaken Nato', 7he Independent, 8 October 1999; 'Wary US Watches as Chirac 
and Blair Forge New European Defence Pact', The Independent, 25 November 1999. 
27Tom Lansford, 'The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security after 
28, 
the Cold War'. Journal ofStrategic Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, (March 1999), pp. 1-28, especially, pp. 9-16. 
Britain to Back Defence Role for Europe', 77ie Times, 21 October 1998; 'Britain and France Sign up to 
Defend Europe', The Times, 5 December 1998. 
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military operations using NATO's assets and capabilities when the US chose not to get 
involved. 29 
This further increased Turkey's suspicions and it strongly objected to this demand. 30 
Turkey managed to postpone the EU proposal with agreement only that the ESDI %vould 
seek consensus in NATO on a 'case-by-case" basiS. 31 However, though it -, vas agreed at 
the Washington Summit that there would be the fullest possible involvement of non-EU 
European allies in EU-Ied crisis response operations, this was ignored at both EU's June 
1999 Cologne and December 1999 Helsinki summits and no reference was made to the 
6strategic concept' which would seek the consent of the Alliance members, on a case-by- 
case basis, to use NATO assets and capabilitieS. 32 The Turkish foreign ministry issued a 
statement following the Helsinki meeting expressing its dissatisfaction with the decision 
to exclude it from the establishment process of a 60,000 European Rapid Reaction Force 
due to become operational by 2003.33 
Turkey., asset or burden 
The NVEU's decision to reject Turkey's full membership application and to sideline it 
from ESDI developments was perceived as a clear sign of the fact that in the absence of an 
immediate Soviet threat, Europe Nvas not keen to shoulder responsibility or risk itself on 
Turkey's behalf. Europe at this time vms pre-occupied by challenges including rising 
migration, illegal immigration, environmental issues, economic crisis, minority problems, 
ethnic strife and drug tmfficking. As then Czech president Vaclav Havel told the NATO 
Council in 1991: 
29Reuters, 20 April 1999. 
30'NATO'da Turkiye-AB Cekismesi', Hurr4wt, 22 April 1999. 
31 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Article 30, Washington, 23-24 April 1999; 'Turkey Escapes From-Last 
Minute Isolation', Briefing, no. 1240,3 May 1999, pp. 18-9; Sukru Elekdag, 'NATO, ABD, AB ve 
Turkiye', )Ifilliyet, 26 April 1999. 
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At the time when the totalitarian system in Central and Eastern Europe fell and 
democracy prevailed everything appeared to us to be clear and simple. But in 
reality the building of democratic systems and transition to market economics were 
much more painful than expected, and Central and Eastern European countries are 
now facing the threat of political and social unrest, material privations, criminal 
activities, increasingly intense feelings of hopelessness in society and the danger 
of popul ism-national ism, xenophobia and national intolerance. 34 
In addition to its preoccupation Nvith the above issues, Europe viewed Turkey 
increasingly as a burden. 35 In this context, though the unstinting support given by Ankara 
to the Western coalition against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf WarA-as praised, it did little to 
influence Brussels to include Turkey in a European security SyStCM. 36 
Moreover, while the Gulf War became a test case for Turkey to prove its value to the 
European members of NATO, it also highlighted the ambivalent attitude of some of these 
states to Turkish security issues. While the Dutch sent units of modem Patriot ground-to- 
air missiles, some other allies were rather reluctant to express their full support and hardly 
made any moves to defend Turkey from a possible Iraqi attack. Belgium, Germany and 
Italy sent a number of completely outdated and lightly armed warplanes that had already 
been marked for retirement. 37 Furthermore, German officials stated that an Iraqi attack on 
Turkey would not be considered as an attack upon NATO and would, therefore, not 
require a NATO response under the Washington Treaty, which prompted president Ozal 
to accuse Germany of being an 'unreliable' ally. 38 By the same token, Turkey 
34'President Havel's Address to the NATO Council', NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 2, (April 1991), pp. 31-5. 
35AIi Karaosmanoglu, Cumhuriyet, 7 February 1992; F. Stephen Larrabee, 'US and European Policy toward 
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acknowledged that, in the absence of the East-West confrontation, its contentious relations 
, *%ith Syria, Iraq or Iranwould not necessarily be NATO's primary concern. 39 
Indeed, as long as Turkey's security problems did not pose a direct threat to the 
European mainland, they %vcrc not a priority for Turkey's European allieS. 40 For example, 
Eberhart Rhein, who headed the European Commission's Turkey desk at the time, 
remarked that EU countries did not perceive Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia as security 
risks4l, while Turkey and its European allies shared different views over Bosnia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Northern Iraq, Cyprus and the Acgean-related issues with 
Grccce. 42As such, Turkey appeared to be the only country responding to the plight of 
Azerbaijan, as it failed to persuade its allies to stop Armenia occupying one-fifth of the 
Azeri territories; while the allies were inactive against Serb atrocities against Bosnians 
during most of the Yugoslav crisis, and rejected the Turkey's proposal for military 
intervention and the end of the arms embargo on Bosnia. 
Apparently, Northern Europe also viewed Turkey's problems with Iraq and Syria as 
part of a strategic equation in the Middle East which had little to do with European 
security. 43 Like%%ise, Russian initiatives to modify the CFE in Caucasia and to deploy 
more Russian 'peace keeping' troops at the expense of Turkey and the newly-independent 
republics as part of its effort to legitimise its presence in Transcaucasia did not cause 
Lepgold and Danny Unger (cds. ), (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 177-8; Patrick M. Cronin, 
'Perspectives on Policy and Strategy'. Strategic Review, vol. 23, no. 4, (Fall 1995), p. 69. 391ntcrview with Hikmet Ozdemir, Hidir Goktas and Metin Gulbay, Soguk Savastan Sicak Barisa: Yeni 
Dunya Duzzeni ve TurWe, (Istanbul: Alan, 1994), pp. 176-7. 
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much concern, among Turkey's European allics. 41 According to Kamran Inan, a long-timc 
minister and a diplomat, while Central and Eastern Europe %N-as well integrated into 
Europe through economic and military mechanisms, the Turkic republics Nvere left to fend 
for themselves against Russia. 45 Nor did Turkey's strategic partnership with Israel 
generate any great support in Europe on the grounds that this move might further 
complicate matters in the Middle East. The Greek foreign minister called the Turkish- 
Israeli relationship as 'an alliance of %%Tongdoers" and 'a threat to the security of the 
region. 946 
Critically, the Turkish political leadership and the wider public also increasingly came 
to sense that in some way its allies were becoming receptive to PKK's efforts to gain a 
political foothold throughout Europe. 47 For example, Ozdem. Sanberk-, Turkey's 
ambassador to London, argued that 'our educated class was raised to assume that its 
destiny was in Europe, but now sees prominent European politicians linking hands with 
groups whose aim is to overthrow our state or even aspire to partitionit. '49 While, Dogan 
Gures, the former army chief of staff, accused some European states, including Germany, 
France, Belgium and Sweden, of harbouring the PKK. 49 Moreover, the Kurdish question, 
particularly the PICK issue, became one of the main impediments to Turkish integration 
into Europe. Turkey's tense relations with its European allies in this matter grew as 
Kurdish organisations, which had close links with the PKK, found refuge in several 
44Sadi Erguvcnc, 'Ortak B ir Avrupa Savunmasina Dogru', Dis Politika; vol. 6, no. 1, (April 1995), pp. 23-9. 
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(June 200 1); Turkish Daily News, 6 March 1998. 
47Erol Manisali, 'Kuzey Irak'ta Tehlikeli Oyun', Cumhurbýet, 16 October 1992; Heinz Kramer, A Changing 
Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 
2000), p. 208. 
48Cited in Carl Cavanagah, 'Turkey and the Pale Light of European Democracy', Alediterranean Politics. 
vol. 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 65. 49'Gures: Teroru Amerika'da, Destekliyor, Gozcu; 4 November 1996. 
64 
European countries, such as Germany, and organised Kurdish refugee groups in Europe. 50 
Baki Ilkin, the Turkish ambassador to Washington expressed Turkey's discomfort over 
this dewvelopment, 'I should underscore the importance of remaining vigilant against 
extensions and front organizations of the PKK, which operate under cultural and political 
guises in Europe and even in this country (the US). '5' 
In this context, the first international Kurdish conference was organised in Paris in 
1989 chaired by the French president Mitterand's %Nife52; the Netherlands agreed to host a 
Kurdish Parliament- in-cxile, which %vas kno%vn to have links with the PKKII; Demnark 
allowed the ERNK, the political uing of the PKK, to open an office in Copenhagen5l and 
Britain granted a licence to the PKK-supported TV station, NIED TV, broadcasting to 
Turkey since 1995. Moreover, Germany imposed an arms embargo on Ankara arguing 
that Turkey used Gennan arms against its own civilian Kurdish population in 1992 and 
further halted its military aid to Turkey in 1995 due to Turkish operations against the 
PKK. 55 The European Parliament demanded that all EU aid to Turkey earmarked to help 
Ankara set up a customs union %Nith the EU be frozen immediately with the exception of 
those funds intended for projects to further promote democracy and respect for human 
rights. 56 Finally, prior to the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's capture in Kenya in 1999, 
Rome allowed him refuge and rejected Turkey's demand for extradition. While, asvvill be 
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discussed later, Greece extended support to the PKK from the very beginning of the 
Kurdish separatist operations. 
21. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): 
The answer to Turkish security issues? 
Despite NATO's unrivalled prominence and crucial role in Turkey's security structure, 
its new geo-strategic cnvirorunent drove Ankara to seek an alternative regional 
mechanism which would provide it the opportunity to put forward its own agenda. 57 The 
1990 Chartcr of Paris tc-dcfined and institutional ised the Confcrcncc on Co-opcmtion and 
Security in Europe (CSCE) for the new international environment in 1994 and its name 
%%-as changed to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 58 
Thus, the OSCE became even more important to Turkey due to the view that the post- 
Cold War order would be shaped by two important principles: the rule of law and 
collective security. 59 Ankara viewed the OSCE as a collective security regime that would 
deal %%ith crises of the post-Cold War era such as Bosnia and Azeri-Armenian wars. 60 
Turkey also asked for the backing of the OSCE countries in its fight against PKK 
terrorism *-, ithin the context of collective action against terrorism, organized crime, arms 
and drug tmfficking. 61 
Although Turkey attached great importance to the OSCE, two major deficiencies 
prevailed in the process of its development into a viable collective security regime during 
the period under discussion. Tle first AN-as the lack of will. As will be discussed later, 
5717or example, following the Paris Summit of 1990, Turkey played an important role in bringing the Turkic 
republics into the organisation with the belief that the membership would help to consolidate their 
independence and facilitate their integration into the Western world. 5817or the activities and institutions of OSCE see, OSC& (Vienna: Secretariat of the OSCE, 1996), pp. 5-8; 
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despite Turkey's desire for the organisation to deal %%rith the crises of Bosnia and Nagomo- 
Karabakh, the OSCE's response was %veak-. Turkish foreign minister Cetin argued that 'the 
CSCE has not lived up to expectations in these crises. '62 Prime minister Ciller also 
criticisc te organisation for sho%Ning a lack of political %kill during a CSCE meetings: 
'The success of institutions or organisations depends on the political %Nill the member 
countries can generate, but that unfortunately this political NNill and determination was not 
being shoNNm in connection Aith Bosnia and Karabakh. '63 One important weaknesses of 
the organisation was that all decisions were taken by consensus and for this reason its 
large membership (%kith fi r, 64 ifty-five countries) made it dif icult to reach such consensus. In 
this sense, as noted by Criss 'the OSCE remains a merc instrument of good-will. '65 
The second deficiency of the organisation, perhaps a more serious one, u-as that 
decisions were not legally binding and as a result several member states ignored OSCE 
agreements and decisions. One clear example of this was the Russian military operations 
in Chechnya, which was viewed as a clear violation of the OSCE Code of Conduct. 66 
2.3. A transformed NATO: Turkey's crucial link with Europe 
It can be argued that given Turkey's new security challenges in the post-Cold War era, 
it needed an even stronger NATO security umbrella. Following the abolition of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation in early 1991, and the %Nithdm%,, -al of the Soviet troops from 
Central and Eastern European countries, in July 1990 the London Declaration of the North 
Atlantic Alliance stated that it no longer regarded the members of the Warsaw Pact as 
62TRT Radio (Ankara), SIVB, EE/I 859,30 November 1993. 
63'CSCE Summit', Newspot, 16 December 1994. 
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adversaries. 67 In response, there were two clashing views over NATO's future. One group 
argued that NATO was the most successful security organisation in modem history and 
was still the sole guarantor at the centre of European defence. The other group argued that 
in the absence of a clear and imminent threat to the West, NATO was no longer relevant 
to Europe's changing security enviromnent. 69 In any event, NATO, as a victorious 
institution of the Cold War era, was bound to redefine itself to justify its continuing role in 
the new European security architecture, and following the disappearance of the Warsaw 
Pact, NATO tried to adapt its new policies and objectives to the changes taking place in 
EuropC. 69 It also established close links with the Central and Eastern European countries 
as well as with the CIS members, notably Russia, despite early fears that the two would 
ncver coopcrate. 70 
Turkey was relieved, to some extent, to see a more powerful NATO attempting to deal 
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with new conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East. 71 Turkey welcomed the 
use of NATO forces for peacekeeping purposes such as in Bosnia, though it argued that 
the organisation should be able to intervene in these regions as a peace making body as 
-w0l. 72 As early as 1992, Turkey asked for a NATO force to be deployed in Karabakh 
when a cease-fire %vas achieved and repeatedly urged NATO to intervene in the -A-ar in 
Bosnia. 73 Ankara also asked for a division size NATO force, to be deployed either in the 
eastern or the southern part of Turkey to help fight the PICK on the grounds that the 
Alliance regarded state supported terrorism as a thrcat. 74 
From the Turkish perspective, as %vill be discussed in the coming chapters, the wars in 
the Balkans demonstrated the inability of the regional and non-regional organisations 
other than NATO to contain the new conflicts. In essence therefore, the successful NATO 
operations during the Bosnia and Kosovo crises, the first 'out-of-area' and ground force 
operations in its history, served to show that there was no practical alternative to NATO 
under American leadership. 75 NATO's involvement also showed that Europe, without 
transatlantic involvement, could not restore and maintain peace on the continent alone. As 
an internal report presented to the WEU Assembly stated, 'despite its efforts for four years 
to establish and conduct a common security policy, Europe has not been able to bring 
about peace in the former Yugoslavia without military and diplomatic intervention and 
military support from the US. '76 For Turkey, therefore, a US-led NATO, as Turkish 
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president Demirel noted in 1999, Nvas the most important forum for protecting the values 
of the civilized world in the next century. 77 
NATO expansion 
Despite some differences %vith the Alliance over NATO's dual process of adaptation 
and enlargement, for Turkey NATO provided the main multilateral link for achieving its 
security needs and addressing old and new regional challenges. Russia objected to 
NATO's casm-ard enlargement to include former Warsaw Bloc countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 78 Turkey was concerned that given Russia's 
regional role in the ex-Soviet republics, Moscow's position should be taken into 
considcmtion since the negative developments could strengthen the hands of anti-Western 
nationalists in Russia who viewed Turkey as a rival. 79TIiere was also the fear that Russia 
might even be pushed to move into Eurasia or 'near abroad' in order to consolidate its 
influence at the expense of the newly-independent regional countries of Caucasia and 
Central Asia, where Turkey had strategic interests. 80 Thus, Ankara reiterated its support 
for Russia in view of the proposed NATO expansion, and argued that Europe's security 
framework could not be constructed without Russia. 81 
Turkey was also concerned by the possibility that NATO expansion might be linked to 
Western European Union, Paris, p. 2. 
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the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990, which proposed significant 
reductions in conventional arms and equipment. Indeed, in 1995, the Russian defence 
minister threatened that Russia would not fulfil CFE treaty obligations if NATO expanded 
into Eastern Europe. This was followed by the creation of the 58 th Army in the Northern 
Caucasus to 'maintain stability and tranquillity' in the region. 82 At this point, it emerged 
that NATO was considering concessions that would allow Moscow to deploy a heavier 
military presence in the Caucasus region than set out in the treaty in return for Russia's 
consent over cxpansion. 83 In fact, to Ankara's disappointment, Russia was permitted 
higher force levels in the original areas of the flank zone and with an extension from 1995 
to 1999 to comply with the treaty obligations during the first CFE Review Conference in 
1996.94 Ankara feared that this might jeopardise the existing military balance at the 
expense of Turkey and undermine the independence of the Caucasian republics. " As the 
Turkish deputy chief of staff Cevik Bir noted the fear that, 'within the context of the CFE 
negotiations, a green light is practically given to prior adversaries to deploy more forces in 
Caucasus in exchange for certain concessions in Central Europe. By doing so, the risks for 
Turkey are compounded and the newly-independent states are left under political and 
military pressure. '86 
Another issue was the direction of NATO's expansion. By 1996, debates on NATO's 
expansion gained momentum particularly when it was backed with great enthusiasm by 
then the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who noted that 'the new NATO could 
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82Douglas L. Clarke, 'Russia and the CFE Treaty', Post Soviet Prospects, vol. 3, no. 6, (June 1995); 
'Conventional Forces in Europe: Outflanked', The Economist, 8 June 1996, p. 44. 
83See, 'Upheaval in Transcaucaus and Turkey: A new centre of challenges and opportunities for Turkey' 
Chapter Nine. 
84According to Dean, one reason for this, was to have a free hand to move ahead with NATO enlargement 
in 1997. Jonathan Dean, 'Future of the CFE Treaty', Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, 
no. 17 (May 1996); Jeffrey D. McCausland, 'NATO and Russian Approaches to Adapting the CFE 
Treaty'. Arms Control Today, (August 1997). 
85Erhan Yarar, 'NATO'ye Evet Ama, Genislemeye "Tereddutsuz Evet'e" Hayir', Yeni Yu-, yil, 27 May 1997. "Strategic Forum, no. 135, (February 1998), p. 4. 
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do for Europe's East what the old NATO did for Europe's West-'87 On the issue of the 
countries to be invited to join, the US initially insisted that only Czechs, Hungarians and 
Poles should join NATO. 88 Germany and Britain agreed, 89 but Turkey supported 
membership of Balkan states including Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Albania, where it 
had direct security concerns. " As such, Turkey strongly backed the French proposal for a 
'southern enlargement' and this won considerable support from the Mediterranean 
members who sought to balance the 'eastern enlargement. 91 Ankara was also concerned 
that NATO's eastern expansion would bring a greater burden on the southern flank 
countries such as Turkey as the Alliance would increasingly concentrate on the east. 92 
During the expansion debates, Turkey also argued that the growth of NATO and other 
European organisations needed to be considered together, with Turkish foreign minister 
Ciller argued that 'it must not be forgotten that NATO documents prescribe that the 
expansion of NATO, the EU and the WEU should proceed together in close relation. 193 
On this basis, Turkey also argued that it would be very difficult for the Turkish parliament 
to ratify NATO's decision for enlargement unless it received certain assurances that there 
would be some progress towards its EU membership application. 94 However, Ankara 
later acknowledged that there was little hope that the European members of the Alliance 
would notice this on the grounds that these were two different issues to be handled 
separately. Ultimately, Ankara was not in a position to push its arguments strongly but to 
87The Economist, 15 February 1997; The Independent, 17 February 1997. 
"John Lwis Gaddis, 'History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement', Survival, vol. 40, no. 1, (Spring 
1998), pp. 145-5 1. 
89See, International Herald Tribune, 9 October 1996; The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU 
(London: Conservative Political Center, 1994), p. 18. "Interview with Sukru Sina Gurel, Turkish minister of state in charge of European affairs, Turk4w, 26 
October 1997. 
917he Economist, 7 June 1997. 
92Ergun Balci, 'NATO'da Yeni Tartisma', Cumhur4w, 17 June 1997. 
93Cumhur4w. 19 February 1997. 
94See the statement of Kamran Inan, head of the foreign affairs commission in the assembly. 'Mansur Akgun, 'Bati ve Turkiyc', Yeni Yuzyd, 10 June 1997; Ferhat Koc, 'Yeni NATO', )WIli Gazzele, 17 July 
1997. 
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go along with the decision for expansion and did not seek to block the accession of the 
prospective entry of new members to NATO. 95 During the Madrid Summit of 1997 the 
Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks and the 
three former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO in 1999 to coincide with the Alliance's 
50th anniVCrsary. 96 
95 The Daily Telegraph, 17 December 1997. 
96Afadrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation, Madrid, 8 July 1997; Washington 
Summit Communiqui. Washington, 24 April 1999. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ALIENATION OF TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3.1. Turkey's prospects for full-membership of the European Union (EU): 
Obsession or reality? 
In addition to Turkey's apparent exclusion from the establishment of the new European 
security structure, Ankara's marginaslisation in the context of 'the new Europe' was even 
more visible in relation to Turkish-EU relations. In addition to Brussels's rejection in 
1989, the Union's Luxembourg Summit in 1997 left Turkey out of EU's biggest ever 
enlargement process following which Ankara even threatened to withdraw its membership 
application totally, as well as suspend political dialogue. On the other hand, the inclusion 
of other nations ahead of Turkey, who had far weaker economies than Turkey and who 
lacked experience of the free market economy and democracy ftirther deepened the 
diasppointment and anger in Turkey. This sense of isolation, in addition to its domestic 
ramifications, resulted in Turkey seeking more diverse relations with other regions in an 
attempt to revitilise its already declining strategic value to Europe. The emergence of new 
foreign policy alternatives beyond its borders in the wake of the Cold War no doubt 
further influenced Turkish policy makers to re-evaluate the traditionally Western-oriented 
outlook. For example, as early as 1990, President Ozal pointed out other areas as new 
alternatives to Europe: the newly opened Central Asia region, the Balkans and the 
Muslim/Arab world. ' The ever-increasing centrality of Washington to Turkish policies 
and the strategic partnership developed with Israel over the last decade should also be 
considered in this respect. 
Turkey's Westemisation policy, which started with the Tanzimat period (Refonnation 
of 1839) during the Ottoman era, gained a new dimension and added momentum with the 
emergence of modem Turkey in 1923. Ataturk believed that, as a pressing priority, 
I'Ozal'dan 6 Mesaj', Cumhuriyet, 17 July 1990. Also see, Sebahattin Zaim, 'Turkiye'nin Avrupa Toplulugu 
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Turkey's place should be among the most civilised nations of the world. According to 
him, civilization meant Europe and this goal could only be realised with a new 
civilisational project, which was nothing less than a 'change of civilisation': from East to 
WeSt. 2 Since that time it had always been Turkey's position that integration fully into 
Europe was the ultimate realisation of its Westernisation policy, and particularly for 
Ataturkist secular elite, this has become a key matter of identity-almost an existential 
concern. 3 In this respect, in the eyes of Turkish officials, the EU provided Turkey a 
platform from which it could realise its long-lasting goal, as such the membership 
application made to the EEC in 1959 was viewed a decisive step. 4 Indeed, following the 
customs union agreement in 1995, the Turkish foreign minister Murat Karayalcin claimed 
in a speech before the Turkey-EU Association that 'Turkey regards the Customs Union 
Agreement as one of the main instruments of her economic and political modernisation 
process. We believe that this will anchor us to Europe in line with the basic orientations of 
our Republic. '5 In this context, as noted by Seyfi Tashan, head of the Foreign Policy 
Institute in Ankara, even Turkey's lengthy representation in the Alliance was no match, 
'NATO is our legal foot in the Western camp, but the EU is the real one. 16 In sum, as 
noted by Ozal in his book, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, in the last forty years 
membership in the EU has become a fundamental foreign policy goal to be viewed as a 
matter of national interest. 
Turkey believes that in joining the EU she identifies her future with that of 
Europe. This is her fundamental purpose. At the cost of very great sacrifices 
Turkey has struggled for more than two centuries to establish a democratic way 
of life based on liberty and human rights. Since we share these ideals with Europe 
Meselesi' in Avrupa Toplulugunun Cevabi ve Yen! Tercihler, (Istanbul: TOBB, 1990), pp. 45-6. 
2Ataturk'un Soylev ve Demecleri, (Istanbul: 1945), pp. 320-5; Nilufer Gole, 'Modern Mahrem, Medeniyet ve 
Ortunme, Fifth edition, (Istanbul: Metis, 1994), pp. 48-76. 3Philip Robins, 'Turkey and Europe: Integration or Alienation? ', Policy Watch, 4 August 1998. 
4Udo Steinbach, 'The European Community, the United States, the Middle East, and Turkey' in Turkey and 
the West, Metin Heper (ed. ), (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 112. 
5 Turkiye-A T 36. Ortaklik Konseyi Toqlantisi, (Istanbul: IKV, 1995). 
6The Economist, 18 June 1988. 
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Turkey believes that she can defend them better with the help of Europe. 7 
In addition to this overriding aspect of Turkish-EU relationship there were several 
other factors underpinning the relationship. The EU appeared as a major economic world 
power and gained substantial influence in international affairs in the post-Soviet era. In 
line with its economic success, Brussels also sought ways to realise its historical goal of 
political integration in the future, which became more evident after its initiatives to form a 
common foreign and security policy among the member states. No doubt such a political 
initiative, without Turkey, as discussed earlier, would bring serious security implications 
for Ankara in the context of the European security system. 8 Political and security reasons 
aside, economic and trade relations alone made Turkish-EU ties exceptional and Turkey's 
immediate economic interests became primarily a sign of co-operation with the West. EU 
members were the most important trading partners of the Turkish economy, and EU 
markets were extremely significant for Turkey. For example, over the decade under 
discussion Turkey's trade volume with the EU accounted for half of Turkey's overall 
trade. As of 1999, the EU accounted for a 54 percent share of Turkey's total exports and 
53 percent of its imports. These figures have been almost stable in the last twenty years 
(with the exception of the early years of 1980s which saw an improvement in trade with 
the Middle Eastern countries). 9 Turkey was about the sixth largest external trading partner 
of the EU and since 1996 has had a full customs union with it. 10 In addition, nearly 60 per 
7Turgut Ozal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, (N icogia: K. Rustern and Brother, 192 1), pp. 340- 1. 
8The Greek factor was another important political reason in Turkey's bid for membership. In fact, one of the 
main reasons behind the Turkish application to the EEC in 1959 was that Ankara did not want to leave 
Greece alone within the community as bilateral relations of the two Aegean members started to 
deteriorate and entered a new phase of tension. Thus, it was Ankara's conviction that the differences in 
the Turco-Greek between would eventually become issues between Turkey and the EU unless Turkey 
represented in Brussels. Esat Cam, 'Avrupa Toplulugu ve Turkiye' in Turk Dis Politikasinda Sorunlar, 
Esat Cam (ed. ), (Istanbul: Der, 1989), pp. 168-74; Tevfik Saracoglu, Turkýve Avrupa Ekonomik 
Toplulugu Ortakligi. - Anlasmalar, (Istanbul: Ekonomi Yayinlari, 1992), p. 4. 
9Turkish Economy and EU-Turkey Relations, TUSIAD, January 2000. 
1OFor the Customs Union Agreement see, Mehmet Gonlubol and F. Hakan Bingun, 11990-1995 Donemi 
Turk Dis Politikasi' in Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1945, Ninth edition, (Ankara: Siyasal, 1996), 
pp. 719-27; M. Ali Birand, Turkiyenin Gumruk Birligi Macerasi, 1953-1996, (Istanbul: AD Yayincilik, 
1996), pp. 448-50; Michael Cendrowicz, 'The European Community and Turkey: Looking Backwards, 
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cent of foreign investment was from EU countries. 11 Moreover, around three million 
Turks live in Europe and they transfer significant amounts of remittance to Turkey: 
estimated at US$3 billion annually. 12 
As Eric Rouleau, the former French ambassador to Ankara argues, given the origins 
and dynamics of Turkey's relationship with the Union, there is almost a national 
consensus that Turkey's future lied with Europe. According to one survey conducted in 
Istanbul in 1993, nearly half of the participants responded that Turkey should be part of 
the EU, more than double those who favoured integration with either the Muslim world or 
the Turkic world (22 and 20 percent, respectively). 13 
Even when Turkish enthusiasm over prospects in Central Asia and the Middle East 
was at its height, Ankara never deviated from its long-standing and deep 
conviction that Turkey's future lies with Europe. Turkey's determination to 
become an integral part of Europe is the fruit of a national consensus that could 
seem strange in a Muslim country with nothing more than a geographical toehold 
in Europe. 14 
Apart from the existence of strong pro-Western bureaucracy, (most notably the foreign 
ministry), secularist Kernalist elite and the army, which has been viewed as the ultimate 
guardian of the Kemalist ideology, in the context of the decision-making process, political 
parties of both right and left wings have traditionally been supportive of Turkey's 
relations with the Union. As a matter of fact, since the time of Turkey's membership 
application to the EU in 1959, different political parties from each spectrum of Turkish 
political life, including military regimes, have become ardent supporters of improved 
Looking Forwards' in Turkish Foreign Policy, C. H. Dodd (ed. ), (Cambridge: The Eotlen Press, 1992), p. 
25; Esra Cayhan, 'Avrupa Birliginin Sorunlari' in Avrupada Yeni Guvenlik Arayislari NATO-AB- 
Turkiye, Esra Oayhan and Nursin A. Guney, (Istanbul: AFA, 1996), pp. 134-6. 
1 IDis Ticaret Istatistiklerl 1995, (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1997), p. 28; Yilmaz, op. cit., p. 97. 
12See, Faruk Sen, 'Turkish Communities in Western Europe' in Turkey Between East and the West: New 
Challenges for a Rising regional Power, Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds. ), (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996), pp. 233-64; Koray Duzgoren, 'Avrupa'daki Turkiye'nin Farkindamiyiz? ', 
Radikal, 10 June 1997; Ismet Solak, 'Almanya'daki Turkiye, Hurriyet, 8 February 1999. 
13Yilmaz Esmer, 'Turk Kamuoyu ve Avrupa' in Turkiye Avrupanin Neresinde?, Bulent Gokay (ed. ), 
(Ankara: Ayrac, 1997), pp. 125-6. 
14Eric Rouleau, 'The Challenges to Turkey', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, (November-December 1993), P. 
115. 
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relations with the EU. The only exceptions to this have been the religious and far-left 
parties, which are generally marginal and have never managed to be dominant in Turkish 
politiCS. 15 One reason for this high level of stability in the country's committed pro- 
Western orientation, according to Celik, was due to the fact that the military establishment 
had dominated foreign policy decision making. 16 To this end, the anti-Western Refah 
Party's relatively short stay in power (between June 1996 and July 1997) is a recent 
example of how Kemalist ideology remains a powerful force. Despite the growing fears 
among Turkey's western allies (as well as financial institutions and investors)17 relations 
with the EU continued to grow. 18 Although Refah's Necmettin Erbakan threatened to 
cancel it before he came to power, nothing happened to the Customs Union Agreement. 
Eventually, Refah's tentative steps towards changing the orientation of the country's 
established foreign policy were highly constrained by the army and resulted in the 
government's removal, in what amounted to a 'soft' or 'post-modem' coup. 
Notwithstanding this commitment shown by Turkey to integrate with Europe and the 
existence of vast economic and political interdependence, two important asymmetries 
within EU-Turkish relations severely affected better relations. The first was that Turkey 
placed far more importance on its relations with the EU than the EU did on its relations 
with Turkey. 19 Essentially, therefore, Brussels's continuous refusal to accept Turkey as a 
full member on economic and political grounds, despite the fact that Turkey, since the 
Ankara Agreement of 1963, had the oldest association relationship with the EU was the 
foremost factor behind the rapid deterioration in political relations. Secondly, as already 
15Pro-Islamist Refah Party (heir to the National Order and National Salvation Parties) and the communist 
the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) in the 1970s became known with their anti-European policies. For a 
well-elaborated research on Turkish political parties' approach towards Turkey's membership application 
see, Esra Cayhan, Dunden Bugune Turkiye- Avrupa Birligi fliskileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakisi, 
(Istanbul: Boyut, 1997). 
16Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p. 152. 
17The Times, 6 June 1996. 
18See, Philip Robins, 'Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, (Summer 1997). 
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briefly noted, in the post-Cold War era Turkey and its European allies had differences and 
held diverse views on many regional issues: from the Kurdish problem to the Azeri- 
Armenian war, from the Cyprus question to the Bosnian crisis. This, however, further 
contributed to the disappointment and resentment with the EU. Additionally, the end of 
the Cold War not only helped to bring an added emphasis on the issues such as human 
rights, democratisation and the rule of law but also influenced Turkey's domestic scene. In 
this regard, the country's fundamental domestic problems were no longer solely internal 
matters. For example, the internationalised-Kurdish issue which had direct bearings on 
these issues had serious implications on Turkey's relationship with Europe. 
Towards the Luxembourg shock 
In 1989, the EU flatly rejected Turkey's membership application of 1987 whilst 
providing no timetable for full membership. The European Commission referred to 
Turkey's unsuitability for membership in political and economic terms. 20 The prospect for 
membership was further hampered as a consequence of the unprecedented developments 
in the European political map in the late 1980s when Central and Eastern European 
countries appeared as new and strong candidates for the EU club. Obviously, this 
significantly reduced Turkey's chance of membership. For example, as early as 1991, 
Fernard Braun, special adviser to Jacques Delors, the president of the EC Commission, 
said at a panel in Istanbul, 'if I tell you that the Community's doors are wide open for 
Turkey, I would not be honest'. 21 Shortly after Turkey's historic Customs Union 
Agreement with the EU22, which made Turkey the first country to conclude a customs 
19Robins, 'Turkey', op. cit. 
20COmmission Opinion on Turkey's Requestfor Accession to the Community, Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels, 20 December 1989; John Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the 
European Community: Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta?, (Hants: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993), pp. 17-62. 
21Dateline TurkeD4 I December 1990. A German diplomat claimed that given its political and cultural 
identity Turkish membership 'would dilute the EC's Europeanness'. The Time, 19 October 1992, p. 33. 
22The customs Union put some additional burden on Turkish economy, though in the long-term it was 
envisaged that it would mainly benefit on the basis that a smooth economic integration of Turkey into the 
customs union would be realised. For the impacts of the customs union on Turkish economy see, Erol 
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union treaty without holding full-membership status, the EU's Luxembourg Summit in 
December 1997 decided the Union's biggest-ever expansion. The EU invited Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia as well as Cyprus into membership 
negotiations starting in March 1998 and promised that negotiations with five other states - 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania- could begin as soon as they were 
deemed ready. Meanwhile, Turkey managed to secure recognition for the first time of its 
'eligibility for accession to the EU' without gaining 'candidate' status. 23 
For Turkey, the summit was a major disappointment -known as 'the Luxembourg 
shock'-and marked a new low in relations with Europe. In Ankara's view, as Sukru Gurel, 
the then foreign minister, put it Turkey's candidacy for full-membership was not judged 
by the same objective criteria applicable to the other candidates. 24 Furthermore, the 
inclusion of Cyprus in the first wave of applicant countries was perceived by Ankara as a 
clear sign that the EU simply did not take any notice of Turkish sensitivity over the issue 
and was taking sides with Greece or acting under the Greek influence. 25 Ankara feared 
that it now faced isolation and marginalisation. In the words of Ozdem Sanberk, a senior 
diplomat at Turkish foreign ministry and Ankara's ambassador to London: 'Europe is 
consciously leaving Turkey out of the patterns it is designing for its own future. The EU 
Manisali, Avrupa Birligine Alinmayan Turkiyeýi Gumruk Birliginde Bekleyen Sorunlar, (Istanbul: 
Baglam, 1994); Deniz Vardar, 'Turkiye-Avrupa Toplulugu Iliskileri' in Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi, 
Faruk Soylemezoglu (ed. ), (Istanbul: Der, 1994), p. 136; Mina Toksoz, 'The Economy: Achievements 
and Prospects' in Turkish Transformation: New Century New Challenges, Brian W. Beeley (ed. ), 
(Huntingdon: The Eathon Press, 2002), pp. 145-7; Turkish Economy-1996, (Istanbul: MUSIAD, 1926), p. 
56; Cumhuriýet, 30 September 1997; Nejdet Sevinc, 'Rakamlarla Gumruk Birligi', Gunaydin, 25 July 
1997; Bahri Yilmaz, 'Turkey's New Role in International Politics', A ussen Politik, vol. 45, no. 1, (1994), 
P. 98. 
23 The Independent, 15 December 1997. 
24Sukru S. Gurel, 'A General Appraisal of Current Turkish Foreign Policy' in Turkey at the Threshold of the 
21"' Century: Global Encounters andlvs. Regional Alternatives, Mustafa Aydin (ed. ), (Ankara: 
International Relations Foundation, 1998), p. 11. 
25Atila Eralp, 'Turkey and the European Union in the post-Cold War Era' in Alan MakovskY and Sabri 
Sayari (eds), Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington: The 
Washington institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 182. 
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clearly has no plans to incorporate or absorb Turkey at present. 126 The German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl's statement at a 1997 meeting of Christian Democrats further helped to 
confirm this perception. 'As far as I am concerned Turkey can never join the EU' Kohl 
said. 27 As a result, political relations between Ankara and Brussels saw a rapid 
deterioration. The Turkish Foreign minister Ismail Cern described the decision as 'wrong 
and negative' declaring Turkey's decision to suspend political discussions with the EU 
unless it came forward with an acceptable formula, but to continue economic relations 
within the framework of the customs union. 28 The Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz 
also affirmed later that Turkey would no longer discuss certain issues with the EU such as 
the dispute with Greece, human rights and the Cyprus question while bilateral discussions 
would carry on with Greece, Britain and America or with any other interested parties-'29 
Then he threatened to withdraw Turkey's membership application from the EU unless 
Brussels fonnally granted it 'candidate status' and included Turkey in the accession 
process by June 1998. Turkey also threatened to boycott goods from 12 EU countries 
(excluding France, Italy and the UK which were seen as sympathetic to the Turkish 
cause). 30 
The only positive development in this context came in 1999. The devastating 
earthquake in Turkey, which resulted in thousands of casualties, had a positive impact on 
Turkey's political relations with the EU. Meanwhile, the new German socialist 
goveniment was more supportive than the previous Kohl govemment to Turkish 
260zdern Sanberk, The Outlook for Relations between Turkey and the European Union after the Cardiff 
Summit, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 July 1998. 
27AIso see German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel's statement, Stephen Kinzer, 'Europeans Shut the Door 
on Turkey's Membership in Union. ' New York Times, 27 March 1997; Stephen Bates and Martin Walker, 
'Bridge over Troubled Waters', The Guardian, 2 December 1998. 
28Hurriývet, 13 December 1997. 
29The Daily Telegraph, 15 December 1997. 
30The Daily Telegraph, 18 December 1997; Zamatt 19 December 1997. 
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membership ambitions. 31 New Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder even stated 'Germany 
determinedly supports Turkey's efforts to be a full EU member. "32 The earthquake also 
generated a significant rapprochement between Turkey and Greece and there was an 
exchange of rescue assistance and humanitarian aid. This was followed by a new political 
dialogue between the two neighbours as Athens became more co-operative in easing its 
long-standing objections towards Turkey's membership of the EU. 33 
In December 1999, Turkey was invited to become a candidate for membership. 34 
Obviously this created enormous enthusiasm in many circles in the country that 'a 160- 
year old dream' was about to come true. 'Turkey's Westernisation vocation which started 
in 1839 with the Tanzimat Fermani finally came to a happy end in Helsinki' wrote 
Istanbul daily Sabah. 35 'The meeting of the century: from knot to wedding', claimed 
Milliyet. 36 However, though the EU confirmed Turkey's candidacy, as explained by prime 
minister Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, the prospect of the opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey remained unclear. 'Turkey has a place in the EU, but this will 
take decades. '37 In fact, Turkey was the only country included in the enlargement process 
but was not given a pre-accession strategy. 38 As one study put it, even if Turkey started 
negotiations for membership by the second half of 2000, Commission officials believed 
that its accession negotiations may take at least ten to fifteen years. 39 
Was Europe asking too much? 
During the Cold War years economic and security issues were the main focus of 
3 'Necati Zincirkiran, 'Almanya'nin Adayi: Turkiye', Sabah, 4 February 1999; Hasan Unal, 'Alman Disisleri 
Bakani'nin Ardindan', Zaman, 24 July 1999. 
32Aksam, 2 September 1999. 
33'FM: Greece to Play Active Role in Turkey EU Bid', Athens News Agency, 13 December 1999. 
34Milliyet, 11-12 December 1999. 
35,160 Yillik Ruya', II December 1999. 
36'Asrin Bulusmasi: Dugumden Dugune', II December 1999. 
37New York Times, 15 December 1997. 
38Erkan Erdogdu, 'Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United', MERIA, vol. 6, no. 2, (June 2002). 39Charles Grant, EU 2010: An Optimistic Vision of the Future, (London: CER., 2000), p. 14 and p. 49. 
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Turkey's relationship with Europe. As such, political and social aspects of the relationship 
including the arguments over Turkey's 'Europeanness' were to a large extent sidelined. In 
the post-Soviet era, however, this consideration was increasingly relevant as Europe began 
to redefine itself along historical and cultural lines. This process highlighted Turkey's 
'distinctiveness'. 40 As Gulnur Aybet noted, 'not only the parameters of European security 
but also those of European culture were being redefined, as the division of Europe ceased 
to exist and Europe-cast and west-was finding new grounds for bonding in historical, 
cultural, and religious terms. '41 Indeed, the political requirements such as human rights 
and issues concerning Turkish democratic life as well as the Cyprus problem and relations 
with Greece increasingly became a perquisite in Turkey's membership negotiations with 
the EU; while economic issues began to slip into the background. 42 
However, against this background, it was apparent that Turkish authorities failed to 
notice the shift in community priorities. They continued to believe that the economic 
reforms they had been implementing since 1980 would satisfy the conditions for 
accession. 43 Accordingly, European demands for the adaptation of several democratic, 
social, cultural and economic reforms within the context of the 'Copenhagen criteria, 
which was established in 1993 and set the standards for democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, the market economy, and the protection of 'minorities' for the prospective 
EU candidates, caused long lasting arguments. In Ankara's view, these criteria were never 
40F. Stephen Larrabee, The Troubled Partnership: Turkey and Europe, (RAND, 1998), p. 15 8. 
41Gulnur Aybet, 'Turkey and European Institutions, ' The International Spectator, vol. 34, no. I (January- 
March 1999), p. 107. 
42'Turkiye'nin AT Uyeligine Simdi Kurt Engeli', Cumhuriyet, 29 March 1992. Sanberk, op. cit. This became 
most evident during the completion process of the customs union with the EU in 1995. The European 
Parliament asked for the improvement of its human rights record and several political reforms, which 
needed some constitutional amendments as a prerequisite for the approval of the agreement. At one point 
the pressures put on Ankara went so far as to isolate Turkey from Europe altogether if Turkey refused to 
take the appropriate measures complying Europe's requests. Newspot, 10 February 1995; Ramazan 
Gozen, 'Two Process in Turkish Foreign Policy: Integration and Isolation', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vOl. 
2 1, nos. 1-2, (1997), p. 118. 
43Sevilay E. Kahraman, 'Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement', 
Turkish Studies vol. 1, no. I (Spring 2000), p. 5. 
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a subject of attention during the Cold War because, according to Turkish foreign minister 
Ismail Cem, Turkey was performing a function vitally important to the West's security 
interests at the time. 44 In particular, demands for the implementation of certain reforms 
towards democratisation including widening political freedoms, abolition of the death 
penalty, the role of the state and the army in Turkish life, greater rights for 'minorities' or 
other ethnic groups, the casing of restrictions on broadcasting and education in ethnic 
languages other than Turkish was perceived in many circles especially among nationalist 
politicians, Kernalist leftist groups and the military establishment as the intervention of 
Turkey's internal affairs and hence incompatible with the existing system based on a 
theme of unification. 
As such, as noted by Hasan Koni, professor of politics at Ankara University, European 
criticism over the closure of pro-Islamic and Kurdish parties were viewed by some as 
undue violations of Turkey's sovereignty. 45 While the calls to transfer power from the 
centre to the periphery, and from the state to social groups was viewed as a move towards 
political fragmentation. 46 This could in turn threaten territorial integrity and national unity, 
and therefore in a way the EU, like the PKK, was trying to divide Turkey. 
For example, Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the ultra-Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 
and the senior coalition partner in the government (1999-2002), said that some of the main 
reforms requested by Brussels were in line with the objectives of the PKK. 47 Professor 
Urnit Ozdag, the director of the highly influential Centre for Eurasian Strategic Research 
of Ankara (ASAM), asserted that the so called Copenhagen criteria put before Turkey as 
the precondition for accession in fact constituted nothing more than an attempt to establish 
441smail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, Second edition, (Nicosia: Rustem, 2001), pp-33-4. 
451-lasan Koni, speech given on US-Turkish Relations in the Post Cold- War Era: The Ankara Perspective, at 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 September 2000. 
46Ersel Aydinli and Ali R. Usul, 'Looking towards Europe', The World Today, vol. 58. no. 10, (October 
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a legal and social framework to new ethnic and national groups. 48 Similarly, General 
Cumhur Asparuk, the secretary-general of the National Security Council, composed of 
political and military leaders, and considered as the top decision-making body of the 
Turkish establishment, said that it was out of the question to allow the broadcasting and 
education in Kurdish language arguing on the grounds that this might destroy the mosaic 
of the Turkish society, though Turkey later partially allowed the use of ethnic languages in 
broadcasting. 49 All in all, although it was generally agreed in Turkey that the country must 
do a great deal to come into line with European standards, in particular modernizing the 
economy, and overhauling the administrative system, the EU's negative stance vis-A-vis 
the Turkish membership and its indifference towards certain issues that concerned 
Turkey's security interests certainly contributed to the rise of nationalist anti-European 
views. 50 It was also argued that even if Turkey made the requested changes Europe would 
never accept it because the EU had a separate agenda, and essentially it was time for 
Ankara to follow 'honourable' foreign policies elsewhere. 
Domestic implications of the tense relationship 
Ultimately, the combination of these developments had a profound impact not only on 
Turkey's external relations but also on domestic politics. The implication of this process 
could be seen in the fact that the developments served to undermine pro-Western 
mainstream political parties in favour of extremist groups, and the ideological gap on the 
subject of the EU membership among different parts of the society such as secularists, 
Islamists, nationalists, leftists and so on seemed to be naffowing. The implication of 
weakening Turkish-EU political relationship, mostly owing to the EU's ongoing refusal to 
integrate Turkey, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the conflicting views on 
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various regional issues could be seen to have affected Turkish public opinion and thus had 
implications for domestic politics to a large extent. According to one survey conducted in 
1997, anti-European views among the Turkish public opinion have been on the rise. 51 
As a result, the whole state of affairs increasingly led Turkish governing circles to 
redefine the 'West' and the 'Westernisation project' and to question its strictly pro- 
western foreign poliCy. 52 In this political environment, rhetoric along the lines of 'we can 
do without Europe' or 'the world does not consist of Western Europe alone' found more 
and more space in the Turkish media. 53 What is more, as noted by Sami Kohen, columnist 
on foreign affairs for the Turkish daily Milliyet, there was a developing view in some 
Turkish intellectual circles that Turkey could be European without being in the EU 
(referring to Switzerland or most recently Norway which rejected membership in a 
referendum) and without severing economic ties. 54 For example, in 1997 deputy prime 
minister Ecevit, said that Turkey did not need to become an EU member to improve its 
economy, 'There are a number of other choices like the US, Canada, Japan, China, India 
and Russia'. 55 It was even suggested that with the establishment of economic and political 
entities among the newly-independent Turkic republics such as a 'commonwealth of 
Turkic republics' or a 'common market of the Turks', Turkey could not only respond to 
its exclusion from Europe but also become an independent 'regional superpower. 56 
Similarly, frustrated with Brussels' refusal to accept Turkey, general Tuncer Kilinc, 
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secretary-general of the powerful National Security Council, openly urged a 
reconsideration of the country's efforts to join the Union and turn towards unconventional 
regional neighbours like Russia and Iran. 'Turkey has not seen the slightest assistance 
from the EU. The EU has a negative view on the problems that concern Turkey. I believe 
that the EU will never accept Turkey. Hence, Turkey needs new allies and it would be 
useful if Turkey engages in a search that would involve Russia and Iran. '57 
These sentiments became most evident following the Luxembourg shock. The Turkish 
media was full of reactions not only from the public at large but also from leading policy 
makers. For example, one headline stated: 'go to hell Europe'58 while a senior Turkish 
general expressed his disillusiomnent with Europe 'we would have been better off if we 
had spent the past 40 years as a communist dictatorship, rather than as a member of 
NATO'. 59 Additionally, developments strengthened the perception that 'the Union will 
never allow Turkey in -not on economic, political, or even strategic grounds, but on 
cultural and religious ones. "60 In the words of Onur Oymen, the Turkish undersecretary of 
foreign affairs, 'Turkey feels that it is being judged by different criteria than other 
countries. It is concerned that the "Iron Curtairf' that once divided Europe is being 
replaced by a "cultural/religious iron curtain. "161 More and more people came to the 
conclusion that political reasons such as Aegean-related problems with Greece, the 
Kurdish and the Cyprus issues and the economic argument laid by the EU were simply 
excuses and not the real reasons behind the EU stance. 'Even if Turkey resolves them they 
will continue to say no. The acceptance of the Eastern European states in the next 
57'Kilinc: EU will Never Accept Turkey', Turkish Daily News, 8 March 2002. It was later claimed by the 
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enlargement, though they experience similar problems, is the clear evidence. 162 According 
to Turkish premier Yilmaz, Europe demanded one condition for membership: 'to change 
our religion. "63 He later also accused European leaders of discriminating against Muslim 
Turkey, 'people who want to change the EU into a "Christian Union7 have won'. So we 
have come to the conclusion that even if we meet all the conditions being put to us, the 
real argument (religious discrimination against Turkey) against our membership will still 
be there. The most important decision in Luxembourg, I believe, is the construction of a 
new Berlin wall, a cultural Berlin wall. '64 
Undoubtedly, the EU's approach over this period greatly undermined its legitimacy in 
Turkey, thereby decreasing trust and weakening the pro-European and pro-democratic 
arguments of the modernising, Western-oriented forces. 65 As a result, anti-Western 
feelings among the Turkish public eventually resulted in the significant success of the 
nationalist and religious parties. As one Turkish academic observed, 
The rising power of nationalist parties and ultra-right groups, and the growth in 
religious movements has played a role in the Western attitude towards Turkey's 
domestic problems. Most of these groups have been anti-Western, partly because 
of the Western attitude and partly because of the Turkish politicians who fuelled 
the anti-Western aspirations in Turkey. 66 
In this respect, traditionally pro-European central right-wing parties that conducted the 
bulk of Turkish-EU relations in the past decades, lost significant support throughout 
1990s. They received 51 percent of the votes in 1991,39 per cent in 1995 and only 25 per 
cent in the 1999 general elections. 67Even the customs union agreement of 1995, in which 
Turkish public opinion was highly concerned that Northern Cyprus was sold out to ease 
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the Greek objections to this agreement is enough to show to the extent that European 
policies had an impact on Turkish domestic politics. In addition to Cyprus, the European 
Parliament's demands for political reforms and constitutional amendments as a pre- 
requisite to endorse the agreement were perceived by Turkish public opinion, as well as 
by the ruling elite, as interference in Turkey's internal affairs. Necmettin Erbakan, the 
leader of the pro-Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party fiercely criticised the agreement and 
argued that the West now had a new market to exploit relentlesSly. 68 He also presented the 
agreement as a part of a Zionist-Christian plan to undermine the possible Turkish 
leadership in an Islamic Union and pledged to tear up the agreement. 69 Thus it can be 
justifiably argued that the attitude of Brussels had bolstered Islamist and nationalist 
votes. 70 In fact, general elections held in the same year resulted in a credible victory for 
the Refah Party while votes for the pro-Western central right and left parties fell 
significantly. Nationalist and pro-Islamist parties gained 35 percent of the votes (it was 13 
per cent in 1987 and 17 per cent in 1991). 71 Moreover, the EU's rejection in 1997 and its 
policies on issues such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Turkey's own separatist war 
against the Kurdish guerrillas were effectively turned into ultra-nationalist Milliyetci 
Hareket Partisi (MHP), the Nationalist Action Party, votes during the 1999 elections. 72 
While Islamist groups turned to the Muslim world for allies, nationalists increasingly 
looked to the Turkic world. For example, the Refah Party's (RP) altemative policies with 
Iran and the Islamic world found considerable support among the Turkish electorate and 
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in fact reflected the disillusionment with Europe. 73 This was most evidenced when the RP 
emerged as the top party in the 1995 elections, increasing its vote from 10 percent in 1991 
to 21 percent. Additionally, the 'region-centric' foreign policies of Bulent Ecevit's 
nationalist-left DSP could also be viewed in this context. The DSP advocated that Turkey, 
as a regional centre, should give more priority to its relations with the neighbouring and 
regional countries in order to establish an area of peace and security. As such, during the 
Gulf War, Ecevit strongly criticised the government's uncritical pro-American policies, 
opposed Turkey's tough stance against Iraq and visited Saddam Hussain before the war. 
He then sought ways for rapprochement with Iraq in 1998 while he was serving as deputy 
prime minister and masterminded the government's decision to refuse Washington's 
demand to use the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey close to the Iraqi border during the 
1998 crisis between Iraq and the US. 74 Also, the policies of the ultra-nationalist MHP, 
which desires the unity of the world's Turks and advocates establishing special relations 
with the Turkic republics as the natural leader of the Turkic world, gained considerable 
electoral support. According to the MHP, Turkey also needed to concentrate more in those 
areas and every effort should be made to develop and institutionalise this special 
relationship as a strategic and national priority. The party even proposed creating a 
common market with the Turkic republics as an alternative to the EU. 75 
This trend became most evident with the general elections of early 1999, which 
resulted in significant victories for both the DSP and the MHP. The two parties received 
more than 40 per cent of the votes and formed a coalition government with Mesut 
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Yilmaz's central right-wing ANAP. 76 In particular, the MHP's nationalist policies made 
more impact on the voters than any other party. MHP received 18 percent of the votes 
(compared to 8 percent in the 1995 elections). 77 Given the composition of the new 
government it was expected that nationalist elements would be increasingly emphasised in 
Turkish foreign policy and in this approach relations with the EU would be more balanced 
and would not be allowed to subjugate national interests. For example, as an outcome of 
this approach, it was expected that Cyprus would not be sacrificed for the sake of the EU 
membership. In fact, it is well known that the MHP was critical of Turkish-EU relations 
because joining the EU would require sharing sovereignty with other international 
organisations. 78 In the words of the foreign minister Ismail Cem, 'EU candidacy and 
membership is a goal for Turkey, not an obsession. Foreign policy covers a wide spectrum 
and Turkey's EU accession, though essential, represented only one of her two main goals. 
The other being to assume a central, decisive role in the emerging Eurasian reality. '79 In 
fact this was clearly indicated in the government programme: 
We shall reinforce the potential of our country as a regional power through 
establishing multifaceted and balanced relations with all countries, in and out of 
our region. We shall endeavour to realize Turkey's aim of full membership in the 
European Union with equal rights and status as other members. Turkey will 
assume its rightful place in the integration process in Europe and while doing this, 
it will go on protecting its national rights and interests meticulously. 80 
A multi-regional approach in external relations 
The EU's negative position towards Turkish membership motivated Turkey to seek 
more diverse economic and, in particular, political and military relations with other 
regions and to look for new alliance relationships including strategic partnership in line 
with its foreign and security policy objectives. Incidentally, the emergence of the new 
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foreign policy options in the wake of the Cold War in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the 
Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Middle East became a driving force in this process. 
Prime minister Ecevit explained, 
The refusal of the European Union to grant membership to Turkey has played an 
educative role. It has made us realize that the world does not consist of Western 
Europe alone, that a country can become strong politically and economically by 
concentrating, by diversifying its international relations, all the over world, and we 
have been doing that with increasing success. And I am sure that sooner or later, 
the European Union will knock on Turkey's door and ask her to join the ranks, 
join the corps ... 81 
As a result, at least in the early years of the 1990s, Turkey distanced itself from its 
traditional policy of Europeanisation as Turkish policy-makers increasingly pointed out 
other areas of intereSt. 82 As such, as subsequent chapters will show, Turkey increasingly 
improved its close economic, cultural, military and political relations with the Turkic 
republics of Central Asia, with Caucasia and the Balkans, Israel and the United States. 
Ankara also promoted and reactivated regional organisations such as the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation Project and the Economic Co-operation Organisation. The scale 
of these relations even led some circles in Europe to think that the deepening ties 
particularly with the Turkic and Muslim world, when accompanied by the fact of 
European rejection, could have weakened Turkey's affinity to Europe and cause to break 
away from its traditional Western-oriented foreign poliCy. 83 As one Western analyst has 
put, 'ever since Ataturk, Turkey itself seems to prefer becoming the last wagon on the 
European train. But if Europe now closes off that option, perhaps Turkey will opt for 
becoming the locomotive on a pan-Turkish-Asian train instead'. 84 Following Ankara's 
decision to host the D-8 Summit in 1997 to boost economic cooperation among the 
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leading Muslim countries, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel also acknowledged that 
Turkey was turning away from Europe out of deep disappointment with the EU, 'Turkey 
feels that it is wrongly treated by Europe. The Summit is not simply the result of 
Erbakan's more pro-Islamic political views. '85 
The Luxembourg shock also became decisive in Ankara's move to replace Turkey's 
close relationship with Western Europe with a strategic partnership with the US and 
Turkey's improved relations with Israel. 86 Right after the historic summit, the Turkish 
prime minister Mesut Yilmaz declared that, 'Turkey is not isolated in its region and still 
has friends in Washington, the Caucasus region, Central Asia and has developing security 
relations with Israel. 87 
3.2. Relations with the United States: From allies to 'strategic partners' 
In contrast to Turkey's politically tense relationship with the EU throughout the 1990s, 
Turkey was able to establish strong relations with the US due to the convergence of 
interests. Although strategic concerns were the dominant factor in the Turkish-US 
relationship during the Cold War years, economic and political issues also played a 
significant part in the relationshiP. 88 Despite the fact that the communist threat had 
disappeared from Turkish borders and the Soviet Union disintegrated, Ankara began to 
attach even greater importance to strengthening its bilateral ties with the US in the post- 
Cold War era. This was primarily due to growing strains in Turkey's relations with 
Europe. 89 Unlike the EU's perspective which placed less emphasis on strategic 
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imperatives than on political and social, even cultural, issues in its relations with Turkey, 
the US still retained a primarily strategic view of Turkey as a useful regional partner. 90 As 
Turkish foreign minister Cern put it, 'The EU has not realised the new economic and 
cultural dimensions that it will reach via Turkey. The US is more courageous than the 
EU. '91 
Deepening Turkish-US strategic cooperation became even more visible following the 
EU's Luxembourg Summit as Ankara further sought to strengthen its existing relations 
with the US. Turkish prime minister Yilmaz's visit to Washington immediately after the 
summit can be interpreted as a reaction to Brussels' decision, but it should also be viewed 
as part of the ongoing relationship between the two countries. However, increasing 
bilateral relations should not be confined to one specific reason (the EU) and should be 
also viewed in terms of the 'new world order'. The US has remained the sole superpower 
in military and political terms. 92 There was a broad consensus among Turkish policy 
makers that the US was the pre-eminent player in global affairs and that only it had the 
power, capability and political will to play a major role in regional issues that concern 
Turkish foreign and security policies. 93 Besides, bilateral ties have been, to some extent, 
cordial since the 1970s. Furthermore, as Turkish deputy prime minister Ecevit put it, the 
US was more receptive towards Turkey than its European allies, 'Europeans do not have a 
vision about international issues. They prefer to interest themselves in their internal 
iSSUeS. 194 This was most clearly evidenced during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crises. 
US intervention was also needed to avert a highly probable Turco-Greek armed 
90Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, Turkey: Challanges of Continuity and Change, (New York and 
Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p. 114; Larrabce, op. cit., p. 2. 
91Sabah, 4-5 December 1997. 
92john Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4, (Fall 1990), P. II- 
93Sabri Sayari, 'Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and 
Divergence' in Turkish-A merican Relations: Past, Present and Future, Mustafa Aydin and Cagri Erhan 
(eds. ), (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 92. 
94 
confrontation over the deployment of S-300 missiles in southern Cyprus and over the 
Imia/Kardak islands crisis in 1996 which raiscd the qucstion of sovercignty in the Acgean. 
The US has long supported Turkey and puts special importance on the relations due to 
the latter's location and strategic importance in the Caucasus/Caspian basin, Central Asia, 
the Middle East and the Balkans. 95 It was the conviction in the US capital that, as stated 
by former US president Clinton, Turkey was a factor that will affect the shape of the 
world in the twenty-first century and was an important force in three regions: Europe, the 
Middle East, and Central Asia. 96 This strategic relationship was even more important 
particularly in the Middle East, in which America's direct national interests stand, as 
Europe did not seem to give much importance to its relations with Turkey in this regard. 97 
Essentially therefore, in the words of the US deputy secretary of state at the time, Turkish- 
US relations had 'even more of a hard headed, geopolitical, strategic rationale in the post- 
Cold War period than during the Cold War. '98 As such, despite divergences on several 
issues during this period such as human rights problems of Turkey, the US policy of dual 
containment of Iraq and Iran, the future of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, and finally 
Turkish weapons acquisition programmes, Ankara cooperated with Washington in several 
important areas of concern. 99 Onur Oymen, the undersecretary of Turkish foreign ministry 
during the Refah government, explained the level of cordial relations in 1997: 'Turkish- 
US relations are "excellent, " and Turkey is "totally satisfied" with US policy toward 
94Sabah, 14 December 1997. 
9513ruce Kuniholm, 'Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, 
and Challenges for Turkey', Turkish Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, (Spring 200 1), pp. 3 6-9. 
96AIan Makovsky, 'With Bilateral Ties Flourishing: Clinton Visits Turkey' Policy Watch, no. 423,12 
November 1999. 
97Heinz Kramer and Friedemann Muller, 'Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries' in Allied 
Divided- Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer 
(eds. ), 1997, CSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge), p. 183. 
98Strobe Talbott, 'U. S. -Turkish Relations in an Age of Interdependence', Policy Watch, 16 october 1998. 
Also see, Sami Kohen, 'Turk-Amerikan Iliskilerinde Yeni Anlayis', Milliyet, 23 February 1995; 0. Metin 
Ozturk, 'Ortadogu'daki Son Gelismeler Acisindan Turkiye ve ABD'ye Bakis', Yeni Forum, Vol. 16, no. 
315, pp. 4-6. 
99See, Kemal Kirisci, 'Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies', MERIA, vol. 2, no. 4, (November 
95 
Turkey's integration into Europe. Turkish-US diplomatic coordination was also effective 
regarding northern Iraq, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and implementation of the CFE treaty. '100 
Baki Ilkin, the Turkish ambassador to Washington, also explained that the relationship of 
the two countries was far beyond being that of only NATO allies and reached such a level 
that it could be defined as a 'enhanced partnership' or in the words of Clinton a 'strategic 
partnership'. 
We are no longer only NATO allies whose relationship, until a decade ago, was 
mainly based on cooperation in defence and security fields. In this transfigured 
post-Cold War landscape, Turkish-American cooperation continues to be of vital 
significance. In fact, our relationship has now reached an advanced stage, which 
we define as 'enhanced partnership'. 101 
Due to a convergence of strategic objectives, the two allies continually expanded 
bilateral cooperation over the decade in question. They had parallel policies in the Middle 
East, the Balkans, and the fonner Soviet territories. In fact, one could trace the roots of 
this special relationship both during and after the Gulf War of 1990-91. Turkey's decision 
to shift from its traditional policy of non-interference and non-involvement in the Middle 
East in order to join the US-led coalition against Iraq was perhaps better understood by the 
American leadership than Turkey's European allies. Then president George Bush praised 
Turkey's role: 'when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Turkey acted courageously to ensure that 
aggression would not stand. And as the whole world knows, the international coalition 
could not have achieved the liberation of Kuwait without Turkey's pivotal 
contributions. '102 The Turkish proposal to create 'safe havens' in northern Iraq for the 
protection of the Iraqi Kurds fleeing from the Baghdad regime right after the war was also 
welcomed by the US and, in fact, the Turkey-based operations enforcing a 'no-fly-zone' 
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in northern Iraq became a key aspect of the US policy toward Iraq in the 1990S. 
103 
Contrary to Europe's stance, Washington generally stood behind Ankara on the Kurdish 
issue. Accordingly, the US accepted the PKK as a 'terrorist' organisation and backed the 
Turkish incursions against the group in northern IraqIO4 as well as Turkey's pressure on 
Syria to extradite the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. It was even claimed that the US 
helped Ankara in the capture of Ocalan in Kenya in 1998.105 The US has also been 
supportive in the context of growing Turkish-Israeli strategic relations and joined the 
Turkish-Israeli joint maritime manoeuvres in 1998 and 1999. 
In the same way, Turkish foreign and security policies seemed to coincide to a great 
extent with those of the US in Central Asia and the Caucasia/Caspian area. 106 Washington 
became quite keen to see Turkey as a role model with a relatively successful market 
economy, a secular, plural istic-democratic system in a predominantly Islamic society for 
the newly-independent Turkic states rather than to see Iran filling the power vacuum that 
was emerging in post-Soviet Central Asia. 107 The US and Turkey had similar polices with 
respect to the oil politics in Caucasia and Turkey received American support for the 
proposed Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which would transport oil from the Caspian basin to 
world markets via Georgia and Turkey. Turkey and the US also agreed to foster the 
independence of the Caucasus states and to discourage the spread of Russian and Iranian 
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dominance in the area. 108 
Turkish-US relations also seemed to be in harmony in the Balkans and in fact, as will 
be discussed, Turkish involvement or relative 'success' in regional affairs coincided with 
the US's heavy engagement in the Balkans. This in turn enabled Turkey to develop 
diplomatic, political, and military relations with several countries in the region and 
thereby increased Turkish influence. Given the fact that the EU was unable to contain the 
developments in the Balkans, Turkey increasingly looked to the US to intervene. 
Accordingly, Ankara strongly supported the US-led NATO initiatives throughout the 
crisis and participated in NATO's operations against Serbia by providing aircraft and 
vessels as well as troops for the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and Bosnia. Turkey also 
agreed to train the Bosnian army with the US and thereby increased Turkey's military ties 
with the latter. 109 In the same way, US-Turkish harmony over the protection of newly- 
independent Macedonian territorial integrity and existence became also visible. The US 
responded to a Turkish call to play a role in the deployment of the UN Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPRDEP) which was deployed in Macedonia in 1993 and 
successfully defused a possible instance of Serbian aggression that could otherwise have 
resulted in a repeat of the atrocities witnessed in Bosnia. Similar patterns were also visible 
in Ankara's deepening military connections with Tirana owing to the fact that Turkish and 
US strategic interests coincided in Albania. Consequently, Turkish interests that 
overlapped with those of the US became the most significant factor allowing Turkey to 
engage actively in the Balkans. I 10 
Finally, the US strongly supported the Turkish application to the EU and played a 
108Harris, op. cit., p. 196. 
109'Bosnak Askerleri Turkiye'de', Cumhuriyet, 15 May 1996. 
11011han Uzgel, 'The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilising Role' in Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multiregional Power, Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds), (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 200 1), 
pp. 54-5 and p. 65. 
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crucial role during the customs union agreement process when the negotiations reached a 
deadlock due to the Greek veto. 111 Clinton reiterated US support for Turkey's EU 
candidacy in his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 'the future on the part of 
our allies in Europe encompasses the foresight to see that our vision of a Europe that is 
undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in all of history, will never be 
complete unless and until it embraces Turkey. I have consistently urged European 
integration to move further and faster, and that includes Turkey. " 12 Against European 
efforts to have an autonomous defence identity within the Alliance, Washington has 
backed Turkey's view that ESDI should be developed within NATO without leading to 
discrimination against non-EU NATO members or the substitution of an EU body for 
NATO. 
Turkish-US economic relations also improved in the 1990s. Turkey enjoyed the 
benefits of US most-favoured-nation trade treatment and the US trade preferences 
programme helped Turkey's goal of decreasing its trade deficit. Between 1990 and 2000 
the volume of trade doubled from US$3.2 billion to US$6.9 billion while Turkey's exports 
to the US tripled, from US$970 million to US$3 billion. Thus, the US ranked second in 
terms of Turkey's exports and third in terms of Turkey's imports. ' 13 Turkey is also a long- 
term leading recipient of US arms; between 1990 and 1999 Turkish acquisitions reached 
over US$9 billion. 114 
IIIB irand, op. cit., pp. 459-60. 
112'Clinton in Turkey', Newspot, (November-December 1999). 
113http: //www. dtm. gov. tr/anl/english/tr-us/general. htm 
114http: //www. fas. org/asmp/profiles/turkey. htm 
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PART THREE 
THE MIDDLE EAST: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW CENTRE OF THREAT 
TO TURKEY'S SECURITY INTERESTS 
Turkey's security environment in south-east improved in the post-Cold War era partly 
due to the fact that Soviet political, financial aid and military assistance was no longer 
available to some of its Middle Eastem neighbours such as Iraq, Iran and particularly 
Syria. Iraq's military strength was further weakened by the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf 
War of 1991. All in all, Turkey emerged as a major military and economic power in the 
region which in turned raised expectations that Ankara would have a far more influential 
role in the politics of the area than before. Moreover, the Middle Eastern peace process of 
the early 1990s -a manifestation of the 'new world order' in the region- and the resultant 
lessening of the tension and strain between the Arab world and Israel, provided Turkey 
with an opportunity to enhance its strategic ties with both sides and thereby strengthen its 
own influence in the area. However, as will be seen in this chapter, this potentially 
promising environment soon faded away as new developments resulted in regional 
turbulence, which threatened Turkey's security interests and left little room for Ankara to 
manoeuvre in its attempt to pursue an effective foreign policy. 
The Gulf War of 1990-1991, for example, turned out to be a disaster for Turkey in 
many ways. It served to interrupt its existing cordial relations with its southern neighbour, 
Iraq and also caused significant economic, political and security problems, both internally 
and externally. The new security environment and security threat from the south also 
helped to exacerbate the Kurdish issue enabling the separatist PKK to declare a full-scale 
war against Turkey, which in turn gave some of its southern neighbours an advantage on 
other issues, notably water. Additionally, deteriorating domestic political and socio- 
economic conditions coupled with the rise of nationalistic and religious extremism saw 
radical parties gain increased prominence in Turkey, allowing for example, the Islamist 
Refah Party to govern for the first time in the Republic's history, bringing a serious 
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challenge to the established secular regime and foreign and security policy direction of the 
country, which in the end, along with the PKK issue, diverted Turkey's attention from 
external developments and opportunities. Subsequently, Ankara found it extremely 
difficult to deal with these increasing, closely-related, internal and external security 
challenges on its own. In order to neutralise the newly-emerging southern threat and 
resultant internal security concerns, Turkey began to foster close relations with Israel to 
the level of becoming 'strategic partners. Such relations attracted serious criticism and 
resentment from the Arab world as well as some sectors of the Turkish public, especially 
over advanced military ties with Israel. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TURKISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF CRISIS 
4.1. Turkey and the Gulf War: The creation of a new centre of threat 
The second Gulf War which began in August 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
not only served to overshadow the international europhoria that had emerged following 
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe but also opened up a new challenge to 
Turkey's security environment. ' Although the influence of the Soviet Union fell 
dramatically in the Middle East, thus enabling Turkey to play a greater role in the regional 
politics, its preoccupation with the political, economic and security implications of the 
war both seriously limited its potential role and restricted it from concentrating on 
establishing cordial relations, and thus a greater presence and influence in the region. 
The Gulf War underlined the fact that the global Soviet threat had now been replaced 
by serious regional challenges and therefore necessitated a redefinition of Turkish policies 
towards the region. As such, during the Gulf War, Turkey pursued a more active role in 
contrast to its more traditional non-intervention policy in the region by which it refrained 
from taking sides in intra-Arab disputes and attempted to maintain good relations with the 
Arab countries. 2 This new trend in Turkish foreign policy could be viewed as the result of 
Ankara's belief that the current situation was not a simple intra-Arab dispute but rather 
IFor an in-depth discussion on the origins of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait see, Laith Kubba, 'The War's 
Impact on Iraq' in The Iran-Iraq War: The Policies of Aggression, Farhang Rajaee (ed. ), (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 48; Lawrence Freedman and Efrairn Karsh, The Gutf Conj7ict 1990- 
91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 45; 
Efraim. Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, (New York: The Free Press, 
199 1), P. 211; Efraim. Karsh, 'Why did Saddarn Invade KuwaitT in The Gutf Crisis: Politico-MilitarY 
Implications, (London: London Defence Studies, 1990), pp. 35-53. For reactions and contributions of the 
international community to the international front against Iraq see, James Gow, 'The Balance of Forces in 
the Gulf. A Summary' in The Gut( Crisis: Politico-Military Implications, (London: London Defence 
Studies, 1990), pp. 2-3; Andrew Bennett, 'Sheriff of the Posse: American Leadership in the Desert Storm 
Coalition' in Friends in Need., Burden Sharing in the Persian Gutf War, Andrew Bennett, Joseph 
Lepgold and Danny Unger (eds. ), (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 42.. 
2AIi L. Karaosmanoglu, 'Turkey: Between the Middle East and Western Europe', International Journal of 
Turkish Studies, vol. 6, no. 1-2, (Winter 1992-94), p. 14; Seyfi Tashan, 'Introduction' in Middle East, 
Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan (eds. ), (Ankara: Foreign Policy 
Institute, 1987), pp. 6-7; Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (London: Pinter for RUSI, 1991), 
pp. 65-7. 
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had severe implications for the wider area and posed a serious threat to Turkey's 
immediate regional interests. Thus, this perception played a major role in Turkey's 
decision to give up its stable low-key diplomacy towards the region at the time of the Gulf 
War. 
Initially, Turkish policy makers viewed the Gulf War as a significant opportunity to 
restore Turkey's declining strategic importance in the eyes of the West following the end 
of the Cold War. Moreover, there was a conviction that this could be a significant 
opportunity for Turkey to develop into an important economic, political and military role 
in the region. 3 It was also clear that Turkey did not want to be left out of the negotiations 
if, and when, Iraq's destiny was decided. Principally, Turkey wanted its interests to be 
taken into consideration if, for example, Iraq's territorial integrity disintegrated and 
neighbouring Iraqi Kurds gained some measure of independence. 4 
Of particular interest was President Ozal's determination (in some cases by 
circumventing the parliament and government) to guide Turkey's policies during the 
crisis, despite the fact that the constitution mainly provided him with a ceremonial role. 5 
According to Ozal, Turkey had to change its passive and inflexible traditional foreign 
policies, which were no longer appropriate, in the political environment of the new era. He 
therefore argued that Turkey should adapt more pragmatic, risk-taking and active policies 
in order to become an important player in international politics in the wake of the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe as he explained. 'The most important factor in a 
political change is to predict developments in a changing world beforehand and have the 
necessary precautions accordingly. Let me make it clear: let's leave timid and 
3Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: L. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 317-8. 
4David Kushner, 'Turkey: Iraq's European Neighbour' in Iraqs Road to War, Amatzia Bararn and Barry 
Rubin (eds. ), (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 211. 
5For decision making process during the Gulf Crisis see, Oguz Eris, 'Korfez Krizi ve Turkiye'de Karar 
Alma Sureci' in Degisen Dunya ve Turkiye, Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed. ), (Istanbul: Baglam, 1995), p. 260; 
Ramazan Gozen, 'Turk Dis Politikasinda Karar Alma Mekanizmasi, Turgut Ozal ve Korfez Krizi, Yeni 
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conservative (passive) policies behind. We should follow more active and far-sighted 
policies. ' 6 Thus, Ozal argued that Turkey should play a leading role in any arrangements, 
which would shape politics in the Middle East. In his view, therefore, Turkey could no 
longer be neutral and it was time for it 'to be at the table, not on the menu'. 7 
They (the Europeans) are trying to alienate Turkey from Europe by excluding us 
from the EC. Now we have a historic opportunity ... we have a chance of allying 
with the West in an important crisis in such a position where we are right. If you 
cannot take this advantage, then there is no point in being a politician, prime 
minister or president! 
He was even ready to take a risk joining the war to, in his words, 'put in one and take 
out three'. 9 As general Necip Torumtay, who resigned along with two senior ministers, as 
the chief of the general staff in protest at Ozal's policies' 0, would later note in his memoirs 
Ozal was anxious to send troops to join the coalition forces in the Gulf in order to be one 
of the main powers to secure the most interest at the conclusion of the war when Iraq was 
defeated. ' 1 He was even thinking of a restricted invasion of Iraq that would enable Turkey 
to control the two oil-rich provinces of Kirkuk and Mousul, which were also within the 
borders of the Misak-i Milli. 12 However, in the face of strong criticism from the opposition 
parties (as well as from his own ruling party members, ANAP), the media and the army, 
Ozat was unable to implement some of these policies and was forced to back down from 
sending troops to join the coalition forces in the Gulf. 13 
Turkiye, Vol. 2, no. 9, (May-June 1996), pp. 286-302. 
6Cumhurbaskani Turgut Ozal'in Dunyadaki Yeni Dengeler ve Turkiye Konulu Pazar Toplantilarinda 
Yaptiklari Konusma, (ANAP: 17 Kasim 199 1). 
7Ramazan Gozen, 'Turgut Ozal and Turkish Foreign Policy: Style and Vision', Foreign Policy (Ankara), 
Vol. 20, nos. 34, (1996), p. 9 1; Gulistan Gurbey, 'Ozal Donemi Turk Dis Politikasi', Dis Politka Dergisi, 
Vol. 6, no, 2, (December 1995), p. 5 1. 
8Mehmet Barlas, Turgut Ozal'in Anilari, (Istanbul: 1994), p. 128. 
9'Opposition Rejects Ozal's Offer to Discuss Middle East', Dateline Turkey, 18 August 1990. 
10'Surprise Resignation of Army Chief Stuns Political Observers in Ankara', Dateline Turkey, I December 
1990; 'Defence Minister Resigns', Dateline Turkey, 20 October 1990. 
1 lNecip Torumtay, Orgeneral Torumtay'in Anilari, (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1993), p. III. 
121bid.., p. 115; Hulki Cevizoglu, Korfez Savasi ve Ozal Diplomasisi (Istanbul: Form, 199 1), p. 37. 
13For example, Oktay Eksi, a leading columnist at the Istanbul daily Hurriýet, compared Ozal's adventurous 
policy with the historic decision which resulted in Turkey entering World War I in 1914. Suleyman 
Demirel, the leader of the Right Path Party, called the whole affair as treacherous and urged the 
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Ankara's decision to take a greater role in the Middle East, and Iraq in particular, was 
also motivated by concerns over the ramifications of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It was 
obvious that such a change in a fragile region could easily lead to the emergence of one 
dominant economic and, more importantly, military power. This was not a desirable 
development in respect to Turkey's own politico-economic interests. Therefore, soon after 
the invasion, Turkey declared that Iraq's aggression was unacceptable and urged Baghdad 
to withdraw from Kuwait. In the words of the then Turkish trade minister, 'Turkey 
regretted Iraq's occupation of Kuwait' which represents 'a threat to the maintenance of 
friendship in the region. '14 
Furthermore, Iraq's massive arms build-up, including weapons of mass destruction in 
the 1980s and early 1990s made it one of the strongest military powers in the region. is 
Moreover, at the beginning of the Gulf crisis in August 1990, Iraq deployed perhaps the 
largest ballistic missile force in the Third World; its chemical stock numbered thousands 
of tons, and its biological 'weaponisation' programme and nuclear research projects were 
at an advanced stage. 16 The whole situation, which had already changed the military 
balance to Turkey's disadvantage, threatened Turkey's national security interests. This 
threat became even more critical, given the existence of differences between the two 
neighbours, notably on the water issue. Thus, according to Ozal, Iraq's military capability 
should be eliminated once and for all to secure Turkey's strategic interests. 
government not to take it upon itself to act as the 'saviour or hero in the region. ' Dateline Turkey, II 
August 1990 and 'Opponents: President Would Fight', Dateline Turkey, 8 September 1990; William 
Hale, 'Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis', International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4, (October 1992), 
p. 684. 
14BBC Summary of World Broadcast ME, 3 August 1990. 
15According to estimates, between 1981-1985 Iraq purchased in excess of US$6-5 billion worth of arms 
making it the second largest arms market in the world. Mensur Akgun, 'Iran-Irak Savasi, Bolge Dengeleri 
ve Turkiye' in Ortadogu Sorunlari ve Turkiye, Haluk Ulman (ed. ), (Istanbul: TUSES, 1991), pp. 54-6. By 
the time of the 1988 cease-fire with Iran, Iraq's army possessed up to 5700 main battle tanks, 3700 
artillery tubes and an active manpower of some 800,000 which reached to 955,000 following the 
invasion. Andrew Rathmell, The Changing Military Balance in the Gujr, (London: RUSI, 1996), p. 25; 
The Independent, 6 August 1990. 
16Martin S. Navias, 'Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction' in The Gutf Crisis: politico-Military 
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There is an oil-rich country at our doorstep, which will be more powerful with 
the oil wealth of Kuwait, equipped with chemical weapons, missiles, and massive 
armaments who had previously bargained with us on the water supply of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris. Would you want to see such a country as a neighbour, 
which is likely to create more strategic problems for you concerning the water 
issue in the ftiture? 17 
Although Turkey was not directly involved in the war, it contributed political, 
economic and military support within the framework of the UN resolutions to the allied 
war effort. 18 Turkey allowed the allied forces to use the Incirlik air base in southern 
Turkey, close to the Iraqi border, against Iraq during the war. 19 Strategically this was an 
important base, which enabled the allied forces to reach targets within Iraq more easily. 
Turkey also deployed an estimated 100,000 troops along its 240 km. border with Iraq 
before the war broke out. This pinned down about eight Iraqi divisions in the north of the 
20 
country who feared that the coalition forces would initiate a second front in the north . 
Furthermore, following UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), which called for a 
complete economic embargo on Iraq, Turkey was among the first to implement sanctions 
and decided to close down the pipeline that carried half of Iraq's oil exports through 
Turkey from Kirkuk to Yumurtalik on Turkey's East Mediterranean coast. 21 It seemed that 
Ozal rushed this decision by himself reflecting his strong anti-Saddam views. General 
Torumtay would later reveal that he heard the decision on TV and he did not think that 
ministry of foreign affairs (possibly the cabinet) knew it before hand. 22 It also froze all 
Implications, (London: London Defence Studies, 1990), p. 54. 
17Cumhurbaskani Turgut Ozal'in '21. Asir Turkiye'nin ve Turkler'in Asri OlacaktirKonulu Konusmalari, 
(Bursa: ANAP, 22 May 1991). Also see prime minister Yildirim Akbulut's statement, Mustafa Aydin, 
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Gutf War of 1990-1991, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo 
Press, 1998), p. 16. 
18See, Saban Calis, The Role ofIdentity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, (Nottingham: University of Nottingham, 1996), pp. 359-60. 
19'National Assembly Gives Ministers Permission to Send Troops to Gulf, Dateline Turkey, 8 September 
1990; Hurriýet, 18 January 1991. 
20Tozun Bahceli, 'Turkey, the Gulf Crisis, and the New World order' in The Gutr War and the New World 
Order, Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds. ), (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 
p. 435; M. Cihat Akyol, 'Korfez Savasi', Yeni Forum, vol. 12, no. 26 1, (February 199 1), p. 54. 
21'Ankara Boru Hattini Kapattil, Cumhuriyet, 8 August 1990. 
22Torumtay, 
op. cit., p. 103. 
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Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in Turkey in August 1990.23 However, as one Turkish diplomat 
noted, this was not just a simple matter of shutting down the oil pipeline as it had serious 
implications for Turkey's economic and political relationship with Iraq. 24 This was 
evidenced by the visit of Taha Yassin Ramadan, a senior lieutenant of Saddam Hussein, to 
Ankara before the pipeline's closure. He warned Turkey that closing the pipeline would 
6create an atmosphere of distrust between the countries. 25 In economic terms, this 
aggravated relations with Iraq, which was Turkey's third largest trading partner, and 
resulted in the loss of some US$400 million annual income form pipeline transit fees in 
addition to the loss of considerable secondary economic benefits. 26 Turkey obtained about 
60% of its oil imports from Iraq (10% of the crude flowing through the pipeline) and the 
increase in world oil prices cost Turkey an extra US$I billion a year as it turned to other 
countries for its oil imports. 27 It also risked the repayments of US$2-3 billion outstanding 
Iraqi debts and affected Turkish companies that had construction projects with assets 
worth well over US$2 billion tied up in Iraq. 28 One Turkish company for example was 
involved in a dam project in Iraq worth US$1.5 billion and employing mainly Turkish 
2,500 construction workers. 29 
Despite early expectations that the Gulf War could benefit Turkey, it ended with 
significant negative repercussions for Turkey. In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
Turkey had to confront a huge Kurdish refugee flow towards its borders following Iraq's 
23Gurbey, op. cit., p. 61; BBC WorldService, 26 August 1990. 
24Dateline Turkey, 18 August 1990. 
25'Bagdat'tan Sert Mesajlar', Cumhuriýet, 6 August 1990; The Independent, 6 August 1990; Ilter Turan, 
'Kuwait Crisis: Turkey Counts the Cost', Dateline Turkey, 18 August 1990.. 
26'Krizin Turkiye'ye Faturasi Agir', Cumhuriyet, 17 August 1990; Dateline Turkey, II August 1990; Philip 
Robins, 'Turkish Foreign Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic? ' in Turkish Foreign 
Policy, C. H. Dodd (ed. ), (Cambridge: The Eatlon Press, 1992), p. 72. 27NUrcan Yuzbasioglu, 'Korfez Krizi'nin Turkiye Ekonomisi Uzerindeki Etkileri (1990-1991), Hazine ve 
Dis Ticaret Dergisi, no. 13, (June 1992), p. 92; The Guardian, 7 August 1990. 28Dateline Turkey, 18 August and 8 September 1990. 29'ENKA Workers Begin to Pull out from Dam Project in Iraq', Dateline Turkey, 18 August 1990. 
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operations to suppress the post-war uprisings. 30 At one point, according to the Turkish 
ministry of foreign affairs, nearly half a million (466,000) Kurdish refugees travelled to 
the Iraqi-Turkish border. 31 Initially, Turkey did not want to absorb any refugees as it had 
already provided refuge to 60,000 refugees fleeing from Saddam's bombings in 1998.32 
Turkey was also concerned that receiving a large number of Kurds could increase 
nationalism among its own Kurdish community or result in a highly destabilising and 
expensive Afghan- or Palestinian-style refugee problem. 33 The possibility of there being 
some separatist PKK guerrillas amongst the refugees was another reason for Turkey not 
wanting to host any more refugees. However, due to the harsh climatic conditions that the 
refugees faced in the Turkish border area and the publicity of the issue in the international 
media, Turkey was forced to admit at least 400,000 refugees. 34 Financially, Turkey almost 
single-handedly carried the whole burden supplying relief aid worth nearly US$100 
million to the refugees. 35 
As already noted the Gulf War had disastrous results for the Turkish economy. 36 The 
Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin claimed 'Turkey is the country most affected by 
30For the uprisings against the Baghdad regime by the Kurds in the north and the ShVites in the south and its 
consequences see, Elizabeth N. Offen, 'Migrants and Refugees: The Human Toll' in The Gut(Crisis and 
its Global Aftermath, Gad Barzilai, Aharon Klieman and Gil Shidlo (eds. ), (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 104; Amatzia Baram, 'The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision Making in Baghdad' 
in Iraqs Road to War, Amatzia Baram. and Barry Rubin (eds. ), (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 27; Ofra 
Bengio, 'Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish Communities: From Resentment to Revolt' in Iraqs Road to TVar, 
Amatzia Bararn and Barry Rubin (eds. ), (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 51-69. 
31Newspot, 2 May 1991. 
32Newspot, 9 May 1991. 
33Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey'Unveiled. From Ataturk andAfter, (London: John Murray, 1997), p. 229. 
34Turkey's proposal to create 'safe havens' in northern Iraq for the protection of refugees from further Iraqi 
attack was accepted by the Allied powers. A multilateral force of 16,000 troops was deployed known 
'Operation Provide Comfort' and with the participation of US, British and French warplanes and support 
aircraft using Turkey's Incirlik NATO airbase patrolled the no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in northern 
Iraq. The scheme was replaced by Operation Northern Watch without French participation later in 1995. 
'President Ozal Proposes UN-Controlled Security Zone in northern Iraq for Temporary Settlements of 
Refugees', Newspot, II April 1991 and 2 May 1991; 'Participants Informed of Turkey's Permission for 
Deployment of Multinational Force', Newspot, 25 July 1991; Ramazan Gozen, 'Operation Provide 
Comfort: Origins and Objectives', A USBFD, vol. 50, nos. 3-4, (June-December 1995), pp. 174-91. 35This was seven times that of all foreign aid Newspot, 2,9 and 23 May 1991. 36For a detailed discussion on the effects of the Gulf War on Turkish economy see, Kadir Saglam, 
Ortadogu'da ve Dunyada Koryez Savasi ile Degisen Guc Dengeleri, (Istanbul: Elit Kitaplar, 1999), pp. 
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the embargo on Iraq and has lost US$20 billion in three years. "37 The final cost was 
believed to be no less than US$35 billion. 38 This included lost trade with Iraq; fees from 
transit trade; tourism revenues; lost construction contracts; worker's remittances; 
increased oil prices and lost Iraqi repayments. 39 In particular, the Gulf war severely hit the 
south-eastem part of the country, causing higher unemployment rates and social unrest, 
which in turn provided a fertile environment for the PKK to recruit more memberS. 40 For 
example, the transit trade of 7,000 trucks and trailers crossing Turkey into Iraq everyday 
was cut off once the war commenced and did not return to previous levels for the duration 
of the period understudy. 41 However, Turkey's huge losses, despite early expectations, 
were not compensated. Turkey was only scheduled to receive a total of US$3.5 billion in 
oil, grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Japan and the EC. 42 In 
addition, the annual US security assistance package increased from US$553.4 million to 
US$635.4 and Turkey ftirther received an estimated US$8 billion worth of arms from the 
US and Germany. 43 However, such economic support fell for short of covering the total 
cost of the war for Turkey and did not even settle the bill as far as tangible, real and 
immediate Turkish revenue losses from the pipeline and trade with Iraq was concerned. 
No doubt, massive economic losses and the loss of the Middle East market exacerbated 
the economic problems that Turkey was facing and thereby adversely affected Turkey's 
overall economic strength which in return effected Turkey's ability in its foreign policy 
initiatives. This precluded Turkey's ability to adopt a pro-active role on the foreign policy 
197-217. 
37, Cetin: Turkey Sustains Huge Loses from Embargo on Iraq', Newspot, 13 May 1994. 
38See Turkish prime minister Ecevit's speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 28 
September 1999. 
39'Prsident Ozal Satisfied with the US Visit', Dateline Turkey, 6 October 1990; 'Gulf Crisis Hits Turkish 
Tourism', Dateline Turkey, I September 1990. 
40'Guneydogu'nun Iki Onemli Sorunu: Guvenlik ve Isssizlik' Cumhuriyet, 18 June 1992. 
4'Newspot, 5 December 1991. 
QMilliyet, 25 January 1996. 
4313ruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey', Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, (Spring 199 1), p. 3 8. 
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front as well as seize the opportunities presented to itself by the regional and international 
developments. 
Moreover, Turkey's hope that its position in the war would ease some obstacles 
preventing EC membership did not work as expected. On the contrary, it was left outside 
the Community throughout the 1990s. Ironically, even the EC's Gulf compensation aid for 
Turkey's losses from the crisis was made contingent on Turkey's human rights record. 44 
In this respect, president Ozal's 1991 letter to EC member states summarised Ankara's 
frustration with Brussels. 'These days when the war in the Gulf has ended and efforts are 
being made to achieve regional peace, the Community has not strengthened Turkey-EC 
relations as was intended and anticipated. This is causing uneasiness in the Turkish public 
opinion and leading us to doubt the intentions of the EC. '45 
Finally (as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter) the power vacuum in 
northern Iraq created after the Gulf War not only facilitated the formation of an actual 
Kurdish state as a new neighbour but also offered a perfect base for operations against 
targets in Turkey and gave a new impetus to the PKK. Moreover, it is widely believed that 
Turkey's anti-Saddam stance throughout the crisis provoked Baghdad to provide military 
and logistic support to the PKK, and allowed it to station itself in the Iraqi territories. Ozal 
publicly accused Iraq of supporting the PKK, something which was later denied by the 
Baghdad regime. 46 Similarly, Resul Mamand, the leader of the Iraqi Kurdistan Socialist 
Party, confirmed Iraq's support for the PKK, and Ocalan, during his trial, acknowledged 
that Iraq provided intelligence about Turkish military operations in northern Iraq. 47Thus, 
the Gulf conflict became a turning point for the PKK, as it increased its operational 
44Dateline Turkey, 17 November 1990. 
45'President Turgut Ozal's Letter to EC Member Country Prime Ministers', Newspot, 7 March 1991. 
46,0zal: PKK'yi Saddam Destekliyor', Cumhuriyet, 7 September 1992 and 'Saddam'a Dort Uyari', 
Cumhuriyet, 13 October 1992., 
47'Bagdat PKK'ya Destek Veriyor, Cumhuriýet, 4 May 1992; Hurriýet, 2 June 1999. 
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48 
capability as a result of having new arms and bases available to infiltrate Turkey. Ocalan 
also claimed that the organisation obtained most of its weapons during, and after, the war 
as the region became a arms 'bazaar'. 49Additionally, deteriorating economic conditions, 
particularly in the southern region of Turkey as a result of the UN embargo imposed on 
Iraq and the loss of the Iraqi market, provided new waves of recruits to the PKK- 
Businessmen and industrialists in the region stressed that the UN embargo was actually 
more detrimental to Turkey than Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 50 The PKK repeatedly called 
the Kurdish citizens of the region to revolt and intensified attacks on Turkey. This resulted 
in massive migration and casualties. 51 Between 1984 and 1991 casualties in the conflicts 
were estimated at 3,568. This figure jumped to 16,613 in three years, between 1992 and 
1995.52 
For Turkey perhaps the only real advantage of the Gulf war, apart from the fact that it 
strengthened its position in the eyes of Washington as a reliable strategic ally, was that 
Iraq lost its military capacity and was both economically and politically weakened. 
Moreover, the war also gave a further impetus to the arms race as the Gulf nations alone 
ordered in excess of US$20 billion worth of arms in 1990 and increased their defence 
expenditures to about 20 percent between 1990 and 1995.53 
4.2. Water disputes: A source for future conflicts? 
The water issue has been a key issue that has pre-occupied political concerns in the 
Middle East over the last two decades as the region is the most water-poor region of the 
48Mehmet Ali Birand, APO ve PKK, (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1992), pp. 2534. 
49Hurriyet, 18 March 1999. 
50'Turkey is being Punished by the Embargo', Newspot, 19 August 1994; Cumhuriyet, 2 August 1996. 
5 I'Kanli Nevruz, 22 Olu', Cumhuriyet, 22 March 1992; 'Guneydoguda Kanli Gun: 88 Olu', Cumhurlýet, 30 
September 1992; 'Kan, Goc, Eylem', Cumhuriyet, 25 August 1992. 
52For the PKK violence in the post-Gulf War period see, Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The 
Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict, (London and Portland: Frank 
Cass, 1997), pp. 127-33. 
53SIPRI Year Book 1998, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 196; Anthony H. Cordesman, 'After 
the Gulf War: The World Arms Trade and Its Arms Races in the 1990s' in RUSI and Brasseys's Defence 
Year Book 1992, (London and Virginia: Brassey's, 1992), p. 208. 
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globe, with the lowest per capita consumption of water. According to estimates, by the 
year 2025 only Iran, Iraq and Turkey will have an acceptable minimum water supply 
54 (annual 1000 cum per capita). It has even been widely argued that the conflict over 
borders, religion and race may pale into insignificance compared with the potential future 
55 
conflict over water. 
In turn, the issue, which is strongly linked to the Kurdish problem, is also an important 
factor in limiting cordial relations between Turkey and its two southern neighbours, Syria 
and Iraq. The conflict over water conflict, particularly with Syria, continued throughout 
the 1990s as Ankara repeatedly accused Damascus of harbouring the Kurdish rebels to 
gain leverage over the water issue. The tension reached a breaking point at the heights of 
PKK attacks and the crisis almost brought the two neighbours to the brink of a war which 
was prevented by a last minute settlement. 56 Thus, in Ankara's view, Damascus remained 
as major regional actor giving a lifeline to the PKK's attacks on Turkey over the last 
decade. Moreover, historical differences, Syria's territorial claim and its advanced military 
build-up made Damascus a key external threat in the eyes of Turkish policy makers during 
this period. 
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which rise in Turkey and flow into the Gulf through 
the territories of Syria and Iraq, are two vital water sources for the region. 57 Turkey's 
decision to use the two rivers for irrigation and hydroelectricity purposes in the early 
54Miriam R. Lowi, 'Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 49, no. 1, 
(Summer 1995), p. 124; NaJi 
* 
Abi-Aqd and Michel Grenon, Instability and Conflict in the Middle East: 
People, Petroleum andSecurity Threats, (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 138-9. 
550ne aspect of the issue aggravating the already fragile situation is that there is a rapid growth in the 
region's population (2.8%) and the major water resources of the region are shared while most of the 
regional countries are dependent on foreign water supplies to varying degrees. Abi-Aqd and Grenon, 
op-cit., pp. 137-40; John Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East, 
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1993), p. 19. For example, King Hussein warned once that 'we can go to a war 
not for any reason, but for water. Dogu Ergil, 'Ortadogu'da Su Savaslari miT, A USBFD, vol. 45, nos. I- 
4, (1990), p. 59. 
56 
57Turkey provides 89% and Syria 11% of the annual water potential of the Euphrates, while Turkey 
provides 51% and Iraq 39% of the Tigris. Mehmet Gonlubol and F. Hakan Bingun, 11990-95 Donemi 
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1980s with the South-East Anatolian Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, GAP), which 
would double the country's electricity capacity and increase Turkey's irrigated farmland 
by one third, as well as creating jobs for some five million people, has become a source of 
dispute with the two downstream countries, Syria and Iraq. 58 The two neighbours 
repeatedly voiced their uneasiness over Turkey's decision to go ahead with the project. 59 
Iraq and Syria considered the Euphrates an international river and demanded the 
implementation of the guidelines of the International Law Commission of the UN which 
restrains upstream states from diverting rivers without consultation or causing appreciable 
harm to their downstream neighbours. Turkey, however, claimed that the Euphrates was a 
'cross-boundary waterway' and wished for exclusive sovereignty over the river until it 
reached the Syrian border. 60 
Syria and Iraq feared that with the completion of the GAP project, Turkey would 
eventually release less water than previously. It has the potential to deprive Syria of 40 per 
cent and Iraq of up to 80 percent of its Euphrates water .6' This was perceived by 
Damascus as a threat to its existence, as Syria relied heavily on the Euphrates, which 
alone represented up to 86 percent of its available water resources. Thus, any low level 
supplies from the Euphrates heavily affected Syria's agriculture as well as its main 
hydroelectric energy source, the Tabqa Dam built on the Euphrates. 62 Syria's heavy 
Turk Dis Politikasi' in Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1995), (Ankara: Siyasal, 1996), pp. 668-9. "The project is one of Turkey's biggest public investment and the largest construction project in the 
countries bordering the Mediterranean. When fully implemented, it will comprise 22 darns and 19 power 
stations cost US$32 billion. Osman Tekinel, 'Gap'in Ekonomiye Olasi Etkisi', Dunya, II May 199 1; 
John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991); Murat Ozgokceler, 
'GAP'in Gelecegi', Strateji, no. 3, (1995), p. 189. 59'Iraq and Syria Ask Turkey to Reduce Period Euphrates will be Cut', Dateline Turkey, 20-26 January 1990. 
60For the legal arguments see, Rauf Versan, 'Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi ve Hukuk Acisindan Turk-Arab Iliskileri' in Su Sorunu, Turkrýe ve Ortadogu, Sabahattin Sen (ed. ), (Istanbul: Baglam, 1993), pp. 441-6. 61 Robert Bowker, Beyond Peace: The Search for Security in the Middle East, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 144; A. J. Venter, 'The Oldest Threat: Water in the Middle East', Middle 
East Policy, vol. 6, no. 1, (June 1998), pp. 128-32. 62Murhaf Jouejati, 'Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of Turkey and Syria' in Reluctant Neighbor: 
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reliance on the Euphrates waters for agricultural, industrial, irrigation, power supply, and 
domestic use considerably increased due to economic progress and population growth. In 
particular, the industrial sector expanded as a result of economic liberalisation in the early 
1990s. Syria enjoyed growth rates of around 8 percent per year from 1990 to 1993, though 
this figure was halved in the second part of the 1990s. 63 Furthermore, with the rising 
demands for food from a population growing at a rate of 3.6 percent a year (2.7% between 
1995 and 2000), Syria planned to expand the irrigated areas by up to three to four times. 
Thus, Syria, joined by Iraq, asserted that the amount of water to be released from the 
Euphrates should not be less than 700 cum/s. 64 This meant that Turkey would have had to 
let two-third of the Euphrates river flow go to Syria and Iraq as the annual average flow of 
the river approximates around 1000 cum/s. 65 
However, Turkey argued that if it accepts this, the remaining part would not be 
sufficient to enable the completion of the GAP projeCt. 
66 Besides, Turkey's water demand 
will continue to rise in the years to come as its population is projected to increase by 20 
percent in the next ten years. 67 Turkey further claimed that Syria was getting more water 
than it actually needed. 'At the moment we are giving them ten times what they need, so 
what is the issueT Emre Gonensay, the Turkish foreign minister, claimed. 68 To 
accommodate the rising concerns of its two neighbours, Turkey signed a protocol with 
Syria in 1987 which guaranteed that 500 cum/s water would pass from the Euphrates 
Turkey's Role in the Middle East, Henri J. Barkey (ed. ), (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 
1996), p. 133. 
63Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated 
Regional System, (London and New York: Routledge), p. 18 1. 64Jouejati, op. cit., pp. 13940. 
65Gun Kut, 'Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris', New Perspectives on Turkey, 
no. 9, (Fall 1993), pp. 12-3; Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1996), pp. 15-23. 
66Sukru Elekdag, 'Suriye'nin Gercek Niyetleri', Milhýet, 26 August 1996. 
67Samir Salha, 'GAP Projesinin Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasina Etkileri', Dis Politika, vol. 4, no. 2, (July 
1993), p. 92. The population in Turkey increased from 56 million in 1990 to 68 million in 2000. http: //www. die. gov. tr 
68'Trouble with the Neighbours', The Economist, 8 June 1996. 
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water across the shared border. Moreover, Turkey assured its neighbours that the GAP 
project was of sufficient magnitude to provide economic benefits for, and stimulate 
development in neighbouring countries. 69 
However, according to the Syrian government, Turkey was using the water issue as a 
70 A weapon to play a leading political role in the region and to encircle Syria. u*ara, in 
turn, accused Syria of providing shelter, arms and financial support to the PKK as a way 
of pressurising Ankara concerning over the water issue. 71 Ozal argued that there was a 
close connection between terrorism and the GAP project as, 'the construction of the dams 
helped Syria and lr; ýq to think that water flow will be cut off completely one day. This 
perception urged them to. support terrorism as the only way to weaken Turkey-172 
Similarly, president Demirel accused Damascus of harbouring the PKK as a way of 
forcing Turkey into giving concessions on the water problem. 173 
It was widely believed that after the PKK lost its training camps in Lebanon following 
the Israeli invasion in 1982, Syria helped the PKK militants with training under the 
supervision of Syrian officers and allowed the organisation to establish its headquarters 
within its territories where it directed PKK operations against Turkish targets. 74 During his 
trial Serndin Sakik, a senior PKK leader, who was captured in northern Iraq in 1998, 
revealed Syria's active support. 'Syria does not want peace in Turkey; its interests lie on 
69For the regional effects of the Gap project see, Erol Manisali, 'Water and Turkish-Middle East Relations', 
International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. 6, nos. 1-2, (Winter 1992-94), pp. 169-70; Lutfu 
Sehsuvaroglu, Su Barisi: Turkiye ve Ortadogu Su Politikalari, (Istanbul: Gumusmotif, 1997), pp. 148-66. 
70Muhammad Muslih, 'Syria and Turkey: Uneasy Relations' in Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the 
Middle East, Henri J. Barkey (ed. ), (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 124-5. 71 Kamer Kasim, The Strategic Role of Turkey in the Middle East in the Post Cold War Era, Unpublished 
MA Thesis, (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1996), p. 49. 
72'Ozal: Teror Barajlarla Basladil, Cumhuriyet, 8 September 1992. 
73Milliyet, 25 July 1996. 
740ne observer argued, 'without its Syrian safe house after 1980 the PKK would probably have never been 
resurrected as it was in 1984. ' Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), p. 126; Nihat Ali Ozcan, PKK. Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yontemi, (Ankara: ASAM, 
1999), pp. 237-252; Sukru Elekdag, '2V2War Strategy', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 1, (March-May 1996), p. 
46. 
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the continuation of the war; the headquarters of the war is in Syria. ' 75 In addition, PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan also revealed details of Syrian support for his movement in 
February 1999.76 Syria repeatedly denied Turkish claims that it sheltered and allowed the 
PKK to train in its territories. After the visits of the Turkish interior and foreign ministers 
to Damascus in 1992, relations between the two countries improved. Syria recognised the 
PKK to be an illegal organisation and agreed to cooperate with Lebanon to eradicate the 
terrorist camps in the Bekaa Valley. In return, Turkey guaranteed to continue to release 
sufficient amounts of water from the Euphrates. 77 
By 1998, although Turkey managed to gain a foothold in northern Iraq thanks to the 
ongoing cross-border incursions, it was Ankara's view that it would not be successful in 
its fight against the PKK as long as Syria continued to support the group. Thus, relations 
between Turkey and Syria deteriorated sharply and a sudden war between the two 
neighbours became a possibility. 78 Indeed, the Turkish chief of general staff went so far as 
to state that there was a state of undeclared war between Turkey and Syria. 79 
Subsequently, Ankara demanded the extradition of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and 
massed troops on the Syrian border. The crisis ended with an agreement whereby Syria 
declared that the PKK was an illegal party and promised not to give it any kind of support. 
Later, Ocalan left Syria and was eventually captured in Kenya in February 1999. Thus, 
Syria was effective in manipulating the PKK for its own advantage against Turkey. A 
strengthened PKK caused all kinds of problems for Turkey. In particular, it kept Turkey 
preoccupied with protecting its national security and social and political stability instead 
75Ergun Balci, 'Suriye Sorunu', Cumhuriýet, II September 1998. Hale, op. cit., p. 680; Oya A. 
Mughisuddin, 'Balkaniar, Kafkaslar ve Ortadogu Ekseninde Turk Dis Politikasi: Etkenler ve Tercihier', 
Yeni Turkiye, vol. 2, no. 9, (May-June 1996), p. 261. %Milfiyet, 26 and 27 February 1999. 
77'Interior Minister Sezgin in Syria, Newspot, 23 April 1992; Kaynak Acar, 'Stratejik Acidan Su Sorunu', 
Strateji, no. 3, (1995), p. 142. 
78'Disisleri Bakani Ismail Cem: Suriye Hala Bir Sey Anlamiyor', Hurriyet, 6 October 1998; 'Suriye He 
Savasirsak Ne Olur? ' Hurriyet, 15 October 1998. 
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of allowing it its strategic interests and influence in the region. 
Moreover, Syria was the chief architect of the efforts to isolate Turkey in the Muslim 
world in general and the Arab world in particular over both the water issue and more 
recently improved Turkish-Israeli military ties. As a senior Arab League official put it 
'Turkey constitutes a threat to all Arab countries. Ankara should review its policy. '80 This 
affected Turkey's interests in two ways. First of all, it harmed Turkey's friendly relations 
with some Arab states as Arab public opinion sympathised with Syria. 81 In this context, it 
also appeared as a possibility that Syria could act together on the issue with Iraq, which 
believed that Turkey betrayed it over the Gulf War. 82 
Secondly, Syria, again together with Iraq, managed to persuade many of the 
prospective international donors not to invest in the GAP project, which forced Turkey to 
rely on its own financial resources. The World Bank has rules, which exclude lending to a 
project involving a water dispute between riparian neighbours. Japan withdrew a US$600 
million irrigation proposal for the same reasons. 83 Turkey thus received only US$3.6 
billion in foreign credit, which fell far short of the US$32 billion needed to complete the 
project. Financial shortcomings (public investment as of 1999 amounted to only US$14 
billion) therefore served to postpone the completion date of the project until 2020s rather 
than 2005 as previously hoped and according to official reports only 41 percent of the 
project had been completed by 1999.84 This delayed long-standing regional development 
79Ergun Balci, 'Suriye ile Gerginlik', Cumhuriyet, 5 October 1998. 
80'Arap Birligi Ankara'yi Sucladi, Cumhuriyet, 9 September 1992; Anatolian News Agency, SJVB, 
EE/ 184 8,17 November 1993. 
81 Irfan C. Acar, Dis Politika, (Ankara: Sevinc, 1993), p. 59. 
82Cumhuriýet, 7 February 1996; Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Turkiye'nin Basi Yakinda Derde Girecek', Sabah, 5 
December 1996. 
83'The Neighbours are Suspicious-The Biggest Project in the Mediterranean', Financial Times, 21 May 
1992. Exceptionally, Britain later agreed to fund a project to build a dam within the Gap project. 'Turkish 
Dam May be Funded by UK', The Independent, I March 1999. 
84Status Report South-eastern Anatolia Project, (Ankara: South-eastern Anatolia Project Regional 
Development Administration, 2000); 'Gap'in 30 Yilda Sadece Yuzde 41'i Tamamlandi', HurriYet, 20 
September 1998; Murat Ozgokceler, 'GAP'in Gelecegi', Strate/i, no. 3, (1995), p. 189. 
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projects within the framework of the GAP, which could have helped to alleviate the 
region's (mainly Kurdish) underdeveloped socio-economic structure, and even build up 
the overall prosperity of Turkey, eventually contributing to the eradication of the ongoing 
PKK terrorism. 85 
Furthermore, it should also be noted that Syria wanted to put Hatay, a province of 
Turkey and the former sanjak of Alexandretta that became part of Turkey in 1939, on the 
political agenda as the Syrian information minister explained, 'Hatay is a national issue 
we can never retract. 186 Consequently, given Syria's stance on the PKK issue; its close 
military ties with Greece including landing rights in Syria for the Greek air force in case 
of a conflict with Turkey87; its territorial claims and its military capabilities including a 
non-conventional weapons programme, the Turkish National Security Policy Paper 
published in 1997 declared Syria (along with Greece) as a leading external threat. 88 
Although Turkish-Syrian bilateral trade started to flourish in the late 1980s due to 
increasing diplomatic relations, the volume of trade only doubled from US$150 million in 
1988 to US$330 million in 1991, while it reached a level of US$2 billion with Iraq over 
the same period. 89 
4.3. The Regional Arms race and nuclear proliferation: Living with the 
proliferators, -Iran, Iraq, and Syria 
The arms race and the proliferation of offensive missiles and weapons of mass 
851n some areas in eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey per capita income is less than us$1000, well 
below the national average and far less than that in western parts of Turkey. Milhývet, 29 December 1998.. 
86Zaman, 20 October 1998; Robert Olson, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward 
Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq since the Gulf War' in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its 
Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Robert Olson (ed. ), (Kentucky: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1996), p. 85 
87See, 'Developments in Turkish-Greek relations: New rivalries, more tension', Chapter Seven. 
88Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'Arming For Peace' Janes Defence Weekly, 19 August 1998, p. 26. 
89Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri 1989 (Ankara: Basbakanlik DIE, 1991); Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri (Ankara: 
Basbakanlik DIE, 1998). Although relations with Syria, in particular in the economic field, improved 
since Syrian support for the PKK declined in late 1998 and the two sides met to discuss the ways of 
strengthening bilateral relations for the first time in 12 years, as Turkish foreign minister noted, there are 
still several bilateral problems to be solved. Ismail Cem, Turkey in the Twenty-first Century, speech 
delivered at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 28 March 2001; Anadolu Haber Ajansi, 24 
March 1999 and Hurriyet, 24 September 1999. 
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destruction (WMD) including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has stood as one 
of the key security issues of the post-Cold War era in general and the Middle East in 
particular. 90 In this context, several Middle Eastern countries possess one or more types of 
WMD and have some form of ballistic missiles capability. From early 1990s, Turkey had 
been concerned that by the fact that its southern neighbours-Iraq, Iran and Syria- all 
developed these non-conventional arsenals as well as massive conventional capabilities. 91 
This situation forced Turkey to continue spending significant sums on large-scale 
weaponisation programmes at the expense of a post-Cold War 'peace dividend'. 
Essentially, the huge military drain on its budget, coupled with the financial burden of the 
long-lasting battle against Kurdish separatism, made Turkey more dependent on foreign 
aid, and thus significantly limited its ability to play a greater role in international politics. 
This was clearly evidenced in Turkey's highly overrated relationship with the 'Turkic 
world' during the period in question. The strong initial euphoria did not go beyond 
sentimentalism and, what is more, the idea of a 'Turkish model' of economic development 
for the new republics was damaged when Ankara failed to meet the immense demands for 
financial aid and assistance demanded by these states. 
In the post-Cold War era, the Middle East remained as one of the largest arms markets 
in the world. 92 The Gulf War in particular further fuelled the arms race most notably 
90Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), pp. 16-9; Richard K. Betts, 'The New Threat of Mass Destruction', Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1, 
(January-February 1998), pp. 27-40. 
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trade. The Military Balance 1997-98, (London: IISS, 1997), p. I IS. For further reading on origins and 
dynamics of the arms race in the region see, Keith B. Payne, 'Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile 
Defence', Orbis, (Spring 1995), p. 201; Yavuz G. Yildiz, 'Ortadogu'da Silahlanma ve Militarism' in Su 
Sorunu, Turkiye ve ortadogu, Sabahattin Sen (ed. ), (Istanbul: Baglam, 1993), p. 171; Asim Arar, 
'Kimyasal Silahlar Sozlesmesi', Dis Politika, vol. 5, no. 3, (April 1994), p. 155; Hugh Beach, Arms 
Control Today, (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 20-1; Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East 
Arms Race, 1991, pp. 71-2; Wallace J. Thies, 'Rethinking the New World Order', Orbis, vol. 38, no. 4, 
(Fall 1994), p. 625; Lawrance Freedman, 'The "Proliferation Problem, ' and the New World Order' in 
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among the Gulf nations as they increased defence budgets considerably in the face of the 
Iraqi and Iranian threat. 93 Furthermore, the absence of real arms control agreements and 
confidence and security-building regimes made the Middle East even more dangerous, 
and, as noted by the Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin in 1992, this made the efforts 
to have an environment of trust almost impossible to achieve. 94 
Iran and Iraq modified and copied missiles that they acquired from developed countries 
and obtained production capabilities. 95 For example, Iran deployed 150 Scud-B missiles 
with a range of 320-340 km, and in the early 1990s around 200 North Korean-built Scud- 
C missiles were deployed with a range of 500-600 km. It was also reported that Iran had 
96 produced the Iran missile with a range of 130-200 km, and had successfully tested a 
1400-km-range Shahab-3 missile, which would enable Iran to strike Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
most of Turkey and part of Russia, while it started developing the next generation of 
Shahab-4 missile with a range of 2000 km. 97 The same is true for Syria: It was widely 
believed that Syria had one of the largest arsenals of surface-to-surface missiles in the 
Middle East, including hundreds of Scud missiles that could carry nuclear or chemical 
payloads. 98 In the late 1980s, Syria deployed a combined total of approximately 300 
missiles including the Frog7 (a range of 70 km), SS21 (120 km), Scud-B and Scud-C with 
Controlled', Middle East Journal, vol. 45, no. 3, (Summer 199 1), p. 449. 93Anthony H. Cordesman, 'After the Gulf War: The World Arms Trade and its Arms Races in the 1990s' in 
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39; Erdogan Oznal, Degisen Dunya Dengeleri ve Turkiye'nin Jeo-Stratejik Onemi, (Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Baskanligi, 1992), pp. 26-32. 
96Martin S. Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East, (London and New York: 
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conventional and chemical warheads and were in the process of developing the M-9 (500 
km). It was believed that Syria's combined total missile deployment was no less than 1000 
during the period in question. 99 According to Turkish officials, Syria deployed missile 
sites as close as 70 km away from the Turkish borders. 100 Iraq, on the other hand, before 
the Gulf conflict, deployed hundreds of missiles of different types with chemical and 
conventional warheads as well as Al-Husayn (600 km) (modified Scud-B) and Al-Abbas 
(900 km) and tested Al-Tammuz (1800 km). It was also believed that during this time Iraq 
was intent upon developing nuclear warhead. 101 
During the Gulf conflict two Patriot missiles were deployed near the Iraqi-Turkish 
border against possible Iraqi Scuds. This highlighted the weakness of Turkey's air defence 
system and prompted the defence minister to declare that Turkey must be prepared against 
the ever-improving defence system and ballistic missile capability of its southern and 
south-eastem neighbours': 'Our short-term goal is to purchase defence systems. '102 The 
issue of the missile threat from neighbouring countries also helped highlight the fact that 
Turkey did not have any medium or long-range missile capability and relied on 120 
MGM-140 Anny Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles with a range of 160 km 
and some other short-range battlefield ballistic missiles with a 50-100 km range-103 In 
order to reduce this disparity and increase its combat capability Ankara signed an 
agreement with China to produce medium-range WS-I missiles at a cost of US$150 
million. It also purchased medium-range air-to-air AMRAAM, surface-to-surface 
ATACMS missiles from the US and received medium-range lhawk missiles from 
99http: //www. fas. org/irp/threat/missile/summary. htm. 
10OMilliyet, 15 September 1997. 
, 10INavias, op. cit., pp. 21-2 and pp. 30-1. 
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France. 104 
Moreover, Iraq, Iran and Syria all aspired to be nuclear powers and achieved 
significant successes in biological and, particularly, chemical weapons technology-105 
Syria, in particular, had a long declared intention of achieving strategic parity with 
Israel, 106 and according to the Monterey Institute Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, 
Syria had the largest and most advanced chemicals weapons capability in the Middle East. 
It also had a limited biotechnology infrastructure that could support a basic biological 
warfare effort. 107 As for nuclear weapon technology, Syria sought closer relations with 
China and Russia on the issue and was reported to have concluded deals with China and 
North Korea on missiles and advanced weapons systems. 108 In 1998, it was also reported 
that Syria and Russia signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 109 Iran, 
on the other hand, was able to employ chemical weapons and its biological warfare 
programme was believed to be generally in the advanced research and development 
phase. ' 10 As for nuclear weapon technology, Iran had been building up its own nuclear 
capability for several decades and"' with Russian assistance in particular had been 
making significant advances. 112 
104Hurriyet, 20 December 1996; Milliyet, 31 January 1996; Milliyet, 10 January 1997; Cumhuriyet, 17 
March 1997. 
105No evidence suggests that Turkey had a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programme. 
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Given this threat, Turkey was unable to rely on NATO alone and was bound to provide 
for its own security arrangements, which necessitated increased defence expenditures. 
Essentially therefore, despite its poor economic performance, high inflation, large budget 
deficits and deep-seated social, political and economic problems, Turkey still felt obliged 
to allocate a significant part of its resources to military defence expenditure in the first 
decade following the end of the Cold War and over the period remained one of the leading 
arms importing countries in the world. For example, in 1994, it was the sixth-largest arms 
importer in the world though in terms of GNP per capita it ranked 78'h'13. In this context, 
with the exception of Greece, Turkey was the only NATO country not to have cut its 
military spending in the post-Soviet era (relative to the GDP it fell to 2.7 percent among 
NATO countries while it remained 4.4 percent in Turkey). Military spending was less than 
US$4 billion in 1988, but amounted to more than US$6 billion in 1995 and almost US$10 
billion in 1999 (the highest ratio as a percentage of GDP of any NATO members with the 
exception of Greece and the US). 114 
In addition to the 10-year modernisation programme of the national defence industry 
introduced in 1985, Turkey also launched a massive 30 year modernisation programme of 
the armed forces at the cost of US$150 billion commencing in 1996.115 This included, for 
example, the modernisation of the air defences through procurement of 240 F-16s, 145 
attack helicopters and the production of 1,000 tanks. 116 Additionally (as will be discussed 
later in this study) Turkey concluded military agreements with Israel in 1996, which 
included the upgrading of Turkey's fleet of US-made F-4 and F-5 fighter planes by Israel. 
113Selami Sezgin and Julide Yildirim, 'The Demand for Turkish Defence Expenditure', Defence and Peace 
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It was also reported that following Iran's successful missile test and Syria's growing 
missile potential, Turkey and Israel agreed to jointly invest in missile production. 117 
Turkish and Israeli officials also agreed to jointly produce 500 km-range Patriot-type 
Arrow missiles and reached an agreement on Popeye-1 type missiles to be produced in 
Turkey. I IS The two countries also planned to co-produce Popeye-2 missiles with a3 50 km 
range. 119 From a Turkish perspective, the strategic relationship with Israel can be seen, in 
part, as Turkey's attempt to balance the military capabilities of its southern Arab 
neighbours. 
4.4. Turkish-Israeli relations: A 'strategic partnership". 
Turkey's generally poor relationship with the Muslim Arab world especially their 
direct/indirect support for Kurdish separatists and clashes over water all proved to Turkey 
that it was facing an ever-growing threat from its immediate neighbours. These factors, as 
well as Turkey's growing isolation from Europe, played a significant role in Ankara's 
decision to review its Middle Eastern policies and to look for new alliances in the region. 
In the words of general Cevik Bir, deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff and one of 
the main architects of Turkish-Israeli military relations, 'new threats that emerged after 
the Cold War led Turkey to become a "strategy-producing" country. The initiation of 
Turkish-Israeli relations should be seen in this light. '120 
In fact, the political basis for rising relations between the two countries had always 
existed. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise the new state of Israel in 1949 
and throughout the 1950s Turkey's pro-Western standing in the region eased the 
development of cordial relations. However, Turkey's expanding relations with the Arab 
Guney, op. cit., p. 5; Turkiye, 22 September 1999. 
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world from the late 1960s came at the expense of the Turkish-Israeli ties and, from this 
date until the late 1980s, this meant that Turkey became increasingly more responsive to 
the Arab cause. 121 Nevertheless, Turkish-Israeli relations never completely broke down 
and witnessed a significant expansion of bilateral relations following the historic Arab- 
Israeli Oslo peace process, by way of high-level visits, trade and military agreements 
culminating in a 'strategic partnership'. 122 
The signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993 removed, from 
Ankara's perspective, the obstacles in the way of improving bilateral relations. 123 
Moreover, regional and international developments such as the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations between Israel and a number of states as well as the Gulf War of 
1991, which for the first time brought both Arabs and Israelis together on the same side 
against Iraq, all became key reasons in Turkey's decision to upgrade links with Israel. 124 
In addition to this suitable international environment, several other factors also combined 
to encourage Turkey to foster close relations with Israel. Primarily, both sides shared 
some common features and views on a number of regional issues. 125 They were both pro- 
Westem, had close ties to the US, committed to democratic and secular values, they had 
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similar views regarding terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, they also shared a 
common enmities with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Perhaps most importantly, Israel and Turkey 
shared a 'common sense of otherness' in a region dominated by Arab and non-democratic 
regimes. 126 
In fact, after the Madrid conference of 1991 Ankara's decision to raise the level of the 
diplomatic relations to embassy status underlined Turkey's readiness to improve its ties 
with Israel. 127 The Turkish tourism minister's visit in 1992 marked the first official visit to 
Israel by a Turkish cabinet minister in almost three decades and started the process of 
normalisation of bilateral relations. The relationship further intensified with the visit of the 
Turkish foreign minister, which similarly marked Turkey's first-ever foreign ministerial 
visit to Israel in 1993, and the Turkish prime minister who visited Israel for the first time 
in 1994. This was followed by a visit by the Turkish president in 1996 and the first ever 
visit by a Turkish chief of staff in 1997.128 
Ankara's motivations for improving relations with Israel were manifold. Firstly, as 
discussed earlier, Turkey's loss of its strategic role as a Cold War bulwark against the 
former Soviet Union continued with the rejection of its application for membership of the 
EU led it to fear marginalisation within the new European economic and political system. 
This fear of isolation, however, served to encourage Turkey to speed up the process of 
forging relations with Israel. As such, following the Luxembourg EU summit of 1997, 
which virtually ended Turkey's hopes for EU membership in the foreseeable future, prime 
minister Yilmaz immediately set out to demonstrate that if Turkey did not have friends in 
126AIan Makovsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations; A Turkish "Periphery Strategy"? ' in Reluctant Neighbour., 
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Brussels, it had powerful friends elsewhere and referred to the Turkish-Israeli 'strategic 
pannership' in this context. 129 
Secondly, shared concerns over terrorism and security threats from Iraq, Iran and, 
particularly, Syria brought the two states closer. 130 Thus, on his visit to Israel in 1996, 
president Demirel highlighted terrorism as one of the main problems in the region and 
named Syria as a country that provided refuge to terrorists. 131 In this context, Turkey 
received full support from Israel in its struggle against terrorists, most notably the PKK. 
Ankara was even assured by the Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres that a peace deal 
between Syria and Israel would not be signed unless Damascus's support for terrorist 
organisations was 'completely severed'. 132 According to general Cevik Bir, then the 
deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, this policy eventually paid a quick dividend 
following Ocalan's departure from Syria. 'The military agreement signed between Turkey 
and Israel paved the way for resolution of the Turkish-Syrian crisis of autumn 1998. 
Syria's more responsive attitude toward Turkey since then proves that the Turkish-Israeli 
agreement works. '133 Additionally, as will be discussed in the coming chapter, it was 
widely accepted that Turkey's other internal threat, the rise of political Islam represented 
by the Refah Party's increasing anti-secular policies in domestic and foreign affairs, was 
another big issue that led the government and, in particular, the army to step up the 
process of developing relations with Israel (especially during the Refah government). "' 
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Turkey's fostering of close relations with Israel was also partly a response to the fact 
that it could not get any real political support for issues like Cyprus from the Arab world, 
despite its constant support for the Palestinian cause. Indeed, no Arab country recognised 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus following its declaration of independence in 
1983, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) did not grand anything more than 
that of observer status. 135 Again, although Turkey had a strong position within the 
Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), with the inclusion of the Turkic republics, it 
was not able to persuade Iran to include the TRNC in the forUM. 136 Moreover, some of the 
Arab nations allied themselves with countries that Turkey had already been engaged in 
conflict with. Syria looked to develop closer military ties with Greece and tried to form a 
front in the Arab world against Turkey on the water issue. Iran supported Annenia, as 
witnessed during the Azeri-Armenian war, and was perceived as a major threat to the 
secular regime in Turkey. In the face of criticism coming from Arab countries over the 
Turkish-Israeli ties, Sami Kohen, a columnist for the Turkish daily Milliyet on foreign 
affairs, wrote, 
They (the Arabs) recall that for many years Turkey had frozen its relations with 
Israel partly because Arab countries demanded that. But these countries, rather 
than supporting Turkey, had taken a stance against Turkey, with Syria 
harbouring the PKK and joining hands with Iraq to launch a campaign against 
Turkey on the water issue. Iran too has supported both the PKK and the 
fundamentalists. The current improvement in Turco-Israeli relations is the 
outcome of the stance some Arab countries have taken against Turkey, the spot 
reached today is not a 'cause' but an 'effect. "" 
Also, with regard to the water problem in the Middle East, Turkey's strategic interests 
drove it to improve its existing relations with Israel. 138 Moreover, as noted by a senior 
135Kut, ' Filistin', op. cit., p. 3 1. 
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Turkish diplomat, in view of the rapidly developing annament programmes of both Syria 
and Iran with advanced military capabilities with conventional and non-conventional 
arms, relations with Israel were considered a deterrent against both neighbours, which 
would also change the regional balance in favour of Turkey-139 At the same time, the 
rapprochement with Israel allowed the army to acquire arms and technology from Israel, 
which it could never have hoped to obtain from Europe or the US because of Turkey's 
human rights record and its conflict with Greece. Washington had already showed a 
reluctance to supply Turkey with arms in the face of domestic opposition as a result of 
lobbying by human rights, arms control groups and the Greek and Armenian lobbies. 140 A 
senior member of the Turkish general staff warned the US administration that 'it would be 
quite normal for us to invest our money in other countries where we are sure that there 
will be no restrictions on weapon system transfers. '141 This resulted in the signing of a 
US$590 million deal with Israel to upgrade Turkey's fleet of American-made F-4 fighter 
planes. 142 Later, Ankara also awarded a US$75 million contract to Israel to upgrade its F-5 
fighters over a French bid in protest at the EU's Luxembourg SUMMit. 143 It was later 
reported that Israel concluded a deal with Turkey to provide US-Israeli joint production of 
Patriot-type Arrow missiles and agreed on the development of joint cooperation in 
satellite technology. 144 All this has been underpinned by military agreements signed in 
February and August 1996 (Israel's first-ever formal military link to a Muslim country) 
which provided for joint air and naval exercises, access to port facilities, access to each 
other's military academies and headquarters, and exchange of military information, 
Baglam, 1992), p. 147. 
139Sukru Elekdag, 'Israil lie Yakinlasma', Milliyet, 2 June 1998. 
1401nterview with professor Hasan Koni of Ankara University, Aksiyon, 10 January 1998; Gresh, op. cit., P. 
191. 
141 Quoted in Thomas Valasek, 'Turkey's Military Modernization Program', Magazine of German-Armenian 
Society, (July 1999); Kemal Kirisci, 'Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies', MEPJA, vol. 2, 
no. 4, (November 1998). 
142The Daily Telegraph, 16 September 1997. 
129 
expertise, and personnel. 145 
Furthermore, Ankara also hoped that its wide-ranging strategic partnership with Israel 
would improve Turkey's image in Washington and could gain strong support from the US 
administration and Congress, and the supporters of Israel in Congress did work for Ankara 
in the US capital. 146 Prime minister Yilmaz in his speech before the leaders of the US 
Jewish community drew attention to this, and called the Jewish communities both inside 
and outside the US as the 'unofficial ambassadors of Turkey'. 147 Moreover, good relations 
with Israel paid a handsome dividend for Turkey in its efforts to integrate into Europe. 
Israeli diplomats were very active in support of Turkey's bid to have its customs union 
agreement with the EU ratified by the European Parliament in 1995. Furthermore, Israeli 
prime minister Peres personally lobbied European leaders on Turkey's behalf in 1996-148 
Finally, economic factors played a significant role. Turkey's trade with Arab countries 
decreased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s due to loss of the Iraqi market and the 
general economic situation in the Middle East. This, in turn, turned Turkey's eyes towards 
alternative markets and other developed countries including Israel. In 1995, exports to 
Islamic countries accounted for less than 14 percent of total Turkish exports; this is in 
stark contrast to its highest point of 48 per cent in 1982.149 In the wake of the visit by 
Demirel to Israel in 1996, a free trade agreement was signed making Turkey the only 
country with which Israel had signed such an agreement other than the US. 150 Although 
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trade volume between two countries was more than half a billion dollars in 1996, this 
reached almost US$I billion (US$885 million, Turkish exports accounted for US$585 
million) in 1999, making Israel a leading Middle Eastern market for Turkish goods. 151 In 
addition, 300400,000 Israeli tourists visited Turkey every year making it the second most 
popular destination after the US, and they spent another half a billion dollars, a significant 
boost to Turkish tourism revenues. 152 
From an Israeli perspective, cooperating with Turkey within its 'periphery strategy' 
represented the most viable opportunity to realise its objective of improving ties with the 
Muslim world. 153 By improving relations with Turkey, Israel helped to guarantee its water 
needs in the event of severe shortages. Close ties to Turkey also brought foreign earnings 
through the selling of arms and technology. ' 54 In addition, in view of the matching mutual 
economic interests, Turkey could ensure Israel's access to the growing markets of the 
newly-independent Central Asian republics, and in fact the two countries agreed to extend 
existing trade relations to Central Asian republics by way of joint investment 
programmes. 155 Also, in strategic terms, the use of Turkish airspace for pilot training was 
highly beneficial to the Israeli air force. 156 As the Israeli ambassador to Ankara Uri Bar- 
Nir noted in 2001, Turkey became the second-most important country for Israel in the 
world (after theUS). 157 
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Although Turkey benefited from the strategic partnership (most notably regarding 
Syrian support for PKK terrorists), its close military ties with Israel faced wide criticism 
from the Muslim world and also created some uneasiness among certain parts of the 
Turkish public, particularly at times of deadlock in Arab-Israeli peace process. Indeed, the 
new political and military alliance between Israel and Turkey, with the strong 
encouragement of the US, foamed Arab fear on the changing balance of power in the 
Middle East despite assurances from Turkey. In the words of president Demirel, 'our 
relations with Israel are bilateral ties based on the mutual interests of the two countries. 
These ties are not aimed at any third country. '158 'We have nothing to say against normal 
relations between Turkey and Israel; but when it comes to a discussion of a strategic or 
military alliance between those two countries, of course we continue to have concerns' 
said one Arab diplomat. 159 Similarly, the Arab League criticised the Turkish-Israeli 
aligmnent as 'a hostile pact' in the region and a threat to the national interests of the Arab 
world. 160 The Syrian vice-president Khaddam described the Turkish-Israeli alliance as 'the 
greatest threat to the Arabs since Israel was created. '161 The joint Israeli, Turkish and 
American maritime manoeuvres (though restricted to humanitarian training) that took 
place in early 1998 and late 1999 further confirmed Arab suspicions, with Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, Lebanon and Iran denouncing the exercises. 162 
Damascus backed by Iraq urged the Arab League and the OIC to pass tougher 
resolutions condemning Turkey and mobilized other Arab countries and Iran to form a 
6counter alliance' to balance the Turkish-Israeli axis. In this context, Syria, Egypt and 
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Saudi Arabia strengthened their strategic relationships with each other. 163 Furthermore, 
close ties between Turkey and Israel led to a partial rapprochement between Syria and 
Iraq (at odds for some 30 years) as one common border reopened in 1997 followed by the 
reopening of an important oil pipeline that had been closed since 1982.164 Iran, which also 
felt threatened by the accord, blamed Ankara for letting its territory be used as Israel's 
backyard and stated that Israeli specialists may have been monitoring the Iranian border 
from Turkey. 165 
It is clear that Ankara's advanced military relationship with Israel intensified historical 
Arab mistrust of Turkey. In the face of severe criticism over Turkish-Israeli relations at 
the meeting of the OIC in Tehran in December 1997, which coincided with the Israeli 
defence minister's official visit to Ankara and Turkish military incursion in northern Iraq, 
president Demirel was forced to leave the conference early. 166 Needless to say, Turkey's 
inability to explain its ties to Israel was exploited by extremist political forces at home. 
For example, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the pro-Islamist Refah Party, argued, 'see how 
miserable they (the president and the prime minister) are. They are being kicked out of 
both Europe and the Islamic Conference at the same time. '167 
According to other critics, although Turkey's political relations with the Middle 
Eastern Arab countries were not ideal for some time and in many cases the fault hardly 
lies with Ankara, nonetheless, Turkey should have paid more respect to the religious and 
162The Daily Telegraph, 8 January 1998. 
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historical ties with the Arab world and refrained alienating this block all together. 168 They 
also argued that Turkey should have kept a low profile with regard to the relationship with 
Israel rather than making it a core aspect of its Middle East policy. However, critics 
generally accepted that Turkey had every right to pursue its own national interests and 
would not stop doing what was required just because the Arab countries disagreed. "' For 
example, Ilnur Cevik, editor of the Turkish Daily News, wrote, 
Turkey has to further strengthen its links with Israel for its own supreme 
interests. Yet, while doing this Ankara cannot and should not hurt the delicate 
balances in the Middle East. The Turkish Foreign Ministry on the other hand 
also supports close links with Israelbut feels this should be done in a 
professional manner and things should not be rushed. The Foreign Ministry is 
also aware that Turkey has to take into account Arab reservations and concerns 
while enhancing ties with Israel. "' 
168Cengiz Candar, a leading analyst on foreign policy issues, argued 'nobody has a right to isolate Turkey in 
the region and the Muslim world, the most powerful and influential country of the area, by reducing its 
role only to Israel's strategic partner in the Middle East. Aksiyon, 26 December 1997, p. 28 169Sami Kohen, Milliývet, 9 May 1997. 
170Turkish Daily News, 15 May 1997. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TURKEY'S INTERNAL THREATS: PKK SEPERATISM 
AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
5.1. Turkey's hidden war: The Kurdish issue 
The power vacuum in UN-protected northern Iraq that developed following the Gulf 
War enabled the establishment of a de facto Kurdish autonomous zone that fuelled PKK 
violence, particularly in the south-eastern part of Turkey. As Alexander Haig, a former 
US secretary of state, pointed out, 'the safe havens, established in northern Iraq, have 
averted the worst for the northern Iraq Kurds but not established security for peace. 
Instead the PKK has found a safe haven. " Thus, PKK issue continued to remain as a 
serious national security threat to Turkey throughout the period under study. 
In addition to the domestic aspects of the issue, it presented an important impediment 
to Turkey's external relations in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia and also 
meant that Turkey could not concentrate on building strong economic and political 
relations with its neighbours Iraq, Iran and, most notably, Syria. The issue also became a 
political tool in the hands of some of those countries that had differences with Turkey 
such as Russia, Annenia, Greece, and to lesser extent Cyprus and Serbia. The matter also 
became an impediment to Ankara's historic goal of joining the EU in the context of its 
human rights violations and the state of democratic reforms. 
Towards a Kurdish state in northern Iraq 
Turkey was concerned that a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would have a direct 
influence on its own security3, and would encourage Kurdish nationalists in Turkey in 
their quest for autonomy or independence in the mainly Kurdish part of the country or 
give momentum to the effort to include the eastern and south-eastem part of Turkey in a 
I The Washington Times, 25 June 1995. 
217or the evolution of Kurdish nationalism and the PKK see, 'Economy-oriented foreign policies, 1980- 
1989', Chapter One. 
3'Ordu, Kurt Devletine Karsi', Cumhuriýet, II October 1992. 
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federation along with the Syrian and Iranian Kurdish-populated areas as a part of a 
'greater Kurdistan'. 4 Turkey was also concerned that such a scenario would definitely 
increase instability in the region and could also endanger an estimated 2.5 million 
Turcomans living in northern Iraq. This, in turn, would force Turkey to intervene to 
protect them5, especially as the Turcoman council, the highest decision-making organ of 
the Iraqi Turcoman Front, had claimed that their future depended on Turkish support. 6 
The Kurdish uprising and the massive exodus of Kurdish civilians in their attempt to 
escape from Saddam. Hussein's brutal repression over Turkish and Iranian borders 
following the Gulf War of 1991, attracted the international community's attention, and 
the issue was, in turn, intemationalised. The Kurdish political issue also brought a host of 
post-Cold War issues to the forefront of Middle Eastern concerns: the challenge of 
breakaway ethnic movements; human rights; the treatment of minorities; democracy; 
cultural autonomy and even the creation of new states out of existing territorial units. 7 
As such, the Gulf War further exacerbated the already chronic Kurdish issue in the 
Middle Eastern region, particularly for Turkey. There were several reasons for this. First 
of all, UN-controlled northern Iraq was home to various ethnic and religious groups with 
different political agendas with an estimated 250-300 political and military camps in the 
region. 8 Of these, the two main Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union Kurdistan (PUK) and 
413askin Oran, Kalkik Horoz: Cekic Guc ve Kurt Devieti, (Istanbul: Bilgi, 1996), p. 187; ldris Bal, 
'Ortadogu'da Istikrarsizliga Yol Acan Faktorler ve PKK'nin Katkisil in 21. Yuzyilin Esiginde Turk Dis 
Politikasi, ldris Bal (ed. ), (Istanbul: Alfa, 2001), p. 707. 
5Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95', Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 4, 
(October 1996), p. 352. 
6Cumhuriyet, 12 September 1999. 
7According to Fuller, 'for the first time in modem history, control over the Kurdish problem has slipped out 
of the grasp of all regional parties as Kurdish politics has taken on a momentum of its own. ' Graham E. 
Fuller, 'The Fate of the Kurds', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 2, (Spring 1993), p. 109; Kumru Baser, 'The 
Internalisation of Turkey's Kurdish Conflict', Turkish Area Studies, no. 5 1, (November 2000), pp. 13-4. 
For demographic distribution of the Kurdish population in the region see, Mehrdad R. Izady, 'The 
Kurdish Demographic Revolution and Its Socio-Political Implications' in Contrast and Solutions in the 
Middle East, Ole Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yurukel (eds. ), (Aarhus C: Aarhus University Press, 1997), p. 
484. 
8'Sedat Aral, 'Dis Kurtler Ne Yapiyor? ', Nokia, 26 April 1992. 
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the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), were deeply divided due to historic, tribal 
differences and political interest. 9 Indeed, the KDP-PUK coalition government formed 
following the election of the first parliament in Kurdish history in 1992 quickly ended and 
led to a civil war in 1994 in which more than 3,000 people were killed. 10 
Furthermore, another problem for Turkey in regard to Iraqi Kurds was that they sought 
protection from both Baghdad and each other. This made the issue more complicated and 
thereby involved regional actors such as Iran which had close ties with the PUK leader 
Jalal Talabani. 11 For example, the KDP, which had close ties with Iraq and Turkey, tumed 
to Baghdad when the balance changed in favour of the PUK. This in turn prompted 
Baghdad to send 30,000 troops and 400 tanks to assist the KDP. 12 Similarly, in 1992, Iran 
bombed several camps in northern Iraq, which were believed to belong to groups opposed 
to the regime in Tehran. 13 Again, in July and October 1996, Iran launched massive 
operations in northern Iraq against the KDP forces in which 15,000 troops supported by 
tanks, heavy artillery and aircraft took part. 14 In effect, although the KDP and the PUK 
agreed to secure the Turco-Iraqi border in close co-operation with Turkey, the conditions 
were not helpful in this respect and Turkey was concerned by the fact that the PKK 
benefited from the ongoing instabilities. 15 
Ankara constantly denied that it had any designs on the region, that it supported a 
9See, Michael M. Gunter, 'The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq', Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 2, 
(Spring 1996), pp. 23940. 
10The Daily Telegraph, 5 April 1995; 'Ilk Kurt Hukumeti', Cumhurtvet, 6 July 1992; K. Nezan, 'The 
Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background' in Kurdish Culture and Identi% P. Kreyenbroek 
and C. Allison (eds. ), (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996), pp. 17-8. 
II Duygu B. Sezer, 'Turkiye'nin Irak Cikmazi', Yeni Yuzyil, 8 September 1996. 
12The Economist, 7 September 1996. 
13'lran'dan Irak'a Sinir Otesi Hareket', Cumhuriyet, 7 April 1992. 
"Mflliýet, 31 July 1996 and 15 October 1996. 
15'General Bitlis Meets Talabani and Barzani', Newspot, 19 November 1992. Talabani was later to admit 
that they made a number of alliances with the PKK and provided financial and moral support. Milliyet, I 
June 1999; Sukru Elekdag, 'Turkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'taki Hedefleri', Milliyet, 22 July 1996; Cumhuriyet, 
21 November 1997. 
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unified Iraq and would not interfere with its territorial integrity. 16 As such, Ankara made 
it clear that it opposed any decision by the north Iraqi Kurds to establish a federal state as 
a unilateral decision that could lead to the partition of Iraq. 17 Turkey also held tripartite 
meetings with Iran and Syria in 1992 and 1994 in response to the KDP and the PUK 
agreements regarding the establishment of a Kurdish state, in which they agreed to 
oppose the partition of Iraq and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. In a 
desire to normalise relations with Iraq in order to contain the Kurdish nationalist threat18, 
Turkey, as well as Syria and Iran, approached Baghdad regarding the lifting of UN 
economic sanctions, and the reopening of the pipeline between Iraq and Turkey. 19 While 
Turkish premier Demirel argued that 'sanctions on Iraq should be lifted as soon as 
possible so that it is necessary for Iraq to play a part on international platforms. 120 
Moreover Turkey chose to continue its interventions into northern Iraq, which began in 
the early 1980s as part of the security agreement signed with Iraq in 1984 for the 'hot 
pursuit' of the PKK terrorists. In fact, Turkey established a de facto security zone within 
northern Iraq, and hoped that these military incursions would both limit the PKK and fill 
the power vacuum in the area. 21 Ankara increased incursions in the second half of the 
1990s in order to eradicate the PKK once and for all. For example, in 1998, the greatest 
16Turkish foreign minister stated 'our policy is the protection of territorial integrity, independence, 
sovereignty and the political unity of Iraq. ' Turkish Daily News, 19 July 1997. Gulnur Aybet, 'Turkey in 
its Geo-Strategic Environment' in Rusi and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1992, (London: RUSI, 1992), p. 
102. 
17'Kurt Devietine Hayir', 'Cumhuriyet, 9 October 1992; 'Turkey Against Disintegration of Iraq', Newspot, 
22 October 1992. 
18See, Robert Olson, 'Turkey and Iraq: Toward Normalisation? ', Middle East International, (7 August 
1992), p. 19. 
19For the tripartite meetings in 1992 and 1994 see a well elaborated article by Robert Olson, 'The Kurdish 
Question Four Years on: The Policies of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq', Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 
(1994), pp. 136-44; Uclu Zirve Irak'in Toprak Butunlugunden Yana', Cumhuriýet, 15 November 1992; 
'Resolution on North Iraq', Newspot, 19 November 1992; Turkey-Iran-Syria Meeting', Newspot, 2 
September 1994; Gunter, op. cit., pp. 234-5. 
20 'Sanctions on Iraq Should be Lifted', Newspot, 2 September 1994. 
211raq rejected to renew the agreement in 1990 and in fact later it lost its authority in the region following 
the Gulf War. For the operations in northern Iraq since 1983 see, Oran, op. cit., p. 38; Turk Ordusu Irak 
Iclerine 15 krn Ilerledi', Cumhuriyet, 30 October 1992. 
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offensive ever against the PKK took place with around 50,000 troops backed by tanks, 
22 helicopter gun ships, and fighter jets participating in the operation. 
The rise ofPKK terror 
Undoubtedly, the power vacuum in northern Iraq provided the PKK with an invaluable 
platform from where to continue its war against Turkey, as well as fertile ground on 
which to develop new recruits and supporters. Moreover, the organisation managed to 
mobilise both in and outside Turkey in order to finance its activities. For example, PKK 
members, who were able to flee to Western Europe after the military coup d'itat of 1980, 
successfully organised thousands of Kurdish refugees and established well-organised pro- 
PKK Kurdish communities which provided moral and financial support. 23 By late 1990s 
it was believed that the PKK had thousands of members in Europe, with 11,500 'active 
members' in Germany alonc. 24 There were reports of PKK involvement in illegal human 
smuggling operations in Western Europe, drug trafficking, extortion from people of 
Kurdish origin residing abroad and other illicit means. 25 According to British security 
sources, the PKK was responsible for 40 per cent of the heroin sold in the EU. 26 Again, 
the Turkish police reported that 80 percent of the drug trafficking to Europe was carried 
out through groups controlled by the PKK. 27 While according to Turkish intelligence, 
these activities made the PKK largely self-sufficient financially. 28 
With the increased PKK violence, as Turkish premier Demirel admitted, Turkey found 
22The Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1998.1992), 
pp. 119-20; Kemal B kay, 'The 23M. Ali Birand, APO ve PKK, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, ur 
Kurdish Question-Its History and Present Situation' in Contrast and Solutions in the Middle East, Ole 
Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yurukel (eds. ), 1997, (Aarhus C: Aarhus University Press, 1997), p. 467. 
24Milliyet, 7 July 1999; The Week in Germany, 24 March 1995. 
251t was reported that in twelve years the PKK smuggled as many as 220,000 people into Europe. For an 
extensive research on PKK's illegal human smuggling into Europe see, Metin Dalman and Ismail Tabak, 
Avrupa'da Insan Ticareti ve PKK, (Istanbul: Turk-Alman Basin Ajansi, 1995); Millývet, 9 May 1995. 
26The Spectator, 5 December 1998; Emin Gurses, Ayrilikc! Terorun AnatomisL11RA-ETA-PKK, (Istanbul: 
Baglarn 1997), pp. 89-90; Nokta, 12 April 1992. 
27'Uyusturucuda Kurt Kartelil, Cumhuriyet, 22 December 1992. 
28Sabah, 23 May 1996. 
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itself in 'a hidden war in the region. 29 PKK attacks and numerous clashes between the 
PKK and the Turkish security forces cost no less than 30,000 lives and left tens of 
thousands of people injured between 1984-1998 including 5,349 civilians, and 5,314 
security personnel. To cope with the issue, Turkey deployed around 270,000 security 
personnel in the region. This amounted to nearly one-third of its total security forces. 30 it 
was estimated that by the. late 1990s Turkey spent in total around US$100 billion in 
fighting the PKK; a figure that was well above its foreign debt. 31 This amount did not 
include lost-tourism-revenues, which amounted to US$I billion per year, and other 
contingent economic JoSt. 32 As such, the Turkish economy became more and more 
dependent on foreign aid and suffered significant structural economic problems such as 
high inflation rates, unemployment, huge domestic and foreign debt and worsening 
income distribution and lacked economic resources for its foreign policy initiatives 
designed to strengthen the country's role as an influential regional power. This was 
evident in the Black Sea Economic Project initiated by Turkey for improving its relations 
with ex-Soviet republics, most notably the Turkic states, and the Balkans. 
Furthermore, the PKK's attacks on teachers and schools resulted in more than 3,600 
schools being closed and 200 school teachers being killed in south-east Turkey. This 
obviously discouraged many teachers from serving in the region; one report revealed that 
67 percent of the teachers assigned to the region refused to go, leaving an estimated 
100,000 children without an education. 33 It also benefited the PKK, which, according to 
29, Demirel: Guneydogu'da Ortlu Savas Var', Cumhuriýet, 24 March 1992; For the PKK attacks between 
1984 and 1999 see, Halil Himsek, Seyh Sa'id Isyan! ve PYX, (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanligi, 
2000), pp. 158-239; 'Petrol Tanklari Kundaklandi', Cumhuriyet, I September 1992; 'Simak'ta Savas', 
Cumhuriyet, 20 August 1992; 'Bebekleri Bile Oldurduler', Cumhuriyet, 3 October 1992. 
30Milliyet, 2 September 1993. 
31 Meclis'in Guneydogu Itirafi', Aksiýon, 5 June 1998; Bal, 'Ortadogu'da', op. cit, p. 708. 
32'Turizmde 20,000 Iptal', Cumhuriyet, 2 April 1992. 
33PKK Terrorism, (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998), pp. 43-4; Kemal Kirisci, 'The Challenges of 
Terrorism: A Turkish Perspective', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 20, no. 3 -4, (1996), p. 4; 'Haydi S imdi Butun Eller Dogu'ya', Aksiýon, 4 March 1999. 
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one survey, recruited half of its members from the unemployed, half from primary school 
graduates and 20 percent from those who have never attended any school, with possible 
overlaps between these categories. 34 This further obstructed social development in the 
region where literacy, already well below the national average (77 percent), was around 
50 percent. 35 Also, the region's already poor economic conditions further deteriorated 
with fear and instability working against economic expansion. For example, the transport 
business, one of the main sectors of the regional economy, was reduced by 30-35 percent 
and exports to Iraq were further obstructed because of the PKK attacks. 36 Similarly, 
arable production and animal husbandry, other key sectors, almost came to a halt. 
According to the State Institute of Statistics (DIE), between 1985-1998, animal husbandry 
decreased by 40 percent. 37 Furthermore, it was estimated that more than two million 
Kurdish civilians were displaced and around 2,000 villages cleared or burnt as part of 
security operations since 1989.38 
Due to economic and security reasons, there was also a large migration to 
neighbouring towns as well as big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. 39 As a result, 
more than half of the Kurdish population now live in the larger cities of western Turkey. 
This added to the high rates of unemployment and led to other societal problems in these 
cities. It also created a certain amount of hostility amongst the Turkish population 
towards the Kurds. For example, Kurdish families were forced to leave some towns, 
particularly in the western part of Turkey and the Black Sea region, and jobs were refused 
34Yesim Comertoglu, 'Terorun Psikolojik Temelleri', Strateji, no. 2, (1995), p. 142; 'Temel Sorun Can 
Guvenligi', Cumhuriýet, 15 July 1990. 
35'Temel Sorun Can Guvenligi, Cumhuriyet, 15 July 1990. 
36'Guneydogu'da Gece Yolculugu Yok', Cumhuriyet, 27 September 1992; 'PKU Amabargosu Irak'a 
Ihracati Durdurdu', Cumhuriýet, 13 August 1992. 
37Milliyet, 17 February 1999. 
38The Daily Telegraph, I May 1998. 
39'Guneydogudan Buyuk Kacis', Nokta, 27 September 1992, pp. 16-9; Guneydogu'nun Iki Onemli Sorunu: 
Guvenlik ve Isssizlik' Cumhuriyet, 18 June 1992. 
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to workers of Kurdish origin. 40 
The Kurdish issue, as set out above, had a significantly adverse influence on Turkey's 
external relations and restrained its foreign policy objectives in two different ways. First, 
Turkey's preoccupation with the issue relegated foreign policy issues to secondary 
concern. Moreover, countries such as Russia, Armenia, Cyprus and Greece all played the 
Kurdish card as a lever vis-a-vis Turkey in order to achieve their strategic goals meaning 
that Turkey's struggle with the Kurdish issue considerably reduced its ability to establish 
strong political and economic relations and thus to play a greater role in its region 
contrary to earlier expectations. 41 
On the other hand, Turkey also faced huge pressure from its western allies because of 
its poor human rights record and lack of success in the running of its democracy. In 
particu ar, the harsh policies of the security forces operating against the PKK during the 
forced clearance of villages during the security operations; the banning of pro-Kurdish 
parties; and the trial of leading Kurdish parliamentarians and other political figures who 
were accused of advocating separatism, were strongly criticised in the West. 42 Indeed, 
European Parliament ratified the Customs Union Agreement with Turkey in 1995 only 
after it conditioned the ratification on improvements in the area of democratisation and 
human rights. 43 Tensions also occasionally erupted between Turkey and some of its 
40As an example, the governor of Ordu, a Black Sea coastal town, banned the south-eastern origin workers 
to work in hazelnut farms on grounds that some of the workers might be PKK members. 'Kurt Tarim 
Iscisine Is Yasagi', Cumhuriyet, 6 September 1998; 'Guneybati Anadolu'da Turk-Kurt Catismasi', 
Nokta, II October 1992, pp. 28-30; 'Laz Kurt'e Sert Bakiyor', Nokta, 18 October 1992, pp. 36-4. 
41 For a detailed discussion on the impacts of the PKK terror on Turkish foreign policy see, Ihsan Bal and 
Onder Aytac, 'Soguk Savas Sonrasi Yeni Dusman Tanimlarnalari Baglaminda Terorizm Sorummun Turk 
Dis Politkasina Etkileri' in 21. Yuzyilin Esiginde Turk Dis Politikasi, ldris Bal (ed. ), (Istanbul: Alfa, 
2001), pp. 685-697, especially pp. 688-92. 
42See, 'Turkey's future prospects for full-membership in the European Union: Obsession vs. reality', 
Chapter Three; Ihsan D. Dagi, 'Turkey in the 1990s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and the Search for a 
New Identity', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4, (Fall 1993), pp. 64-6. 43Mehmet A. Birand, Turkiyenin Gumruk Birlig! Maceras! 1956-1996, (Istanbul: AD, 1996), pp. 463-9; 
Philip Robins, 'More Apparent than Real? The Impact of the Kurdish Issue on Euro-Turkish Relations' in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1900s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Robert Olson (ed. ), (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), pp. 114-132. 
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European allies, notably Germany, over Turkey's Kurdish policy. Bonn imposed an arms 
embargo on Ankara in 1992 following allegations that Turkey was using German arms 
against its own civilian Kurdish nationals. 44Again, following Turkish security operations 
in northern Iraq in 1995 Germany reacted to the intervention by refusing to sell arms to 
Turkey. Holland and Norway later followed suit. 45 
Nevertheless, the Turkish security forces had considerable success against the PKK 
during the late 1990s and they retained a certain foothold in northern Iraq due to the 
successful incursions there. 46 In this context, the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's arrest in 
early 1999 marked a breakthrough on the PKK issue as the political rather than the 
military option was now increasingly emphasised. Following his detention as Ocalan 
claimed during his trial 'the period of uprising is over; in democratic countries violence 
has no place. Uprisings and revolutions cannot be a language for the solution of 
problems. A7 While, Osman Ocalan, the new leader of the PKK and Ocalan's brother, 
declared. 'We are giving up the armed struggle. The process of converting the 
organisation into a peaceful group involves determination and patience. 148 
The Turkish military leadership was sceptical of these policy changeS49 and the 
existence of PKK terrorists in Iran, Iraq and Syria was still considered a threat to 
Turkey. 50 Although the organization has promoted political optimism, according to 
intelligence sources, it has kept around 5,000 PKK guerrillas capable of waging another 
44'Almanya Ile Kurt Kavgasi', Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1992; 'Germany Lifts Ban on Military Aid to 
Turkey', Newspot, 13 May 5994; Peri Pamir, 'Turkey in its Revional Environment in the Post-bipolar 
Era: Opportunities and Constrains' in Building Peace in the Middle East, Elise Boulding (ed. ), (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 142. 
45'Germans suspend arms sales, to Turks' The New York Times, 28 March 1995; Ergun Balci, 'K. Irak: 
Celiskiler ve Senaryolar', Cumhuriyet, 26 March 1995; Meltern Muftuler-Bac, 'Turkey: A New Player in 
Middle Eastern Politics', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4, (Fall 1999), pp. 118-9. 
46'PKK'nin Eylern ve Kadrosu 1990 Duzeyine Cekildi', Hurrlýet, 8 May 1998. 
47'Kurt DevIeti Gercekci Degil' Hurriyet, I June 1999; Nihat A. Ozcan, 'Ocalan'in Ince Taktikleri', 
Zaman, 5 October 1999. 
48Cumhuriyet, 2 September 1999. 
49'1§te MGK'ya Sunulan Rapor', Sabah, 30 November 2000. 
50Cumhuriyet, 29 September 1999. 
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war on the Turkish border. " in Ankara's view, the PKK continued to have support from 
Tehran which replaced Syria as the main supporter of the organization. 52 Prime minister 
Ecevit publicly warned Iran not to give shelter to the PKK. 53 
Until 1991, Turkey had constantly denied 'the Kurdish reality'. For example, prime 
minister Yildirim Akbulut stated that there are no Kurds, only Turks here. '54 Ankara also 
asserted that there was no Kurdish issue only a terror problem. 55 Despite this view, in 
order to find a genuine, lasting solution Turkey will have to rely on alternative policies 
than the military one. In fact, the Turkish security forces' harsh measures to stop the PKK 
from carving out a separate state in south-east of the country, though successful to a 
point, became one of the main factors to aggravate the issue. 56 It served to increase PKK 
support among the Kurdish population, and made the people in the region more 
disaffected and more alienated from the state. As in the Social Democratic Populist 
Party's (SHP) Southeast Report has noted, over the years successive governments 
generally focused on tightening security measures by way of marshal law, emergency 
measures, increased security forces and so on. However, socio-economic, psychological 
and cultural efforts were generally neglected. 57 It is no surprise that according to the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, by 1999 the PKK, which began with no more than a few 
hundred guerrillas, is now estimated to have tens of thousands of members, with 15,000 
armed supporters, and hundreds of thousands of sympathisers inside and outside Turkey. 
51 Fikret Bila, 'Apo'yu Biz de Kullanmaliyiz', Milliyet, 28 November 2000. 
52According to Turkish intelligence, the PKK moved some of its camps into Iranian territory after they lost 
its bases in northern Iraq. Milliyet, 28 July 1999. 
53Cumhuriyet, 28 July 1999. 
54'Akbulut: Herkes Turktur, Kurt Yoktur', Cumhuriyet, 31 July 1990. 
55See prime minister Erbakan's press conference. Washington Post, 8 October 1996. 
56For security measures implemented since 1983 see, Philip Robins, 'The Overlord State: Turkish Policy 
and the Kurdish Issue, International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4, (July 1993), pp. 664-5. 
57, SHP'nin Guneydogu Raporu', Cumhuriyet, 15 July 1990. Hasan Cemal, 'Guneydogu Haberleri', 
Cumhuriýet, 31 July 1990. 
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5.2. The rise of political Islam: A tough challenge to secular regime? 
Like the Kurdish issue, the rise of political Islam also became an important internal 
security threat, which increasingly distracted Turkey from engaging in external relations 
during the period under question. Though the process dates back to the early 1980s, 
Turkey witnessed a swift rise in Islamic consciousness in the early 1990s, as the end of 
the Cold War further served to influence both internal and external factors. In particular, 
the electoral success of political Islam eventually enabled the pro-Islamist Refah Party to 
win power in 1996 for the. first time in modem history. Given its anti-secular and anti- 
western stance, an empowered political Islam has increasingly been seen as a national 
security issue. Indeed, admiral Guven Erkaya, commander of the naval forces and the 
chief architect of the so-called '28 February process' which resulted in the removal of the 
Refah Party from power, declared in 1997 that Islamic fundamentalism had replaced PKK 
terror as Turkey's number one threat. 58 This declaration was largely influenced by the rise 
of the Refah Party. 59 Indeed, a 1997 national security policy paper declared the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement and the PKK's separatist terrorism as the immediate internal 
threats and explained that destroy them was of 'life and death' importance for Turkey. 60 
The efforts of the pro-Islamist government to change the country's staunchly pro- 
western orientation also created confusion and instability in regard to Turkish foreign and 
security priorities and direction. Furthermore, the army's decision to take a high profile 
role in domestic politics due to mistrust of the civil authorities, especially in the late 
1990s, adversely affected the harmony between the civil and military establishment. 
Moreover, the military's growing role in politics further increased criticisms over the 
58During a National Security Council meeting on 28 
government to implement a twenty-point progr-, 
fundamentalism. 
59'lrtica PKK'dan Tehlikeli', Milliyet, 25 February 1997. 
60Sariibrahimoglu, Op-cit., p. 26; Milliyet, 30 April 1997. 
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February 1997, the military side forced the 
nme prepared to curtail growing Islamic 
democratic credentials of Turkey. 61 It was clear that given the level domestic struggle at 
home, Turkey could not and would not pursue a consistent foreign policy and have a 
broader outlook vis-a-vis the new regional and international developments as opposed to 
its claim to play a 'great power' role. 
There is no doubt that developments in the Islamic world in particular the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, the Gulf War of 1991, and the Bosnian war had a considerable 
impact on the rise of Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa. 62 The 
Iranian Revolution gave impetus to existing movements. Moreover, the economy-oriented 
foreign polices of the early 1980s and the search for political support for the national 
causes, such as Cyprus, have all drove Turkey to pursue closer relations with Middle 
Eastern and Arab countries which, to a considerable extent conflicted with its secular and 
western-looking policies. Its neutral position in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1990s also 
allowed it to improve economic relations with both countries, as well as other Muslim 
countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 63 
One movement, in particular, the Milli Gorus, (national view) represented national 
political Islam at an organisational level in Turkey through its numerous political parties 
61For the army's mission to defend the secular regime see, M. Ali Birand, The Generals' Coup in Turkey, 
(London: Brassey's, 1987), p. 177 and p. 187; Heath Lowry, 'Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the 
Decade of the Nineties', Interdisciplinary Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies, vol. 5, (Fall 1996), p. 108. 
62Raggay Ham, 'Exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path between Pan-Islam and Nationalism' 
in Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (eds. ), 
(London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 13; Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: 
Religion and Politics in the Middle East, (London: 1. B. Tauris, 1995), p. 118. On Iran's foreign policy 
objectives see, Mohammad Javad Larijani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Principles and Objectives, The 
Iranian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 4, (Winter 1996), pp. 755-63. For internal reasons 
that feed political/societal unrest in the Middle East and thus contribute to the rise of Islamic groups see, 
E. G. H. Joffe, 'Relations Between the Middle East and the West', Middle Eastern Journal, pp. 257-8; 
Anders Jerichow, 'The Mosque and Fear of Fundamentalism' in Contrast and Solutions in the Middle 
East, Ole Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yurukel (eds. ), (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1997), p. 72; 
Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, A Sense ofSiege: The Geopolitics of1slam and the West, (Colorado: 
Rand, 1995), pp. 165-6. For the impact of the Gulf war on the process see, Pierre Salinger, 'The United 
States, The United Nations, and the Gulf War', Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. 4, (Autumn 1995), p. 
612. For the effects of the Bosnian tragedy see, Hilal Khashan, 'The New World Order and the Tempo of 
Militant Islam', British Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, (1997), p. 9. 
63See, Mehmet Gonlubol, 'Turkiye'ninl980'li Yillardaki Dis Politikasinin Bir Degerlendirilmesi' in 
Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1995), (Ankara: Siyasal, 1996), pp. 611-632. 
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which were established and banned one after the other. The first to be established was the 
National Order Party (Milli Nizarn Partisi, MNP), then the National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi, MSP), followed by the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), and finally the 
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). 64 The Islamic 
parties founded in last thirty years have adhered the view that Turkey should follow a 
more pro-Islamic foreign policy and establish close relations with Muslim countries in 
every field including the creation of an EU-like economic body; an organisation of the 
United Nations of Islam, NATO-type Islamic security pacts, a common currency and so 
on. In this regard, Refah Party's 1995 election manifesto categorised the EU as a 
Christian club and argued that a Muslim Turkey should not be a part of it. 'The objective 
in foreign policy is to see Turkey not as a satellite but a leader country. Thus, Turkey's 
place should be within the "union of world Muslim countries" or "Islamic Union from 
Kazakhstan to Morocco" not the EU165 or as Refah Party leader Necmettin Erbakan 
declared 'when we come to power we will no longer be the servant, the slave of the 
West'. 66 
In addition to this anti-westem stance, relations with the newly-independent Turkic 
republics of the fonner Soviet Union were less of a foreign policy priority and the Refah 
64For general reading on pro-Islamist political parties in modem Turkish politics see, Binnaz Toprak, 
'Islam and the Secular State in Turkey' in Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 
1990s, C. Balim, E. Kalaycioglu, C. Karatas, G. Winrow and F. Yasemee (eds. ), (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1995), pp. 91-6; Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, 'Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects' in 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, L.. Whitehead (eds), 
(Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 177-82; Nilufer Gole, 'Secularism and 
Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites', Middle East Journal, vol. 51, no. 1, 
(Winter 1997), pp. 45-58; Michael B. Bishku, 'Ataturk's Legacy versus Religious Reassertion: 
Secularism and Islam in Modem Turkey', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 4, (Fall 1992), pp. 86-90; 
Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, 'The Resurgence of Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey' in 
Middle East Report, Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ), (London: L. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 146-9. 
65Refah Partisi Secim Beyannamesi (Ankara: 1995), p. 29; Herve Couturier, 'Islamist Leader Formidable 
Politician', Middle East Times, 31 December 1995; Necmettin Erbakan, 'Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasi Nasil 
Olmali? ', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 1, no. 3, (March-April 1995), pp. 58-61; Turker Alkan, 'The National 
Salvation Party in Turkey' in Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, Metin Heper and Raphael 
Israeli (eds. ), (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 79-102. 66Turkish Daily News, 6 January 1996. 
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Party even opposed Ankara's efforts to integrate the republics into various international 
organisations. In the words of Erbakan, 'Turkish officials visiting the Turkic republics 
advise them to join the Western multilateral bodies to be able to integrate into the 
international society. We cannot possibly turn a blind eye to this. If you follow Turkey 
you will be miserable too. '67 
Secularists feared that these developments would reverse all the reforms achieved 
within the context of Europeanisation and secularisation since the establishment of the 
Republic. For example, Hasan Mezarci, a RP deputy who was expelled from the party 
and imprisoned because of his anti-Kemalist views, claimed 'we want to establish the 
Islamic Caliphate and state system (similar to the Ottoman administrative system) and 
Islamic rule. ' He even suggested that Ataturk's mausoleum in Ankara should be knocked 
down. 68The secular elite of Turkey viewed these radical views with serious concern. 
Since the late 1980s, Refah had steadily increased its votes in successive local and 
general elections. With the collapse of the communist regimes, religious sentiments 
gained increased importance in the Muslim-populated Balkans, Central Asia and 
Caucasus regions. This also had an impact on Turkey, as sharp ideological differences 
tended to wane, ethnic, national and religious identity politics began to take priority. 69 For 
example, in the 1995 general elections, nationalist and Islamist parties gained 34 percent 
of the votes. This figure had been less than 17 per cent in 1991 and 13 percent in 1987. In 
other words, between 1987 and 1991, these parties increased their vote by 28 per cent 
while between 1991 and 1995 it rose by 104 per cent. 70 In addition to this, one of the 
main factors, which helped the RP to become so popular, within such a relatively short 
67'Turkiye'ye Benzerseniz Perisan Olursunuz', Cumhuriyet, 15 December 1992. 
68'Refahli Mezarci: Anitkabir Yikilsin', Cumhuriyet, 14 November 1992. 
69Ayse G. Ayata and Sencer Ayata, 'Turkey's Mainstream Political Parties on the Centre-Right and Centre Left' in Turkey Since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society, Debbie Lovatt (ed. ), (Hampshire and N. York: 200 1, Palgrave), p. 107. 
70Nilufer Narli and Sinan Dirlik, 'Turkiye'nin Siyasal Haritasi', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 2, no. 9, (May-June 1996), p. 133. 
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period of time, was the failure of the mainstream secular parties to fulfil their promises 
particularly in the area of economic welfare and achieving a rise in the standard of living. 
Furthermore, indifference to issues such as corruption, unemployment, hyperinflation, the 
weakening of traditional values and institutions, all helped to increase the Refah vote. The 
divide between the centre-right parties also helped Refah's success especially in the local 
elections. The RP slogan of adil duzen Oust order) even managed to attract, unusually, 
some social democratic votes, by promising to put an end to clientism, corruption and 
waste. 71 The RP also superseded all other political parties in terms of the size of its 
membership and also in the elaborateness and efficiency of the party organisation, and 
had a responsive and well-organised grass-root membership. 72 
Furthermore, Refah's rhetoric and party slogans found resonance with the wider 
public. For example, Turkey's constant exclusion from the EU fostered a suspicion that 
the Europeans would never include Turkey because of its Islamic identity. Finally, 
regional and global developments in the international system, in particular, the perceived 
inaction of the West over the Bosnian, Chechen and Karabakh crises accelerated the 
disappointment with the West and put Western values on trial. The demonstrations that 
took place during the conflicts clearly underlined this, and various Islamist and nationalist 
groups were quick to seize the opportunity to exploit this disillusiomnent by appearing as 
self-declared liberators of these regions. 73 Needless to say nationalist and Islamist parties 
gained overwhelming support from the situation. In particular, the RP had vowed the 
same arguments for years, boosted its share of support. For example, at a speech during 
71Huri Tursan, 'Ersatz Democracy: Turkey in the 1990s' in Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, Gillespie 
Richard (ed. ), (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 222-5. 
72, Secimde Refah Farkil, Cumhuriyet, 4 November 1992; Sencer Ayata, 'Patronage, Party, and State: The 
Politicization of Islam in Turkey', Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 1, (Winter 1996), p. 52. Birol A. 
Yesilada, 'Realignment and Party Adaptation: The Case of the Refah and Fazilet Parties' in Politics, 
Parties and Elections in Turkey, Sabri Sayari and Yilmaz Esmer (eds), (Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002), pp. 172-5. 
731hsan D. Dagi, 'Islam, Politics and the Welfare Party', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 19, nos. 3-4, (1995), 
p. 26-7; Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p. 160. 
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demonstrations in support of Bosnia, Erbakan blamed both the West and the Turkish 
government for failing to intervene in response to the Serb atrocities against Bosnian 
Muslims. 'As the Serbs are getting more and more barbaric, our prime minister is rushing 
to kiss the Israeli prime minister's hands. The West and the US that destroyed Saddam 
will not intervene in this conflict this time because they have no real interest in the region. 
Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia all helped Bosnia but not Turkey-174 
In 1987, the Welfare Party, in its first election, obtained only 7.2 percent of the votes. 
In 1991, the party increased its vote to around 10 percent of the electorate. 75 The local 
elections held in 1994, were a clear signal to the right-wing secular parties that protest 
votes that had usually gone to left-wing parties were now going to Islamists and Refah 
got 17.8 percent of the total vote and won office in 28 of the 72 municipalities, including 
Turkey's largest city Istanbul and the capital Ankara. 76 In the 1995 elections, the RP was 
the first party to gain 158 deputies in a 550-member parlimnent. This represented 21.3 
percent of the total votes cast . 
77 However, anti-Refah opposition was strong in parliament 
78 
with both DYP and ANAP declaring their opposition to a coalition with the RP . Ecevit, 
the leader of the DSP, also refused to form a goverment with the RP arguing that the RP 
was not committed to secularism. 79 In June 1996, following the collapse of the short-lived 
coalition government between the two right wing, liberal-conservative parties, the DYP 
and the ANAP, supported by the leftist DSP, (which was viewed as an army inspired 
alliance intended to keep the RP out of power), Erbakan became the first pro-Islamist 
premier in the Republic's seventy-year history. 
74'Erbakan: Hukumet Katliama Seyirci Kaliyor', Cumhuriyet, 23 August 1992. 
751n this election two other minor parties came under the RP banner in order to overcome the 10 percent 
threshold and received 17 percent of the votes, Toprak, op. cit., p. 92. 76The New York Times, 29 March 1994. 
77Milliyet, 26 December 1996. 
78Hurriyet, 26 December 1996. 
79Cumhurýret, 16 January 1996. 
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Departingftom pro- Westernforeign policy? 
Erbakan's anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric created problems for 
Turkey's external relations, particularly among the Western allies. For example, Morton 
Abramowitz, the former US ambassador to Ankara, publicly asked: 'How do you deal 
with a NATO ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO, fundamentally anti- 
Semitic and fundamentally pro-Islamist, even if he's largely behaving himself? '80 
Erbakan argued that Turkey should first improve its relations with the Islamic world, 
be a member of an 'Islamic common market and Islamic defence pact' as opposed to the 
EU, and once it had attained an equal standing with Europe should then seek to engage 
with it. 
81 
In line with this position, Erbakan received a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood as his 
first foreign visitor as leader and paid his first foreign visit to Iran, in August 1996. He 
then made priority to visits to Nigeria, as well as Egypt and Libya rather than to Europe 
or Central Asia. This indicated the shift in Turkey's foreign policy priorities under the 
Refah government and further bolstered the suspicion, especially in the West, that a 
definite 'alteration of the route' had begun. 82 During his Iranian visit he concluded a 
US$23 billion gas deal, which had been initiated before his term in 1995.83 But the 
important point was that the deal was concluded just a few days after a bill passed in the 
US Congress which banned companies from investing over US$40 million in Iran and 
Libya. 84 Though Turkish officials insisted that the agreement did not involve any 
investment and was only a trade deal85, it was also believed that during the visit the two 
80International Herald Tribune, 12 August 1996. 
81Fatih Cekirge, 'Erbakan'dan Avrupa'ya Uyari', Sabah, 4 December 1996; 'Erbakan's Vision: Islamic 
Harmony and a Cleanced Society', Briefing, 14 October 1991, p. 6. 
82Newspot, no. 20,1996. Sami Kohen, 'Kimin Dis Politikasi? ', Milliyet, 9 October 1996. 
83 Turkish Daily News, 16 January 1996. 
84AIan Makovsky, 'Turkey: Work to Keep it Western', International Herald Tribune, 19 August 1996. 
85'Turkey-Iran Signs Gas Deal', Washington Post, 12 August 1996. 
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countries held talks on establishing co-operation in defence-related industries. Erbakan 
even went further during his Libya visit by attacking the US by announcing that he would 
co-operate with Gaddafi against the terrorism threat, which Gaddafi claimed the West 
was supporting against his country. 87 During Erbakan's visit Gaddafi also accused Turkey 
of mistreating its Kurdish population and following polices in favour of Israel against the 
Arab world. 88 
Nevertheless, Erbakan hoped that Refah's Islamic character would help in easing long- 
lasting differences between Turkey and Muslim countries in general and its southern 
neighbours in particular. This could be interpreted as Refah's attempt to live up to its 
campaign to support Muslim states in their national causes in international forums, and its 
attempts to urge previous Turkish governments to ally themselves with the Islamic world 
rather than the Western world. In this context, the Refah govenunent sought to establish 
bilateral and multilateral relations with the Islamic world, as well as with Islamic non- 
governmental organisations and groups (including radical Islamist groups such as 
Palestinian Hamas). For example, Refah officials somewhat naively hoped that Syria 
would extradite the PKK leader Ocalan as a gesture of good Will. 89 On a multilateral 
level, the Refah government sought to bring together some rising nations from the Islamic 
world under the Developing-8 (D-8) initiative. 90 The project aimed to establish economic 
and trade co-operation in many fields among the members. 91 
86For the US's reaction to increasing relations with Iran see, Samil Tayyar, Refahyol Tutanaklari, (Ankara: 
Umit, 1997), p. 165; S. Gulden Ayman, 'Turkiye-Iran Iliskileri', Radikal, 16 December 1996; Ergun 
Balci, 'Turkiye ve Iran', Cumhuriyet, 22 December 1996. 
87Sami Kohen, 'Kimin Dis Politikasi? ', Milliyet, 9 October 1996. 
881t was reported to have Gaddafi said that 'it does not make much difference to oppress nations seeking 
independence. Turkey (the Ottomans) tried it against the Arabs fighting for their independence just as the 
Kurds doing today and failed. No doubt one day they (the Kurds) will stand under the sun of the Middle 
East. ' Fatih Cekirge, 'Libya'da CIA Krizi', Sabah, 8 October 1996. 
89Fatih Cekirge, 'Suriye He Apo Pazarligi', Sabah, II July 1996. 
901t includes, apart from Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan. 
911stanbul Declaration of Developing-8 (D-8), Istanbul, 15 June 1997; 'D-8, Yunanistan'i Urkuttu', 
Aksiyon, 17 January 1997, pp. 44-50. 
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However, the main state institutions such as the army, the security services, and 
especially the ministry of foreign affairs and the secular elite gave little support to the 
government on these foreign policy objectives and were determined to maintain the status 
quo and to curtail the Refah govemment's objectives. The govemment was isolated 
especially by the army's actions. It was not informed over the details of the Turkish- 
Israeli military accords or about military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK 
guerrillas or of the capture of Serndin Sakik, a senior PKK leader, by a special operation 
in northern Iraq. 92 Similarly, the national security policy document of 1997, which not 
only reflected the military's evaluation of the internal and external threats to Turkey but 
also served as the foundation of the country's security policies, was not submitted to the 
cabinet for approval until Refah had lost power. Military officials argued that it would 
have been unrealistic to expect the government, which denied the existence of an Islamic 
fundamentalist threat, and vigorously courted better relations with Iran, to support a 
document which listed fundamentalism as one of the main threats to the country's 
security. 93 Given these restrains, the Refah Goverment, in its one-year term, could not, 
despite early expectations, make any real move away from Turkey's traditional Western 
allies or Israel . 
94 Erbakan even signed military co-operation agreements with Israel and 
agreed to renew the parliamentary mandate for 'Operation Provide Comfort', which he 
had previously accused of transporting weapons to Armenia, and collaborating with the 
PKK. 95 He also remained committed to the customs union agreement with the EU, despite 
his earlier promise 'to tear it up' if and when he came to power. 96 
92MillýVet, 14 April 1998. 
93Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circumstances: The Turkish Military and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 200 1), pp. 47-9. 
94See, Philip Robins, 'Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, (Summer 1997), pp. 
82-100; 'Islam and Turkey: the Regional Impact', Bulletin ofRegional Co-operation in the Middle East, 
vol. 6, no. 2, (Summer 1997).. 
95Cumhuriyet, 29 June 1992; Meydan, 16 January 1992. 
96Sabalt 14 February 1995; Turkiye, 9 March 1995. 
153 
Thus, despite Erbakan's pre-election slogans and rhetoric, he was unable to change 
Turkey's westem-orientated foreign policy nor was he successful in establishing a new 
approach with the Islamic world. In any event, his government was short lived and forced 
to resign in June 1997, as a result of what was perceived as a 'civil intervention', a 'quiet' 
or 'post-modem coup', or even a 'fourth coup' in the Republic's hiStory. 97 As one 
Turkish academic noted 'the armed forces once again showed that they were the primary 
decision makers in the conduct of the foreign policy in Turkey. 198 But although Erbakan's 
restricted Islamist foreign policy was unable to re-direct Turkish foreign policy 
orientation, he did cause deep concern, and uneasiness among the ruling elite and the 
secular public. 
97Erol Ozkasnak who was serving as the secretary of the Turkish chief of staff at that time acknowledged 
this in a TV interview. 'Ceviz Kabugul, Kanal 6,15 January 2001. 
98Celik, op. cit., p. 152. 
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PARTFOUR 
A NEW POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALKANS 
AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY 
Unprecedented changes in the European landscape in the late 1980s not only had a 
profound effect on the Balkans political map but also opened up a new chapter in 
Turkey's external relations vis-a-vis the region. Like Central Asia and Caucasia Turkey's 
relationship with the Balkans during the Cold War had been limited and for the most part 
confined to dealing bilateral Turco-Greek issues. Given Turkey's special ties and 
proximity to the region, it soon became an 'unofficial centre' for the new post-Cold War 
regimes, communities and newly-independent Balkan states desiring close relations on 
economic, political and military levels. However, although Turkey was able to form close 
relations with some of the countries of the region (i. e. Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and 
some of the ex-Yugoslav republics), it failed to respond in many cases when the sudden 
and unpredictable changes caught it by surprise. Nor was it able to develop an approach 
to the ethnic Turks and the Balkan Muslim populations. 
Ankara's desire to exert a strong influence on the new Balkans was further hampered 
by the rise of new security challenges to Turkey's immediate interests in one of the most 
volatile parts of Europe in the immediate post-Cold War era. More specifically, the 
painful disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1992 and the Kosovo crisis of the late 1990s 
highlighted that appropriate mechanisms to prevent crises in the post-Cold War years 
period were not yet fully established and soon the Balkans found itself in the bloodiest 
conflict that Europe had witnessed since 1945. Increasingly, therefore, Turkey was to be 
preoccupied with how to contain the repercussions of the transition witnessed in the area 
rather than seizing the opportunities of the new era. Additionally, developments in the 
region also opened up new areas of tension and rivalry for the two Aegean neighbours, 
Turkey and Greece. Effectively, this tense relationship remained as a significant 
impediment in Turkey's overall Balkan policies and other areas of Turkish concern, 
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particularly its relations with Europe over the period understudy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE BALKANS: A TURKISH SPHERE OF INFLUENCE? 
6.1. The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Turkey: Facing its Ottoman legacy 
The dramatic collapse of communist influence in the Balkans, not only provided 
Turkey %Nith the opportunity to emerge as a major regional actor but also offered the 
opportunity to foster close relations with the regional states free of Cold War restrictions. 
In this context, the emergence of new states, and, in particular, the rediscovery of Turkish 
minorities (in Bulgaria, Romania and some of the ex-Yugoslav republics) and large 
Muslim communities (in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Albania) created a real 
hope in Ankara that it would be able to exert its influence in regional affairs. 
However, the Yugoslav crisis quickly highlighted the limitations of such aspiration. 
Events in Bosnia and the Kosovo came to pre-occupy Ankara's Balkan policy as Turkey 
tried to fend off rising challenges, as much as cultivate new opportunities. Thus, Turkey 
was unablc to conccntmtc on building strong cconomic and political rclations with the 
new Balkan states. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the two superpowers, to some extent, 
were able to 'manage' the region. However, in the new era, Europe a post-Cold War 
strategic as well as economic power, with conflicting interests and divergent policies, 
struggled to fill the power vacuum, and this meant that the increasing ethnic tensions and 
rivalries went unchecked. As one observer explained, 'the Cold War years in the Balkans 
played a role as a freezer but with the new era the door of the freezer has been tom away, 
and the politics and attitudes of the pre-1945 years lie thawing in the sun. Many give a 
revolting smell. 'I 
For the origins and dynamics of the Yugoslav crises see, John B. Allcock, 'Borders, States, Citizenship: Unscrambling Yugoslavia' in The Changing Shape of the Balkans, F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris (eds), (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 63-79; Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 177; William Pfaff, 'The Balkan Ailments are Political, Thus Treatable', International Herald Tribune, 8 October 1996; Harvey J. Feldman, 'The Balkan Dimensions 
of the Yugoslav Crisis', Mediterranean Quarterly, (Summer 1992), p. 21; Gabriel Partos, 'Still Europe's 
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In late 1991 and early 1992, the EEC's decision to recognise the breakaway republics 
of Croatia and Slovenia2 led to the Serbo-Croat conflict developing into a full-scale 
bloody war in August 1991 that resulted in around 18,000 Croat casualties and saw 
420,000 people being either displaced in Croatia or becoming refugeeS. 3 As the military 
conflict spilled over into Bosnia, it evolved into a real human catastrophe. 4 Until the end 
of the war in 1995, the conflict produced a stream of refugees, mostly Muslims. 
Furthermore, the Serbs pursued a policy of 'ethnic cleansing' in the form of brutal 
displacement of civilians, coupled with concentration camps, and gang rapes, particularly, 
of Bosnian Muslim women. As a result of this, it is believed that between 150,000 and 
200,000 people were killed. About the same number were wounded; 3.5 million were 
classified as refugees or displaced persons. 5 
The Yugoslav crisis, in particular when it spilled over into Bosnia, forced Turkey to 
adopt new and more active policies towards the region due to massive internal and 
external pressures, as well as strategic necessity. At the time there were more than three 
million Turkish citizens residing in Western Europe, Turkey's biggest trade partner, and 
the Yugoslav crisis severely affected cargo and passenger transport as Turkey was 
dependent on Serbian roads for both transporting Turkish goods and immigrant workers 
to and from Europe. Indeed, during the conflict a number of Turkish workers were killed 
Powder-Keg', The World Today, vol. 53, no: 4, (April 1997), pp- 88-91. 
2'Yugoslavya Tarih Oldu', Cumhuriyet, I February 1992; John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, (London: 
Brassey's, 1992), pp. 434; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan 
Politics in Transition, Second edition, (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 199. For the 
EU's Balkan policies see, Richard Caplan, 'The European Community's Recognition of New States in 
Yugoslavia: The Strategic Implications', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (September 
1998), pp. 2445. 
31nformation Notes on Former Yugoslavia, UNCHR, no. 10, (October 1994), p. 18. 4Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, (London: RUSI, 1995), pp. 83-5; Zametica, op. cit., pp. 36-7; 
'A Fragile Peace for Bosnia', Strategic Survey 1995-96, (London: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 
1996), pp. 134-5. 
5'Another Destructive Year', op. cit., p. 104; The Economist, 29 May 1993. Sabrina P. Ramet, 'Introduction: 
The Roots of Discord and the Language of War' in Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture 
in a Shattered Community, Sabrina P. Ramet and Ljubia S. Adamovich (eds. ), (Colorado and Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1995), pp. 7-8. 
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and the UN-imposed embargo on Serbia brought additional costs to the Turkish 
econoMy. 6 
Moreover, the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and the attempt by Serbia to create 
a 'greater Serbia' was perceived as changing the entire balance of power in the area at the 
expense of other regional states which would inevitably increase 'Slav-Orthodox' 
influence and make its rivals Russia and Greece the leading powers in the region. 7 Given 
its proximity to the region and its tense relationship with Greece this was potentially a 
serious challenge to Turkey's overall security interests. In this context, Athens' strong 
pro-Serbian polices, which later received backing from Russia, together with Greek, 
Bosnian Serb co-operation, convinced Ankara that the Balkans soon be dominated by a 
strong anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim coalition in which Greece would play a decisive 
role. 8 Thus, Turkey tried to get support for its Bosnian policies from other Balkan 
countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia. The visit by president Turgut Ozal 
to those countries in 1993 resulted in their agreement to obey all measures taken by the 
UN to end the Bosnia crisis. 9 Furthermore, Ankara also feared that the crisis might cause 
mass refugee flows into Turkey (as was the case following the Gulf War and when the 
Turkish minority was forced to flee Bulgaria in 1980). 10 
In addition to its geographic proximity, Turkey's distinct cultural ties with the region 
were another major factor in drawing Turkey into the crisis. In fact, from the fourteenth 
century until its withdrawal (in the wake of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First 
World War), the Ottoman state was very much a Balkan power. The decline of the 
6Newspot, II July 199 1. 
7AH Karaosmanoglu, 'Balkanlar'da Baris Askeri Cozumden Gecer', Strateji, no. 3, (1995), p. 7. 
8Duygu B. Sezer, 'Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region' in Turkey 
Between East and West, Voitech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds. ), (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 
p. 84. 
9'President Turgut Ozal Visits the Balkans', Newspot, 25 January 1993. 
IOTurkey hosted about 25,000 Bosnian refugees during the crisis. 'Bosnians Being Settled in Tekirdag', 
Newspot, 18 June 1992 and '269 More Bosnians in Turkey', Newspot, 19 November 1992. 
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Ottomans resulted in the mass migration of Turks and other Muslim groups including 
Albanians, Bosnians and Pomaks to Turkey from different parts of the Balkans. At the 
same time, with the emergence of new states with new borders, a significant percentages 
of the Turkish and non-Turkish Muslim population remained, scattered all over the 
region, but bound by religious and ethnic ties that would always allow for close relations 
with Turkey. II Thus, as one Turkish academic has pointed out, the Ottoman legacy in the 
Balkans is represented not only by around 10 million Muslims but also by the Ottoman 
social and communal organisational structure and identity patterns seen in Bulgaria, 
Albania, the former Yugoslavia, and northern Greece. 12 
Thus, since the end of the Cold War Turkey has been forced to face its Ottoman past in 
the Balkans (the same is also true for Caucasia), and Bosnia and Albania were the 
cornerstones of the Turkish involvement in the Balkans during the Ottoman period 
meaning that the protection of those former subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the region 
was viewed not only as a moral duty but was also essential for Turkish strategic 
influence. 13 As Bosnian vice-president Ayoup Ghanic put it, the defence of Turkey does 
not start with the Turkish borders but in Bosnia and as such the Bosnian war in fact was 
'Turkey's war. '14Reflecting these feelings for example, president Ozal in his speech in 
support of Bosnia in 1992 stated that Turkey was responsible for looking after the well 
It is believed that there are more than two million people of Turkish ethnicity live in the Balkans. For 
Turkish minority in the region see, Halit Eren, 'Balkanlar'da Turk ve Diger Musluman Toplumlari ve 
Goc Olgusu' in Balkanlar, Ismail Soysal (ed. ), (Istanbul: OBIV, 1993), pp. 289-99. 
12AIi L. Karaosmanoglu, 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks', International Journal of 
Turkish Studies, vol. 6, nos. 1-2, (Winter 1992-1994), p. 14 13Ahmet Davudoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu, (Istanbul: Kure, 200 1), pp. 314- 
8; Ihsan D. Dagi, 'Turkey in the 1990s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and the Search for a New 
Identity', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4, (Fall 1993), p. 74; Prevelakis George, 'The Return of 
Macedonia Question' in The Changing Shape of the Balkans, F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris (eds), 
(London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 60. 
14A Bosnian commander's plea for support from Turkey in the conflict reflects this belief best. 'Turkey 
should be the country to help us most; we accept ourselves as part of Turkey in the Balkans. 'Umudun 
Adi Turkiye', Cumhuriývet, 4 August 1992. 'Cengiz Candar, 'Turkiye, Bosna-Hersek ve "Tarihie 
Barismak"', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 1, no. 3, (March-April 1995), p. 284; TGRT (Turkish TV channel), 22 
January 1995. 
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being of the Muslim populations of the Balkans. 
As long as Turkish Republic exists we will not allow the destruction of Bosnia. 
For us, Bosnia is a new Andalusia which we have only discovered at the end of 
the twentieth century. Its fate will not be the same as Andalusia. To look after this 
trust that history has put on our shoulders after a century, is a moral, historical, 
national and sacred duty. It is a duty of honour. We will revere this honour. 15 
Indeed, since the end of the Cold War the non-Turkish Muslim populations of the area 
had turned to Turkey as the defacto source of regional support for all Balkan Muslims. In 
the words of the president Demirel: 
The international community remained silent over the developments in Bosnia for 
a long time. Turkey showed every effort to diffuse the attempts of extermination 
and ethnic cleansing of the Bosnians. They are our last remnants in Europe. They 
came to us for help and said 'you have a responsibility because you made us 
Muslims; either you will protect us or take us out of these lands. '16 
In the same way, in the face of the threat of a 'Greater Serbia' Albanians (in both 
Albania and Kosovo), as well as the Muslims of Bosnia and Sandjak, and also the 
government in Macedonia made repeated appeals for Turkey's support. 17 The prime 
minister of Kosovo argued that 'it is time for Turkey to have its influence felt in the 
Balkans. '18 In this context, the besieged govermnent of Bosnia-Herzegovina repeatedly 
sought Ankara's help to stem the advance of the militarily superior Serbian nationalist 
forces. 19 During his several visits to Ankara, the Bosnian president Alija Izzetbegovic, 
demanded that Turkey continue its political support for lifting the arms embargo imposed 
15'Cumhurbaskani Turgut Ozal'in Bosna-Hersek Mitingindeki Konusmasi', Turkiye Gunlugu, no. 22, 
(Spring 1992), pp. 10-1. 
16Cumhurbaskani Suleyman Demirel'in Harp Akademileri, yj k Sy I dog nde Turkiye Ka aa Balkan ar ve Orta u Konulu Konferansi, (Istanbul: 8 March 2000). 
171smail Soysal, 'Gunumuzde Balkanlar ve Turkiye'nin Tutumu' in Balkanlar, Ismail Soysal (ed. ), 
(Istanbul: OBIV, 1993), p. 237; David Bachard, Turkey and the European Union, (London: CER, 1998), 
p. 38; Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey and the Middle East Northern Tier' in The Middle East in Global 
Change, Laura Guazzone (ed. ), (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 50; Mustafa Kahramanyol, 'Balkantar'da Muslumanlar'in Dunu Bugunu', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 1, no. 3, (March-April 1995), pp. 263-8; Ersin 
Onulduran, 'Bolgesel Bir Guc Olarak Turkiye', Strateji, no. 2, (1995), p. 52; Peri Pamir, 'Turkey in its 
Regional Environment in the Post-bipolar Era: Opportunities and Constrains' in Building Peace in the Middle East, Elise Boulding (ed. ), (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 140. 18'Bosna-Hersek'teki Savas Kosova'ya Sicrar', Cumhurlýet, 18 June 1992. 
19Tozun Bahceli, 'Turkey, the Gulf Crisis, and the New World Order' in The Gutr War and the New World Order, Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds. ), (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 
p. 443. 
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against Bosnia, 'we don't have the feeling that we are alone. What Turkey has done for 
Bosnia is very important. "20 
Another dynamic of the issue was the considerable number of Balkan citizens living in 
Turkey. According to various estimates, this number was between 10-12 million, most of 
whose ancestors migrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the 
Ottomans withdrew from the region. 21 It was estimated that the Bosnians that settled in 
Turkey over the past decades account for approximately five per cent of the Turkish 
population. 22 It obviously helped buttress Turkish interest in Bosnia. 23 As a member of 
the Bosnian presidential council pointed out, 'we have managed to organise a 16-million 
strong Bosnian lobby through four million Bosnians living in Turkey. But we have not 
been able to get any positive response from the Turkish government so far in our demand 
to receive weapons. '24 Accordingly, lobby groups representing Balkan states (such as 
Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia) as well as the wider public became an important source 
in shaping Turkey's new Balkan policy. Massive protests, meetings and other campaigns 
were organised by various groups and political parties in support of Bosnia in all major 
cities. 25 In fact, domestic pressure was the foremost reason for Turkey's growing 
engagement in the Balkans. 
When the crises eruPted, Turkey favoured the maintenance of the status quo in the 
Balkans and the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. 26 Indeed, it was only after 
20Newspot, 6 July 1993. 
210ya A. Maghisuddin, 'Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Ortadogu Ekseninde Turk Dis Politikasi: Etkenler ve 
Tercihler', Yeni Turk(ye, vol. 2, no. 9, (May-June 1996), p. 258. 22 Bahceli, 'Turkey', op, cit., p. 443; The Economist, 12 September 1992. 
23Duygu B. Sezer, 'The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Turkey's Relations with Western Europe' 
in The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations, Mathias Jopp (ed. ), 
(Paris: VVEU-Institute for Security Studies, 1994), p. 33. 24'Turkiye'den Silah Bekliyoruz', Cumhurjýet, 22 August 1992. 
25Cumhuriývet, 23 August 1992. For instance, thousands of schoolgirls marched to protest Serbian atrocities 
and international organisations carrying banners like 'atrocities in Bosnia where is the UNT. 'Massacre 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina Condemned', Newspot, 28 January 1993. 
26See, Turkish foreign minister's statement, 'The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Yugoslavia Must be 
Protected', Newspot, 4 July 199 1. 
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the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EU and the US that Turkey decided to 
recognise the four new republics of the former Yugoslavia together in February 1992.27 
The reason for its hesitancy was that it did not want to be seen as contributing to the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and thus it waited for the international response first. In the 
words of deputy prime minister Erdal Inonu, 'Turkey always avoided activities which 
would lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and kept the way open for dialogue with 
all parties. '28 However, once it became evident that the country was on the path to 
disintegration, and that the project of a 'greater Serbia' would be implemented at the 
expense of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, Turkey's policy changed. This policy 
change became even more evident and essential as the military conflict in Bosnia further 
evolved into a real human catastrophe amidst growing public pressure. 
Having been caught unprepared by the outbreak of the Balkan crisis, Turkey was 
forced to adopt fast and immediate policies and found itself facing a web of dilemmas 
regarding how to further respond the crisis. Unilateral intervention by Turkey was out of 
question for several reasons. To start with, traditional Turkish foreign policy did not 
favour such an action, especially when it was based on shared religious and cultural 
values. As such, aggressive interventionist proposals put forward, for example, by 
president Ozal, were flatly rejected by the government. Indeed, Turkey lacked the 
political will in this respect and any proposals in favour of more active policies on the 
grounds of history, religion and culture were largely ignored. Prime minister Demirel 
ruled out any suggestion that Turkey would act without the UN. 'If the world takes a 
decision to intervene in Bosnia, Turkey is ready to participate in any kind of operation. 
27'Dort Yugoslav Cumhuriyet Tanindi', Cumhuriyet, 7 February 1992. Sule Kut, Yugoslavya Bunalimi ve 
Turkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikasi: 1990-1993' in Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi, Faruk 
Soylemezoglu (ed. ), Second edition, (Istanbul: Der, 1998), pp. 326-7. 28'Intensive Diplomatic Traffic in Ankara', Newspot, 10 January 1992. 
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Turkey will act with the world and not on its own. 929 It was also clear that the possibility 
of a Turkish intervention into the conflict did not seem likely as it did not have the 
military capability though it was central to be able to play a 'great power' role as far as 
regional issues were concerned. Indeed, the Turkish military denied that a unilateral 
intervention by Turkey had any feasibility whatsoever due to technical difficulties, and in 
the later stages of the crisis Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria declared that they 
would not open their air space to any unilateral Turkish intervention. 30 
In this respect, Turkey rejected the pleas of Bosnian Muslims to supply weapons on 
the grounds that Turkey, as a responsible Balkan country and a UN and CSCE member 
would not supply arms openly or clandestinely. 31 Turkey also acknowledged that a 
intervening unilaterally could also raise some suspicions about its intentions in the 
region. 32 Such fears of 'neo-Ottomanism, of were strongly voiced by Serbia, Russia and 
in particular, Greece who had been preoccupied with the idea that Turkey would attempt 
to dominate the Balkans. 33 In this context, Turkish participation in the UN peacekeeping 
force in Bosnia, with about 1,450 troops in 1994, angered the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia and 
Greece. 34 It should be underlined that technical difficulties and international reaction 
about a possible Turkish unilateral intervention aside, the civil/military ruling elite in 
Ankara would not allow for an action as there was no fundamental threat to the country's 
29'Prime Minister Demirel's Press Conference, Newspot, 28 February 1993; 'Coming around to Turkey's 
Point on Bosnia', Turkish Probe, 15 December 1992, p. 8; Saban Calis and Birol Akgun, 'Catismadan 
UzIasmaya: 21. Yuzyila Girerken Balkanlarda Turk Yunan Rekabeti' in 21. Yuzyilin Esiginde Turk Dis 
Politikasi, Idris Bat (ed. ), (Istanbul: Alfa, 2001), p. 232. 
30'Mudahale Olanaksiz', Cumhuriyet, 13 December 1992; Mehmet Gonlubol and F. Hakan Bingun, '1990- 
95 Donemi Turk Dis Politikasi' in Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1995), (Ankara: Siyasal, 1996), 
p. 686. 
31 See Turkish defence minister's statement, 'Ayaz: Batili Ulkeler Cifte Standartli', Cumhuriyet, 23 August 
1992; 'Oluler Gonderdiklerinizi Yiyemez', Cumhuriyet, 13 July 1992. Ali Fuat Borovali, 'The Bosnian 
Crisis and Turkish Foreign Policy', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 18, nos. 34, (1993), p. 82. 32Huseyin Bagci, Guvenlik Politikalarl ve Risk Analizi Cercevesinde Balkanlar 1990-1993, (Ankara: Dis 
Politika Enstitusu, 1994), p. 104. 
33T. Veremis, 'Greek-Turkish Relations and the Balkans', The South-Eastern Yearbook, (Athens: The 
Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, 199 1), pp. 240- 1. 34'Turkish Peace Keeping Force in Bosnia, Newspot, 24 June 1994; The Independent, 19 June 1994. 
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territorial integrity and unity. As discussed earlier, Turkey's pro-active policy during the 
Gulf War of 1990-91 clearly revealed this fact as the ruling establishment became uneasy 
in the face of a military involvement. Despite the fact that the Bosnian issue had an 
apparent strategic importance for the country, in fact domestic pressure was the first and 
foremost reason behind Turkish involvement. As one Turkish diplomat stated, 'had it not 
been for the force of public opinion in Turkey, the Bosnian crisis would not have featured 
as a top priority in Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly, Turkish involvement or relative 
(success' in the regional affairs only became with the US's heavy engagement in the 
Balkans. 
As Morton Abramowitz, the former US ambassador to Ankara, noted Turkey remained 
cautious and tried to prod the West into greater military involvement and humanitarian 
and multilateral military efforts. 35 Ankara's new policies aimed to end the bloodshed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; to preserve its independence and territorial integrity; and to prevent 
the involvement of Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, the Sandjak, and Vojvodina in a larger 
Balkan war. 36 Ankara also sought to ensure the protection of the Bosnian Muslims 
through various intemational organisations such as the UN, the CSCE, the BSECP and 
the OIC, the Council of Europe. 37 
In accordance with the UN Security Council's decision for an embargo against the 
former Yugoslavia, Turkey froze the country's assets, closed its air space to Yugoslav 
aircraft and, in May 1992,. recalled its ambassador. 38 At the same time, and on several 
35Morton 1. Abramowitz, 'Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal', Foreign Policy, vol. 9 1, (Summer 1993), p. 
169; C. Soraji, 'Islam and Bosnia's Muslim Nation' in The Changing Shape of the Balkans, F. W. Carter 
and H. T. Norris (eds), (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 60. 
36Sezer, 'Turkey', op. cit., p. 82. 
37'UN Approves Turkey's Efforts to Stop Serbian Aggression', Newspot, 29 December 1992; OTC Foreign 
Ministers: Extraordinary Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina Held in Istanbul', Newspot, 18 June 1992; 
'KEI Toplantisinda Saraybosna Kaygisi', Cumhuriyet, 10 December 1992; Berhan Ekinci, 
'Yugoslavya'nin Dagilmasi ve Turkiye' in Balkanlar, Ismail Soysal (ed. ), (Istanbul: OBIV, 1993), p. 
255; Kut, Yugoslavya', op. cit., pp. 321-36. 
38'Turkiye'den Ambargol, Cumhurrýet, 3 June 1992. 
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occasions, the Turkish government stated its opposition to the arms embargo against 
Bosnian Muslims and demanded the lifting of the ban. 39 In July 1992, Turkey submitted 
an taction plan' to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, detailing 
proposals on to how to deal with the Belgrade government. In it, Turkey proposed limited 
air raids on the Serbs in Bosnia if they refused to accept a cease-fire and the confiscation 
of their heavy arms weaponry. The plan also proposed lifting the arms embargo against 
Bosnian MUSJiMS. 40 
In August 1992, the London Conference opened to a 'rousing condemnation of the 
Serbs' from nearly two dozen nations. Moreover, with the exception of Turkey there were 
virtually no calls for action beyond tightening economic sanctions. As foreign minister 
Hikmet Cetin noted at that time, from the onset of the Bosnian crisis Turkey had 
consistently drawn attention to the necessity of limited air offensives to stop Serbian 
aggression, 'There is nothing left to do. The Serbian massacres must be stopped and the 
only option we have is a limited military operation. 141 Furthermore, at these forums, 
Turkey always expressed its readiness to contribute troops to a combined expeditionary 
force. 42 As deputy prime minister Erdal Inonu explained, 'if necessary we will send 
troops in case of an intervention under the UN umbrella. 143The Turkish parliament also 
authorised the government to send troops to Bosnia in a unanimous vote (319 to 0) in 
1992.44 This was the first time since the Korean War of 1950 that Turkey was openly 
39'Turkiye Bosna'ya Silah Istiyor', Cumhuriyet, 3 November 1992. Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Turkey's 
Relations With A Changing Europe, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 
49. 
406Sirplara Askeri Onlem', Cumhuriyet, 6 August 1992; Newspot, 13 August 1992; For the details of the 
proposal see, Sedat Aral, 'Balkan'larda Surekli Kan Akiyor', Nokta, 23 August 1992, pp. 68-71; Irfan C. 
Acar, Dis Polilika, (Ankara: Sevinc, 1993), p. 14. 
41'The Address of the Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin at the London Conference', Newspot, 10 September 
1992. 
42jonathan Rugman, 'Turkey Offers 1000 Troops for UN Force', The Guardian, 17 August 1992. 
43Newspot, 16 July 1992. 
44Newspot, 17 December 1992. 
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declaring its willingness to join an international force. 45 
Moreover, Turkey convened a Balkan conference in Istanbul in November 1992 in 
which all the Balkan states, except Greece and the new Yugoslavia, took part. This was 
viewed as a diplomatic success as the participants supported Turkey's basic policies on 
Bosnia. 46 Turkey also strongly advocated a Croat-Muslim alliance against Serbian forces 
suggesting that clashes between Croats and Bosnian Muslims in central Bosnia would 
only strengthen the hand of the Serbs, and the likelihood of achieving their objective of a 
'greater Serbia. This was also acknowledged by Croatia during an official visit by its 
president Franjo Tudjman to Ankara in May 1993.47 
Although the scholar William Hale has argued that Turkey's efforts to influence 
western policy can be said 'to have been successful, to the extent that the western powers 
might not have paid as much attention to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims if Turkey, 
like other Muslim countries, had not pushed it onto their agenda', it is difficult to claim 
that there was, at least in the beginning, a clear European policy on the issue. 48 Initially, 
there was a fundamental disagreement among the major European powers over the 
policies to be implemented in the Balkans and the US intervention was a long delayed 
one, or as Van Baar has noted, 'the Americans were not willing and [the] Europeans were 
not able to do the j ob. '49This was perceived in Turkey as Western indifference, which in 
45Kemal Kirisci, 'The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour', Foreign 
Policy (Ankara), vol. 18, nos. 3-4, (1993), p. 2 and pp. 16-9. 
46For the conference see, 'Ankara'nin Diplomatik Basarisi', Cumhuriyet, 27 November 1992; 'Balkan 
Solidarity', Newspot, 3 December 1992. 
47Semih D. Idiz, 'Tudjman in Ankara', Turkish Probe, 4 May 1993, p. 12; 'Demirel: Those who Prepare 
Peace Plans Should be Responsible for the Results', Newspot, 22 July 1994. 
48Williarn Hale, 'Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War', Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Vol. 1, 
(1993), p. 248. 
49Hans van den Broek, former Dutch foreign minister and vice-president of the EC Commission, noted, 
'Europe's divisions have only helped convince the Serbs that they have nothing to worry about. ' 
International Herald Tribune, 18 January 1993; Jed C. Snyder, 'Proliferation Threats to Security in 
NATO's Southern Region', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1, (Winter 1993), p. 108; Dirk J. Van 
Baar, 'The Balkans and Turkey: A European Sideshow' in Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order, Gunay G. Ozdogan and Kemali Saybasili (eds. ), (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), pp. 323-5; 'Bush'un 
Bosnaya Mudahaleye Niyeti Yok', Cumhuriyet, 10 August 1992; Bert Wayne, The Reluctant 
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turn increased anti-Western feelings. 50 
It was clear from the very beginning that being only a middle power, the degree of its 
influence over the developments was bound to be limited, or as much as its level of power 
permitted. Indeed, as the conflict developed into a full-scale war, it became apparent that 
Turkey did not have the capability or power to influence the ongoing developments 
beyond its borders other than by relying on multilateral efforts which proved ineffective 
and therefore fell short in meeting Ankara's expectations. This led to anger and 
disappointment as well as anti-westem sentiments among the Turkish populace and put 
Turkish policy-makers in Ankara in a difficult position as they faced a classic dilemma of 
reconciling internal political pressures with external realities. 51 Extreme nationalism and 
political Islam increasingly gained momentum at the expense of mainstream pro-western. 
moderate groups, as the western approach to the Bosnian crisis was compared with the 
Azeri-Armenian war, the Kurdish issue and the Chechnya war. For example, Muhsin 
Yazicioglu, the leader of the nationalist Great Union Party (Buyuk Birlik Partisi, BBP) 
and one of the most prominent leaders of the nationalist movement in Turkey, asserted 
that the reason for Washington's reluctance to intervening the crisis from the very 
beginning was that it could not persuade the Christian West to take firm action to protect 
theMUSliMS. 52Similarly, Erbakan declared that if his party came to power, it would do 
the same in Bosnia as Turkey did in Cyprus, recalling the Turkish military intervention in 
1974 when he was deputy prime minister. 'The West that destroyed Saddam will not 
intervene in this conflict this time because they have no real interest. Iran, Pakistan and 
Superpower: United States'Policy in Bosnia 1991-95, (New York: Westview Press, 1997), P. 153. 
5OErsan Kalaycioglu, 'The Logic of Contemporary Turkish Politics', Journal, no. 3, (September 1997), p. 5; 
Kenneth Mackenzie, 'Turkey's Circumspect Activism', The World Today, (February 1993), p. 26; J. F. 
Brown, 'Turkey: Back to the Balkans' in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western 
China, Graham Fuller (ed. ), (Oxford: Westview, 1993), p. 154; Kemali Saybasili, 'Introduction' in 
Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order, Gunay G. Ozdogan and Kemali Saybasili (eds. ), 
(Istanbul: Eren, 1995), p. 19. 
51 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 260. 
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Saudi Arabia all helped Bosnia but not Turkey. '53 
6.2. The Kosovo crisis: More turmoil in the Balkans 
Instability in the Balkans began with the disintegration of former Yugoslavia but 
culminated with the Kosovo crisis of the late 1990s. Events in Kosovo underscored the 
lack of effective mechanisms available to contain potential crises in the new era in a 
volatile region. 54 Even the successful NATO operations against the Serbs towards the end 
of the Bosnian war did not deter the Belgrade regime from launching another large-scale 
ethnic cleansing campaign against the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. As in the case of 
Bosnia, Turkey was once more was drawn into the Balkan conflagration. Additionally, 
rising domestic pressure to protect the Kosovar Muslims and an adverse affect on 
Turkey's foreign trade combined with Greece's pro-Serbian ties and the potential refugee 
crisis all played an important role in Turkey's approach to KoSOVO. 55 Finally, the 
existence of a Turkish minority in Kosovo, which was estimated at between 9,000-15,000 
(though it has been claimed by the Turkish foreign ministry that this figure was no less 
than 60,000 at the time) was another reason that Turkey felt obliged to take a more active 
role. 56 
Essentially, the conflict in Kosovo distracted Turkish attention away from focusing on 
establishing stronger economic and political relations with the region and once more 
forced Turkish foreign and security policy to preoccupy itself with formulating policies 
521nterview with Muhsin Yazicioglu, ibid, p. 294. 
53'Erbakan: Hukumet Katliama Seyirci Kaliyor', Cumhuriyet, 23 August 1992. 
54For example, Sandjak in Serbia and Montenegro has been seeking for independence for some time, which 
could be another flash point after Kosovo in the years ahead. Oya A. Mughisuddin, 'The Balkans in 
Transition: Old Conflicts, New Dimensions, Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 18, nos. 34, (1993), pp. 106- 
11; Milan Andrejevich, 'The Sandjak: The Next Balkan Theatre of War? ', RFERL Research Report, 
vol. 1, no. 47, (27 November 1992), p. 26. 
5517or example, 1,300 Turkish lorries were driven to Yugoslavia a year before, no Turkish lorry travelled to 
this country since the crisis. Anadolu Ajansi, 24 May 1999. 
561nterview with the Turkish ambassador to Tirana, Zaman, 20 May 1999; Aydin Babuna, 'Kosova Sorunu 
Uzerine', Dis Politika, vol. 10, (1999), p. 6; $ule Kut, 'Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect? ', Perceptions, 
vol. 5, no. 3 (Sept-Nov. 2000); Statement on the Clashes in Kosovo, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
29 December 1998. 
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on how to resolve the confliCt. 57 
In contrast to its public diplomatic efforts during the Bosnian conflict, Turkey pursued 
a low profile role in the Kosovo war and did not take up the issue in various international 
organisations. It especially distanced itself from the military option. The ethnic Albanian 
lobby in Turkey accused Ankara of pursuing an overly cautious policy toward the Kosovo 
issue. 58 Hadi Uluengin in his column in the Istanbul daily Hurriyet criticised Turkey's 
ineffective stance and questioned its lack of political will to protect the Kosovar Muslims, 
twe are so occupied with other trivial issues that we do not seem to be aware of the fact 
that we are being driven out of Europe with every single Kosovar who is either being 
killed or made a refugee. Kosovo is the legacy of our Ottoman past, culture, faith and 
honour. 159 
As a general policy, Turkey adopted a cautious approach with respect to the Kosovo 
issue, emphasising its opposition to engaging in policies purely based on ethnic and 
religious tieS60, and supported the talks between Serbia and the ethnic Albanian groups for 
a negotiated political solution. 61 However, in the face of events in Kosovo, Ankara altered 
its previous position and supported international efforts to end Serbian advances stressing 
the necessity of a military operation and declaring its readiness to participate. 62 Turkish 
president Demirel declared, 'those oppressed in Kosovo are Muslim Turks and Albanians, 
thus in an operation which aims to save our kinsmen, Turkey cannot follow a policy of 
57Cumhuriyet, 23 January, 6 May and 10 October 1996; Sule Kut, 'Turkish Policy toward the Balkans' in 
Turkey's New World., Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari 
(eds), (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 81. 
5 8Kut, 'Turkish', op. cit., p. 76. 
59Hadi Uluengin, 'Turban, Tumor ve Gundem', Hurriyet, 15 May 1999. 
60Turk1sh Daily News, 15 October 1992; Baskin Oran, 'Turkiye'nin Balkan ve Kafkas Politikasi', 
A USBFD, vol. 50, nos. 1-2, (January-June 1995), p. 273. 61For the peace negotiations see, Marc Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo', International 
Affairs, vol. 75, no, 2, (April 1999), pp. 211-5 1. 
62Sabah, I February 1999 and Aksam, 4 March 1999. 
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indifference. ' 63 The ethnic cleansing perpetrated against the Kosovars was reminiscent of 
the atrocities that had been formerly witnessed in Bosnia. 64 In short time, Serb forces 
drove 300,000 Kosovar Albanians from their homes. 65 Even the NATO strikes on 
Yugoslavia in March 1999 did not stop the Serb forces in Kosovo from rounding up 
ethnic Albanians and expelling them. 66 This resulted in Europe's worst refugee crisis 
since the end of the Second World War as 90 per cent of an estimated 1.6 million ethnic 
Albanians were refugeeS. 67 It was estimated that 800,000 refugees fled to Albania, 
Macedonia and Montenegro or were evacuated to other countries, and some 600,000 were 
displaced within the province. 68 
With the launch of NATO air strikes following the failure of the peace talks in early 
1999, Turkey contributed sixteen of its F16 fighter planes, which first flanked NATO 
warplanes in raids over Yugoslavia and then took part in NATO attacks. 69 Furthermore, 
Turkey opened bases in the west of the country to NATO warplanes for attacks on 
Yugoslavia. 70 Additionally, some 1,000 Turkish soldiers joined the NATO-led 
peacekeeping force in KoSOVO. 71 Later, Ankara also sent 126 troops to Albania to help to 
co-ordinate the handling of the refugee crisis. 72 Turkey also received around 20,000 
63Sedat Ergin, 'Demirel: Bombaliyoruz', Hurriyet, 21 May 1999. 
64For the origins and dynamics of the crisis in the post-Yugoslavia see, Glenny Misha, The Rebirth of 
History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy, (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 136; Reginald 
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'Sirplar'a Gore Kosova Sorunu', AvrasyaDosyasi, vol. 4, no. 1- 2, (Spring-Summer 1998), p. 168; 
Enver Hasan, 'Politik ve Hukuki Acidan Kosova Krizi', Avrasya Dosyasi, vol. 4, nos. 1-2, (Spring- 
Summer 1998), pp. 126-7. 
65 The Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1996; Athanassopoulou Ekavi, 'Hoping for the Best Planning for the 
Worst: Conflict in Kosovo', The World Today, vol. 52, nos: 8-9, (August-September 1996), p. 226; Chris 
Hedges, 'Kosovo's Next Masters', Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 3, (May-June 1999), pp. 24-42; 'Road 
out of Hell', The Times, I October 1998. 
66The Economist, 20 and 27 March 1999. 
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72Sabah, 13 May 1999; Hurriýet, 31 May 1999. 
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refugees and helped to establish refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia for another 
20,000.73 According to the Turkish defence minister, Turkey sent the most humanitarian 
aid to the Kosovars worth US$4 million and spent another US$14 million on the refugee 
camps in Turkey, Albania and Macedonia. 74 In this context, as the refugee problem 
reached crisis point, various state and non-govermnental organisations initiated fund- 
raising campaigns across the country and raised donations worth millions of dollars. 75 It 
was also reported that wounded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members were treated at 
Turkish hospitals in Turkey and Kosovar refugees were enrolled at Turkish universitieS. 76 
Like the Bosnian war, the Kosovo crisis had several implications for Turkish foreign 
and security policy. Firstly, it destabilised the region making it difficult for Turkey to 
foster relations with the Balkan countries on the pretence of common ethnic and religious 
grounds because to do so would have caused an immediate backlash from regional 
competitors like Greece. Secondly, a reduced and crippled Kosovo automatically meant a 
reduced Turkish presence and influence in the region, as Kosovo was a natural ally for 
Turkey in the region. Thirdly, Turkey found itself faced with the Bosnian and Kosovo 
war. This seriously prevented it from developing and executing pro-active foreign 
policies in the region as opposed to contaimnent policies. 
6.3. A new Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans: Discovery of new allies 
As a result of its imperial past spanning over four centuries Turkey has common 
historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic links with the Balkans region. More importantly, 
owing to these ties, domestic factors also forced Ankara to take a high profile role 
towards the developments occurring in those countries during the period under study. 
In particular, Turkey sought to utilise the potential emerging market opportunities for 
73'Kosovo', Newspot, no. 14,1999. 
74TUrkjýe, II May I 99g.. 
7SHurrrlyet, 6 April 1999. 
76'Wounded KLA Guerrillas Treated in Turkey', Turkish Daily News, 17 May 1999. Anadolu Ajansi, 17 
June 1999. 
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Turkish goods. 77 Turkish citizens of Balkan origin who own hundreds of small and 
medium-size companies especially in the western part of Turkey also contributed to the 
Turkish economic policy in the region as they actively worked for the improvement of 
inter-regional trade. 78 As in Caucasia and Central Asia, many non-governmental. 
organisations and various private investors quickly established a number of cultural and 
educational centres including Turkish schools in the Balkans. Such organisations also 
proved successful in establishing themselves in the media sector as well. 79 
This aided to improve Turkey's ties with Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia, 
while Bulgaria, and, especially, Macedonia, despite their Christian Orthodoxy links, did 
not join the Greek-Serb coalition. In fact, as will be discussed later Athens's dealings with 
Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania and the support it gave to Serbia during the Yugoslav 
crisis strongly encouraged these states to improve relations with Turkey and it was only in 
the second half of the 1990s that Athens attempted to restore relations with its Balkan 
neighbours of Macedonia and Albania and to intensify cooperation with Bulgaria and 
Romania impacted on Turkey's Balkan policies, especially in the economic field. 
Moreover, regional countries also faced severe internal challenges in the face of a 
wealk, democratic tradition and socio-economic realities, which made the implementation 
of Turkish policies difficult. Additionally, as will be discussed in the coming chapter, 
Greece as a main regional rival, further hampered the Turkish efforts in this respect. 
Turkey's limited economic capacity to extend sizeable aid and credits to the region and a 
growing interest in the Turkic republics and Russia, which in turn diverted scant 
resources was another factor in Turkey's relatively limited success, particularly in the 
77For example, by 1994, in Romania only Turkish firms numbered around 2,500. In 1999, this was 5,600 
and they made investments worth US$1.2 billion. The trade balance between the two countries reached a 
maximum level in 1998 with US$813 million. Newspot, 7 April 1994 and Aksam, 8 July 1999. 78Turan Aydin 'Turkey's Rising Economic Capacity', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 3, (September-November 
1996), p. 146. 
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economic field, in achieving closer ties to the Balkans. Thus, having lacked economic 
capability meant Turkey missed the opportunity to exert greater influence, albeit 
indirectly, in the form of aid and large investment schemes, and it was quickly filled by 
other regional and non-regional powers, i. e. Greece in particular and other EU countries 
such as Germany and Italy, For example, although Turkey provided political support to 
Bosnia from the very onset of the conflict, economic ties lagged far behind political- 
military support. Turkey granted a mere US$26 million Eximbank credits (it had 
originally offered US$80 million). Thus, the prospects of expanding economic relations 
remained low and bilateral trade remained insignificant whilst the leading EU countries 
increasingly dominated the country's economy. 80 For example, as of 2000, trade with 
Turkey was less than I per cent of Bosnia's overall trade while trade with Italy and 
Germany alone accounted for more than 25 percent. 81 In the same way, Turkish firms 
have not been represented to any significant extent in post-war reconstruction of Bosnia. 
Additionally, Greece was quick to reap the benefits of its policy change towards the 
regional countries as it looked to enhance its economic expansion. Greece viewed 
advanced economic ties as the main instrument by which to exert more political influence 
in the Balkans. As the only EU member in the region, Greece clearly benefited from its 
position as a natural bridge for western multinational companies in the area. Accordingly, 
Greece developed into the main investor in Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria, all 
countries regarded as Turkey's close allies. 82 By the year of 2000, total Greek 
investments reached nearly US$3 billion and Greek exports accounted for more than 20 
79For example, the Istanbul-based Turkish daily Zaman was being circulated in these countries in both Turkish and local languages. 
8011han Uzgel, 'The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilising Role' in Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multiregional Power, Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds), (Boulder and London: Lynne Riermer, 2001), p. 54. 
81http: //www. komorabih. com/en/economybih/foreigntrade. html. 
82See, Charalambos Tsardanidis and Evangelos Karafotakis, 'Greece's Economic Diplomacy Towards the 
Balkan Countries', Perceptions, vol. 5, no. 3, (September-November 2000). 
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percent of the region's trade, while only 2.6 percent of Turkey's total external trade was 
with the Balkan countries and Turkish investments accounted for only just over US$l 
billion. 83 
Improving relations with Bulgaria 
Fearing that a Greek-Serbian-Bulgarian Orthodox block in the Balkan Peninsula could 
threaten Turkey, it attached much importance to developing its relationship with Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria generally resisted such a grouping and followed a balanced policy that was to an 
extent favourable to Turkey's interests in the Balkans. This was aided by the existence of 
more than one million Turks in Bulgaria (one-tenth of the whole population)84 and 
Bulgaria's post-Cold War efforts to make up for the bitter memories of the mid-1980s, 
which saw of around 300,000 of Bulgaria's population flee Turkey in 1990 in respect to 
Bulgaria's disastrous policy of forced assimilation of its ethnic Turkish minority. 85 In 
fact, the return of approximately 150,000 Turks to Bulgaria after the Sofia goverriment's 
decision to halt the camPaign reflected the level of cordial relations between the two 
neighbours. 86 Although new equal rights for the hitherto oppressed Turkish minority 
aroused deep-seated nationalist sentiment among large numbers of Bulgarians, and led to 
nationalist strikes at the beginning of 1990, which were exacerbated by worsening 
economic conditions, 87 new democratic rights also facilitated the representation of the 
8311han Uzgel, 'Balkanlarla Iliskiler' in Turk Dis Politikasi, Baskin Oran (ed. ), vol. 2, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 
2002), pp. 513-8. 
84AIi Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, (London: Institute of Muslim Minority 
Affairs, 1997), pp. 79-81; Anna Krasteva, 'Bulgaristan'in Etno-Kulturel Panoramasi', Dis Politika, vol. 
6, no, 2, pp. 97-114; Huseyin Memisoglu, 'Bulgaristan ve Bulgaristan Turk Azinlik Sorunu' in Tarihi 
Gelismeler Icinde Turkiyenin Sorunlari Sempozyumu (Dun-Bugun-Yarin), (Ankara: TTK, 1990), pp. 
115-25. 
85Bulgaria denied Turkish minority and re-labelled them 'Bulgarians of Muslim Faith' see, Jonothan Eyal, 
'Managing Balkans' in Rusi and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1992, (London: RUSI, 1992), p. 82; 
Imbroglio Balkan, 'Turkish Uncertainties: Domestic and Foreign Policy Identities in the 1990s' in 
Politics and Security in South-Eastern Europe, Daniel N. Nelson (ed. ), (Colorado: Westview, 199 1), PP. 
98-9. During his visit to Ankara in 1997, Bulgarian President Peter Stayonov apologised for Bulgaria's 
policy under the communist rule. Radikal, 29 July 1997. 
860mer Turan, 'Bulgaristan Turklerinin Bugunku Durumu', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 1, no. 3, (March-April 
1995), p. 296. 
87'Post-Communist Balkans: The First Phase', Strategic Survey 1990-91, (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 
175 
Turkish population in the Bulgarian parliament, which in turn helped to contribute to the 
improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian relations. 88 
In the military arena, Turkey signed an assistance and training agreement with 
Bulgaria, and for the first time in their history, the two countries' armies joined forces in 
military manoeuvres organised by Bulgaria. 89 As a gesture of good will, Turkey decided 
to withdraw two anny divisions from the Turco-Bulgarian border in 1992 and both 
countries signed another military agreement in 1996, which called for the exchange of 
military advisors. 90 The two countries signed a further defence industry cooperation 
agreement, to include the joint production of weapons systems, the repair of military 
vehicles and the promotion of the sale of products to third countries. 91 
Relations also evolved in the economic field as Turkey granted Bulgaria a US$175 
million credit and supplied oil and electricity to Bulgaria when it had difficulties meeting 
its needs during the Gulf crisis of 1990.92 The two countries also concluded a number of 
economic, industrial and technical co-operation agreements which saw the abolition of 
the customs tariff and (with the participation of Romania) they agreed to establish a tri- 
partite free trade and economic zone in 1999.93 This provided the basis for the entry of 
over 2,000 Turkish companies that now operate in Bulgaria. 94 The overall trade volume 
between the two countries exceeded half a billion dollars in 1999, a five-fold increase 
1991), p. 169; Aksiýon, 9-15 November 1996, p. 64; Turkish-German Round Table Meeting, (Ankara: 
SAM, 1996), p. 16. 
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7; Huseyin Memisoglu, 'Bulgaristan'da Demokrasi ve Yasalar', Dis Polilika Bulteni, vol. 3, no. 2, 
(September 199 1), pp. 48-53. 
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9ONewspot, 2 July 1992; Milliyet, 26 January 1996. 
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from 1990 (of this Turkish exports amounted to US$213 million), making Turkey the 
eighth largest importer into Bulgaria. 95 Turkey was also the tenth biggest investor with 
US$160 million. Over the -same period, however Greece became the leading trade and 
investment partner of Bulgaria, well ahead of Turkey. By late 1990s, Greece was 
Bulgaria's second-largest foreign investor as total Greek investments exceeded US$850 
million, while bilateral trade amounted to over US$700 million (Greek exports account 
for US$411 million, twice that of Turkey). 96 Thus, overall, in the post-Cold War era, 
Turkey developed and sustained a good relationship with Bulgaria. 
A new ally: Macedonia 
Like Bulgaria, Macedonia also became a comer stone of Turkey's Balkan policy. 
From Ankara's perspective, a stable and strong Macedonia suited Turkish interests in the 
Balkans as a reliable ally and a counter-weight to possible Greek and Serbian designs. In 
turn, for Macedonia, close diplomatic links with Turkey served to balance the same 
tlueats. 97 Moreover, Macedonia's vulnerable position in the face of internal and external 
threats and the wider implications of a possible break-up of the whole Balkan region also 
became an issue for Turkey. The existence of an ethnic Turkish minority numbering 
around 80,000, (4% of the population and the third largest ethnic group in Macedonia) 
and the large and influential population of immigrant Macedonian Turks, also played an 
important part in Turkey's policy towards Macedonia. 98 
Although Macedonia gained its independence peacefully in 1991, successfully stayed 
out of the Yugoslav war, secured 'inter-ethnic peace' and attempted democratic and 
95Sabah, 13 May 1999. 
96Sabah, 13 August 1999; 
http: //ýww. mfa-grlenglishlforeign_policyleuropý_southeasternlbalkansIBulgariahtmI 
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economic reforms, its fragile ethnic composition, with half a million Muslims (the vast 
majority Albanians) in a total population of about two million, continued to be a potential 
threat to stability. 99 Indeed, the rising Albanian ethnic population caused serious tensions 
among the Macedonian Slav majority, and this in turn resulted in growing Macedonian 
nationalism. 100 
Apart from domestic ethnic tensions, there were several other external factors that 
made Macedonia even more vulnerable to instability, and which also convinced the 
Skopje government to foster closer relations with Turkey. For example, international 
recognition of Macedonia had been blocked by Greece, as Athens feared that a future 
revival of territorial claims on Greek Macedonia by a Macedonian state will be 
unavoidable. 101 In this framework, Greece imposed a blockade on Macedonia, which 
effected 70% of its exports, while it had already lost its major trade partner, Yugoslavia, 
following the UN sanctions against the latter. 102 Bulgaria, on the other hand, insisted that 
Macedonian history was an integral part of Bulgarian national history and that 
Macedonia's language was a variant of Bulgarian. 103 Furthermore, Serbia, for historical 
Macmillan, 1999), pp. 117-9. 
99Duncan M. Perry, 'The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival', RFEIRL Research Report, 
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reasons, considered Macedonia an integral part of Serbia, and also regarded Macedonians 
as being of Serbian ethnic origin in the view of its Slav language and majority Orthodox 
population. 104 In this context, the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPRDEP) was 
invited into Macedonia in 1993 to defuse any possible Serbian aggression. 105 All in all, 
extemal pressures, particularly the Greek factor urged the Skopje govemment to seek 
more economic and political help from Ankara. For example, in 1991 the Macedonian 
president Kiro Gligorov made his first visit abroad to Turkey to appeal for economic and 
political support. 106 
Turkey first showed diplomatic support by recognising Macedonia in February 
1992.107 It also became the first country to establish a diplomatic mission in Skopje-108 
Turkey also offered to play a mediatory role between Tirana and Skopje over the 
increasingly unstable Albanian minority issue. In addition, Turkey raised its concerns 
over Macedonia's security at various international forums, lobbied for international 
recognition and supported Macedonian membership to NATO. While Greece particularly 
used the EU to block the recognition of the Skopje government. 109 The two countries 
finalised a military co-operation agreement and joint military exercises were held in 1997, 
the first initiative of its kind for nearly a century. 110 This was followed by Turkey's 
decision to give 20 of its F-5s fighter planes to the Macedonian army force-III 
Furthermore, Ankara supplied oil and humanitarian assistance to Macedonia to ease the 
economic crisis that it suffered in 1991 and 1992 in the face of the embargo on 
an Independent State, unpublished MA thesis, (London: University of Westminster, 1995), p. 41. 
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105The Times, 29 March 1999. 
1066Macedonian President Gligorov Visits Ankara', Newspot, II July 1991; 6Macedonian Deputy Premier: 
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107'Dort Yugoslav Cumhuriyet Tanindi, Cumhuriyet, 7 February 1992. 
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Yugoslavia, structural difficulties in the economy, the lack of international aid and Greek 
sanctions. 112 
Although a trade and economic cooperation and a free trade agreements were signed 
between Turkey and Macedonia in 1994 and 1998 respectively, progress in the economic 
field did not reflect political ties. Bilateral trade remained at around US$80 million for 
much of this period. In simple terms, Turkey lacked the economic resources to provide 
the kind of economic assistance Macedonia needed, and which would have made it the 
primary economic actor in Macedonia. Thus, the Turkish Eximbank credit worth US$25 
million fell for short of expectations despite calls from the Skopje government for more 
Turkish economic involvement, leaving opportunity for others. 113 For example, the 
Macedonian government offered Turkish businessmen the first option to enter new 
privatisation projects in the country on favourable terms, 114 but unable to take up these 
projects, Greece became the biggest foreign investor in the country and the second largest 
trade partner of the country after Germany. For example, about 90% percent of the 
foreign capital investment came from Greece and Greek companies either taken over, or 
were in the final stages of assuming control of a number of vital sectors of the 
Macedonian economy, including construction, tobacco, oil and banking. 115 As of 1999, 
Greek exports to Macedonia were US$425 million while Turkish exports accounted for 
only US$63 million. 
A full-fledged alliance with Albania 
From a Turkish perspective, Albania was a natural ally to balance Serbia and, in 
particular, Greek endeavours to expand influence in the region. In this context, the 
III Umit Enginsoy, 'Turkey to give F-5 s to Macedonia', Defence News, 13 July 1998. 112'Turkish Red Crescent Aid to Turkish Republics, Russia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina', Newspot, 18 June 1992. 
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existence of a large group of Turkish citizens of Albanian origin played an important role. 
Especially following the decision of the Albanian leadership to undertake reforms and to 
end its policy of international isolation, Albania held its first free elections in 1991 ending 
fifty years of communist rule and established closer political and economic relations with 
the neighbouring Balkan states as well as the Western world. 116 This promptly led to a 
natural interaction between the peoples of Turkey and Albania where 70 per cent of 
Albania's three million strong population are Muslim. 
Despite Albania's expanding economic and diplomatic relationship with the outside 
world, and welcome economic reforms, it remained the poorest country in Europe during 
this period. 117 This caused serious unrest and brought the country to the brink of a civil 
war in 1997, which in turn magnified the threat to the wider stability of the Balkans-118 
While the existence of a poor Albanian community in northern Greece, and the latter's 
territorial claims over the southern part of Albania as Part of Greater Hellas, also led to 
tense relations with Athens. ' 19 Indeed, Greece used its veto to block EU aid to Albania. 120 
Moreover, ethnic Albanians living outside the existing Albanian national borders 
(totalling more than 2 million people), notably in Macedonia and Kosovo, aspired to a 
closer relationship, or even unity with Tirana, although Albania's own economic and 
political shortcomings did not favour the realisation. of a 'greater Albania. '121 These 
nationalist movements, however, contributed to the deterioration of Albania's relations 
with Serbia and Macedonia despite the fact that the Tirana government accepts 
11 6Esat Oz and Ceren Sarisaltik 'Amavutluk'ta Demokrasiye Gecis Sureci', Avrasya Dosyasi, vol. 1, no. 1, 
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Macedonia as a counterweight to Serbia and Greece. The Kosovo crisis further strained 
already tense relationship with Serbia. 122 Given Albania's potential for economic and 
political crisis and its proximity to hostile neighbours (most notably Serbia) the Tirana 
goverment asked NATO to help seal its border to prevent the flow of people and 
weapons to the conflict area given the fact it was unable to guard its borders on its own 
with a small army numbering 10,000.123 
In responding to Albania's request, Turkey supplied humanitarian aid consisting of 
food and basic consumer goods to Albania between 1991 and 1993 totalling US$31 
million at a time when the country was severely hit by economic crisis. 124 Additionally, 
Turkey sent around 800 troops to join the Italian-led contingent and police reinforcements 
to restore order in Albania following the economic meltdown of April 1997.125 
Membership of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSECP) in 1992 further 
contributed to the normalisation of the country's foreign relations. Furthermore, Ankara 
offered technical and training assistance following Tirana's decision to switch to a free 
market economy and privatisation. and helped to set up a telecommunications systems. 126 
In 1992, the two countries signed a Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation 
agreement, by which, Turkey pledged to provide Albania military aid, mainly for officer 
training and military education and technical assistance to rebuild its military and security 
forces. 127 In addition, Turkey agreed to provide a US$5 million credit to repair a harbour 
in Albania, and sent troops to support the project logistically. 128 
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Turkey was also one of the leading supporters of Albania's inclusion in NATO during 
the alliance's expansion process, with prime minister Ecevit announcing that Turkey 
would support Albania because it was 'encircled by danger. '129The cordial nature of 
relations became even more visible during the Kosovo crisis as the Tirana government 
repeatedly sought Turkey's help against Serbian attacks on Albanians, much to the 
appreciation of Albanian leadership. 130 
However, once more bilateral economic ties did not match the level of politico- 
military relations, despite Albania's desire for Turkish economic aid and investment. 
Although, Turkish companies found Albania a promising market, they soon had to face 
strong competition from Italian, and later, Greek firms. Thus, trade between the two 
countries remained insignificant. The credits extended to Albania worth US$53.5 million 
(only US$15 million of it was released by the end of 1999) was not sufficient in this 
respect. Greece, on the other hand, became Albania's second largest trade partner after 
Italy, with imports from Greece accounting for more than a third of the country's overall 
imports. As of 2000, Albania's overall trade with these two countries accounted for 82 
and 65 percent respectively. Albania's import from Turkey were only 6 percent of the 
total in the same year. 131 Similarly, in the same period Greece's share in overall foreign 
investment in Albania, particularly in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, banking 
and fanning sectors, was over 34 percent (Italy controlled 48 percent of the investment) 
while Turkey's share was a mere 2 percent. 132 Consequently, as in Macedonia, Turkey 
remained far behind other countries, most notably Greece, in establishing strong 
economic ties. 
129Aksam, 4 March 1999. 
130See the statement of Iskender Gjinushi, the Speaker of the Albanian Parliament, Hurriyet, 23 June 1999. 
131Arnavutluk Ulke Raporu, (Ankara: TIKA, 1995), p. 60; Newspot, II March 1993; Uzgel, 'The Balkans', 
op. cit., p. 56; http: //www. workmall. conVwfb200 I /albania/albania_economy. html; Charalambos, op. cit. 
132http: //www. oecd. orgtpdf/MO0032000/MO0032256. pdf 
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6.4. The Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project: A Turkish diplomatic 
success? 
Turkey also looked to multilateral economic schemes with the countries of the 
Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In particular it initiated the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation Project (BSECP). Although Turkey strongly rejected claims that 
the project was a substitute for the EU and thereby was evidence of the reorientation of its 
foreign policy following its exclusion from the EU membership track, the frustration with 
Brussels was obvious and made a regional multilateral framework. 133 Turkey hoped that 
the introduction of such co-operation among the regional countries would contain and 
reduce the growing security threats and risks on its borders. More specifically, it was 
hoped that the existence of such an effective regional mechanism would provide a 
platform for regional conflict resolutions. 134 
In the words of Turkish premier Demirel 'we believe we have to create effective 
regional mechanisms to solve today's conflicts and to work on economic interdependence 
so that future conflicts can be avoided. '135 Similarly, foreign minister Cetin also 
underlined Ankara's reliance on multilateral institutions, 'fostering regional economic 
integration through infrastructure projects requiring multilateral collaborations would 
foster peace and stability". 136 Thus, the intention was, as one Turkish diplomat stated, 'to 
take the steps that would lead to economic stability and lasting peace in the region 
through stronger economies. '137 Presumably, such mechanisms offered Turkey valuable 
133Ercan Ozer, 'The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the EU' Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 3, (September- 
November 1996), pp. 72-86; Oral Sander, 'Turkey and the Organisation for Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation', International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. 6, nos. 1-2, (Winter 1992-94), p. 66; 
'Ankara Hosts Key Black Sea Region Development Meeting', Dateline Turkey, 22 December 1990; 
Faruk Sen, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Supplement to the EC? ', Aussen Politik vol. 44, no. 3, 
(1993), p. 281. 
1340ral Sander, 'The Balkan and Black Sea Cooperation', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 17, no. 3, (1993), 
p. 37; Duygu B. Sezer, 'The Black Sea Politics and Turkey', Turkey at the Threshold of the 21s' Century. 
Global Encounters andlvs. Regional Alternatives, (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998). 
135 World Statesman, vol. 2, no. 1, (Winter 1993), p. 84. 
136'Turkey Says Economic Ties Can End Black Sea Strife', The Reuters, 10 December 1992. 
1370ktay Ozuye, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 3, (Summer 
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opportunities to develop into an important political and economic player. 138 Thus, Ankara 
was strongly convinced that Turkey's place in this changing environment should be 
represented institutionally by establishing a new organisation under Turkish leadership 
known as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project. 139 
The BSECP was signed by Turkey, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine at a summit meeting in Istanbul in June 
1992, and the agreement was institutionalised subsequently. ' 40 It was hoped that the 
organisation would create political co-operation in the two hinterlands: the Balkans 
through Turkey, and Central Asia and the Caucasus through the Ukraine. 141 In the initial 
period, Turkey financed the whole initiative, hosted almost all the meetings, and 
undertook the secretariat work for nearly two years. 142 The participating countries 
declared that they had decided to develop mutual and bilateral economic co-operation and 
that priority would be 'given to projects in areas such as transportation and 
communication; the exchange of economic and commercial data; standardisation; energy; 
tourism; agriculture; the environment; and science and technology. 143 It also agreed to 
establish the 'BSEC Trade and Development Bank' which commenced into operations in 
1999.144 Later, the members proclaimed the 11-nation group as a regional economic 
organisation. In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC was established with the 
1992), p. 49. 
138Sule Kut, 'Karadeniz Ekonomik Isbirligi'nin Boyutlari', Strateji, no. 3, (1995), pp. 93-105. 
139Muftuler-Bac, op. cit., p. 44; Miltiadhes Evert, 'Turkey's Strategic Goals: Possibilities and Weakness', 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4, (Fall 1993), p. 32. 
140For more detailed information on origins and objectives of the project see, 'Born Healthy: Black Sea 
Cooperation in Effect, Newspot, 2 July 1992; Tunc Aybak, 'Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) 
and Turkey: Extending European Integration to the East? ' in Politics of Black Sea: Dynamics Of CO- 
operation and Conflict, Tunc Aybak (ed. ), (London and New York: 1. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 31-7; Tansug 
Bleda, 
, 
'Black Sea-Economic Cooperation Region', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 16, no. 1-2, (1991), 
pp. 60-1. 
14 1 Oral Sander, 'Turkey and the Turkic World', Central Asian Survey, vol. 13, no. 1, (1994), p. 42. 
142Ayse Y. Kolat, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation in Perspective', Eurasian Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, (Fall 
1996), p. 24. 
1430zuye, op. cit., pp. 52-3. 
144Anadolu Ajansi, 21 June 1999. 
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goals of creating the legal basis for economic co-operation among member countries and 
promoting regional peace. 145 The Assembly established was unique, as it provided the 
only regional forum of the Black Sea countries where parliamentarians from participant 
nations could discuss a variety of issues. 146 
The project was considered an important achievement for Turkey and reflected its 
growing role as a regional power in the new envirorunent. Sukru Elekdag, a senior 
Turkish diplomat who originally proposed the project, has argued that 'the agreement 
means that for the first time in the course of 50 years of the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic that ground has been laid for an international institution for a project pioneered 
by Turkey. '147 The project was also branded a triumph for Turkish diplomacy in its 
successes in bringing together the leaders of a large number of mutually suspicious, if not 
entirely hostile, nations with various disputes and armed conflicts, though this became 
one of the main factors responsible for the project's failure to achieve anything 
significant. 149 
Although the organisation was founded on a firm basis and had a huge potential to 
grow, it did not make the progress expected of it in the period under examination. 149 
There were several economic, political and legal reasons for this. The ratification of its 
charter in the national parliaments of the member countries was delayed until 1999, 
though highlighting the reluctance of member states to commit to the process. As such the 
organisation was not regarded as a true international organisation and was ineligible for 
funds from international bodies such as the World Bank. 150 Moreover, some of the 
members, Turkey and Greece, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ukraine and Russia disagreed on 
145'BSCE New Dimensions', Newspot, II March 1993. 
146'Black Sea States Form Parliamentary Assembly, Reuters, 26 February 1993. 
147Sukru Elekdag, 'Karadeniz Ekonomik Isbirligi, Milliyet, 2 February 1992. 
14SHale, 'Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War', op. cit., p. 244. 149Sukru Elekdag, 'Karadeniz Ekonomik Isbirligi (KEI)', Mdfiýet, 25 November 1996. 
1 SOUzgel, 'Balkanlar', op. cit., P. 522. 
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numerous issues raised at the forum. 151 Economically, there were also sharp differences 
between the economies of the members and most of them (with the exception of Turkey 
and Greece) still had to complete the process of transition from centralised economies to 
the free market system. More importantly, financial resources to fund the main projects 
were lacking. 152 
As of 1997, the member countries enjoyed combined GNPs of US$1-1 trillion with a 
total trade of US$350 billion and they had a wide range of complementary industries and 
agricultural sectors. 153 Thus, the economic value of the BSEC from Turkey's point of 
view was more than simply the opening up of a formerly closed or semi-closed markets 
of more than 350 million people. 154 Despite this immense potential, Turkish trade did not 
generate the dramatic increases with the member states that were hoped. Within two years 
of the launch of the project, trade volume with the other members of the BSEC reached 9 
percent of Turkey's overall trade (up from 7 per cent in 1992). 155 By 1999, this was 8 
percent of its total exports, and almost II percent of its imports. However, it should be 
noted that Russia was responsible for almost half this figure, and in fact Turkey's export 
to Russia suffered a sharp decrease following the financial crisis in Russia in the late 
1990S. 156As such, the increase in trade may well have happened anyway regardless of the 
BSEC objectives. 157 
151Sule Kut, 'The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s' in Turkey in iVorld Politics: An 
Emerging Multiregional Power, Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds), (Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), p. 6. 
152Ercan Ozer, 'Concept and Prospects of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Foreign Policy (Ankara), 
vol. 20, nos. 1-2, (1996), pp. 100-3; Richard E. Ericson, 'On Problems of Economic Transition in the 
Black Sea Region', Bogx-ici Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, (1995), pp. 23-3 1. 153For economies of the member states see, N. Bulent Gultekin and Ayse Mumcu, 'Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation' in Turkey Between East and West, Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds. ), (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 185-99. 
154Ziya Onis, 'Turkey in the Post-Cold War era: In Search of Identity', Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no. 
no. 1, (Winter 1995), p. 58. 
155'Romanya KEI'yi Istiyor', Akstývoi; 24-30 December 1994, p. 44. I%Turkiýve Temel Ekonomik Gostergeler Hazziran 2001, (T. C. Basbakanlik DPT) 
157Hale, op. cit., p. 269. 
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Initial expectations in Turkey about the prospect of creating an EFTA-type free trade 
area, which could embrace new members including Turkic states, also failed to 
develop. 158 In all, although the project was ambitious, it ultimately failed to meet the 
expectations and promises nothing more than a loose political organisation with little 
prospect of evolving into a genuine economic union. 159 
158Muzaffer Dartan, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC): A New Regional Integration Project', 
Marmara Journal ofEuropean Studies, vol. 3, nos. 1-2, (1993-1994), p. 148. 15913ulent Aras, The New Geopolitics ofEurasia and Turkey's Polstion, (London: Frank Cass, 2002) p. 100; Baskin Oran, Turk Dis Politikasi, Baskin Oran (ed. ), vol. 2, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2002), pp. 521-2. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
TURCO-GREEK RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: 
NEIGHBOURS STILL IN CONFLICT 
7.1. Developments in Turkish-Greek Relations: New rivalries and tensions 
The end of the Cold War era and subsequent developments in the Balkan peninsula 
added to Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus- I Moreover, it could 
be argued that the post-Cold War era illuminated the differences between both countrieS2 
and, especially with developments in the Balkans, the relationship became more strained 
than previoUSly. 3 
As such, Turkey's new role in the post-Cold War Balkan peninsula caused serious 
concerns in Greece, where it was feared that 'Ankara's grand strategy aims at boosting 
the world role of Turkic and Islamic nations stretching from Central Asia to central 
Yugoslavia. 14 In particular, rhetoric relating to the 'Turkish world extending from [the] 
Adriatic to China' and 'the Turkish century' further increased Greek suspicion of Turkish 
intentions. With respect to the Balkans, Athens believed that Turkey was motivated to 
exploit an already volatile situation by expanding its influence among the various Muslim 
populations on Greece's northern frontier. 5 As early as 1992, while Yugoslavia was still 
in the process of disintegration, the Greek foreign minister expressed Athens's concern 
over Turkish pressures on Greece through the encirclement of his country by the Muslim 
Consequently, as Korkmaz Haktanir, a former senior foreign ministry official and Turkish ambassador to 
London, explained, relations strained to the extent that the two neighbours did not have any significant 
dialogue for more than twenty years. Milhýet, 3 March 1999; 
2GuInur Aybet, Turkey's Foreign Policy and its Implicationsfor the West, (London: RUSI, 1994), p. 37.; 
3During the Cold War years, this tense relationship was certainly further invigorated during the reign of 
successive PASOK governments, Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, under the leadership of Andreas 
Papandreou (who was known for his uncompromising stance against Turkey) between 1981 and 1989. 
See, 'Towards a multi-dimensional foreign policy', 1960-1980. More about PASOK's policy on Turkish- 
Greek relations see, Tozun Bahceli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, (Colorado: Westview Press, 
1990), P. 153; Van Coufoudakis, 'PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations' in Greece, 1981-89: The 
Populist Decade, Richard Clogg (ed. ), (London and Hampshire: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 167-78. 4N. A. Stavrou, 'The Dismantling of the Balkan Security: Consequences for Greece, Europe, and NATO', 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 1, (Winter 1995), p. 32. 5'Yunanistan'in Turkiye Korkusu', Cumhuriyet, 12 February 1992. Peter Thompson, 'Trouble in the 
Balkans', Europe Magazine, April 1991, p. 29; Gregorios Dernestichas, 'Greek Security and Defence 
Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, (Spring 1997), p. 22 1. 
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and Turkish communities in the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, 
Kosovo, as well as in Western Thrace in Greece). 6 This sense of suspicion was 
highlighted during the wars in Bosnia, and later Kosovo. 7 Indeed, as one Turkish 
academic argued, the pro-Serbian policies of Athens during the Yugoslav crisis were 
based to a large extent on Greece's perception of how the evolving situation might or 
might not work to Turkey's advantage. 8 Indeed, as one Greek diplomat noted, the US-led 
action in Yugoslavia was viewed in Athens as an effort to alter national borders in the 
Balkans and to destroy Serbia by providing greater land for Albania, thereby making 
Turkey a 'super power' in the region. 9 
In this context, Turkey's close relationship with those countries not to mention 
Bulgaria was viewed by Athens as a direct threat to its security-10 As such, Turkish 
recognition of Macedonia in the face of Greek opposition, and the diplomatic, political 
and economic support given to Albania, which Greece perceived as tantamount to 
encirclement by two new, potentially hostile neighbours, all served to confirm Greek 
suspicions about Turkey's designs, as well as to aggravate existing tensions. 11 Turkish 
support for Albanian membership in the Organisation of Islamic States Conference in 
1992 was perceived as an evidence of this. 12The Greek prime minister accused Turkey of 
actively encouraging Albania against Greece. 13 Similarly the Greek defence minister 
6D. Volkan Vamik and Norman Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict, (Huntingdon: The 
Eothen Press, 1994), p. 165. 
7For example, Greece opposed Turkey's proposal for a military action to halt the Serbian attacks on 
Bosnian Muslims and contrary to Turkish policy it closed its airspace to NATO planes striking against 
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis 'Atina Bosnaya Asked Mudahelede Yer Almayacak', Cumhurlyet, 
15 August 1992 and Hurriyet, 13 May 1999. 
SSezer, 'Turkey', op. cit., pp. 84-5. 
Wsam, 25 November 1999. 
10Stephanos Constantinides, 'Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy the Neo-Ottoman Imperial 
Model', Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 24,1996, pp. 323-34; Eric Rouleau, 'The 
Challenges to Turkey', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, (November-December 1993), p. 114. 
1 I'Taninma Karari Yunanistan'i Uzdul, Cumhuriývet, 7 February 1992. Karpat, op. cit. p. 5. 
1211han Uzgel, 'Balkanlarla lliskiler' in Turk Dis Politikasi, Baskin Oran (ed. ), vol. 2, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 
2002), p. 515. 
13Nazlan Ertan, 'Where Do We Go from HereT Turkish Probe, 16 September 1994, p. 4. 
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argued that Turkey's initiatives in the region and its refusal to withdraw troops from 
Thrace and the Aegean region confirmed the fact that Turkey was still the country's main 
external threat. 14 Even the Turkish attempts to create multilateral schemes to strengthen 
cultural and economic ties were viewed by Athens as an attempt by Turkey to establish a 
Muslim axis in the Balkans. The agreements signed between Turkey, Macedonia, Albania 
and Bulgaria on the construction of a trans-Balkan highway project which would join the 
Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea, not to mention the establishment of a telecommunication 
systems also raised Greek suspicions. 15 In response to this, Greece initiated a motorway 
project that would connect Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Russia. 16 However, Turkey 
categorically denied these Greek claims, with Demirel explaining, 'Turkey's friendly 
relations with Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria in the Balkans should not be perceived as 
a threat by Greece. '17 
Having seen Turkey as the single 'source' of external threat for more than twenty-five 
years, military and diplomatic deterrence was indispensable to the Greek concept of 
survival. 18 This motivated Greece to attempt to marginalize Turkish influence in the post- 
communist Balkans as well as in the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Black Sea. This 
limited the Turkish role in the new geo-strategic environment. The ongoing Turkish- 
14The official defence doctrine adopted in 1984 considers Turkey as a permanent long-term source of 
danger to Greek interest and the primary strategic adversary in the Balkans. Andre Gerolymatos, 'The 
Military Balance of Power between Greece and Turkey: Tactical and Strategic Objectives' in The 
Aegean Sea after the Cold lVar: Security and Law of the Sea Issues, Andre Gerolymatos and John 0. 
latrides (eds), (London and N. York: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 54; 'Yunanistan'a Tehdit Turkiye'den 
Geliyor', Cumhurtret, 2 July 1992; 'Tek Tehdit Turkiye', Cumhurlýet, 7 December 1992. 
15Sule Kut, 'Yugoslavya Bunalimi ve Turkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikasi: 1990-1993' in 
Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi, Faruk Soylemezoglu (ed. ), Second edition, (Istanbul: Der, 1998), p. 337; 
'Turkey Leads the Way for Trans-Balkan Highway, Turkish Daily News, 24 October 1995. 
1611han Uzgel, 'The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilising Role' in Turkey in world Politics: An Emerging 
Afultiregional Power, Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds), (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 
200 1), p. 64. 
17'Demirel: Turkiye Balkan'larda Yunanistan'i Tehdit Etmiyor', Cumhuriýet, 2 February 1992. 
I gKostas Ifantis, 'Perception and Rapprochement: Debating a Greek Strategy towards Turkey' in Turkish- 
Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Ifantis (eds. ), 
(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 250. 
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Greek conflict was also one of the main political impediments to the Turkish application 
for membership in the EU. Athens also tried to counterbalance Turkey's potential threat 
by improving relations with the PKK as well as several countries that Ankara had tense 
relations with such as Syria and Annenia. It also tried to fonn an Orthodox Alliance to 
counter what it viewed as a Turkish-Muslim group along the northern borders of 
Greece. 19 Indeed, in 1986 Greek defence minister Gerassimos Arsenis said 'we have 
military cooperation with non-NATO countries that have problems with Turkey. This is 
our policy' and called for the establishment of an anti-Turkish front, a kind of regional 
co-operation system, that would include Armenia, Bulgaria, Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria, 
as well as other regional states. As such, since 1990 Greece had landing rights in Syria for 
its warplanes in case of a conflict with Turkey or northern Cyprus. This was viewed by 
Ankara as a 'strategic partnership'. 20 Greece also finalised significant military agreements 
with Syria and Russia, in 1991 and 1995 respectively and held joint air manoeuvres with 
Russia in the Aegean in 1997.21 Athens also signed a military cooperation agreement with 
Armenia in 1996 which was perceived as a Greek plot to 'surround' Turkey from the 
Caucasian front. 22 It was also claimed that following the Greek foreign ministry meetings 
with his Armenian and Iranian counterparts in 1998 and 1999, it was agreed on a regional 
defence alliance against Turkey and Israel. 23 These Greek efforts to improve its regional 
role and limit Turkish influence were viewed by Turkey as a plan to encircle it 
militarily. 24 Furthennore, Greece was also involved with the Russian-led oil pipeline 
19M. Fatih Tayfur, 'An Analysis of Turco-Greek Relations in the post-Cold War Era', Turkish Area Studies, 
no. 53, (November 200 1), p. 19. 
20Cumhuriýet, 2 April 1996; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe (FBIS-WEV), 4 April 
1996. 
21Hasmet Akyuz, 'Degisen Dengelerin Odaginda Turkiye', Silahli Kuwetler Dergisi, vol. 120, no. 367, 
(January 200 1), pp. 67-8 
22Sami Kohen, 'Guclu Hukumet Olmadikca', Milliyet, 19 June 1996. 
23Daniel Pipes, 'The Real "New Middle Easf", Commentary, II November, 1998, p. 25; Emil Danielyan, 
'Officials Endorse Trilateral Economic Cooperation: Armenia, Iran, and Greece', RFEIRL, 9 September 
1999. 
24Malik Mufti, 'Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy', Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no. 1, 
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project that was competing with the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to transport Caspian oil to the 
world markets. The proposed 'orthodox' or sea-land-sea project would bypass the Turkish 
straits and instead transport oil from Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk through the 
Bulgarian port of Bourgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandropolis. 
Furthermore, the PKK issue seemed to offer a viable opportunity for Athens to force 
Turkey to compromise over disputed issues within the framework of bilateral relations. 
From a Greek perspective, as long as Turkey was preoccupied with the PKK issue, its 
foreign policy objectives particularly in the Balkans would be greatly hampered. 25 Indeed, 
as early as 1993, Kostas Badovas, a Greek parliamentarian who participated in the pro- 
Kurdish Democracy Party's (DEP) congress, a party considered to be a political wing of 
the PKK, declared in his speech their support for the Kurdish cause, 'We extend our 
wishes to the heroic Kurdish peoples for success. We understand your just cause and 
support it wholeheartedly. '26 According to Turkish officials, senior Greek delegations met 
with Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, and Greek military officers trained PKK 
members. It was also claimed that a group of officers led by a retired Greek general 
trained terrorists in regions extending from the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to the Zap 
region in northern Iraq. The PKK also received missile training on the coast of the 
Adriatic Sea from a high-ranking Greek officer', according to the information received 
from the captured PKK members. 27 In fact, it was also revealed by one senior PKK 
member that Greece supplied the PKK with Serbian Strela missiles, which were used to 
bring down a Turkish helicopter. 28 Moreover, in 1997,110 members of the Greek 
parliament sent letters to the Greek cabinet and to local administrations asking that the 
(Winter 1998), p. 40 
25Greece and PKK Terrorism, (Ankara, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999); Spiros Ch. Kaminaris, 
'Greece and the Middle East', MERIA, vol. 3, no. 2, (June 1999). 26Melek Firat, 'Yunanistan'la Iliskiler' in Turk Dis Politikasi, Baskin Oran (ed. ), vol. 2, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2002), p. 459. 
27Cumhuriýet, 27 July 1997. 
28Ugur Dundar, 'Bakin Su Yunanistan'in Yaptigina', Hurriýet, 7 March 1999. 
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PKK leader be officially invited to Athens. 29 Greece also allowed ERNK, the political 
wing of the PKK, to open an Athens office in 1998, the first official PKK office in 
Europe. 30 High level representatives of the ruling socialist PASOK Party, the New 
Democracy Party and the Left Coalition attended the opening ceremony. 31 However, 
Greece repeatedly denied allegations of failing to adhere to its obligations to fight 
terrorism and of extending logistical and political support to the PKK. 32 For example, 
Costas Simitis, the former Greek premier, assured Turkey, during his visit in 1998, that 
his country did not, and would not, support the PKK or any other terrorist organisations. 33 
Greek support for the PKK was most evident following Ocalan's departure from Syria 
in October 1998. When Ocalan's asylum request was refused by the Italian government 
(he was also refused by Russia and other European states) he was flown to Kenya with a 
false Greek Cypriot passport by Greek intelligence agents and sheltered in the Greek 
embassy until his capture in February 1999.34 Later, during his trial, Ocalan would reveal 
that Greece had supplied weapons and training to the PKK since 1988 and that the 
organisation had training camps on Greek territory. 35 This further damaged the already 
tense bi-lateral relationship and motivated Turkish president Demirel to describe Greece 
as a rogue state, which should be condemned as a terrorist-supporting country. He even 
29, Xfijl4, et, II April 1997. 
30M. Ali Yula, 'Yunanli General Apo ile Basbasa', Nokta, 12 April 1992; Turkish Probe, 16 September 
1994, p. 3; Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: From Ataturk and After, (London: John Murray, 
1997), pp. 76-7. 
31Zaman, I May 1998. 
327ension Riding High in the Aegean', Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 121; Sukru Elekdag, 
'21/2 War Strategy', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 1, (March-May 1996), pp. 34-5. 
3311urrjýet, 14 October 1998. 
34AYilliývet, 16 February 1999; Ocalan's capture caused severe crisis in Athens and resulted with resignation 
of three senior ministers. The Guardian, 19 February 1999. 
35'Greece Fed Weapons to Kurd Rebels', The Independent, 24 February 1999; Hurriýet, 23 February 1999; 
Afilliýet, 26 and 27 February 1999. 
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threatened that 'if they [Greece] choose to continue with their unlawful behaviour we 
reserve the right to take precautions in self defence. '36 
Additionally, Greece's increasing allocation of resources to defence was primarily 
influenced by growing Turkish military capabilities, particularly following the full 
implementation of the Turkish armament programmes. 37 According to the Greek defence 
minister, the Greek army had to curb its numerical inferiority with regards to the Turkish 
army by acquiring high-tech weaponry, increasing the mobility of its units and 
concentrating on troop training. 38 This is given credence by the fact that Greece's defence 
budget of US$5 billion annually, is the most per capita of any NATO members excluding 
the US39 and Greece was engaged in a five year (1996-2000), US$14 billion upgrade. 40 It 
also strengthened its air defence system with the purchase of patriot missiles and other air 
defence systems worth US$18 billion. 41 
Finally, the tense Turco-Greek relationship also severely disrupted the Turkish-EU 
relationship as the Greek factor emerged as one of the main post-Cold War impediments 
to Turkish ties with the EU. As Greek defence minister Akis Cohacopulos said in 1996, 
Greece was determined to block all Turkish efforts in this respeCt. 42 In fact, ever since 
Greece became a member of the EU in 1981 its European veto became Greece's main 
instrument against Turk-ey. 43 As Ozdem, Sanberk, a former senior foreign ministry official 
36The Guardian, 24 February 1999; Briefing, Issue. 1234,15 March 1999, p. 20. 
37Christos G. Kollias, 'The Effects of External Security Considerations on Defence Expenditures in the 
Context of Greek-Turkish Bilateral Relations', Bogazici Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, (1995), p. 145; Heinz- 
Jurgen Axt, 'Dogu-Bati Ihilafinin Sona Ermesiyle Balkanlarda Soyutlanan Yunanistan'in Dis Politika ve 
Guvenlik Politikasina Iliskin Durumu', Dis Politika Dergisi, vol. 6, no. 1, (April 1995), p. 145; Thanos 
Dokos, 'Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era', A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues, 
(Summer 1998). 
38Sabah, 4 February 1997. 
39SIPRI Year Book 1997, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 195 and p. 201; SIPRI Year Book 
2001, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 281 and p. 287. 
40Marcia Christoff Kurop, 'Greece and Turkey: Can They Mend Fences? ', Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1, 
(January-February 1998), p. 11. 
41 Turktýe, 14 January 1999. 
QCumhurrýet, 17 December 1996. 
43Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides, 'The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus 
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and Turkish ambassador to London, has explained 'the central fact for us is that since 
1981, the EU has allowed one of its members to subordinate the Union's interests to a 
historical and political vendetta against a neighbour. This has paralysed our working 
relations and institutional links; isolated our country; and poisoned the atmosphere at 
every level. $44 
Athens continuously blocked any new development in EU-Turkish relations hoping 
that it could garner political support and get more concessions from Turkey in its bilateral 
disputes by using its position inside the EU. 45 As such, Greece was the only member to 
vote against asking the Commission to prepare an opinion as to when Turkey formally 
applied for EU membership in 1987.46 It was also widely perceived in Ankara that Greece 
(alongside Germany) played a major role in the exclusion of Turkey from the EU's 
biggest enlargement process to date during the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, and only 
dropped its veto on Turkey's EU candidacy during the Helsinki SUMMit Of 1999.47 
Athens also blocked the fourth EC-Turkey financial protocol, which would have released 
ECU600 million, and Turkish access to the Development Aid Programme for 
Mediterranean Countries. 48During the completion process of the Customs Union with the 
EU in 1995, Greece agreed to lift its veto threat on the condition that the EU would give a 
deadline for the start of accession negotiations with Greek Cyprus, and the deadlock was 
only broken when the EU promised to start negotiations six months after 
Triangle' in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Factors, Dimitri Constas 
(ed. ), (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), p. 226. 'A Survey of Turkey: Getting Ready for Europe', 
The Economist, 18 June 1988, p. 4; David Bachard, Turkey and the European Union, (London: CER, 
1998), p. 27. 
440zdem Sanberk, The Outlook for Relations between Turkey and the European Union after the Cardiff 
Summit, speech delivered at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 July 1998. 
45Ronald Meinardus, 'Third Party involvement in Greek-Turkish Dispute' in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in 
the 1990s: Domestic and External Factors, Dimitri Constas (ed. ), (London: Mcmillan, 199 1), pp. 161-3. 
46john Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus, and 
Malt0 (Hants: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993), p. 3 8. VAthens*ýýs Agency, 13 December 1999. 
48Suha Bolukbasi, 'The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies, and Prospects' in Turkish Foreign Policy, C. 
H. Dodd (ed. ), (Cambridge: The Eatlon Press, 1992), p. 47. 
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intergovenunental talks. Following this Greece also refused to release community aid to 
Turkey worth ECU375 million (US$472 million), which had been agreed under the 
Customs Union agreement. 49 
Given the security concerns of the Cold War, Brussels, to some extent, was able to 
maintain a balanced policy in its relations with Greece and Turkey. However with the end 
of the bipolar era this became increasingly difficult for the EU to continue. 50 In essence, 
from the early 1990s, Brussels began to link future relations with Turkey to the solution 
of the Cyprus issue and the improvement of Turco-Greek relations. 51 The implication was 
that the ongoing disputes between Turkey and Greece should be resolved prior to any 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU. 52 As Sanberk argued 'the familiar tests for 
eligibility for EU membership were being replaced by new questions such as the Turkish- 
Greek dispute, Cyprus, and the Kurds. Economic issues began to slip into the 
background. '53 In response, Turkey argued that neither the Cyprus problem nor the 
Turkish-Greek dispute should affect Turkish-EU relations, and that once Turkey became 
a member of the Union, settlements of the disputes would be much easier. 54 
Taken together, the Turkish national security policy paper published in 1997 declared 
Greece, alongside Syria, as the main external threat to Turkey. 55 Thus, post-Cold War and 
regional developments that presented Turkey with significant opportunities to evolve into 
a regional power in the Caucasus, the Middle East and particularly the Balkans, was to 
49Canan Balkir, 'The Customs Union and Beyond' in The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet 
Era, Libby Rittenberg (ed. ), (Westport: Praeger, 1998), p. 70. 
5OHarun Arikan, Turkey and the European Union: an Awkward Candidate for EU Membership, (Harts: 
Ashgate, 2003), pp. 147-8; Ronald I- Krebs 'Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish 
Conflict', International Organisation, vol. 53, no. 2, (Spring 1999), p. 366. 
51 Sukru Gurel, Tarihsel Boyut Icinde Turk Yunan Iliskileri 1821-1993, (Ankara: Umit, 1993), P. 102. 
52Meltem Muftuler-Bac, 'The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union' in Turkey Before and 
After A taturk: Internal and External Affairs, Sylvia Kedourie (ed. ), (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 245. 
53Sanberk, op. cit. 
54Sukru S. Gurel, 'Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Aegean relationship in Turkey and Europe, C. Balkir 
and A. Williams (eds. ), (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p. 181. 55Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'Arming For Peace' Janes Defence Weekly, 19 August 1998, p. 26. 
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some extent limited by the Greek factor as Turkey had to concentrate on containing and 
minimising the Greek challenge and as such could not focus on developing and 
implementing a foreign policy that would capitalise on the regional opportunities that 
existed. It took a devastating earthquake to hit Turkey in late 1999 and later a less severe 
one that took place in Greece to bring a significant rapprochement between the two 
neighbours. These natural catastrophes saw the exchange of rescue operations and 
humanitarian aid and the start of a new dialogue. This 'seismic diplomacy' led to bilateral 
talks and the development of what the Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem termed 
people-to-people relations. 56 
7.2. Cyprus: New crises not new solution 
The end of the Cold War did not bring about a concrete solution to the Cyprus 
question. 57 Rather, the issue became particularly acute for Turkey's external relations in 
the face of a Cypriot arms-build up and in 1997 the EU membership application of Greek 
Cyprus. 
Cyprus only fifty miles off Turkey's Mediterranean coast, makes it is a key strategic 
concern for Ankara as Turkish premier Ecevit claimed, 'as much as Turkey is the 
guarantee of the TRNC's security (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), the TRNC is 
the guarantee of Turkey's security. '58 There are also familial and historic ties with the 
200,000 Turkish Cypriots living on the island, as such Cyprus has been an important 
element in Turkey's foreign and security policies in general and in the Turco-Greek 
relations in particular for almost half a century. 59 
561smail Cem, Turkey in the Twenty-first Century, speech delivered at The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 28 March 2001. 
57See, Suha Bolukbasi, 'The Cyprus Dispute in the Post-Cold War Era', Turkish Studies Association 
Bulletin, vol. 18, no. 1, (Spring 1994), pp. 1-23, especially pp. 7-23. 
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As neither party has agreed to compromise on issues on which they have strong 
interests, international efforts for a settlement, mostly through the UN, have failed. 60 This 
in turn led to what former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called, 'a deep 
crisis of confidence between the two sides. '61 Even the US special negotiator, Richard 
Holbrooke, acclaimed as the architect of the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia, admitted 
that he could make no headway in resolving the dispute, 'Cyprus is not like Bosnia, it is 
more difficult and will take a long time to tackle. '62 
To make things more complicated, the Greek-Cypriot government applied for EC 
membership in 1990.63 George Vassiliou, president of Cyprus at the time, announced, 'we 
are making this application on behalf of all Cypriots'. 64 Instantaneously, the Turkish side 
declared that the application did not represent the whole of Cyprus and argued that it was 
against the London and Zurich agreements that bar Cyprus ftom joining economic and 
political organisations in which both guarantors, Greece and Turkey are not members. 65 
Rauf Denktas, the leader of Turkish Cypriots, stated that the accession of Greek Cyprus to 
Mirror of the New International Order, Gunay G. Ozdogan and Kemali Saybasili (eds. ), (Istanbul: Eren, 
1995), p. 209. For a detailed discussion on the implications of the Cyprus dispute on Turkish-Greek 
relations see, Andreas D. Mavroyiannis, 'Kibris Sorunumm Turk-Yunan Iliskilerine Etkileri' in Turk- 
Yunan Uyusmazzligi, Semih Vaner (ed. ), (Istanbul: Metis, 1988). 
60For the UN initiatives since the crisis began see, Suha Bolukbasi, 'The Cyprus Dispute and the United 
Nations: Peaceful non-Settlement Between 1954-1996', International Journal Middle East Studies, vol. 
30, no. 3, (1998), pp. 411-34. 
61Report ofthe Secreta? y-General, The UN Security Council, S/24830,19 November 1992. 
62The Daily Telegraph, 26 September 1997. 
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membership negotiations in 1998. Opinion on the Application Made by Cyprus to Join the European 
Union' European Commission, Corn (93), Brussels, 30 June 1993; Bulletin of the European 
Communities, no. 6,1994; Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 6,1995; The Independent, 15 
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Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 123. Bolukbasi, 'The Cyprus', op. cit., p. 425; Margarita 
Mathiopoulos, 'Toward an Aegean Treaty: 2+4 for Turkey and Greece', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 
8, no. 3, (Summer 1997), p. 128. 
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Kanunsuzdur', Cumhuriýet, 17 July 1990; 'Greek Cypriot EC Application a Setback, Say Ozal and 
Denktas', Dateline Turkey, 15 September 1990. For the legal arguments see, Michael Stephen, The 
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Denktas, 'Urgent Need to Rethink Cyprus', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 4, (March-May 1996), p. 17; S. R. 
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the EC would effectively solve the Cyprus problem 'on the basis of two separate 
republics' and described such a move as enosis, the Greek term for union between Greece 
and Cyprus, through the EC. 66 
Turkey opposed the unilateral Greek Cypriot application on legal, political and 
security grounds. Ankara argued that the Greek side had no lawful authority under the 
1960 Treaties on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people or the whole of Cyprus; thus, the 
EU should not have processed it as if it were a valid application. Consequently, 'the 
Greek Cypriot application could not be taken up before a settlement on the island. '67 
According to Turkish president Demirel, 'if Turkey turned a blind eye to attempts to 
violate these provisions, its status as a guarantor-state on the island would be ruined. '68 
Turkey was further concerned by the fact that a possible Greek Cypriot accession, 
ignoring the existence of the Turkish side completely, would see the encirclement of 
Turkey from the south, as well as adding another Greek vote to the already existing one 
within the EU, which would likely result in the further alienation of Turkey from Europe. 
This may be viewed, as one Turkish scholar claimed, as a development that enabled the 
Greek government to 'Europeanise' the Cyprus problem by using its veto power in other 
policy areas requiring unanimous decisions. 69 This could in turn, it was argued, result in 
the EU becoming heavily embroiled in Turco-Greek disputes and lead to the extension of 
support for the Greek side in the wider Turkish-Greek dispute. 70 In fact, although 
economic imperatives were a major factor in the Cypriot application, political and 
66New Cyprus, vol. 7, no. 1, (January 199 1), p. 11. 
67See, Turkish foreign minister Erdal Inonu's statement, Turkish Daily News, 21 September 1995. 
68Newspot, 1997. 
69Mehmet Ugur, 7he European Union and Turkey: An AnchorlCredibility Dilemma, (Hants: Ashgate 
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International Spectator, vol. 30, no. 3, (July-September 1995), p. 45; Heinz Kramer and Friedemann 
Muller, 'Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries' in Allied Divided: Transatlantic 
Policiesfor the Greater Middle East, Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer (eds. ), (Cambridge: 
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security issues also played a significant role. 71 Some of these factors were acknowledged 
by Glafcos Clcridcs who explained that, the Greek Cypriot presidcnL 'admitting Cyprus 
into the EU, %%ill abrogate Turkey's right stemming from the Guarantor Treaty to 
unilatemlly intervene. '72 
In response to the Greek Cypriot application for full membership of the EC Turkey 
decided to strengthened political and economic tics %%ith Turkish Cyprus. 73 Furthermore, 
the EU's decision to open negotiations %%ith Cyprus resulted in the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership declaring that they %vould %Nithdraw from the inter communal talks while 
Ankara warned that Turkey would proceed with the 'partial integration' of North Cyprus 
if the membership talks went ahead. 74 This did not occur but an agreement for the 
establishment of an Association Council between Turkey and the TRNC AN-as signed, as 
the first concrete step to%N-ards partial economic integration between Turkey and Northern 
Cyprus. 75 Turkish and Northern Cypriot officials also agreed on the formation of a 'joint 
economic zone' between the two, which aimed to abolish eventually customs restrictions 
lead to a 'customs union. 76 
In the end, %%ith the accession of Cyprus as a full member, the issue effectively became 
a 'European issue' and, thus, as Greek foreign minister Papandreou claimed, Turkey was 
faced with a dilenuna, namely that Ankara would either accept a solution to the Cyprus 
7 IJames Redmond and Roderic Pace, 'European Security in the 1990s and Beyond: The implications of the 
Accession of C)prus and Malta to the European Union', Contemporary Security Policy, vOl- 17, no. 3, 
(December 1996), p. 432. 
72'Unrinished Symphony ... Cyprus', Newspo4 June 1997. 73'Turkey and KKTC Plan Customs Union', Dateline Turbe)ý 28 July 1990; j. D. Norton, Talk to Turkish 
Students on 'qprus and the European Uniom London, IS March 1998. 
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problem which would probably be of a type that would be in conflict with Turkey's 
policy on the matter so far or be left outside the EU. 77 
In addition to the unilateral membership application of Greek Cyprus to the EU, the 
Cyprus question was further exacerbated by the fact that the Greek side became more and 
more ambitious in its arms build up in recent years. This put Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots in a delicate position. 78 Between 1990 and 1992 it was reported that the Nicosia 
government spent USS750 million on armS. 79 The official defence budget was US$365 
million in 1996, -which represented 4.1 percent of GDP. 90 The Centre for Cyprus Strategic 
Studies (CSS), an independent think tank-, put this figure at 5.5 percent for 1998.81 
According to Nicosia, the reason for the ongoing arms build up is the existence of the 
Turkish army on the island. 82 
Furthermore, the decision of the Greek Cypriots to conclude a US$660 million air- 
defence deal %%ith Russia to buy a number of 'S-300' ground-to-air missiles to strength 
their anti-aircraft system further increased tcnsionS. 83 If the missiles had been deployed, 
thcy would havc bccn %Nithin striking distancc of southern Turk-cy. This could havc 
dramatically shifted the military balance and greatly reduced Turkey's air superiority over 
the divided island. Turkey strongly opposed the deployment of the missiles and warned of 
its intent to stage a second intervention if any attempt was made to deploy the missiles. 84 
"Helsinti European Council. Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999; Afil/4, et, 21 December 1999. 79james Nathan, 'Turkey on Edge', International Relations, vol. 13, no. 5, (August 1997), p. 17. 
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Ultimately, Turkey managed to prevent dcplo), mcnt and they were transferred to the 
Grcek island of Crcte as part of a US-brokcrcd deal. 85 
A realistic solution the Cyprus crisis, acceptable to all parties concerned, would 
inevitably be of a great help to Turkey in coping . %ith the diffliculties it faces in its 
external relations, in particular, %Nith Greece and the EU, one of the main impediments to 
improved Turco-Grcek bilateral relations and ties %Nith BnissclS. 86 Until the matter is 
resolved, Turkey %%ill continue to have to bear the economic, political and military burden 
of northem Cyprus. 87 
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DISINTEGIUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES IN CAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA FOR TURKEY 
The brcak-up of the Soviet Union and then the emergence of the new independent states in 
Cuacasia and Central Asia significantly impacted Turkey's geo-strategic environment. Thus, 
for example, Turkey is no longer under the constant ideological and expansionist threat of 
communism and the border lands with its old formidable northern neighbour were replaced 
by the weak, ncwly-indepcrident south Caucasian republics. In particular, the emergence of 
the Central Asian Turkic republics presented not only vast political and economic 
opportunities but also created huge enthusiasm among many circles that a gigantic 'Turkic 
world' has emerged extending from the Adriatic Sea to Chinese borders, raising expectations 
that as a 'pivotal state' it could play a leadership role in these geographies and thus had a real 
chance to be a significant regional (super) power in the twenty-first century. 
However, certain developments in the post-Soviet era served to show that Turkey had to 
deal with serious challenges. Indeed, the power vacuum emerged with the decline of the 
Soviet rule led to numerous instabilities and conflicts particularly in Caucasia, such as the 
ethnic unrest in Georgia, the Azeri-Armenian and Chcchen wars. As such, Turkey was 
increasingly preoccupied with how to fend off these new security issues rather than focus on 
formulating policies to seize the new opportunities. Moreover, the developments in Russian 
domestic politics necessitated that Russia should retain its supremacy in the 'near abroad' 
and Moscow quickly rc-cstablished its political and military influence in the old Soviet 
territories %%hile becoming increasingly hostile to 'outsiders', notably Turkey. Hence, despite 
their pragmatic relations in economic field, Turkey and Russia had serious differences on 
numerous issues. When this coupled with its own political and economic shortcomings, 
Turkey's efforts to be a main actor in regional politics were seriously hampered. 
2D4 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA: 
AN END TO ADVERSARY? 
8.1. Difficult (but pragmatic) relations with Russia 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the end of two centuries, during which 
Turkey's geopolitical environment had been determined by the threat of Russian/Soviet 
expansionism, in particular on Turkey's northern and most vulnerable border) However, 
Russia's ongoing desire to be the sole power in the former Soviet territories exacerbated 
tension between Moscow and Ankara over Turkey's growing relations with its 'near abroad', 
Bli--hnee -arube: he, an expression made up by Russians to distinguish between independent 
former imperial domains with Russian minorities and the rest of the world. 2 As such, the two 
countries developed diverse views and serious differences on issues ranging from the Azeri- 
Armenian conflict, the Bosnian and the Kosovo wars, rivalry in Central Asian and the 
Caucasia regions. There were also differences over Moscow's initiatives to undermine the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in the 'near abroad', while the transportation of 
Caspian oil was also a matter of tension. 3 Relations were also disturbed, to some extent, by 
the issues of the Chechen war as well as Kurdish and the Russian anns sale to countries that 
Turkey had difficult relationships with. In addition, Russia remained a military superpower in 
both conventional and nuclear terms. All these factors severely limited Turkey's geo- 
113ulent Gokay and Richard Langhorne. Turkey and the New States of the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
(Norwich and London: Wilton Park Paper, 1996), pp. 1-2. Russian foreign policy analyst Markushin 
described this difficult neighborhood 'the two countries fought more than traded, but the eternal rivals have 
always remained eternal neighbours. 1 Vadim Markushin, 'Russia-Turkey: Doomed to be Eternal 
Neighbours', Perceptions, vol. 2, no. 1, (March-May 1997), p. 93. 
2AIvin Z. Zubinstein, 'The Asian Interior The Geopolitical Pull on Russia' in Regional Power Rivalries in the 
New Eurasia: Russix Turkey anit Iram Alvin 7- Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (eds. ), (New York and 
London: N1. I- Sharpe, 1995), p. 257. 
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strategic ambition in the region. Powers aspiring to play a 'great power' role should be able 
pursue its national interests despite another powcr. Having lacked the necessary capability, 
Turkey was not in a situation to challenge Russia in regional issues that closely concerned it 
and increasingly found it difficult to exert innucncc beyond its immediate locality. 
Nloreovcr, dc%, clopmcnts in domestic Russian politics also challenged Turkey's position in 
the cx-Sovict territories (particularly in Caucasia and Central Asia). The failure of the 
transition towards dcrnocratisation and a free market economy deepened the socio-economic 
crisis and intcnsiried political instability, %hilc a growing number of Russia's dissatisfied 
population began to support anti-reform policies and militant nationalist ideas. 4 The 
parliamentary elections of late 1993 resulted in important gains for 'Eurasians' as well as 
ultra nationalists at the expense of the reformers or 'Atlanticists' %%ho urged the government 
to rc-incorporatc many of the cx-Sovict territories into a greater Russia in a policy of 'neo- 
imperialism'. 5 Soon, they became successful in pushing the government to return to Eurasia 
with more assertive and tougher foreign policies and making Russia the natural guarantor of 
its near abroad -most notably Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Turk-ic republiCS. 6 
'417or the reforms see, Dimitri Simes, 'Reform Reaffirmed', Foreign Policy, no. 90, (Spring 1993), pp. 38-56; 
Alexander Kozherniakin, Ternocratisation and Foreign Policy Change: The Case of the Russian Federation', 
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Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation', Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, no. 2, (April- 
June 1995), p. 150. 
5The basic division between the "Atlanticisf and the 'Eurasians' is the former wanted Russia to join the 
Western community as soon as possible N%hile the latter instead looked to creating a role for Russia as a 
bridge between Europe and Asia. Mark Galeotti, The Age of Anxiety Security and Politics in Soviet and 
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Eventually, Russia became more suspicious of outsiders trying to fill the power vacuum in 
the near abroad. In opposition to Westcm-oricnted Moscow leaders, who viewed Ankara as a 
stabilising force in the former Soviet south, geo-politically minded Russians inevitably saw 
Turkey as a riVal. 7 The ultra nationalist Liberal Democratic Party secured more than one-fifth 
of the votes in the Russian legislative elections in December 1993 under the leadership of 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, %Nho presented Turkey as a contemporary rival and historic cnemy. 8 
As a matter of fact, as the Yeltsin administration sought to capture nationalist ground from 
the opposition, particularly after the 1993 elections, Russian foreign policy became more 
assertive in tonc and deliberately exaggerated the fears of the revival of pan-Turkism. 9 
The new Russian foreign policy %vas soon put into practice and in due course, as will be 
seen later, Moscow managed to re-impose its dominance particularly in Transcaucasia and 
Central Asia. 10 By 1994, although Turkey no longer shared land borders with Russia, 
Moscow had managed to deploy Russian troops along the Turkish-Armenian and Turkish- 
Georgian borders as wc1l as to secure a number of long-term military bases. It received the 
same privilege in Tajikistan and K)Tgyztan, and had proposed similar arrangements with 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine N%hile Turkmenistan had 'contracted' with Russia for the 
participation of Russian officers into Turkmen patrols. 11 Russia was also behind the 
agreement for economic and cultural integration signed between itself, Bclarus, Kyrgyzstan 
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and Kazakhstan, %%hich raised suspicions in Turkey that it would constitute a step toward 
reviving the former Soviet Empire. As President Demirel noted 'it is not the official policy of 
Russia to revive the Soviet Empire, but there arc moves and tendencies in Russia which 
suggcst othcn%-isc. ' 12 
Indeed, before long, Moscow openly expressed its revived strategic interests in the 
Balkans, the cast Meditcrranean and the Middle East. For example, Russia sided with Serbia 
during the Bosnian and Kosovo crises and friendship blossomed with Greek and Greek 
Cypriots, raising the suspicions in Ankara about an evolving anti-Turkish entente. This was, 
as noted already, evidenced by the sale of S-300 ground-to-air missiles to the Greek Cypriots 
in the mid-1990S. 13 Russia and Greece coordinated their positions during the Bosnian war 
and had similar policies over the Kosovo crisiS. 14 Russia also expressed its uneasiness over 
Turkish incursions into northcm Iraq on the grounds that Turkcy was dircctly interming in 
the clashes between the Kurdish groups that would increase tension on the region. 15 
Moreover, several other aspects of Russia's conduct caused concern in Ankara. Moscow 
sought to sell arms to countries who had poor relations with Turkey. For example, Russia 
sold USSI billion worth of wcapons to Iran in 1994, and it was fearcd that Moscow had 
approached Iran to sell it nuclear reactors. 16 The easy access to Russian-made weapons posed 
a serious threat to Turkey in view of its proximity to the troubled regions and its war against 
"Cumhuriyet. 9 May 1996. 
"See, 'Cyprus: New crisis not new solutions'. Chapter Seven; A. Suat Bilge, 'An Analysis of Turkish-Russian 
Relations'. Perceptions. vol. 2. no. 2. (Junc-August 1997), p. 83; Veysel Yayan, 'Rusya Federasyonu vc Eski 
Dogu Bloku Ulkcierinde Sa%unma Sanayii', Akademik Arastirmalar Dergisi, vol. 1. no. 1, (May 1999), pp. 
145-164. Richard K. Herrmann, 'Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical 
Contradictions', 11idXe East Journal, vol. 48, no. 3, (Summer 1994), pp. 455. 
14Duygu Bazoglu Sczcr, 'Turkish-Russian Relations: From Adversity to "Virtual Rapprochment"' in 'Turkey's 
New WOrld' Changing Lý-namics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (edsj 
(Washington: 'Me Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 93. 
1 sAfilliyet. 12 November 1997. 
16' Iran'dan Nukleer Tehlike'. Cumhuriyet. 6 January 1992. 
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PKK tcrrorism. 17 lndccd, it was %vidcly acknowlcdged that Russia sold arms to the PKK 
through Armcnia and Iran. " 
In spite of this unfavourablc political environment, Turkey maintained pragmatic relations 
with Russia particularly in the economic ficid, from the late 1980s. 19 From the Turkish 
perspective, the development of economic interdependency with Russia appeared to be the 
only viable way, to minimize the vcry real differences that existed. Hence the Turkish- 
Russian relationship in the new cra was based on mutual economic interests. Turkish 
president Turgut Ozal visited Moscow in early 1991, the first such high level visit since 
1969, and several economic agreements particularly in economic ficld were concluded. 20 The 
BSECP of 1992 further contributed to the strengthening of economic relations, and the 
contribution of the dynamic Turkish private sector was also remarkable in this process during 
this period. Indeed, Turkish investments brought tens of thousands of Turkish workers to 
Russia, and cvcry year around one million Russian visitors add significant revenues to 
Turkey's tourism industry. 21 
Additionally, Turkish Eximbank extended close to US$1.5 billion worth of credits to 
Moscow and close economic relations soon resulted in a sharp increase in the trade between 
17Rajan Nlenon and Ilend J. Barkcy, 'Thc Transformation of Central Asia: Implications for Regional and 
International Security', Survival, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 834; Nancy Lubin, 'Central Asia: issues and Challenges 
for United States Policy' in The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands, Ali Banuazizi and 
Myron Weiner (eds. ), (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 265. 
1 Illurri5yt, 9 June 1997. 
19'SSCB ile Ek-onomik Flort', Cumhuriyet, 6 August 1990; 'IBS Study Analysis Turkey's Route to Soviet 
MarkcV, Dateline Turkey. 13 October 1990; Alexi Kuprianov, 'Sovyetler Birligi'nin Dis Ekonomik Iliskileri 
vc Turkiyc ile Isbirligi lmkanllfi' in SSCB ve Dogu Arrupa Wkelerinde Ekonomik Reformlar veTurkiye He 
Isbirligi Wanlari, (Istanbul: ISO, 1990), pp. 123-30. 
2(ýTurkey also signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation with Russia during 
Turkish prime minister Demirel's visit to Moscow in 1992 'Spectacular Progress in Turco-Soviet 
Cooperation', New, spoc 14 March 1991; 'Rusya ile Yeni Doncm', Cumhuri)vt 5 February 1992; Turkkaya 
Ataov. 'Turkey, the CIS and Eastern Europe' in Turkey and Europe Canan Balkir and A. williams (eds. ), (London: Pinter, 1993). pp. 196-8.. 
21Turan Aydin. 'Turkey's Rising Economic Capacity', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 3, (September-November 1996), 
p. 145; Mensur Akgun, 'Turk-Rus Iliskileri, ' Yeni Yu. -)il, 22 October 1996; http//: www. kultur. gov. tr. 
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the two countries: from USSI. 9 billion in 1990, to over USS3.3 billion in 1995 and USS4.2 
billion in 1997.22 In short, trade with Russia more than doubled between 1990 and 1997 
(excluding black-markct 6suit case" trade worth bctN%-ccn US$6 to USSIO billion a year), 
making Russia Turkey's second largest trading partner. Turkish goods, of better quality than 
Russian ones, but cheaper than European counterparts, filled a gap in the lucrative markct-23 
llo%%-cvcr, during the 1998 and 1999 Russian financial criscs, this trade fell to US$3.5 
billion in 1998 and USS3 billion in 1999. Turkish exports to Russia also experienced a sharp 
decline in 1998 (USSI. 3 billion) with a 34 per cent drop from the previous year, and less than 
USS600 million in 1999 %%hile imports increased drastically mostly owing to Russian gas 
purchases. These figurcs for both exports and imports were more than US$2 billion in 
1997.24 A similar gloomy trend from the Turkish perspective was evident in the Turkish 
construction activity. By 1998, the total value of construction undertakings by Turkish 
developers had reached USSIO billion since 1987. In the year 2000, it fell to USSIOO-150 
million. 25 
Furthermore, Turkey became heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, importing 6 
billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from Russia. 26 In 1997, Turkey signed a further 
agreement worth US$13 billion, known as 'Blue Stream', which would enable it to import 30 
billion cubic meters of natural gas annually for 25 years. 27 Turkey imports nearly 60 percent 
of its natural gas consumption from Russia %Nhich makes the country Russia's second biggest 
22Di. 1 ricaret IttatistiVer4 (Ankara: TC Basbakanlik DIF, 1998), p. 515; Briefing; no. 1110,30 September 
1996, p. 20. 
23'Turk-ey- Elusive Golden Apple'. The Economist, 8 June 1996, p. 12. 
24TurAi)r Temel EAonomik Gattergeler H=iran 2001, (r. C. Basbakanlik DPT) 
25Duygu B. Sezer, 'Turk, ish-Russian Relations a Decade Later From Adversity to Managed Competition' 
Perceptions, vol. 6, no. I (March - May 2001). 
26Yeni hq)il, 15 January 1996; 'Turco-Russian Relations'. New-spot. 1996. 
"Basbakan Memit )-jlm=in Konusmalari, (Ankara: TC Basbakanlik. 1997), p. 209; 'Turkey Signs a Gas 
Deal'. The New Yark 7-Imes. 29 Apri 11997. 
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natural gas customer after Germany. Ultimately, even though Turkey was not one of Russia's 
top tcn trade partners (as of 2000, Turkey ranked fourteenth in terms of imports and twelfth 
in terms of exports), these extensive economic relations served to case some of the difficult 
bilateral differences, %%hich would have othcrwisc been more potentially explosive. 
On the other hand, although the extent of economic tics served to create an economic 
interdependence between the two countries, it was still not sufficient to establish a common 
ground for a total rapprochement or to remove the mutual suspicions regarding each other's 
activities particularly in Central Asia, the Caucasus and else, ývherc. In fact, mutual 
differences over the Chechcn war, the oil issue and the evolving Russian military presence in 
Caucasia continued to impact adversely bilateral relations. 
8.2. The Chcchen War: The Turkish dilemma 
Although the developments taking place in the North Caucasus in general, and Chcchnya 
in particular, did not pose direct security risks to Turkey, given the existence of special ties 
with the various ethnic groups and nationalities of the region and the millions of Turkish 
citizens of north Caucasian descent, the situation there attmcted a great deal of public 
attention in Turkey.. 's Similarly, Chechens turned to Turkey as the main source of support for 
recognition and support in their struggle against Russia. The Chechen unilateral declaration 
of independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, though never recognised either by 
Moscow or the international community, created a certain excitement among the estimated 
2IFor the origins and dynarnics of the regional developments which saw the whole Caucasus developed into one 
of the most tense regions in the post Soviet era see, Bill Bradley, 'Eurasia Letter. A Nlisguided Russian Policy'. Foreign Policy, no. 101, (Winter 1995-1996); Robert Bruce Ware, 'Conflict in the Caucasus: An 
Historical Context and a Prospect for Peace', Central Asian Survey. vol. 17, no. 2, (1998), pp. 3434; Anna hiatvccva, 'Caucasus in Flames', The ff'brId Today, vol. 55, no. 10, (October 1999), p. 9; Ware, op-cit., P. 346; Bulent Gokay, 'Post-Soviet Order War in Chcchnya' in Afilletterarasi Afunasebetler Turk Yilligý 
(Ankam: AUSBF, 1994). p. 25; Svante E. Cornell, 'Conflicts in the North Caucasus', Central Asian SurveY, 
vol. 17, no. 3, (1998), pp. 409.4 1. 
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70,000-80,000 Turks of Chcchcn origin. 29 Equally, the two Chechen'. %-ars (in 1994 and 1999) 
against Russian forccs rcceivcd significant moral and material support from the Turkish 
citizens of Chechen origin as well as sympathy among the wider Turkish publiC. 30 
So did the wars' massive casualties and refugees particularly among the seven million 
Turkish citizens of North Caucasian origin. 31 Thus, the Chcchen issue affected Turkish 
internal and external policies in two %vays. First, Russian allegations of Turkish support for 
the Chcchcns inevitably strained Turkish-Russian relations. This perception in turn motivated 
Moscow to play the Kurdish card to weaken Turkey. Secondly, Turkey's official stance not 
to get involved in a crisis it presented as a purely internal matter for Russia, ultimately 
caused some uneasiness in the wider public and this (as in the Bosnian case) was exploited 
by rcligious and ultra-nationalist groups %%ho successfully manipulated these sentiments. 
From the start of the Chechen wars, Turkey considered the issue a Russian domestic 
matter and accordingly supported a peaceful solution to the conflict within the framework of 
the federal structure that preserved the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. 32 As 
such, Turkey refrained from involvement in the conflict and therefore ignored Chechnya's 
29Niyazi Guney, 'Kuzey Ka&wya ve Cecenistan', ) eni TurAi)v, vol. 1. no. 3, (Niarch-April 1995), pp. 319-25; 
Nlustafi Aydin, 'Turkey and Central Asia', Central Asian Surve),, vol. 15, no. 2, (June 1996), p. 169. 
3017or Russi3's Chechnya policy see, Gracme Ilerd, Russia in Crisis: The Disintegration of the Federation7, 
(London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1998), p. 31; Interview with Nadir Deviet, deputy 
head of Turcology Institute of Marmara University. Istanbul, Aksi)vn, 31 December 1994, pp. 48-5 1. 
31The first Chechen war resulted in 80,000 casualties %%hile roughly a third of Chechnya's pre-war population, 
more than 450,000 people, became refugees. Ware, op. cit., p. 346; Carlotte Gall and Thomas de Wool. 
Chechn)v: A Small i7dorious Mar. (London: Pan Books, 1997). p. 360; Charles Blandey, Cehchen 
Connections: From Khasm3-urt to Moscow, (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1997). The second 
Chechen war has again caused serious refugee flows as more than 300,000 people fled the Russian 
bombardment and took refuge in neighbouring states. Tracey German and Tamara Pataracia, 'Cehcchen 
Refugees on the Move', 1he Hlorld T64,, vol. 56, no. 4, (April 2000), pp. 7-8; Alice Lagnado, '400 Killed 
in Russian Blitz on Dagestan'. 7he 771mes, 17 August 1999; The Independent, 25 November 1999. 
32SIatement of TurkishMinistr), of Foreign Affairs on Chechn)v, 12 December 1994; Turkish Foreign Afini. 517Y 
Denies Training Chechnians in Turke)-, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 October 1995; Soguk Savas 
SonrasindaMilletlerarasi Iliskiler, (Istanbul: Harp Akadernileri Komutanligi Yayinlaxi, 1996), p. III- 
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call for mediation. 33 Thus, while Demirel received the Chechen leader in 1993, Ankara did 
not provide the Chechens with any official assistance. 34 Similarly, on the eve of his visit to 
Moscow in 1999, the Turkish premier Ecevit reiterated Turkey's neutrality in the conflict and 
added: 'This is Russia's internal matter and we give importance to preserve Russia's 
territorial integrity as much as we do for Turkcy. '35 
Despite the mounting public pressure, Turkey's own struggle against separatist PICK 
guerrillas increased Turkish reluctance to get involved, lest Moscow increase its support to 
the PKK. There were even suspicions in Ankara that Russia was using the Kurdish card in 
order to weaken the Turkish position with regards to the proposed Baku-Ceyhan route of the 
Caspian energy pipelines. 36 Turkish deputy prime minister Tansu Ciller was warned 
explicitly during her visit to Moscow in 1996 that if Ankara got involved in Chechnya, 
Russia would intensify its links with the PKK. 37 On the same lines, Albert Chernishev, the 
Russian ambassador to Turkey, used a Russian saying when issuing a warning to the Turkish 
authorities about interfering in Chechnya: 'do not throw stones at your neighbour's window 
if your house has windows as well. 138 
The Russians, for their part, were worried about Caucasian solidarity movements in 
Turkey which, they feared, might support an independent Chechnya. 39 In fact, Russia 
33'Turkey Tries to Save Face on Chechnya Crisis, Turkish Probe, 23 December 1994, p. 12. 
34Malik Mufti, 'Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy', Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no. 1, (Winter 
1998), p. 38. 
35'Basbakan Ecevit: Cecenistan Ic Sorun', Zaman, 4 November 1999. 
36Sezer, 'Turkish', op. cit., p. 106. 
37Samil Tayyar, Refahyol Tutanaklari, (Ankara: Umit, 1997), p. 141. 38Selcuk Gultasli, 'Chechens Disappointed with Ankara! s Response', Turkish Probe, 26 December 1999. 39MOSCOW feared that Chechen uprising for independence, if accomplished, could encourage the other nineteen 
autonomous republics within Russia to follow the example. For example Boris Berezovsky, one of the top 
aide of president Ycltsin in security issues, expressed Moscow's concern, 'but what next, do we let Dagestan 
go, then Tatarstan? What next? '. Quoted in Graeme Herd, Russia in Crisis: The Disintegration of the 
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permitted a PKK organised Kurdish conference to take place in Moscow in early 1994 and 
1997, which included Kurdish groups from the former Eastern block countries. 40 In 1995, 
Russia permitted the opening of a Kurdish office on its territories and allowed the Kurdish 
parliament in exile to convene in Moscow. While one Russian newspaper, Moskowski 
Komsomelets, published claims that the GRU, Russian military intelligence, had given 
US$10 million to the PKK in the mid-1990s, as part of its effort to distract Turkey's attention 
from the Chechen war. 41 Finally, the 450-seat Russian State Duma overwhelmingly passed a 
resolution (298-0, with one abstention) urging the government to grant refuge to the PKK 
leader Ocalan after he was forced out of Syria in 1998.42 In 1995, Turkey and Russia signed a 
'Protocol to Prevent Terrorism', in which Ankara agreed not to allow volunteers to go and 
fight in Chechnya or sell arms to the Chechens. In return, Russia promised not to allow the 
PKK to operate within its territories. Thus, Turkey was forced to take a low profile in the 
entire Caucasus region. 43 
This antagonised public opinion as well as the 47 official Caucasian solidarity groups in 
Turkey, who had become quite active in pressurising the government to take tougher action 
against Russia over Chechnya. Chechen leader Jokhar Dudayev led the way by arguing that 
da stronger Caucasia means a stronger Turkey. 144 Thousands of people, mainly ethnic 
Caucasians, staged demonstrations in Istanbul to condemn the Russian offensive and to show 
Federation?, (London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1998), p. 31; 'Turkey: Elusive Golden 
Apple', The Economist, 8 June 1996, p. 17. 
40Scrnih D. Idiz, 'Developments in Russia Bad News for Turkey', Turkish Probe, 3 March 1994, p. 13; Sabah, 
14 February 1997. 
41'Russia Provided Money for PKK', Turkish Daily News, 28 February 2000. 
42Sezcr, 'Turkish', op. cit., p. 106. 
43Robert Olson, 'Tbe Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf 
War', Afiddle East Policy, vol. 4, no. 3, (March 1996), pp. 111-2. 44Tansu Yildirim, 'Cecenistan Sorunu ve Turkiye' in Degisen Dunya ve Turkiye, Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed. ), 
(Istanbul: Baglarn, 1995), pp. 212-4. He also expressed their desire to join the oil pipeline, which would be 
built between Turkey and Azerbaijan, opposing the Russian proposal. Milliyet andZaman, 29 January 1994. 
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support for Chechen independence while smaller protests were held in several other citieS. 45 
It also appeared that some Turkish citizens joined the fight and often donated funds. 46 Fuat 
Bol, a leading columnist in the Istanbul-based daily Turkiye, wrote 'the safety of Turkey's 
eastern borders depend upon the stability in the Caucasus. Instead of trying to prevent a 
human tragedy in the Caucasus, where civilians have been killed or have had to migrate, we 
are shaking hands with the RussianS. '47 Hence, the representatives of Turkey's ethnic 
Caucasian communities criticised Ankara's official stand as too weak in the face of 
successive Russian attacks against what they considered to be a sovereign state. They argued 
that Turkish acceptance of Chechnya as a domestic Russian issue was a historical mistake 
and would never be forgotten by the Chcchcn people. 48 As Ilhan Muktedir, the secretary of 
the Caucasia-Chechen Solidarity Committee argued: 'the West views the Chechen issue as an 
internal matter for their own reasons, which is quite understandable considering their 
interests, but it is obvious that Turkey's moral responsibilities and its real interests are not 
necessarily the same. '49 
8.3. Oil politics: A new 'great game' 
The discovery of vast oil reserves in the Caucasus raised Turkish-Russian rivalries to a 
new level. In fact, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea Basin, described as 
'the Persian Gulf of the twenty-first century', became a potential hotbed of international 
tension and instability. 50 It has even been suggested that a new version of the 'great game' is 
45'Turkey Tries to Save Face on Chechnya Crisis', Turkish Probe, 23 December 1994, p. 12. 
46Turkish Probe, 26 December 1999. 
47Turkiye, 8 November 1999. 
48Turkish Probe, 26 December 1999. 
49'Turkcy Fears Transcaucasia will be another Yugoslavia', Turkish Probe, 16 December 1994, pp. 10- 1. Ilhan 
Muktcdir, 'Ccccnistan'in Bagimsizlik Ilaninin Hukuki Dayanaklari', Yeni Turkiye, vol. 1, no. 3, (March- 
April 1995), p. 328. 
50Selcuk Solakoglu, 'Uluslararasi Hukukta Hazarin Statusu Sorunu', AUSBFD, vol. 53, nos. 1-4, (1998), PP. 
107-20; R. K. Zhulaman and S. K. Kushkumbaev, 'Problems of the Caspian Area: Geopolitical Parallels and 
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being played out, not in Central Asia-the site of the original great power rivalry in the 
nineteenth century-but in the Caspian region. 51 
No doubt, Turkey's close proximity to these huge untapped energy reserves further 
enhanced its strategic importance. In addition to the rich oil reserves of the Caspian Sea, the 
region, which lies between Russia, Iran and Turkey, is strategically important for Ankara 
since potential oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Turkey would 
most likely cross through the TranscaucasuS. 52 
Although Turkey is close to the world's major energy sources, it is not self-sufficient in 
fuel requirements. 53 As a result of steady economic growth, rapid industrial isation, 
population growth and fast urbanisation Turkey's energy demands are constantly increasing. 
Energy demand for Turkey is expected to increase by an average of 6.7 percent annually until 
2010, resulting in Turkey importing 60 percent of its energy requirements in the near 
future. 54 
Similarly, Russia is concerned not only that it does not control an energy-rich sector of the 
Caspian Sea, but also that it may lose its sphere of influence in the Transcaucasus and 
Meridians', Contemporary Central Asia, vol. 2, no. 1, (March 1998), pp. 1-20; S. Frederick Starr, Thomas R. 
Stauffer and Julia Nanay, 'Symposium-Caspian Oil: Pipelines and Politics', Middle East Policy, vol. 5, no. 4, 
(January 1998), pp. 2749. 
51ne Caspian Sea basin involves 5 Caspian littoral states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan. Estimates of proven and possible reserves of oil and natural gas across the Caspian Basin is 
believed to be around 200bn barrels of oil equivalent, the third largest storehouse after the Middle East and 
Siberia. Rosemarie Forsyt, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Adclphi Paper, no. 300, 
(London: IISS, 1996), p. 11; Gareth M. Winrow, 'Turkish Policy toward the Central Asia and 
Transcaucasus' in Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alan Makovsky and 
Sabri Sayari (eds), (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 116. 
521t was projected that Turkey would receive USS100 million income in the form of pipeline transit fees per 
year in addition to secondary benefits. NTV (Turkish News Channel), 18 November 1999. 
53Brent Sasley, 'Turkey's Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era', Middle East Review of International 
Affairs, vol. 2, no. 4, (November 1998). 
54Turkey and Pipelines: An Energy Bridge, (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997); 
http: //www. tpao. gov. tr/rprtelencrgy. htm; F. S. Larrabee, 'US and European Policy toward Turkey and the 
Caspian Basin' in Allies Divided. Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1998), p. 155; Temel Iskit, 'Turkey: A New Actor in the Field of Energy Politics?, Perceptions, vOl. 
1, no. 1, (March-May 1996), p. 67. 
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Central Asia. This concern translated into Russian policies attempting to limit Western 
influence in the region while promoting Russian control. 55 Thus, Moscow was determined to 
ensure that the Central Asians and the Azerbaijanis remain to some extent economically and 
hence politically dependent on Russia by insisting that the pipelines, which transport oil from 
these states, continued to flow through its territory. 56 By the middle of 1993, oil had become 
the driving force behind Russian activities as Moscow began to focus on gaining a monopoly 
over the region's energy sources. 57 Russian efforts to restore its much reduced politico- 
military presence in the region at the expense of outside forces, notably Turkey, should be 
seen from this perspective. Consequently, Turkey had to tread carefully, once again taking 
into account, Russian interests in the region with the view of avoiding conflict and tension at 
a time where former Russian president Yeltsin openly talked about 'the oil pipeline war'. 58 
As will be discussed later, staunch pro-Turkish Azeri president Elchibey's decision to favour 
the Turkish route, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and to transport Azeri oil to world markets 
prompted Russia to take some drastic measures including support for Armenia in the Azeri- 
Armenian war and aiding a military coup to overthrow the anti-Russian Elchibey 
govemment. 
Similarly the support given for the same route by the Tbilisi and Baku governments 
resulted in several assassination attempts against the Georgian and the Azeri presidents, 
which were allegedly planned by Moscow. 59 A similar attempt made against the Armenian 
55Cynthia M. Croissant and Michael P. Croissant, 'The Caspian Sea Status Dispute: Context and implications', 
Eurasian Studies, no. 4, (Winter 1996-1997), p. 3 7. 
56Winrow, 'Turkey', op. cit., p. 44. 
57Michael P. Croissant, 'Oil and Russian Imperialism in the Transcaucasus', Eurasian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 
(Spring 1996), p. 16. 
58Sedat Sertoglu, 'Buyuk Oyun, Sabah, 16 February 1998. 
59For example, in the wake of the assassination attempt against president Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian 
parliament called for full access to Russia! s five military bases in the country arguing on grounds that the 
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president prompted the Turkish press to call this series of incidents 'a grand Russian game' 
to secure the transportation of Caucasian oil through its territory by destabilizing the regional 
countries through which other alternative oil routes would pass. 60 In other words, Russia 
made it clear that there could be no real progress developing Central Asia and Caspian 
region's energy and other resources without Russia's consent, and if possible, without 
Russian part icipation. 61 
In these circumstances, Turkey's determination to ensure Azeri oil was transported 
through its territory to theworld markets became a source of tension and rivalry between the 
two countries. Turkey argued that the proposed Russian route, which inevitably included the 
use of the Turkish Straits to reach the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, would make the 
Straits a canal of tankers and would further increase the amount of oil deliveries being 
shipped through the Turkish straits from around 5 million tones per year to 45 million-50 
million tones. This in turn would bring potential environmental risks to Turkey's largest city, 
Istanbul, and the entire region of Marmara where 20 million people reside, as well as 
increase the risk of oil tanker collisions due to congestion. 62 In this context, in 1994, Turkey 
adopted new regulations for the Straits, which introduced new restrictions on the passage of 
oil tankers in terms of time periods and the amount of oil to be shipped. 63 The UN 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) approved the new arnendments. 64 However, 
attackers might be being shielded at the bases, while Shevardnadze linked it to a struggle over oil revenues 'a 
possible positive decision on the transit of Caspian oil across Georgia's territory gives rise to great resistance 
on the part of certain forces. ' BBC News, 10 February 1998. 
60Sertog1u, lbid 
61Nancy D. Smith, 'Central Asia's New "Great Game"', The Wall Street Journal, IS October 1996; Anthony 
Robinson, 'Oil Around Risky Waters', Financial Times, 17 June 1998. 
62M. A. Gokirmak, 'Turkiye-Rusya Iliskileri ve Petrol Tasimaciligi Sorunu: Jeopolitik Bir Degerlendirme' in 
Degisen Dunya ve Turkiye, Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed. ), (Istanbul: Baglam, 1995), pp. 169-75; Sukru Elekdag, 
'Diplomasi, Petrol ve Avrasya Staratejik Dengesi, Milliyet, 23 December 1996. 
63Turkish Probe, 8 July 1994. 
64'Turkish Diplomatic Victory on Straits', Newspot, 10 June 1994. 
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Russia refused to accept the new regulations on political rather than technical grounds, and 
argued that the new regulations conflict with Turkey's international obligations under the 
Montreux Convention of 1936 which regulated passage through the straits. 65 As such, Russia 
initiated an alternative plan, the 'orthodox project' or sea-land-sea project that would use the 
route from the Bulgarian port of Bourgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandropolis, they 
bypassing the straits. Russia convinced Bulgaria and Greece on the viability of this project in 
1994.66 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and the US supported the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline for the 
transportation of Azeri oil. It would cross Turkey via Azerbaijan and Iran or through 
Armenia and Nakhichevan, or across Georgia before reaching the Turkish Mediterranean 
port of Ccyhan, from whcre it would bc shippcd to consumcr markcts. It would also carry 
crude oil and natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan with additional pipelines. 67 The 
Iranian option as a possible route for the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline was out of the question 
due to poor Iranian-Western relations, and the ongoing Azeri-Armenian conflict did not 
make the Armenian alternative feasible. 68 Thus, the only remaining route was the Georgian 
one, which would carry the oil to the Georgian Black Sea port of Soupsa to Ceyhan with a 
new line across Turkey. 69 Besides Turkey and the US, 70 this project was supported by all the 
65F. Kovalev, 'Caspian Oil: Russian Interests', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 3, (1997), p. 53. 
66Ferai Tunc, 'Baku-Ceyhan Suya Dusuyor', Hurriyet, 24 March 1997; Heinz Kramer and Friedemann Muller, 
'Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries' in Allied Divided., Transatlantic Policiesfor the 
Greater Middle East, Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer (eds. ), (Cambridge: CSIA Studies in 
International Security, 1997), p. 197. 
67Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan agreed to transport their crude oil and natural gas through Turkey in 1999. 
'Future Dims for Turkey's Pet Project, Briefing, 8 March 1999, p. 22; Sami Kohen 'Ismail Cern ile Ufuk 
Turu', Milliyet, 6 January 1997. 
68Jan H. Kalicki, 'US Policy in the Caspian: Pipelines, Partnership and Prosperity', Middle East Policy, vol. 6, 
no. 2, (2 October 1998), p. 147; 'Competition and American Sanctions Frustrate Iran in the Caspian', The 
Economist, 24 January 1998, p. 6 1; 'Iran "Best Route to Caspian"', Financial Times, 5 May 1998. 
691. Resat Ozkan, Dis Politika: Dis Kapinin Dis Mandali, (Istanbul: Cinar, 1996), p. 383. 70See, Bulent Aras, 'US-Central Asian Relations: A View from Turkey', MERIA, vol. 1, no. 1, (January 1997). 
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Caspian Sea littoral states, with the exception of Russia and Iran, which were all land-locked. 
Finally, the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and a gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea from 
Turkmenistan to Baku was signed during the OSCE summit in Istanbul between Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, Georgia and Kazakhstan in November 1999.71 Thus despite setbacks on the Turkish 
route, Ankara was able to push its preferred position with strong backing from Washington. 
Otherwise, it would have been more difficult for Turkey to contend with the Russian factor 
as Moscow views its monopoly over energy transportation central to its continued dominant 
position in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Indeed, Moscow and Tehran considered these 
developments as detrimental to their national interests and joined forces in issuing a strong 
protest against a trans-Caspian pipeline. 72 
Hence, Russian interests and its willingness to exert itself in the oil projects of the region 
delayed and precluded Turkey from being able to take advantage of its affinity and geo- 
strategic proximity to the Caucasus. It was only able to sign an agreement with the 
aforementioned states on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project with the backing of the US in 
1999. Thus, in this regard, it has, at the very best, been delayed in gaining the benefits of this 
project which in turn has directly impacted in its capacity to develop into a serious economic 
and strategic power in the region and in the eyes of the West. 
8.4. Resurgence of Russian power on Turkish borders 
The growing Russian military presence in Caucasia, particularly in Transcaucasia became 
a source of tension in Turco-Russian relations throughout the 1990s. As will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter, this ongoing conflict was instrumental in limiting a more powerful 
Turkish role. Accordingly, Turkish policies in Caucasia had to carefully take into account 
71NTV (Turkish News Channel), 18 November 1999. 
72Gennaey Chuffin, 'The Caspian Sea Basin: The Security Dimensions' in SIPRI Yearbook 1999, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 218 and p. 237.220 
Russian strategic interests in order to avoid conflict with Moscow. This policy of 'we should 
not provoke Russia' combined w ith a resurgence of clear Russian politico-military influence 
in the area; the ongoing almost region-wide conflicts; and the West's lack of interest in 
regional matters convinced Ankara that it should avoid conflict at all costs and focus on 
cooperation, particularly in the economic field. 
There are several reasons for Russian military expansion in the region. The first related to 
Russia's political ambitions. Russia attempted to re-establish its former influence in the area 
and to contain instability before it spilt over into its territory. 73 Also, in view of the ongoing 
instability, Russia was afraid of the possibility of a security vacuum in the region which 
would be filled by other powers -whether they were regional players, like Turkey or Iran, or 
global ones like the US. 74 The existence of rich Caspian oil reserves and the interest of 
outsiders was another reason for Russia's concern. Indeed, the US, declared Azerbaijan as a 
zone of vital interests as early as 1994.75 Moreover, though remote and underdeveloped, the 
northern Caucasus was of strategic importance for Russia and was a crucial buffer, as well as 
filter between Russia, Turkey and Iran, 76 pushing Moscow to re-establish its dominance over 
73For Russian interests in the region see, A. Zaitsev, 'Russia and Transcaucasia', International Affairs 
(Moscow), vol. 43, no. 5, (1997), pp. 180-187; Margot Light, 'Russia and Transcaucasia' in Transcaucasian 
Borders, John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard Schofield (eds. ), (London: UCL Press, 1996), 
pp. 46-7; Fred Halliday, 'The Empires Strike back? Russia, Iran and the New Republics, The World Today, 
vol. 5 1, no. 11, (November 1995), p. 220. 
74Dimitri Trenin, 'Russia's Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region' in Contested Borders in the 
Caucasus, Bruno Coppieters (ed. ), (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), p. 94. 
75Boris Nikolin, 'The Threat from the Caucasus', Russian Politics and Law, vol. 36, no. 1, (January-February 
1998), p. 42; Graham E. Fuller, 'Central Asia and American National Interests' in Central Asia: Its Strategic 
Importance and Future Prospects, Hafeez Malik (ed. ), (Hampshire and London: Mcmillan, 1994), p. 140. 
Moscow became reluctant to have a third actor outside the CIS as an arbiter or mediator in the regional 
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Particular reference to the Russian Federation and Transcaucasia' in Turkish-German Round Table Meeting, 
(Ankara: SAM, 1996), p. 23. 
76Havva Gok, 'Chechen Crisis and Russia's Future', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 19, nos. 1-2, (1995), p. 40. 
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Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 77 
In 1996, as a means of re-establishing its position, Russia, much to Turkey's frustration, 
increased its military presence in the North Caucasus to a level greater than had been agreed 
upon under the CFE Treaty of 1990 (which was later modified by the Flank Agreement in 
1996). 78 Apart from changing the regional military balances, Ankara was also concerned by 
the fact that increased Russian forces in the region could pose a serious threat to the 
independence of the Transcucasian republics where Turkey had growing strategic interests. 
Furthermore, Russia invested considerable efforts in becoming the sole peacemaker in the 
fonner Soviet republics, denying a role to any foreign forces in the region. 79 It even stationed 
troops in states which had not given their consent, such as in Moldova and Georgia. 80 
Russian peacekeeping forces were integrated as a policy instrument as part of a wider 
strategy to advance Russian interests in Georgia, for example, using means short of war. 81 
From the Russian perspective, similar to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Georgia's ethnic 
composition offered Russia a suitable ground to restore its declining influence. This could be 
seen as evidence of Moscow's policy of 'divide and rule' in order to reach its ob ectives. 82 j 
Indeed, Georgia's inability to respond soon resulted in its loss of effective control over the 
autonomous entities in South Ossettia and Abkhazia and their move to defacto independence 
77William, Hale, 'Turkey, the Black Sea and Transcaucasia' in Transcaucasian Borders, John F. R.. Wright, 
Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard Schofield (eds. ), (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 69. 
78For the Treaty and the Agreement on Adaptation of CFE Treaty signed in 1999, and Russian arguments not to 
comply with the Treaty see, http., *Ilwww. osce. orgldocslenglishl]990-19991cfelcfetreate. htm; Gulnur Aybet, 
'The CFE Treaty: The Way Forward for Conventional Arms Control in Europe', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 1, 
(March-May 1996), pp. 25-6; Adam Boger, 'Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion', The 
Defence Monitor, vol. 14, no. 19, (December 2000). 
79Russian president Yeltsin argued 'the time has come for distinguished international organisations, including 
the UN, to grant Russia special powers of a guarantor of peace and stability in regions of the former USSR. ' 
'Russia Has No Special Minority Rights Claim', The Christian Science Monitor, 14 April 1993. 
80Boger, op. cit. 
8IDov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, 
(Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 127-49. 
82Erik Cornell, Turkey in the 21' Century: Opportunities, Challenges, Threats, (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), p. 7. 
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by the end of 1993.83 The Tbilisi government was forced to agree to the deployment of a 
Russian-dominated peacekeeping force in the region following a cease-fire in the South 
Ossettian conflict mediated by Russia. In the same way, after the collapse of Georgian 
resistance in Abkhazia in October 1993, viewing the Western refusal to assemble a UN 
peacekeeping force, there was no other alternative for the Tbilisi government but to join the 
CIS and to allow five Russian military bases in the country in return for support for 
Georgia's effort to regain control over Abkhazia. 84 Furthermore, Russia deployed about 
8,000 troops in Georgia, and entered into an agreement to deploy more than 10,000 Russian 
border guards to patrol the borders with Turkey and the Black Sea coast, while Georgia's 
meagre forces of 5,000 border troops protected its other frontiers. 85 
This, move was viewed by Turkey as a Russian attempt to dominate Caucasia. Turkey 
expressed doubts as to whether 'a country sending its military forces to another unilaterally 
[can be] a peacekeeper' and argued that such a force should be under the umbrella of the 
CSCE. 86 It also made it clear that it considered such developments a major security concern 
due to its own proximity to, and interest in, the region. Thus, for example, in 1994 Turkish 
prime minister Ciller expressed the Turkish view that growing nationalism in Russia and the 
expansionist tendency of the post-Soviet leadership caused a real threat or as the Turkish 
chief of staff Dogan Gures warned 'Russia is posing a greater threat today than during the 
Cold War. 187 
83Jonathan Aves, 'National Security and Military Issues in the Transcaucasia: The Cases of Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia' in State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Bruce Parrot 
(ed. ), (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 214-5. 
84Russia agreed to close two of its four bases in Georgia and for negotiating the closure of the other two. 85Michael Gordon, 'Georgia Bridles at Russia's Heavy Hand', International Herald Tribune, 14 January 1997. 
86'Russia Struggles with CFE-Again', Turkish Probe, 24 June 1994, p. 10; A. Ahat Andican, Degisim 
Surecinde Turk Dunyasi, (Istanbul: Emre, 1996), pp. 269-72. 87'Russia: A Threat or not Threat? ', Turkish Probe, 10 June 1994, p. 2; Turkish Probe, 3 June 1994, P. 13. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
TURKISH POLICY IN CAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA: 
THWARTED AMBITION 
9.1. The new geopolitics of Caucasia 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union not only had a major impact in the political map of 
Caucasia but also significantly changed Turkey's regional enviromnent as it led to the 
emergence of new republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on Turkey's north-east 
borders. Turkey could now freely forge close relationships with its relatively weak 
neighbours for the first time in a generation. The emergence of Georgia and, in particular, 
Azerbaijan with whom Turkey shared ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties, offered new 
prospects for Turkey's external relations. Apart from relieving burden of the existing 
beside the Russian superpower, the new political enviromnent also provided a significant 
market opportunity for Turkish goods which were desperate to find new alternatives 
following the loss of the Middle East market after the Gulf War of 1990-91. In particular, 
the discovery of vast oil resources in the Caspian basin and the possibility of establishing 
energy corridors that would be routed through Turkey not only offered Turkey the 
opportunity to meet its growing energy needs but also offered the increased prospect of 
political influence. 
Moreover, as in the Balkans, conunon cultural and historic ties with the region were an 
important asset in Turkey's attempt to strengthen relations. Turkey's multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural identity with around 10 million Turkish citizens with links to the entire 
region (Crimea, Georgia, Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Dagestan, etc. ) made 
improved ties with the region both imperative and desirable. ' In this context, it could even 
be argued that there was a psychological factor in Turkey's involvement in the region. As 
these ethnic groups rushed to establish links with their kinsmen in the Caucasus after the 
Paul B. Henze, Turkey andAtaturk's Legacy, (Haarlem: SOTA, 1998), pp. 172-3. 
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decline of the Soviet Union, they played an important role in Turkey's improving 
economic and cultural relations with the region. 2 In turn, the Turkish public embraced the 
whole Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan where there was no language barrier, with great 
enthusiasm. 
In fact, as well as the Azeri-Armenian war, developments in both north Caucasia and 
Transcaucasia highlighted to Turkey numerous uncertainties and conflicts in the region. 
This was further exacerbated as feelings of irredentism, separatism, and territorial claims 
and counter claims, which had been long suppressed under Soviet rule, came to the 
forefront. 3 For instance, as'will be shown later, in 1996 there were at least five separate 
wars in progress in the Caucasus region, involving no fewer than twelve ethnic groups, 
which in many respects presented Turkey with far more problems than coexistence with 
Soviet Russia ever did. 4 The ensuing Chechen wars in north Caucasia, ethnic conflict in 
Georgia and, in particular, the Azeri-Annenian war in Transcaucasia proved that the 
communist threat to Turkey's northern borders had been replaced with other serious risks 
and dangers which hampered Turkish success in gaining further access to the region. 
As Turkey was being increasingly drawn into regional conflagration, Turkish policy 
makers found themselves in the predicament of trying to reconcile domestic demands for 
ethnic/religious solidarity with external realities. For example, Turkish citizens of 
Caucasian origin managed to build up a strong Caucasian lobby and with the backing of 
the public and other political forces pressured political leaders into formulating policies 
favourable the region. On the other hand, Ankara had to take into consideration other 
factors, such as its traditional policy of non-involvement in regional affairs. Consequently, 
2Baskin Oran 'Turkiye'nin Balkan ve Kafkas Politikasi', A USBF Dergisi, vol. 50, nos. 1-2, (January-June 
1995), p. 274. 
3For the dynamics and sources of the regional instabilities see, Gela Charkviani, 'Georgia, Transcaucasus 
and Beyond', Milletlerarasi Munasebetler Turk Yilligi, (Ankara: AUSBF, 1994), p. 91; Stephen Blank, 
'New Trends in Caucasian Security,, Eurasian Studies, no. 13, (Spring 1998), pp. 2-11. 
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consensus among elite and public opinion on foreign policy objectives was not evident, as 
was evidenced during the Chechen war, the Azeri-Armenian war and the conflict between 
Georgia and ethnic Abkhazians. 
Moreover, having been isolated from the region for decades Turkey was caught 
completely unprepared by these new developments and therefore Turkish policy makers 
found themselves grappling with new, diverse and multiple challenges. Furthermore, as 
discussed earlier, growing instability naturally made Russia's return to the region easier 
and helped Moscow to re-estAlish its political and military supremacy in the midst of 
rising Russian nationalism. This in turn increasingly jeopardised Turkish interests and 
marginalized Turkey. What is more, it also became apparent that the support given to 
Turkey by its Western allies, the US in particular, in the early years of the post-Soviet era 
vis-A-vis the regional developments was insufficient and effectively meant that Ankara 
was left alone to deal with diverse regional issues. As a result, initial expectations about 
Turkey becoming a significant regional power in Caucasia were, to a very large extent, 
proved wrong. 
9.1.1. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: A test case for Turkey's role as a regional 
power 
As with the Chechen issue, the territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
developed into an important issue for Turkey both domestically and externally during the 
early 1990s. The conflict quickly overshadowed initial euphoria about a Turkish role in 
Transcaucasia. As the dispute evolved into a full-scale war, its repercussions seriously 
challenged Turkey's external relations, in general, and its Caucasian policy, in particular. 
The power vacuum that developed following the collapse of the Soviet Union offered a 
valuable opportunity for Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mainly by Armenians and 
incorporated into the territory of Azerbaijan by the Soviets in 1921, to unite with 
4jwnes Pattifer, The Turkish Labyrinth: Ataturk and the New Islam, (Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 205-6. 226 
Armenia, 5 and the Armenian government adopted a resolution on the unification of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. This, however, led to growing antagonism between Azeris and 
Armenians, who had longstanding historical, religious and cultural differences. 6 It soon 
became clear that the absence of political control and, more importantly, the absence of 
effective regional and international mechanisms akin to the bi-polar international system 
of the Cold War years fuelled the crisis. Indeed, by time of a ceasefire in 1994, Armenia 
had seized approximately one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory. Nagorno-Karabakh became 
entirely Azeri-free and the autonomous Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan along the Turkish 
border was sealed off from the rest of the country. 7 The conflict caused massive 
casualties, and led some one million civilians to flee their homes, forcing Azerbaijan to 
shelter them. 8 
Initially Turkey remained neutral and pursued a balanced policy in its relations with 
both Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, it was soon forced to adopt a more pro- 
Azerbaijani stance in the wake of Armenian military advances into Azerbaijani territories 
and amidst growing domestic pressure and security concerns. 9 As will be discussed later, 
this dashed Turkish hopes of mending historical differences with Armenia and made the 
latter a key Russian ally in the area. Ankara's support was most evidenced when Azeri 
5'Armenian Suspicions of Turkey Continue', Dateline Turkey, 6 October 1990; G. Tabrizi and Reza Sabri, 
'Azerbaijan and Armenian Conflict and Coexistence' in From the Gutf To Centrnl Asia: Players in the 
New Great Game, Anoushirasan Ehteshami (ed. ), (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994), p. 150. 
6David Rieff, 'Nagamo-Karabakh: Case Study in Ethnic Strife', Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 2, (March- 
April 1997), p. 42. 
7For the negotiations leading to the cease-fire see, V. Kazimirov, 'A History of the Karabakh Conflict', 
International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 3, (1996), pp. 182-195; Stephan H. Astourian, 'The 
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Dimensions, Lessons, and Prospects', Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 
4, (Fall 1994), p. 94; Michael Mihalka, 'Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian Peacekeeping: Prospects for a 
Second Dayton', International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 3, (Autumn 1996), pp. 17-19. 80les M. Smolansky, 'Russia and Transcaucasia: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh' in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and, Iran, Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (eds. ), (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 202-3; Selcuk Korkud, 'Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Some Facts', Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 1, (March-May 1996), pp. 146-50. 9'Demirel: Tarafsiz Kalamayizl, Cumhuriyet, 4 March 1992. 
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civilians were killed in the Karabakh town of Khojali in early 1992.10 At this time, Ankara 
refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and helped Azerbaijan in its 
economic blockade against Armenia. Turkish premier Demirel warned the Armenians that 
'if they continue to kill the Azerbaijanis, Turkish public opinion would not allow the 
Turkish government to be hand-in-hand with Armenia. It would be very difficult. 'l I 
There are several reasons behind Ankara's decision to side with Baku while avoiding 
unilateral particularly military intervention. The most important of these was the existing 
ties with Azerbaijan and the presence of a large Caucasian and Azeri population in 
Turkey. This in turn led to domestic pressure with massive demonstrations taking place in 
major cities calling the government to provide military support to the Muslim 
Azerbaijanis of Turkic descent. 12 In particular, nationalist and Islamist groups, as well as 
various Caucasian groups organised protests. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) even 
prepared an action schedule so that demonstrations in support of Azeris could be held 
throughout the country. 13 On one occasion, it was also reported that hundreds of 
volunteers, mostly youngsters, queued outside an army conscription office in one of the 
western towns to join the fight against the Armenians. 14 Again, according to one survey 
conducted in 1993, nearly 38 percent of those polled wanted Turkey to intervene in the 
conflict while 49 percent favoured the use economic and political sanctions first, followed 
by military intervention if these were not effective. Only 13 percent demanded that 
Turkey should stay out of the conflict. 15 
10 'Ermeni Teroru: 20 Olu', Cumhuriýet, 12 February 1992. 
1 I'Blaine Harden, 'Turkish Premier Voices Worries over Pull of Ethnic Conflict in Caucasus', The 
Washington Post, 19 March 1992. 
12'Kamoyu Ermenileri Kiniyor', Cumhuriyet, 9 March 1992; 'Turkish Public Reacts Strongly Against 
Armenian Attack on Azerbaijan', Newspot, 8 April 1993. 
13'Ulkuculerin Eylem Takvimi', Cumhuriyet, 7 March 1992. 
14'llk Cumada Ulkucu-Islamci Rekabetil, Cumhuriýet, 7 March 1992. 
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The government also came under strong criticism from opposition parties, the media 
and other pressure groups which claimed that Turkey's new image as a regional power 
and role model for the newly-emerged Turkic republics would be irrecoverably damaged 
if Ankara remained neutral. For example, Bulent Ecevit, the former prime minister and the 
leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), argued that, 'the only thing Ankara does is to 
call on the West for help without making any real effort itself. Surely this will shake new 
republics' trust in Turkey. '16 He then urged the government to consider military 
intervention. 17 Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the right-wing ANAP and the former prime 
minister, asked for troop deployments along the Turkish-Armenian border to deter the 
Armenians. 18 'The government seriously believes that the Karabakh crisis will be solved 
through telephone conversations or simply taking the issue to international organisations' 
said one senior Refah Party deputy. 19 Kamran Inan, a former diplomat and minister, 
accused the government of 'offering Azerbaijan to Moscow on a plate. "20 Ergun Balci, a 
leading columnist at leftist Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet, blamed the government following 
the Armenian attack on neighbouring Nakhichevan, for failing to show the necessary 
determination in trying to stop these attacks on its doorstep. 'You cannot continue 
pursuing such a foreign policy by avoiding every single crisis with a fear of 
entanglement. ' 21 
What's more, as the Azeri president pointed out, throughout the crisis, albeit never 
officially, Baku turned to Ankara for economic, political and military help. 22 Indeed, 
16'Karabag Tartismasi Meclisi Karistirdi', Cumhuriyet, 5 March 1992. 
17'Ecevit Askeri Mudahele Istedi', Cumhurtýet, 8 May 1992. 
18'Yilmaz Gerekirese Birlik Kaydirilsin', Cumhurrýet, 5 March 1992. 
19Nokta, 17 May 1992. 
201nterview with Kamran Inan, Soguk Savastan, op. cit., p. 216. 21 Ergun Balci, 'Naheivan, Karabag ve Turkiye'nin Politikasi', Cumhuriyet, 7 May 1992. 
22'Demirel Turkey Supports the Just Demands of Azerbaijan', Newspot, 9 February 1994. 
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Nakhichevan called on Ankara to intervene to stop the Annenian offensives in 1992.23 
Furthermore, the decision of Moscow to side with Armenia (after initial support for the 
Azeris) changed the war's direction in favour of the Armenians. The reason for this policy 
change, according to a senior Azeri official, was that 'Moscow is preparing for the 
eventuality of having to withdraw the Red Army units from there, so it wants to leave 
behind a strong Armenia as a strategic ally which will take care of its interests. 924 
The region was also a priority for Turkey. As Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cern put 
in 1997, the entire region was Turkey's window to Central Asia and Russia. 25 In essence 
therefore, given Turkey's immediate economic and political interests in Central Asia and 
crucial economic ties with Russia, as well as the existence of energy corridors in the 
region, it was hoped that the Caucasus would be transformed into a 'belt of peace' and 
become a buffer zone between Russia and Turkey. 26 Additionally, a 'greater Armenia' 
was never been a desirable option for Turkey considering the historic animosities between 
the two nations. 
Once again, as witnessed during the Bosnian and the Chechen wars, notwithstanding 
domestic pressure, Turkey's cautious policies vis-A-vis the Karabakh crises put it in a real 
dilemma. Failure to rescue Azerbaijan would put Turkey's natural leadership and image as 
a regional power into question. On the other hand, Turkey's traditional foreign policy did 
not allow for any adventurous intervention abroad or alignment with Baku unless there 
was a serious threat to the country's national security. Having been caught by surprise by 
developments, Turkey found it difficult to formulate a comprehensive policy over how to 
deal with the issue. There was even a dichotomy among the decision-makers in Ankara on 
23'Nahcivan Turkiye'yi Mudaheleye Cagirdi', Cumhuriýet, 5 May 1992. 
24'Russia: Helping or Confusing the Issue', Turkish Probe, 6 April 1993, p. 6; Uwe Halbach and Heinrich Tiller, 'Russia and its Southern Flank', A ussen Politik, vol. 45, no. 2, (1994), pp. 160- 1. 25'Ismail Cern Stresses Wide-Angle Foreign Policy Approach', Turkish Daily News, 19 July 1997. 
26Seyfl Tashan, 'The Caucasus and Central Asia: Strategic Implications', Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol. 18, 
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how to deal with the issue. For example, despite president Ozal's appeals for a tougher 
line on the issue by suggesting that 'Turkey frighten the Armenians a little bit', the 
Demirel government chose to pursue more cautious policies: 'We will help but we do not 
want the military involved. We want a political solution. 127 Similarly the Turkish army's 
chief of staff Dogan Gures argued that 'it is so obvious that unilateral actions in the region 
will make the problem (in the Caucasus) even more difficult. Hence, I believe that 
international endeavours similar to that in the Balkan and other parts of the world should 
also be initiated for this region. '28 Thus, according to the goverment, the Karabakh and 
Nakhichevan problems became issues, like the dispute in Bosnia, which had to be solved 
by the interriational system and more specifically as Demirel stated 'the CSCE should be 
the main forum in dealing with this conflict. '29 It could also be justifiably argued that, as 
witnessed during the Bosnian conflict, having been unable to affect events beyond its 
borders due to its own reasons, Turkish policy-makers tried to stay within the limits of 
traditional Turkish foreign policy rituals and relied on multilateral efforts even though 
they knew that they would likely fail or become ineffective given their apparent own 
structural problems. 
Ankara was also concerned that such a unilateral action could easily find Turkey 
opposed by traditional Western allies sympathetic to Armenia as the Armenian diaspora 
had lobbied the American and French governments to send help to Armenia. 30 Indeed, the 
US stopped supplying humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan, while president Mitterand's visit to 
Ankara in 1992 angered Annenians and they staged protests in France. In the end, during 
nos. 3-4, (1993), p. 46. 
27Hurriyet, 7 March 1992. 
28'Turks Warns of Religious War in Azerbaijan', The New York Times, 12 Mart 1992. 
29Prime Minister Demirel's Press Conference, 28 March 1992; 'Prime Minister Demirel Receives 
Armenian Delegation, Newspot, 18 June 1992. 
30Roderic H. Davison, Turkey: A Short History, Third edition, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998), p. 
223. 
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the Azeri energy blockade on Armenia Ankara was forced to give the go-ahead for 
Western help for Armenia, which evidently could be done only through Turkey. 31 
Furthermore, Turkish policy-makers feared that such a unilateral intervention, similar 
that in Cyprus in 1974, would inevitably harm Turkey's prestige in the West and could 
result in its international isolation. 32 It was also generally accepted that Turkish 
involvement would increase the risks of an escalation of the conflict, in the worst case 
scenario leading to a confrontation between Turkey and Russia, possibly involving Iran as 
well. 33 Favouring caution, Turkey even rejected the Azeri request for some helicopters to 
be used in the evacuation of civilians and injured personnel fearing that it might rise 
Russian suspicions about Turkey's role. 34 A real concern given that the commander of the 
CIS armed forces, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, threatened that Turkish intervention could 
result in the outbreak of a Third World War. 35 
Finally, Turkey, waging its own war against the insurgent PKK was already involved 
in massive military operations, which distracted attention from external issues. Moreover, 
there was a possibility that certain groups, if united under the Dashnak Party both in 
Annenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which had waged violent struggles against Turkey for 
years, could conduct various forms of low-level conflict. It was also possible that they 
could join forces with the PKK, which would unite two of Turkey's main security threats, 
and it was already known that the PKK talked openly of support from, and links to, 
31'Azerbaycan'a Yardim Kesildi', Cumhuriyet, 31 October 1992; 'Fransalda Ermeni Gosterisi', 
Cumhuriýet, 20 April 1992; Freddy De Pauw, 'Turkey's Policies in Transcaucasus' in Contested Borders 
in the Caucasus, Bruno Coppieters, (ed. ), (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), p. 183. 
32'Karabag'a Mudahele Turkiye'yi Yalnizliga Iter', Cumhuriyet, 13 May 1992; Ugur Mumcu, 'Eski Tas 
Eski Harnam', Cumhuriyet, 22 May 1992. 
33Svante E. Cornell, 'Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance', Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, (January 1998), p. 5 1. 
34Mustafa Aydin, 'Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla Iliskiler' in Turk Dis Politikasi, Baskin Oran (ed. ), (Istanbul: 
Iletisim, 2002), p. 404. 
35, Saposnikof Rahatsizlik Yarattil, Cumhuriyet, 22 May 1992. 
232 
Armenia. 36 For example, the Kurdish Parliament in exile passed a resolution recognising 
and marking the Armenian Genocide, an issue which Turkey is deeply sensitive about, 
and later Ocalan reiterated the PKK's intention to continue cooperation with Amenia. 37 
Indeed, Azerbaijan even claimed that PKK and the Armenian forces cooperated in 
Karabakh. 38While there was other evidence of this according to the Turkish intelligence 
service, Armenia-PKK cooperation had been occurring for over a decade and Armenia did 
provide a training camp near to Yerevan and sold US$1.6 million worth arms to the PKK 
in 1993.39 Ocalan later confirmed during his trial that Armenia and the ASALA 
collaborated with the PKK. 40 
On one occasion in 1992, the Turkish armed forces prepared to respond to a possible 
Armenian attack on Nakhichevan. 41 Turkey also opened the Nakhichevan border, which 
could have been viewed as a move to intimidate Armenia. 42 Later in 1993 Turkish premier 
Ciller announced that she would ask parliament for permission to intervene militarily 
should the Armenians move on Nakhichevan. 43 Ankara claimed the right to intervene 
according to the Treaty of Kars signed in 1921 between Turkey and the Soviet Union. 44 
Moreover, it appears that Turkey sent some 150 retired senior army officers to train the 
Azerbaijani armed forces. 45 
However, though Turkey first and foremost sought to mobilise diplomatic channels to 
36Stephen J. Blank, 'Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the Former USSR and US Interests' in Turkey's 
Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs, (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), p. 65. 
37'Kurdistan Recognises the Armenian Genocide, http: //Www. cilicia. com/armol Oijurdistan. html 38'Karabag'da Ermeni-PKK Elele', Cumhuriyet, 12 March 1992. 
39Sabah, 16 March 1999. 
40Hurriyet, 2 June 1999. 
41 Cumhuriyet, 21 February 1992. 
42'PKK'ya Yeni Bir Kapi miT, Nokta, 7 June 1992, pp. 224. 43'The Armenians are Playing a Dangerous Game They Cannot Win', Turkish Probe, 7 September 1993, p. 
4. 
44See, Ismail Soysal, Turkiyenin SjýasalAntlasmalari (1920-1945), (Ankara: TTK, 1989), pp. 17-47. 
45This was practically all the military help given to the Azeris by Turkey. 'Emekli Turk Generaller 
Azerbaycan'da', Cumhuriyet, 5 July 1992; Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Co- 
operation, Second edition, (London: C. Hurst, 1995), p. 214. 
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bring the issue onto the Western agenda as well as multilateral organisations such as the 
CSCE, the UN and NATO. 46 Ankara's intensive diplomatic efforts were instrumental in 
bringing about the mediation efforts of the CSCE through the 'Minsk Group' organised in 
June 1992.47 Turkey also entered into joint political initiatives with Russia to draft a peace 
plan, which would serve to compliment the Minsk peace procesS. 48 The result of these 
interventions was that the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution in 1993, 
which was followed by another two resolutions demanding a complete Armenian 
withdrawal from occupied Azeri lands and a return to the negotiations proceSS. 49 Likewise 
fifty-four CSCE member states, excluding Armenia, accepted Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity and again following the Turkish initiatives in 1993, a NATO Communique 
emphasised the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries of the 
region. 50 In this context, Turkey firmly opposed an exclusively CIS peacekeeping 
presence in the Transcaucasus and declared its readiness to participate in any kind of 
intemational operation. 51 
In Ankara's view, Turkish initiatives vis-A-vis the crisis were successful to the extent 
that the Azeri standpoint was represented at various international forums, which in turn 
served to neutralise Armenian claims. In the words of Demirel, 
In the beginning the world was ready to side with Armenia against Azerbaijan. 
However, through consultations with various countries the message was given that 
if you encourage Armenia you may turn the issue into a Muslim-Christian crisis. 
In this case, another Middle East may emerge as a result of this. Certain countries 
neither sided with Armenia nor took a stand against Turkey and Azerbaijan-52 
46'Turkey's Diplomatic Initiatives on Karabakh', Newspot, 26 March 1992. 
47The Minsk Group has II members including Turkey. The other members are:, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
France, Germany, Belarus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Italy, Sweden, Russia and the US. 
48'Turkish-Russian Joint Initiative on Upper Karabakh', Newspot, 29 March 1993. 
49'Tlie Armenians Stand Condemned for Aggression', Turkish Probe, 3 August 1993, p. 13; Oliver Paye 
and Eric Remacle, 'UN and CSCE Policies in Transcaucasia' in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, 
Bruno Coppieters (ed. ), (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), pp. 103-36. 
50'The NATO Summit', Newspot, 19 January 1993. 
51 Prime Minister Demirel's Press Conference, 28 February 1993. 
52'Demirel Evaluates the First 500 Days', Newspot, 21 April 1993. 
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However, similar to the Bosnian case Turkey acknowledged that its over reliance on 
international efforts was evidence of its own inability to act unilaterally. Moreover, its 
new security environment was no more a primary concern in the capitals of its European 
allies and the security problems encountered by Turkey did not have the highest priority in 
the West which faced different threats and challenges. 53 As such, throughout the conflict, 
Turkey remained the only country that responded to the plight of the Azeris. Western 
countries did not take a direct interest in the events in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 
diplomatic initiatives neither helped to stop Armenian offensives nor forced the Yerevan 
government to withdraw from the occupied Azeri lands. Premier Ciller expressed 
Turkey's frustration at this one CSCE meetings 'The success of institutions or 
organisations depended on political will the member countries could generate, but that 
unfortunately this political will and determination was not being shown in connection with 
Bosnia and Karabakh. "54 The US, Russia and the major European powers, as well as Iran, 
pursued policies in the conflict, which were favourable to Annenia. Iran collaborated with 
Armenia in order to contain Turkish goals in the Caucasus and to limit Azeri influence. 55 
Tehran was also fully aware that Azeri victories over Armenia could stir separatist 
sentiments among the ten million Azeris living in north-westem Iran (25 per cent of the 
Iranian population). 56 Even the Turkic republics of Central Asia failed to condemn 
Armenia, another CIS country, in order to avoid clashing with Russia. 
In the end, Turkey's preoccupation, at least in diplomatic terms, with the conflict 
severely restricted Ankara from focusing on the new foreign policy opportunities that had 
53William W. Maggs, 'Armenia and Azerbaijan: Looking Toward the Middle East', Current HistorY 
Journal, vol. 92, no. 570, p. 6. 
54'CSCE Summit', Newspol, 16 December 1994. 
55James M. Dorsey, 'The Growing Entente between Armenia and Iran', Middle East International', no. 439, 
(4 December 1992), pp. 17-8. 
56Hanna Y. Freij, 'State Interests vs. Umma: Iranian Foreign Policy in Central Asia, Middle East Journal, 
vol. 50, no. 1, (Winter 1996), pp. 72-3. 
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presented themselves in Caucasia. While Ankara's inability to do anything but rely on 
multilateral bodies to stop Armenian advances during the two-year war and to force the 
Yerevan government to withdraw from Azeri territories significantly undermined 
Turkey's prestige and credibility in the region. What is more, the military victories of 
Armenian army no doubt contributed to the fall of pro-Turkish Abulfaz Elchibey who was 
even said to have been thinking of proposing a federation with Turkey. 57 Indeed, Russia 
was quick to fill the power vacuum and increased its influence in the area at the expense 
of Turkey. Moreover, Turkish policy vis-A-vis the region became a hostage to the Azeri- 
Armenian conflict and thus Yerevan further distanced itself from Ankara, thus becoming 
Moscow's main regional ally. 
9.1.2. Between options and challenges: Bilateral relations with the 
newly-independent Transcaucasian republics 
Faced with new opportunities, instabilities and challenges, including growing Russian 
politico-military involvement, 'Turkey tried to extend both bilateral and multilateral 
relations with its new Caucasian neighbours. As in the Middle East and the Balkans, 
Turkey looked for new ties that would counterbalance the growing regional anti-Turkish 
political axis made up of Moscow, Yerevan and, to some extent, Tehran. In this context, 
Turkey's shared ethnic, historical and cultural ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia served to 
expand relations, and combined with increasing economic, political, military and cultural 
relations, and a common fear of the Russia, and the Armenia factor, the two countries 
developed in natural allies. These ties were further institutionalised with the establishment 
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project (BSECP) in 1992, which aimed to bring 
economic and political cooperation among the regional countries. 
However, historical emnities and Turkey's staunch pro-Azeri policy over the ongoing 
57Eric Rouleau , 'The Challenges to Turkey', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, (November-December 1993), 
p. 133. According to Kamran Inan, 'this was nothing than presentation of the opportunities that appeared 
before it to the Russians on a silver platter. ' Quoted in Malik Mufti , 'Daring and Caution 
in Turkish 
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Azeri-Armenian war did not provide a positive beginning to improve Turkish-Armenian 
relations and the Yerevan government adopted more pro-Russian policies in the region. 
Additionally, the strong Russian presence in the area clearly prevented Turkey from 
gaining further influence in both Azerbaijan and Georgia. These countries soon became 
victims of bloody wars and domestic instabilities in which Russia was involved in some 
way or another. Thus, Turkey refrained from provoking Russia in its policies vis-A-vis 
Caucasia and tried to extend economic and cultural relations. In this context, economic 
initiatives, in particular from the private sector, played a profound role in creating a form 
of economic interdependence with both Azerbaijan and Georgia, and contributed to any 
rise in Ankara's influence highlighting how economic relations have became so important 
for Turkey that it mostly relied on these expanding links to secure itself a regional role. 58 
Moreover, various non-governmental organisations along with the state extended cultural 
and educational links, which further helped to consolidate bilateral relations. As of 1999, 
this included no less than two private universities, 21 Turkish schools (16 in Azerbaijan) 
and many other educational and cultural centres in both countries. 59 
A natural ally Azerbayan 
Azerbaijan emerged as Turkey's closest ally amongst the new republics, especially in 
regard to the Russian challenge and the Armenian factor. 60 Ankara was the first country to 
recognise the Baku government in November 1991 and supplied help in modernising its 
infrastructure in education, telecommunications, transport and other major fields. 61 
Bilateral relations, especially in the military sphere, also gradually expanded and within 
Foreign Policy', Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no. 1, (Winter 1998), P. 46. 
5SGulnur Aybet, 'Turkey in its Geo-Strategic Environment' in Rusi and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1992, 
(London: RUSI, 1992), p. 108. 
59http: //www. meb. gov. tr; Aydin, op. cit, pp. 384-5. 60Shireen T. Hunter, 'Azerbaijan: Search for Identity and New Partners' in Nations and Policies in the 
Soviet Successor States, Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds. ), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 220; Kamran Inan, 'Rusya'nin Kafkasya Politikasi', Avrasya Dosyasi, vol. 1, no. 1, (Spring 
1994), pp. 26-9. 
6 I'Turkey Recognises Independence of Azerbaijan', Newspot, 14 November 199 1. 
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the framework of military cooperation agreements, Turkey extended Azerbaijan military 
training and financial assistance to improve its armed forces. Accordingly, around 900 
Azeri military officers were trained in Turkey with the Turkish government covering all 
these expenses, and helping in establishing Azeri war academies. Turkey also undertook 
the task of bringing the Azeri armed forces up to NATO standards at a brigade level. 62 
Furthermore, the two allies entered into strategic cooperation with the signing of 
'Deepened Strategic Cooperation' in which the parties agreed to help each other in the 
event that either side's sovereignty and territorial integrity was endangered. 63 
On the economic front, in 1992, half of Turkey's trade with the six Muslim former 
Soviet republics was with Azerbaijan, though in the following years the Central Asian 
republics increased their share. 64 Azerbaijan was granted credits which amounted to 
almost half a billion dollars. More than 650 Turkish companies began operating in 
Azerbaijan and the Turkish investments amounted to nearly US$1.5 billion. Azerbaijan 
became the gateway to the newly independent Turkic republics, and their huge unexplored 
energy resources. Fearing Iranian influence, and in an effort to achieve a linguistic unity, 
Turkey helped Azerbaijan in its transition to the Latin alphabet by supplying books, 
printing machines and other educational materialS. 65 Two thousand Azeri students 
received scholarships from the Turkish government and Turkey also offered Azerbaijan 
diplomatic help in gaining membership in several regional and international organisations 
in the hope that such membership would serve to consolidate Azerbaijan's independence 
and facilitate its steady integration into international society after decades of Soviet rule. 
Although the two neighbours were able to establish these steady relations in the early 
62Aydin, op. cit., p. 387. 
63Cumhurjbvet, 6 May 1997. 
64Subat 1993de Turkjýe Ekonomisi Istatistik ve Yorumlar, (Ankara: TC Basbakanlik DIE, 1993). 65Andrew Finkel, 'Turkey Exploits Cultural Links as it Eyes Central Asia Rich', The Times, 28 January 
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years of Azeri independence and such links were further strengthened with the election of 
Abulfaz Elchibey, known for his 'anti-Russian' views and his admiration for Turkey, in 
May 1992, his overthrow by a pro-Russian coup in June 1993 was a major blow to 
bilateral relations. " During Elchibey's presidency, Ankara and Baku concluded several 
important agreements including oil deals, all at Russia's expense. 67 In addition, Elchibey 
refused to ratify the CIS founding documents. However, his attempt to stay out of the CIS 
would cost the Azerbaijanis dearly and also gave a strategic advantage to Armenia, which 
ratified the accords and generally followed a pro-Russian poliCy. 68 Still worse, the total 
exclusion of Russia from the oil deals that were concluded with Turkey and other leading 
Western countries soon forced Moscow to act swiftly to re-enter the region, and Khaidar 
Aliyev, a former Soviet Politburo member, came to power in Baku in June 1993.69 It 
became clear that despite Ankara's full support for Elchibey, Turkey could not stop a pro- 
Russian coup and accepted the new regime as afait accoMpli. 70 
Regime change, however, not only showed the extent of Moscow's influence in the 
region but %%-as also a significant blow to Turkey's standing and prestige in the eyes of the 
new republics and ended Turkey's hopes of developing into the dominant regional 
power. 71 It could also be argued that this clearly undermined the so-called 'Turkish 
model' for the newly independent Turkic states and Moscow steadily restored its fading 
1992. 
66For the Popular Front, Elchibey's party, and other main political parties' adherence for Turkism see, 
Aryeh Wasserman, 'A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan' in Afuslim Eurasia: Conflicting 
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68Martha Brill Olcott, 'Sovereignty and the "Near Abroad"', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 3, (Summer 1995), pp. 356- 
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power at the expense of Ankara. Indeed, to no one9s surprise, under the new 
administration, it became clear that Turkey would not be the first priority in Azerbaijan's 
external relations. That is to say Baku joined the CIS in October 1993, suspended oil 
agreements concluded previously with Turkey, and granted Moscow 10 percent of the 
rights of exploiting Azerbaijani oil. 72 The Aliyev government also imposed visa 
restrictions on Turkish nationals and laid off around 1,600 Turkish military experts 
employed by the previous regime. Although Aliyev later made some efforts to restore bi- 
lateral relations it became clear that the special Turkish-Azeri relationship entered a new, 
less beneficial phase. 73 
The only consolation for Turkey was that despite being a CIS member, much to 
Moscow's disappointment, Aliyev refused to allow the redeployment of Russian troops in 
Azerbaijani territories. 74 Having been left alone against Armenian advances and Russia's 
continuing influence, he initially hoped that the oil concessions and CIS membership 
would stop Armenian attacks on another CIS member, but this simply did not happen. 75 In 
addition, Russia was not satisfied with a mere 'share' in Azeri oil. This led to a Russian- 
backed coup attempt against Aliyev in 1994 and 1995 as well as in 1998, the success of 
which could have further diminished Turkish influence in Baku. It was also suggested that 
Moscow played the ethnic separatist card supporting various national movements in order 
to topple Aliyev. For example, a Russian-backed faction of the Lezgin minority group 
declared war on Baku in 1996.76 
'Strategic partnershipwith Georgia 
Like Azerbaijan, Georgia also emerged as a natural ally of Turkey in the post-Soviet 
72Yusuf Asian, 'Elcibey, Aliyev ve Azerbaycan Fenomeni', Avrasya Etudleri, no. 1, (Spring 1994), p. 61; 
'Russia is Back in the Azeri Oil Deal' Turkish Probe, 4 November 1993, p. 14. 
73Aydin, op. cit., p. 405. 
747he Caucasus Come Full Circle and Back to Russia's Lap, Turkish Probe, 12 October 1993, p. 16. 
75AsIan, op. cit., p. 62. 
76Ariel Cohen, 'The New Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Eurasia', Eurasian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, (Spring 
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era. Turkey was the first country to recognise the Tbilisi government in December 1991 
and signed an Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1992, which was 
followed by a Friendship, Cooperation and Solidarity agreement in 1994.77 However, as 
discussed earlier, increased bilateral relations coupled with Turkish-Georgian cooperation 
on oil issues quickly caught Russian attention and as Moscow re-established its control via 
the manipulation of ethnic instability Turkey's relations were eroded. 
Georgia is the most ethnically heterogeneous (with three autonomous regions) of the 
Transcaucasus republics, and therefore suffered from ethnic unrest following its 
independence in 1991.78 Thus, Georgia as a vulnerable new state looked to Turkey for 
diplomatic and political support, particularly, following the Russian destabilization of 
ethnic groups. In the same way, Abkhazians, due to cultural and historical ties, turned to 
Ankara for political and diplomatic support. However, given Turkey's isolation in the 
region, Ankara was not in a position to pursue a well-calculated Caucasian policy or take 
any initiative that would have allowed it to play a stabilising role vis-A-vis regional 
developments. indeed, the government came under strong criticism on the grounds that it 
failed to show enough interest in the issue before the conflict turned into a year-long civil 
war (1992-1993) while both sides were ready to accept a Turkish role in a possible 
mediation effort. For example, as Ecevit explained 'Ankara could have been more active 
in bringing the two sides together to settle the issue by a compromise. A high-level 
Abkhaz delegation came to Turkey to ask for help to find a peaceful solution over the 
conflict with Georgia, as happened to the Chechen delegation, they could not talk to any 
official in Ankara. '79 In fact, Vladislav Ardzinba, the leader of Abkhazia, visited Turkey 
1996), p. 11; Nancy D. Smith, 'Central Asia's New "Great Game"', The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 
1996. 
77'Demirel: Turkey Supports Georgian Struggle for Progress', Newspot, 19 January 1994. 
78Cohen, op. cit., p. 7. 
79BuIent Ecevit, 'Bolge-Merkezli Dis Politika', Yeni Turkiýe, vol. 1, no. 3, (March-April 1995), p. 68. 
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several times in 1992 and 1993 for helP and recognition. 
There is little doubt that Abkhazia's unilateral declaration of independence from 
Georgia created a great deal of good will among the 500,000 Abkhazis living in Turkey. 80 
However, the Abkhaz demand for recognition, and, more importantly the war, which cost 
over 35,000 lives and forced 270,000 to flee as refugees, placed Turkey in a real dilemma, 
similar to the one it faced in Chechnya. Many organisations representing Caucasians 
appealed for Caucasians in Turkey to help the Abkhazia's and Abkhaz volunteers from 
Turkey joined the war against Georgia. They also organised mass demonstrations in 
support of Abkhazia and criticised the government's unreceptive stance on the issue. 81 In 
addition, the existence of large numbers of Turkish citizens of Georgian origin, (Georgian 
president Eduard Shevardnadzc estimated it to be as many as two million) further 
complicated the iSSUC. 82 
However, in spite of the pressure exerted by its pro-Abkhaz lobby, Turkey supported 
the territorial integrity and political unity of Georgia and rejected Abkhazia's demand for 
recognition of its independence while it extended humanitarian aid to both Abkhazia and 
Georgia. 83 Additionally, it tried to contribute to the diplomatic efforts to find a solution to 
the ongoing conflict at different multilateral platforms such as the BSEC. 84 Later, Georgia 
asked Turkey to send observers to monitor the cease-fire with the break-away republic of 
Abkhazia. Ankara's political support for Georgia when its survival was at stake further 
bolstered bilateral relations and confirmed the perception of Turkey as a reliable ally. 
80John F. R. Wright 'The Geopolitics of Georgia' in Transcaucasian Borders, John F. R. Wright, Suzanne 
Goldenberg and Richard Schofield (eds. ), (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 146. 
81'Abhazya'da. "Cok Uluslu" Savas', Cumhuriyet, 29 September 1992; 'Turkey's Circassians: Raising a 
Nation out of Ruins', Turkish Probe, 8 December 1992, pp. 9-10; 'Cerkezler Basbakanliga Yurudu', 
Cumhurjýet, 29 September 1992. 
82AWItret, 26 June 1996. 
83'Savas Degil Dostluk IstiyoruzI, Cumhuriývet, 28 July 1992; 'Turkish Aid to Abkhazian Autonomous 
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Through its expanding economic relationship, Turkey soon became Georgia's number- 
one trading partner of and bilateral relations were further consolidated with the 
establishment of BSECP of 1992.95 Trade between the two countries increased ftorn 
US$18 million in 1992 to US$207 million in 1999 of which Turkish exports accounted for 
US$114 million. Total Turkish investments reached US$45 million, while Turkish 
companies gained contracts amounting to nearly US$200 million. Turkey also extended 
Georgia credits of US$42 million until the end of 1999. Apart from economic and political 
ties, military relations also improved, as Georgia sought Turkey's support to 
counterbalance growing Russian influence. 86 In the same way, Turkey viewed Georgia as 
a counterbalance to Russian/Armenian influence. In this context, the two neighbours 
signed a military training agreement which was designed to transfer Turkish training 
expertise to Georgia. 97 Turkey also helped Georgia to establish its national army within 
the context of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative, extended military aid worth US$4 
million in 1999 and provided technical support and training. Turkey also funded the 
reconstruction of a former Soviet military airbase in Georgia to be used jointly by the air 
forces of the two countries, this highlighting what Georgian president Eduard 
Shevardnadze called a 'strategic partnership'. 88 
However, despite growing ties, the Russian factor remained the key obstacle 
preventing Turkey from maintaining better relations and more regional influence. For 
example, fearing Russia's reaction, Tbilisi claimed that the partnership was not against 
any third country and rejected suggestions that Turkey would station a military base on 
Georgian territory. Close Turkish-Georgian cooperation with respect to oil pipeline 
94'Abhazya'ya KEIB Cozumu', Cumhuriyet, II October 1992. 
85Charkviani, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
86Semih D. Idiz, 'Georgia Looks to Turkey, and Turkey Responds', Turkish Probe, IS November 1994, pp. 
4-5. 
VHurriývet, 5 April 1996. 
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projects that would bypass Russia also attracted a strong reaction from Moscow. Only a 
few days before the Turkish prime minister's visit to discuss the pipeline projects in 1995, 
there was an attempt to assassinate the Georgian president. A further assassination attempt 
occurred in 1998 only a few days after Georgia's decision to support the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline. This, %vas later followed by a military uprising. Such developments prompted the 
Georgian president to accuse external powers (Russia), who opposed the pipelines 
traversing Georgia, of masterminding the events. 89 Russia was adamant in preventing any 
efforts, particularly those orchestrated by 'outsiders', to break up its oil transportation 
monopoly which provided Moscow with invaluable leverage. 
Difficult neighbours: the case ofArmenia 
In contrast to the emergence of Azerbaijan and Georgia as natural allies, Armenia 
provided a troublesome neighbour for Turkey. Initially, both countries sought pragmatic 
relations despite the old erunities going back to the years of the First World War. The 
Yerevan government received Ankara's recognition in December 1991 and Turkey, as a 
founding member of the BSECP, also invited Armenia to join in 1992.90 Ankara 
concluded that in order to have free access to Azerbaijan and Central Asia and to reduce 
the Russian presence in Transcaucasia, friendship with Annenia was invaluable. 91 It was 
also needed to reduce the hostile attitude of the strong Armenian lobby in the US and 
Europe, as well as to defuse the terror organisation ASALA. 92 By way of improving 
relations, Ankara decided to sell 100,000 tons of grain in 1992, and started supplying 
electricity to meet 20 per cent of Armenia's energy demand after the Azeri blockade. It 
88Aydin, op. cit., pp. 420-1. 
891bid, p. 42 1; 'Suikastta Rus Golgesi', Milliýet, II February 199 8. 
90Kamuran Gurun, 'Turco-Annenian Relations', Eurasian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, (Spring 1996), pp. 624. 91Suha Bolukbasi, 'Ankara's Baku-Centred Transcaucasia Policy: Has it FailedT, Middle Eastern Journal, 
vol. 51, no. 1, (Winter 1997), p. 80. 92Sahin Alpay, 'Ennenistan ve Israil', Cumhuriýet, 26 February 1992. 
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also accepted the passage of intemational aid through its territory. 93 This support and co- 
operation was perceived negatively by the Turkish public who compared it to the lack of 
help and aid the govemment provided to Azerbaijan. 94 It also caused serious 
disappointment in Baku, and was described by the Azeri defence minister Rahim Gaziyev 
as 'nothing but a betrayal of the people of Azerbaijan'. 95 This in turn led Turkey to cancel 
its abovc agreemcnts with Amcnia. 96 
Moreover, the Armenian persistence in relying on a military solution to the Karabakh 
problem and its refusal to withdraw from Azeri territories resulted in Turkey adopting a 
staunchly pro-Azeri stance which led to deterioration in Turkish-Amenian relations. 97 
While Annenia refused to recognise its borders with Turkey, a decision taken by the 
Armenian Parliament in 1991, which indirectly referred to some of the Turkish border 
to%vns as 'western Armenia', was perceived by Turkey to be Armenia's continuing pursuit 
of its dream of a 'Greater Armenia'98, and though Armenian president Ter Petrossian 
denied that Yerevan had any territorial claims on Turkey99, a map, distributed by the 
Armenian embassy in London, showing a large part of Turkey within the borders of 
'Greater Annenia, further increased Turkey's suspicions. 100 Ultimately, diplomatic 
relations were suspended and the border was closed in 1993, as was the transit road across 
the Turkish border. Turkey rejected the renewal of diplomatic relations with Armenia until 
it withdrew fully from Azeri territories. 101 In the words of the then Turkish foreign 
93'Ankara'dan Erivan'a Bugday', Cumhuriýet, 24 September 1992; 'Armenia: Dependent on Energy, 
Obliged to Peace, Turkish Probe, 15 December 1992, p. 4. 
94'Ankara Karabagda Cozurn Ariyor', Cumhuriyet, 4 March 1992. 
95, Strains in Ties with Azerbaijan' Turkish Probe, 12 January 1993, p. II 
96'Karabag Katliamina Cifte Gosteri', Cumhuriyet, 2 March 1992. 
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minister Deniz Baykal: 'If the Armenians withdraw from all occupied territories and 
cooperate sincerely with the Minsk group for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
dispute, Turkey would regard these developments as a suitable opportunity for the 
initiation of bilateral co-operation and for the development of relations with Armenia-'102 
Armenia's isolation in the region in the face of the Turkish-Azeri block, and the 
steadily developing Turkish-Georgian relationship, drove it to follow a more pro-Russian 
policy, most notably in the military field. Accordingly, Armenia developed into a 
stronghold of Russian interests in the region. Thus, for example, Russia placed 12,000 
troops on Annenian soil to help guard its borders and the two countries signed a Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which was seen by Baku as 'a military 
alliance within the CIS'. Its provisions pennitted Moscow to step up anns transfers to 
Armenia, which could significantly alter the military balance in the area at the expense of 
Azerbaijan. 103 Moscow also managed to secure a 25-year military base agreement with 
Armenia, as well as control of these shared borders. It argued that these arrangements 
were necessary to protect Armenia from any future Turkish intervention. ' 04 Vaan 
Ovanesyan, the head of the defence and national security committee of the Armenian 
parliament, justified the presence of a Russian military base as a counterbalance to the 
close military cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 105 Russian military 
aid, according to Azeri officials, included the supply of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and 
102Foreign Policy Statement of Turkish Foreign Minister DenLz Baykal before the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, 3 November 1995; 'An interview with President Ter Petrossian', Armenian International 
Jklaga-zine, (January-February 1997), pp. 28-3 1; Ergun Balci, 'AGIT Zirvesi'nin Ardindan', Cumhuriyet, 
5 December 1996; Eýan Kurbanov, 'Azerbaijan Security Concerns: Conflict with Armenia Over 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Potentials for Other Internal Discords', Eurasian Studies, no. 4, (Winter 1996- 
97), p. 11. 
103The Economist, 21 September 1996, p. 52; Gennady Chuffin, 'The Caspian Sea Basin: The Security 
Dimensions' in SIPRI Yearbook 1999, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 233. 104Paul B. Henze, 'Turkey and Armenia: Past Problems and Future Prospects', Eurasian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, (Spring 1996), pp. 49-50. 
105Armenia Daily Digest, 20 September 200 1. 
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the increased training of Armenian generals. 106 Moreover, it transpired that Russia sent 32 
SCUD-B missiles and eight launchers to Armenia, which could not only hit Baku but also 
some Turkish border to%NMS. 107 Azerbaijan later accused Russia of sending Armenia US$I 
billion, worth of military hardware from 1994-1996.108 In response to this close Russian- 
Armenian co-operation, Vefa Guluzade, special adviser to the president on foreign policy, 
suggested that NATO should open a military base in Azerbaijan in cooperation with 
Turkey, an appeal rejected by Ankara and attracted strong Russian and Iranian protests-109 
Furthcn-nore, Ankara's initial 'Azerbaijan first' policy and its deteriorating domestic 
economy due to its land-locked location between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Iran, 
contributed to the election of the nationalist hard-liner Robert Kocharian in 1998 (he was 
once Armenia's prime minister and former president of the unrecognised republic of 
Nagomo-Karabak-h) who replaced the moderate Ter Petrossian as the new Armenian 
president. This mms another setback for the OSCE initiative to resolve the Karabakh issue, 
and damaged any prospect of establishing relations with Turkey. 110 Indeed, Kocharian 
legalised the Dashnak Party which had a strong anti-Turkish stance and was outlawed 
during the previous administration. Furthermore, contrary to Petrossian's position and 
policy, the Kocharian government gave priority to the recognition of the Annenian 
'genocide' claims and intensified cooperation with the Armenian diasporas to achieve this 
goal in several countries and in fact succeeded to do so, for example in France which 
caused adverse effects on Turkish-French relations. "I This however further engaged 
106The Daily Telegraph 21 July 1998. 
107Cumhuriyet, 15 May 1997. 
IOS'Azerbaijan Condemns Russian-Armenian Military Ties, Reuters, 20 July 1998;, Nfilliyet, 15 September 
1997. 
109'Azerbaycan'a Turk Askeri', Aksiýon; 30 January-5 February 1999, p. 48; Cumhuriýet, 27 January 1999 
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Claims and Historical Fact, (in-kara: SAM, 1998); Turkkaya Ataov, 'Removing Misconceptions about 
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Turkish foreign policy as the issue was discussed in European parliaments and the US 
Congress. 
Consequently, Turkey could not use the opportunity that emerged with the new era to 
improve relations %vith Armenia, while apart from Russia the Yerevan government has 
attempted to foster closer relations with the countries that Turkey has tense relationships 
with and effectively joined the 'anti-Turkish grouping' in the region. It forged cordial ties 
with Iran and Syria, and most notably Greece. The two countries signed a comprehensive 
defence cooperation agreement to cooperate in the exchange of military intelligence and 
training, which was presented in the Turkish press as an 'evil front against Turkey'. ' 12 As 
already noted, Turkey repeatedly accused Armenia of supporting the PKK by sheltering it 
and providing it , vith weapons. 113 Turkey was also unable to foster stronger economic 
relations %,. ith Armenia, which if successful, might have contributed to a thawing in 
relations. In fact, although there was no direct trade between Turkey and Armenia, other 
regional countries such as Iran and most notably Georgia sold Turkish foods to Armenia 
worth several hundred millions, and according to Armenian-Turkish businessmen, this 
could increase to US$500 if the border was open as highlighting the extent of economic 
opportunities for Turkey in Armenia which in turn could help to create economic 
interdependence between the two neighbours in the future. 114 
9.2. The emergence of the Central Asian Turkic Republics: An end to the identity 
crisis? 
The formal break-up of the Soviet Union also opened up new foreign policy 
opportunities and options for Turkey in Central Asia. Five republics: Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, were now independent after more 
Turkish-Armenian Relations', Perceptions, vol. 2, no. 2, (June-August 1997), pp. 42-8. 
112Hurr4, et, 19 June 1996. 
113See, the statement of General Erol Ozkasnak, Secretary General of the General Staff, Cumhur4W, 9 June 
1997. 
11 4Armenia This Week 22 August 1997 and 2 March 200 1. 
248 
than a century of Russian/Soviet domination. All the republics, except Tajikistan, are 
Turkic in language and culture. 115 As in Caucasia, Turkey's relations with the Central 
Asian republics had been cut off until the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Turkey 
effectively abandoned its interest in the Turkic republics and various Muslim/Turkic 
communities %vithin the Soviet Union with the establishment of modem Turkey in 1923. 
The Kemalist ideology limited Turkey to national goals that were circumscribed by 
territorial arrangements and denied any claim to Turkic irredentism. 116 As such, as one of 
the main features of Kernalism, Turkey strictly distanced itself from a revival of pan- 
Turkist, pan-Turan or pan-Islamic expansionism in other Turkic communities, particularly 
in Soviet Central Asia and Caucasia. 1 17 As the result of this isolationist approach, Ankara 
pursued policy of a non-involvement in the affairs of the ethnic Turkic people. As one 
observer put it, 'as long as the Soviet Union existed, Turkey acted as if the Turkic 
republics to the East did not exist. "18 Even in the initial stages of the post-Soviet em 
Turkey -mas slow to approach the republics until its Western allies suggested that Ankara 
could play a role to promote the Western values by using its special ties. 119 
During his visit to the region in 1992 Turkish premier Demirel proclaimed, probably 
for the first time in the history of modem Turkey, the importance of the Turkish-speaking 
community of states outside the borders of Turkey: 'Turks living in an area extending 
from the Adriatic Sea to the China Sea have awakened and become active'. 120 
Importantly, the emergence of the Turkic world coincided with Turkey's margina isation 
115Turkkaya Ataov, 'The Turkic-Speaking Peoples of the Former USSR', AUSBA Vol. 47, nos. 1-2, 
(January-June 1992), pp. 169-79. 
116Yordanka Bibina, 'Turkey and the New Europe' in The New Europe and the JVorld, Lawrence Ziring 
(ed. ), (Michigan: W. Michigan University Press, 1993), p. 234. 
11 7Ataturkun Soylev ve Demecleri, (Ankara: Turk Devrim Tarihi Enstitusu), p. 43 6. 
11 8Graharn E. Fuller, Central Asia and Transcaucasia after the Cold War. - Conflict Unleashed, Conference 
paper on 'The End of the Cold War: Effects and Prospects for Asia and Africa', (SOAS, University of 
London, 21-22 October 1994). 
119Saban Calis, The Role of1dentity in the Alaking ofModern Turkish Foreign Policy, (PhD Thesis, 
University of Nottingham, 1996), p. 423. 
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in the European economic and political system following its declining importance to 
Western Europe with the removal of the Soviet threat. Thus, having been marginalised in 
Europe, and facing tough challenges from its immediate Middle Eastern. and Aegean 
neighbours, Turkey felt increasingly isolated both culturally and politically, and insecure 
in the international arena. Essentially, the emergence of the Turkic states presented 
Turkey not only with vast economic prospects but also new allies, 121 and enable Turkey to 
look to the future as the leader of the Turkic world. 122 
The psychology of isolation was one of the main motivcs behind Turkey's rush to 
embrace the Turkic republics despite the fact that it had no prior policies or knowledge 
whatsoever about the region and its peoples. Essentially, this very factor became one of 
the major reasons for Turkey's failure to take a dominant role in post-Soviet Central Asia. 
By 1993, the initial euphoria was being replaced by disappointment as Ankara began to 
realise the realities of this new relationship, and began to acknowledge that relations 
solely based on historic and ethnic ties would ultimately fail. 
The dmvn ofa neiv era? 
There is no doubt the emergence of the Turkic world with more than 60 million people 
boosted Turkey's morale, self esteem and optimism and created a certain euphoria about 
the creation of interlinked Turkish world, and led to hopes that the twenty-first century 
would be a 'Turkish century', and an 'era of the Turks. 123 Some analysts described this as 
a historic changing point in the history of the Turkish people. Cengiz Candar, a leading 
journalist and foreign policy analyst who is well known for his neo-Ottomanist views, 
120rhe Middle East, no. 213, (July 1992), p. 5. 
121For example, Turkish was accepted as the seventh official language at the CSCE. 'AGIK'in Ardindan 
Turk Lobisinin Macar Seferi', Nokta, 19 July 1992, pp. 68-70. 
122Ziya Onis, 'Turkey in the Post-Cold War era: In Search of Identity', Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no. 1, 
(Winter 1995), p. 60; Cengiz Candar, 'Degismekte Olan Dunyada Turkiye'nin Bagimsizligini Kazarian 
Yeni Turk Cumhuriyetlerle Iliskileri' in Yeni Dunya Duzeni ve Turkiye, Sabahattin Sen (ed. ), (Istanbul: 
Baglam, 1992), p. 134. 
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argued that 'the existence of a link between Central Asia and Minor Asia (Anatolia) under 
21" century conditions has such a potential that it can change the whole international 
balance of power politiCS. 1124 Similarly, according to president Ozal, one of the most 
ardent political champions of this idea, the disintegration of the Soviet Union presented 
Turkey %%ith the chance to be the leader of the region for the first time in 400 years; 
speaking at a party conference in 1991 titled '21't century will be Turkey's and Turks' 
century', he explained 
We have a Turkic world of 140 million stretching from the Balkans to China and, 
who, more importantly, see Turkey as a role model. If we stay in the right 
direction and make correct decisions then without any doubt the 21't century will 
be a Turkish century. As long as we stick together and work hard towards this 
goal, then whether we become a member of the EC or not does not make much 
difference. We can feel ourselves as strong as Japan. 125 
Correspondingly, this whole new state of affairs created enthusiasm among the Turkic 
republics, and served to increase Turkey's influence in the region as the Central Asian 
leaders initially showed an interest in accepting Turkey as a role model. 126 The end of 
centralised Soviet power provided them with an opportunity to develop stronger inter- 
regional relations and to initiate economic and political relations with the outside world, to 
discard the central planning models and to lessen their dependence onMOSCOW. 127 In this 
context, Turkey, a developed country in economic, cultural, and political terms with a 
relatively successful market economy, a secular, pluralistic-democratic system in an 
to Western China, Graham Fuller (ed. ), (Oxford: Westview, 1993), p. 67. 
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Islamic society, and close ties with the Western world, appeared as an attractive model. In 
thewords of Azeri president Elchibey 'in the past, there was only one independent Turkic 
state we looked upon as a model for Azerbaijan. '128 Moreover, as the Kazakh president 
also claimed, most of the leaders of the republics viewed Islamic fundamentalist Iran as 
the main threat to the region and therefore looked to Turkey as a counterweight. 129 While 
Uzbek leader, Islam Karimov, explained why his nation strongly favoured. Turkey over 
Iran. 
When Uzbekistan, as an independent state, is faced with the dilemma of choosing 
which course of development to follow from; one that accords with our own 
interests, I can definitely say that the Turkish path of development is more 
acceptable for us than the Iranian one, first and foremost because it leads to the 
development of a secular, civilised society. Of course, we must work out our own 
path of development, using Turkey as a model. 130 
Unlike Iran, the leaders of Central Asia also saw Turkey as a bridge to the West and an 
advocate of their economic needs. 131 Furthermore, as a member of Western alliances and 
blocs, Turkey could act as an political intermediary for Central Asia. 132 In 1992, the 
Tashkent government even asked Turkey to represent Uzbekistan in international 
organisations on a temporary basis. Similarly, Turkmenistan did not join the CSCE 
summit in 1992 but asked Turkey to represent it. 
In this framework, the leaders of the Central Asian republics expressed adherence to 
the 'Turkish model' on many occasions. Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan used the metaphor of 
a morning star that shows the way ahead in regard to Turkey's role for the Turkic 
128Yalcin Tokcr, Buyuk Lý, anis, (Istanbul: Toker, 1992), p. 61. 
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republics, 'we want to share Turkey's experience in the economic field and benefit from 
it'. 133 The Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed his intent to follow the 
Turkish example: 'We want to implement a free-market economy. For this our only model 
is Turkey. '134 Saparmurat Niyazov, the Turkmen president, said in his first ever visit to 
Turkey, 'for us, Turkey is not only a gateway to Europe but also a partner with huge 
potential, which will guide the Turkmen economy all the way through. '135 Ankara became 
the first foreign port of call for Central Asian leaders who wanted aid, political support 
and access to the West, which they believed Turkey could provide. 136 In turn, Turkey 
found new opportunities for investment and trade as well as for cultural and political 
influence as the 'unofficial centre" of the Turkic world. 137 
Turkey also received support from the West as it emerged as a role model for the 
newly-independent republics and attempted to fill the political vacuum following the end 
of the Soviet Union. In fact, desperate to prove that it could play a strategic role in the 
region by acting as a block to radical Islam Turkish officials played up the threat of an 
Islamic resurgence. 138 This was received by the then US administration with James Baker, 
the US Secretary of State, declaring that the US did not want these states to come under 
influence of Iranian fundamentalism. 139 Even Russia accepted, for a time, Turkey's 
133'President Akayev of Kyrgzhia in Turkey', Newspot, 2 January 1992. 
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primacy in Central Asia, again, in the hope that it would prevent Iranian fundamentalism 
from gaining a foothold there. 140 All in all, it seemed that Turkey, with a strong backing 
from the West, would play a pivotal role politically in the region. 141 However, the extent 
that Turkey was ready for such an unexpected role was another issue altogether. 
Economic, political, diplomatic and cultural ties 
Ankara became the first country to recognise the new republics as a whole in 
December 1991.142 Initially, Turkey gave priority to strengthening the independence of 
these new republics. In the words of Halil Akinci, a senior diplomat in charge of the 
Central Asian republics, 'in the Euro-Asian continent, for the first time in the last three- 
four hundred years, there is a chance of having a real balance of power. Their 
independence is one of the guarantees of Turkey's security. '143 To serve this purpose, 
Ankara established diplomatic missions immediately after extending formal recognition, 
and initiated the necessary formalities for membership of the new states into various 
European, as well as regional, and international organisations. 144 In doing so, Turkey 
hoped that quick entry of the Turkic republics into the multilateral system would bolster 
their newly-won independence in the face of Russian efforts to dominate them. 145 Turkey 
also hoped that their participation in regional and international organisations would end 
their isolation from the West and facilitate their economic development and political 
stability. 146 Turkey also played a successful role in integrating the republics into the 
1992. 
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Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) in 1993, a body established by Turkey, 
Pakistan and Iran in 1985 with the aim of promoting multi-dimensional regional co- 
opemtion. 147 
Ozal later became the first head of state to pay an official visit to the republics. In turn, 
all the leaders of these republics visited Turkey and within two years Turkey signed more 
than 200 agreements in economic, cultural, educational, communications and transport, 
technical assistance and training fields. 148 During a visit to the five Turkic republics in 
1992 by Demirel, Ankara commenced export and investment credits to the republics 
worth more than US$600 million (including US$50 million to Tajikistan), which later 
increased to over US$800 million. 149 In addition to the creation of a new ministry in 
charge of relations with the new republics, an economic, cultural, educational and 
technical organisation named the Turkish International Co-operation Agency (TICA) 
attached to the foreign ministry was established in 1992 in order to co-ordinate and direct 
the assistance provided by Turkey. 150 Turkey also helped to train bankers, financial 
administrators, engineers and diplomats, from the Turkic republics. 151 It was also 
projected that 10,000 students from the new republics would receive scholarships to study 
in Turkey. As of 1999, the number had reached 7,425.152 By the end of 1994, Turkey's 
spending on humanitarian relief in the Central Asian republics had reached a total of 
US$78 million. 153 Thus, technical and economic assistance was the key policy tool used to 
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ensure a balanced transition to a liberal economy and democratic policies. With this, 
Turkey hoped that it could limit the effects of rapid change in the region, thus reducing the 
security risks of regional conflicts and domestic instability. 154 
With regard to political ties, the first Turkic Summit was held in Ankara in 1992. It was 
attended by the leaders of Turkey, the Turkic republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, 
and resulted in the Ankara declaration that underlined a determination 'to strengthen 
relations and cooperation among themselves based on the principles of independence, 
sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in each others' internal 
affairs and equality'. 155 This was followed by the second summit in 1994, which it was 
hoped would be repeated every year. 
In the cultural sphere, several professional bodies from the republics and Turkey 
established unions, such as the News Agencies Union of the Turkish-Speaking Countries, 
and the Union of Turkish World Writers. Joint newspapers and magazine projects were 
also created. 156 Moreover, with the participation of the culture ministers of the Turkic 
world (including the TRNC, Tatarstan and Bashkortastan of Russian Federation) a cultural 
agreement was signed in 1993 with the objective of developing cultural relations, as well 
as maintaining a common language and alphabet among the Turkish speaking countries 
and communities. 157 Following this Turkey's minister for culture claimed that 'a Turkish 
UNESCO is bom"58 and when the Central Asian countries decided to switch their 
alphabets from Cyrillic, Turkey strongly campaigned for the Latin alphabet suggesting 
that it would make these republics more accessible to Westem ideology and technology 
154CIaire Spencer, Turkey between Europe andAsia, (W. Sussex: Wilton Park Paper, 1993), p. 26. 
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and less prone to the fundamentalism of Iran and the Arabic alphabet. It was also argued 
that this would eventually remove most of the dialectic differences between the Turkic 
languages and forge closer links at cultural, economic, and commercial levels. 159 A new 
dictionary comprising the main Turkic languages was published to promote 
communication among the Turkic-speaking countries and communities in various ex- 
Soviet republics adopted a thirty-four-letter common alphabet. 160 To help this Turkey 
supplied materials, such as school books and printing equipment and offered any 
necessary training, in the hope that it would limit further Russian and Iranian influence. 
Eventually, Nvith the exception of Tajikistan, all the Turkic republics accepted the Latin 
alphabet. 161 Further to this, the Turkic republics even dreamed adopting Turkish as the 
'lingua franca'. 162 
The Turkish govenunent, as well as non-govermnental organisations established 
numerous educational/cultural centres, schools and universities in several Central Asian 
states. 163 As of 1999, there were 104 Turkish schools, II of which were opened by the 
Turkish government (18 private and 6 state schools were closed in Uzbekistan in 1999), 
10 universities and various other educational establishments. 164 In particular, Turkish 
ultra-nationalist and religious groups became active in the region and, especially, a faith- 
based cultural movement under the influence of Fethullah Gulen, a prominent Islamic 
scholar in Turkey, established nearly 100 schools and universities as well as other 
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cultural/educational centres. 165 The same group's Istanbul-based daily paper Zaman began 
circulating, not only in Turkic republics, but also in some of the Russian republics, mainly 
for Turkic nationalities, and became one of the largest circulation papers in these 
republics. Turkey also largely invested in the telecommunications sector. It opened direct 
air links to four of the capitals, which previously had been accessible only via Moscow 
and the Turkish public telecommunications company (PTT) provided public telephone 
exchanges to the five republics free of charge while Turkish state television started to 
broadcast the Eurasian TV, A vrasya, across Central Asia and the Caucasus. 166 
From euphoria to disappointment 
Though the emergence of Turkic republics led to hopes of creating a 'Turkic world', 
Turkish policy makers soon acknowledged that policies solely based on these feelings 
could not overcome real challenges, of which Russia was the foremost. The end of 
Russian control of region had unexpectedly caught the newly-independent republics 
unprepared and confused. Weak regimes presiding over rapid change in which the 
political institutions inherited from socialism were incomplete, the economic structures 
distorted and social and economic expectations out of line with the capacity to satisfy 
peoples of the region, also caused great domestic instability. 167 This resulted in ethnic 
conflict, arise of radical nationalism, growing poverty and disillusionment. 168 The same 
factors also sharply increased the risk of inter-ethnic clashes in Central Asia. Indeed, the 
clashes between Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks in Uzbekistan; the violent feuds between 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs in Kyrgyzstan; and the civil war in Tajikistan resulted in thousands 
165See, M. Hak-an Yavuz, 'Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gulen', 
Afiddle East Journal, vol. 53, no. 4, (Autumn 1999), pp. 596-9; Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, 'Fethullah 
Gulen and His Liberal "Turkish Islam" Movement', AIERIA, vol. 4, no. 4, (December 2000). 
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of casualties and forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes-"' 
This domestic instability made the new republics heavily dependent on Russia in the 
areas of finance, transport, communications, and security. 170 In particular, Russia was 
viewed as the guarantor of security in the region in the face of inter-ethnic conflict and the 
surge of Islamic fundamentalism. 171 Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, apart from 
Azerbaijan, the Central Asian regimes were not fully enthusiastic to assert their 
independence and did not reject Russian influence straightaway. Indeed, though the CIS 
when established in December 1992, only included the Slavic republics of Belarus, 
Ukraine and Russia, the Central Asian republics, led by Kazakhstan, insisted upon their 
inclusion and their membership was accepted later that month. 172 Notably, the earliest 
leaders (except Akaev) of independent republics had previously been Communist party 
leaders. Finally, the existence of huge Russian minorities in various parts of Central Asia 
drove the republics to be more cautious in their relations with Russia173, as Kyrgyz leader 
Akaev explained, 
No matter what new ties we establish in the West and East, no matter how great 
our urge to merge into the eastern or western, or world-wide economic 
community, our ties with Russia and our friendship and cooperation with the 
Russian people will always be special. We will give this priority. 174 
Theory and Practice', Eurasian Studies, no. 3, (Fall 1996), p. 85. 
1691t is estimated that up to 100,000 people died and more than half a million people became refugees in 
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In turn, the Russian nationalists began to argue persuasively that control over the 
members of the CIS was a matter of prestige, a view supported by vice-president 
Alexander Rutskoi who stated, 'the historical consciousness of Russians does not permit 
anyone mechanically to bring the borders of Russia in line with the Russian 
Federation. '175 
Initially, Turkey assumed (especially in the early years of the post-Soviet era) that, 
given its own domestic problems, Russia would not be interested in the region. 
However, both Russian nationalism and suspicion of Ankara's efforts to increase its 
own role in the region resulted in a growing power struggle between Turkey, Russia 
and, to a lesser extent, Iran over influence. 176 Iran was from the very onset concerned 
that any reduction in Soviet influence would be replaced by an increase in Turkish 
influence and, by extension of American influence. Thus, Tehran preferred Moscow's 
dominance. 177 This resulted in cooperation between Russia and Iran (as well as 
Armenia) over the Karabakh issue, the Kurdish issue, on support for opposition to the 
pan-Turkish movements, and Caspian OiJ178 (Iran masterminded the formation of the 
Caspian Sea Co-operation Council in 1992, which appeared to be Iran's response to the 
Turkish-sponsored BSECP). 179 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p. 139. 
175Quoted in William C. Bodie, 'The Threat to America from the Former USSR, Orbis, vol. 37, no. 4, (Fall 
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On numerous occasions, Russia publicly accused Turkey of attempting to revive pan- 
Turkism, and tried to block various agreements signed and summits held between Turkey 
and the Turkic republics. As one senior official from the Russian foreign ministry argued 
'it is unthinkable that a summit based on the principle of nationality will not disturb 
Russia'. 180 Russia also expressed its reservations over the membership of the Central 
Asian states in the ECO. For example, Russia's first deputy prime minister at the time 
Alexander Shokhin argued that the Central Asian countries had to decide whether they 
wanted to be member of the CIS or to join other entities. 18 1 Russia was also concerned that 
the strengthening of Turkey's influence, particularly if coupled with pan-Turkish designs, 
would present a serious danger by stirring the sentiments of more than 15 million Muslims 
inside the Russian Federation most of whom were indigenous Turkic peoples. 182 Again, 
'Turkic World' Friendship, Fraternity and Cooperation congresses, which were organised 
annually and include participants from the Turkic states and communities including the 
Russian Federation, took place in Turkey despite the fact that it was agreed that the 
meeting would be hosted by a different country each year. This underlined the extent that 
Turkic republics were prepared to enhance close relations with Turkey and ignore Russian 
suspicions. 
Thus, despite considerable rhetoric emanating from Ankara in the early stages of the 
post-Soviet era, Turkey was prevented from forging strong political ties with Turkic 
republics due to Russian pressure. As such multilateral co-operation between the Tur ic 
states and Turkey was mainly restricted to the economic, cultural and educational 
and the New States of the Caucasus and Central Asia, (Norwich and London: Wilton Park Paper, 1996), 
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spheres. 184 
In the early years of independence the Turkic republics also expressed reservations 
about tying themselves too closely to Turkey and following Ozal's proposal for an 
immediate economic union of Turkic-language states, they expressed their unwillingness 
to consider such a dramatic step and suggested that Turkish efforts to create a 'Greater 
Turkestan' was not only unwelcome but also potentially destabilising. 185 For example, 
Kazakh leader Nazarbayev argued that 'the restructuring of the region along ethnic and 
religious lines would impede their integration into the rest of the world. ' 186 Similarly, the 
Uzbek leader Kerimov declared his opposition to the establishment of a supranational 
body that would coordinate common policies in the 'Turkic world' and made it clear that 
'the Turkish Summit will not turn into a political and military entity as it is claimed'. 187 In 
fact, in 1996, Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan agreed to form their own customs union. 188 
Furthermore, the newly-independent republics were not keen to gain a new 'big 
brother' (an agabey), Turkey, when they had just removed one (a tarshey brat), Russia, 
nor were they keen to respond to the rhetoric of 'pan-Turkism'. It was true that earlier 
rhetoric about the pan-Turkic world under the 'leadership of Turkey' offended some of the 
Turkic republics. Indeed, the Azeri prime minister stated that 'we do not want another big 
brother. What we want is an equal relationship with Turkey. '189 Thus, they effectively 
184Gareth M. Winrow, 'Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus', 
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rejected the notion of Turkey as their natural leader and role model. 190 
What is more, Turkey's demands for more assistance concerning some of its political 
and strategic issues were often rejected by the Turkic republics, who had different 
priorities. For example, they refrained from recognizing the TRNC, declined to condemn 
the Bosnian Serbs and avoided taking a pro-Azeri stance throughout the Azeri-Armenian 
conflict. Indeed, at the end of the two Turkic summits held in 1992 and 1994 respectively 
there was no strong-worded declaration on the Annenian occupation on Azerbaijan, and 
Kazakhstan opposed the wording of a resolution which referred to Armenia as the 
aggressor while on one occasion, Azerbaijan publicly accused its Turkic brother 
Turkmenistan of supplying natural gas to Armenia. 191 
The Turkish proposal to set up a common military establishment and to train Central 
Asian military forces was limited in scale and size and was therefore of insufficient value 
to underpin wider ties. For I example, Kazakhstan rejected Turkey's invitation to send 
Kazak students to study at Turkish military academies, and only Turkmenistan sent a 
number of officers for military training. 192 This was primarily due to the fact that the 
Central Asian military was heavily dependent on Russian economic support and lacked 
experienced personnel (as so few Central Asians became officers in the Soviet Army)193, 
and in 1993 in the face of civil war in Tajikistan and continuing instability in Afghanistan, 
the Turkic countries (except Turkmenistan) decided to meet their security needs under the 
190Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, 'Turkish-Russian Relations: From Adversity to "Virtual Rapprochment"' in 
'Turkey's New World. Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari 
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CIS 194, and thus entering into Treaty on Collective Security in 1992 in Tashkent. Echoing 
NATO Treaty, the agreement stated that an attack against member would be considered an 
attack against them all. 195 
Moreover, one of the main factors limiting the development of economic relations 
between Turkey and the newly independent republics was that the economies of the 
Central Asian republics were underdeveloped, and the industry in particularly was grossly 
inefficient. Central Asia also had little hope of substantial help from the West, as Russia 
was the main beneficiary of foreign aid. 196 This meant that the weak economies of the 
republics had to manage without the massive subsidies. 197 Moreover, Central Asian 
financial systems were tied to the Russian rouble, while they had no control over the 
monetary policies in MOSCOW. 198 The republics had very high rural populations, high 
degrees of non-industrial employment and a high level of agricultural output. It was one of 
the poorest regions of the former Soviet Union in per capita terms and had much higher 
rates over poverty than average. 199 
In view of this, and given Turkey's lack of financial and commercial resources, huge 
foreign debt, soaring inflation and budget deficits, it was obvious that Turkey was 
nowhere near capable of meeting the immense demands and socio-economic needs of the 
underdeveloped former Soviet republiCS. 200 In fact, having acknowledged this reality, 
194R. Craig Nation, 'The Turkic and Other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans' 
in Turkey Between East and West, Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds. ), (Colorado and Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 107. 
195Nokta, 31 May 1992; Olgan Bekar, 'Turk Curnhuriyetlerinde Guvenlik Yapilamnalari', Strateii, no. 4, 
(1995), pp. 31-8. 
196James Rupert, 'Dateline Tashkent: Post-Soviet Central Asia', Foreign Policy, no. 87, (Summer 1992), p. 
185. 
197Hyman, op. cit., p. 294. 
198Anna Matveeva, 'Democratisation, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia', International 
Affairs, vol. 75, no. 1, (1999), p. 26. 
199Derek Verrall, 'Economic Development and the Search for National Identity in Central Asia', Remaking 
the Middle East, Paul J. White and William S. Logan (eds. ), (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1997), P. 178 
and p. 182. 
200SO much so was Turkey's weakness that, for example, whatever the reason might be, it took one year to 
264 
presi ent Ozal, for example, marketed Turkey as a channel for Western and Far Eastern 
investments to explore, produce and distribute the oil, gas and minerals of the region. 201 
However, Turkey's own economic instability and the resultant financial crisis of 1994, for 
example, put off foreign investment and the republics redirected themselves not only to 
establish economic ties with the region through Moscow but also to seize the emerging 
Russian market opportunities. In the end, Turkey's desire for a 'privileged partnership' 
did not develop, and, increasingly the new republics turned towards industrial powers 
such as the US, the EU, South Korea and their immediate neighbours, most notably 
Iran. 202 The high level visits made by the Central Asian leaders to Tehran immediately 
following the first Turkic summit could be seen as a proof that they certainly looked for 
sources of support and cooperation other than Turkey. 203 
As such, contrary to earlier expectations, trade with the Turkic republics did not 
generate enormous benefits. For example, though Turkish exports to the Turkic republics 
increased from a mere US$185 million in 1992 to a record level of US$910 million in 
1997, this declined to US$835 million in 1998 and US$574 million in 1999 (half of this 
total trade was with Azerbaijan). This amounted to 2.2 percent of Turkey's total exports. 
Similarly despite the four-fold increase in overall trade, from US$273 million in 1992 to 
US$1,031 million in 1999, this amounted to only 1.5 percent of Turkey's total trade. In 
fact, Turkey's trade with Russia increased three times more than it did with the Turkic 
republics over the period. While Turkey's exports to the EU totalled US$7,937 million 
ship 1,000 promised typewriters to Azerbaijan. Mehmet Gonlubol and F. Hakan Bingun, '1990-95 
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and US$14,349 million, respectively (50 and 54 percent of its total exports). 204 
Russia remained the number one trade partner for Central Asian imports and among the 
leading export market. For example, as of 2000, Russian export accounted for nearly 50 
percent of Kazakhstan's, 17 percent of Uzbekistan's, 24 percent of Kyrgyzstan's and 22 
percent of Azerbaijan's imports. Turkey's exports to the Turkic republics fell well behind 
this: it accounted for around 3 percent of imports in Kazakhstan, 4.8 percent in 
Kyrgyzstan, II percent in Azerbaijan and just over 3 percent in Uzbekistan This was also 
well below countries like Germany and South Korea. 205 Nevertheless, as of 1999, around 
2500 Turkish companies were involved in a wide range of investment projects and 
services and made investments worth over US$8.4 billion in the region. The construction 
industry have also reached an amount of US$7 billion. 206 
Thus, Ozal's rhetoric which predicted that Turkey would enter the twenty-first century 
as the strongest country in the region did not materialise. 207 There was no 'Turkish 
commonwealth' or 'common market of the Turks', and relations mainly focused on 
economic, cultural and educational ties. Even here there were setbacks as, for example, 
the Uzbek government recalled almost all of the 2,000 Uzbek students studying in Turkey 
in 1997 and stopped the project all together reportedly after learning that Islamic groups 
had made attempts to recruit them. 208 Relations with Uzbekistan rapidly deteriorated as it 
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competed with Turkey for leadership of the Turkic world. An unsuccessful plot to 
assassinate the president Islam Karimov in early 1999 led to further tensions with Turkey. 
Uzbekistan accused Turkey of harbouring the political opponents of its government when 
Ankara came under fire for moving too slow to extradite one suspect. The Tashkent 
government called back the Uzbek ambassador in Ankara, closed its airspace to Turkish 
flights and the Turkish schools. 
Similarly, Turkish-Turkmen economic relations also suffered in the late 1990s, 
although Turkey made its largest investment in Turkmenistan among the Turkic republics. 
Among other reasons, the Turkmen government claimed that by signing the multi-billion 
gas deal with Russia, the 'Blue Stream', Turkey acted against Turkmenistan which held 
the world's third-largest natural gas reserves and was desperate to market its main hard- 
currency export commodity. Accordingly, Turkish construction firms could not get any 
contracts in Turkmenistan at all, despite the fact that nearly 50 percent of Turkmenistan's 
infrastructure was built by Turkish finns after independence. 209 
Nevertheless, Turkey did managed to achieve some success in both economic and 
cultural relations without irritating other potential actors in the region too much. It can be 
also argued that Turkey could exert greater influence in the region in the long run given 
the fact that necessary foundations have been laid for improved relations in cultural, and 
particularly economic field with increasing trade relations and new energy projects. 
209Aydin, op. cit., p. 430. 
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CONCLUSION 
Following the end of the Cold War there was a consensus in many circles, both inside 
and outside Turkey, that the country would now emerge as an important regional, or 
perhaps even super, power. Some had hoped that Turkey would evolve into a leading 
leader force in the area extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China, 
bringing about what some Turkish policy makers to declare that the twenty-first century 
would be a 'Turkish century'. This aspiration was important for the country at this time as 
it was becoming increasingly clear that its historic ultimate foreign policy goal of joining 
the European Community was increasingly remote. 
However, contrary to these initial high hopes and expectations, this study has shown 
that though Turkey achieved some notable post-Cold War foreign and security policy 
successes, overall it failed to develop into a true regional power. The preceding chapters 
have attempted to show just how, and why, Turkey failed to seize the new regional 
opportunities between 1989 and 1999. 
Following the end of the Cold War Turkish policy makers were forced to adopt a new 
policy understanding or a 'grand strategy' in line with the new emerging political realities, 
and they certainly cannot be faulted for investigating policy options outside the 
traditionally Western-oriented focus. In part this was part of an attempt to overcome its 
politico-cultural isolation as neither a fully eastern nor fully European nation, as well as its 
confused image in international relations. 
The new political and economic realities in the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Middle East 
and particularly in the ex-Soviet territories of the Caucasia and Central Asia with its 
Turkic/Muslim nationalities who shared common historical, cultural and linguistic bonds, 
offered a perfect opportunity to Turkey to define its identity and realise its strategic 
interests at this stage. 
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Although Turkish policy makers were keen to seize the new foreign policy 
opportunities and naYve enough as to attempt to fill the post-Cold War vacuum in the 
region, they soon realised that without sustaining certain economic, political and social 
dynamics internally, polices based on sentiments borne out of the initial euphoria would 
not be as successful as expected. In fact, having realised this Turkish policy makers were 
later to focus on improving bi-lateral. economic and cultural relations rather than on 
playing a leadership role in several areas where they had, in theory at least, considerable 
influence. 
To begin with, it was not realistic for a country, which had traditionally taken a 
backseat in international relations and had consciously avoided direct involvement in its 
near-regions throughout the Cold War years, to walk into such a role. Over much of the 
twentieth century Ankara had generally stayed out of Middle Eastern affairs; kept 
relations with the Balkan countries to a minimum and had frozen its ties with the ex- 
Soviet republics of Caucasia and Central Asia, in particular with the Turkic republics. 
Thus, by the end of the Cold War Turkey, though aware of the opportunities, was less 
than equipped for the responsibilities of the new geo-strategic environment it found itself 
in. In particular, it was taken completely by surprise by the rapid emergence of the new 
republics and nationalities in its immediate area that were themselves very eager to 
establish close relationships with Turkey. Consequently, as the newly independent 
regional states, regimes and nationalities turned to Turkey for political, economic and 
military assistance and guidance Ankara even as it revelled in its new position as the 
&unofficial centre' of the region was unable to live up to this role. 
Plagued by ongoing domestic political and socio-economic problems; a highly 
fragmented political party system which resulted in the period of weak coalition 
governments vrith conflicting foreign policy orientations and priorities at a time that 
clarity and cooperation were vital, Turkey failed to develop coherent policies. 
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Likewise, the rise of political Islam, which brought the pro-Islamist Refah Party to 
power for the first time, not only threatened to undermine the basic foundations of the 
secular regime but also, with its so-called Islamist foreign policy approach, caused havoc 
regarding Turkey's commitment to its traditional pro-Western foreign policy orientation 
and the nature of its involvement and ties with the newly-established Turkic republics, not 
to mention Israel. 
Similarly, the mounting terrorism of the separatist PICK organisation placed a 
significant financial burden on the already troubled economy and no less importantly 
deeply strained Turkish national unity and territorial integrity. It also increased the erunity 
between Turkish and Kurdish-origin citizens. All of which meant that there was little 
domestic agreement over the best way to pursue a new foreign policy. Indeed, often 
during the period under examination domestic preoccupations appeared to relegate foreign 
policy issues to secondary importance. This left Turkey, with some notable exceptions 
such as the increasingly strong US-Turkish and Israeli-Turkish relationship, increasingly 
sidelined in the push for becoming a regional great power. 
Moreover, even leaving these significant domestic obstacles aside, it was also true that 
the initial optimism over the opportunities available to Turkey was overplayed and many 
of the foreign policy objectives put forward early on were unrealistic and not easily 
attaina le. In terms of security, although Turkey was relieved that the end of the Cold War 
had resulted in the decline of the Soviet threat, it now faced a plethora of new regional 
security challenges, from insurgency to full-scale war in the 'devilish triangle' of the 
Middle East, the Balkans and the territories of the former Soviet Union. This shift from 
the relative stability of the Cold War to an unprecedented level of uncertainty made it 
increasingly difficult for Turkey to forge closer relations with these regions. Rather it 
focused more and more on how to contain the new threats rather than exploit the new 
opportunities. 
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Turkey also faced rising competition from its traditional rivals such as with Russia and 
to a lesser extent Iran in Central Asia and Caucasia, and Greece in the Balkans both as a 
way to exert their influence in the rapidly evolving region and as a way of blocking 
Turkish efforts. 
The combination of these internal and external factors significantly limited Turkey's 
success in exploiting the new foreign policy opportunities in the new regional 
environment. That is to say, although Turkey successfully established strong alliances 
with Israel and the US and developed some valuable links with the newly-emerging 
Turkic republics, it also found itself increasingly isolated in Europe and the Arab Middle 
East; while its relations with Greece, Cyprus, Russia and Armenia were also troubled. 
Most notably, despite the hope in the early stages of the post-Cold War era that Turkey 
would develop into a 'role model' and evolve into a leading partner in the establishment 
of an economic, political and cultural 'Turkish commonwealth' or 'common market of the 
Turks', this dream never came about and indeed froze at the level of limited bilateral ties. 
Nevertheless, despite all these disappointments Turkey did manage to lay the 
foundations for an enhanced relationship with the former Soviet republics of Caucasia, 
Central Asia and in the Balkans and it is highly probable that it will benefit from this in 
the longer term, and there is still the possibility that the twenty-first century could see 
Turkey becoming a key player in what has been called the new Eurasian reality, especially 
if it achieves its ultimate goal of membership of the enlarged European Union sometime 
in the next two decades. 
But Turkey needs to learn from its failures and successes over the decade between 
1989 and 1999, that abstract historic, linguistic geographic and cultural ties alone are not 
enough to guarantee influence. Rather, domestic unity, economic stability and the capacity 
to project power and adapt quickly to fast-changing external realities, are the key to future 
success in attaining ambitious foreign policy goals. 
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